Changing Religious Landscape in Contemporary East Asia

Date:
11-13 July 2017

Time:
9:00a.m. - 6:00p.m.

Venue:
Council Chamber, SWT 501, Hong Kong Baptist University

Conference Paper
### Day 1 - 11 Jul 2017 (Tue)

#### 09:15 - 10:30

**Keynote 1, Council Chamber**  
*Francis Jae-ryong SONG, Kyung Hee University*

**Chair:** NG Yau Nang William, Hong Kong Baptist University

- The Cultural Habits of the Heart of Confucianism and Christianity: Focused on ‘Transcendental Horizon’ of Zuo Guangdou’s and Thomas More’s Religious Life

#### 10:45 - 12:15

**Session A1, Council Chamber**  
**Christianity and Modern East Asia**

**Chair:** TAM Yik Fai, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **CHAO Hsing-kuang, Tunghai University**  
The Changing Face of Christianity - Findings from Christian and Congregational Surveys in Taiwan

- **CHONG Chaeyong, Graduate School of Practical Theology**  
The Result of Population Census and the Trend of the Protestants in Korea

- **JANG Hyung Chull, Induk University**  
The Reality and Prospect of Contemporary East Asian Religions--The Religious Cultural Hybridity of Korean Protestantism

#### 10:45 - 12:15

**Session A2, WLB109**  
**Contemporary Chinese Christianity**

**Chair:** QU Li, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **TSAI Yen-zen, National Chengchi University / The Chinese University of Hong Kong**  
The Rise of Contemporary Chinese Christianity: A Discussion of Its Contextual Characteristics in Relation to World Christianity

- **LIU Dawei, East China Normal University**  
"Official Church" and "Private Temple " : A Village Belief Landscape

- **LI Hui, The Chinese University of Hong Kong**  
Benefits and Politics : The Reason of City A and City B’s Christian Triple Markets’ Transformation
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- **Xiao Yunze, East China Normal University**
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Chair: NG Yau Nang William, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **WANG Ling, China Business News**
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#### 09:00-10:15
**Keynote 2, Council Chamber**

**YANG Fenggang, Center on Religion and Chinese Society, Purdue University**

Chair: Francis Jae-ryong SONG, Kyung Hee University

- **Religion in the Global East: Challenges and Opportunities for the Social Scientific Study of Religion**

#### 10:35-12:05
**Session D1, Council Chamber**

**Buddhism and Modern East Asia**

Chair: Keith CHAN, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **Weishan HUANG, The Chinese University of Hong Kong**
  The Restoration of Tradition - Buddhist Temples in Contemporary Urban Gentrified Shanghai

- **ZHANG Ellen Ying, Hong Kong Baptist University**
  Understanding Human Rights in the Context of Buddhism

- **Ng Yau-nang William, Hong Kong Baptist University**
  The Syncretic Nature of Master Shengyan's Ch'an Teaching

#### 10:35-12:05
**Session D2, WLB109**

**Chinese Local Church 2**

Chair: POON Kai Chung Joe, Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong

- **ZHANG Zhipeng, Anhui University of Technology**
  Demand of Faith, Institutional Constraints and the Niches Choice of a China New City Christian Group

- **XIE Ying, Guangzhou University**
  Strategy Choices and Organization Structure of Localized Christian Sect in Mainland: Based on the Research on the “Disciple Society”

- **ZHAO Cuicui, East China Normal University**
  Interests Relationship and Belief Conflict ——A Study of a Seaside Church in a Town, Zhejiang Province
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**Session E1, Council Chamber**
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Chair: Keith CHAN, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **ZHU Jianzhong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong**
  Religious Regulation and Churches Responses: A Case Study on the Anti-demolition Action of Christianity in Wenzhou [443]

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  Between the Sacred and the Secular: the Religious Economic Practice of Daoshi (Taoist Master) in Zhanjiang [501]

- **WANG Qiyong, Peking University**

- **ZHAO Hao, Southeast University**
  “Three Heads Snake”: Multiple Practice of Local Religion: The Faith of the God of Wealth in County Y and the Picture of Rural Public Life [550]

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Chair: TAM Yik Fai, Hong Kong Baptist University

- **CHAN Shun-hing, Hong Kong Baptist University**
  The Role of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement [564]

- **Jesse CICCOTTO, Hong Kong Baptist University**
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Session F2, WLB109  
Daesoon Jinrihoe  
Chair: YOO Kwang Suk, Kyung Hee University, Korea

- **Jason GREENBERGER, Daejin University**  
  Together in Dao and Empowered through Virtue: A Ritschlian Appraisal of Morality and Community in Daesoon-Jinrihoe

- **YU Byeong-mu, LEE Gyungwon, Daejin University**  
  "An Appraisal and Critique of Social Enterprises in Korean New Religions: Focusing on Daesoon-Jinrihoe"

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**Day 3 - 13 Jul 2017 (Thu)**

09:00-10:15  
Keynote 3 Council Chamber  
*Lily KONG, Singapore Management University*  
Chair: YANG Fenggang, Purdue University

- **Entrepreneurial Religion: Changing Epistemology of Religiosity and the Re-Invention of a Buddhist Monastery in Hong Kong**
The Cultural Habits of the Heart of Confucianism and Christianity: Focused on
‘Transcendental Horizon’ of Zuo Guangdou’s and Thomas More’s Religious Life
Francis Jae-ryong Song, Ph.D.

Kyung Hee University

This presentation examines the ‘cultural habits of the heart’ of both Confucian and Christian cultures. For this, it focuses on the difference between the ‘transcendental horizon’ of two religions, which are well reflected in the tragic life and death of Ming Chinese Confucian politician, ‘Zuo Guangdou’ and Henry VIII’s Lord High Chancellor of England, ‘Thomas More’. The religious faith and practice of these two great figures all reveal the highest and heroic allegiance to the objects of ultimate concern and devotion that they have directed. It was their devout faith and moral resolve that allowed them to consistently sustain their virtuous and noble lives even under the harsh life conditions. However, there is a difference in the level of content and directionality that their moral resolves orient towards. This difference reflects the level of ‘transcendental horizons’ on which the normative value system of the two religions is based. In short, the strength and scope of the power of Confucian ‘transcendental horizon’ appears to be relatively weaker than that of Christianity.

In such attitudes reflected in both Zuo’s and More’s integrity and faith, there is a truly great and heroic loyalty that refuses to waver even at such unbearably severe moment. The roots of the strength and endurance of two great cultures, the Confucian and Christian culture, are displayed in the epistles that they left behind.

In terms of Confucian attitudes toward political and familial authority heartbreakingly expressed in Zuo’s words, there seems not to be any point of leverage in the Confucian ‘transcendental horizon’ from which challenge or disobedience to any secular authorities like Kings or parents (father) could be justified. (They are of course advised or criticized positively, but not disobeyed eventually. There is little in the Confucian transcendental horizon to justify going beyond that level)(see, 礼记, The Book of Rites). It leads to an absence of a point of ‘transcendent loyalty’ that could provide legitimation for any sort of creative innovations in, either familial or social or political terms.

However, in terms of the Christian attitudes vividly shown in More’s disobedience, the Christian ‘transcendental horizon’ makes clear God’s fundamental priority over any secular authorities. It is on the basis of authority derived from God that secular authorities like parents and kings should be reverenced. It echoes well More’s word: “The king's good servant, but God's first”. As More did, so did Reformers in 16c. M. Luther, J. Calvin, and other Reformers were able to challenge and disobey the secular authorities like fathers, pope, monarchical kings, when they felt they did not accord with God (divine intent).

The ‘Confucian transcendental horizon’ made absolute its core virtues: ‘filial piety’ and ‘loyalty’, which provided legitimation for the natural and social orders, so did never being able to going ultimately beyond them. However, the ‘Christian transcendental horizon’ presumed clearly that everything secular and natural had only relative value and could be questioned, so being able to going beyond them to the question of the ultimate itself.
In short, in the Christian culture, it was God alone who eventually exercised power, whereas, in Confucian culture, the father, as a symbol of powerful ruler, continued to dominate.

In Christian faith and practice, it is imperative to establish a hierarchy that transcends the hierarchical structure of reality. Therefore, the transcendental horizon beyond the secular horizon works strongly. However, although relative, Confucianism is not as powerful as Christianity in its operation of transcendental horizon in the sense that it tends not to go beyond the earthly secular horizon. Rather, the Confucian transcendental horizon tends to justify the secular horizon which has temporal superiority.

This difference between the two religions had much influences on the characteristics of two cultures. First, strong transcendental orientation of Christianity has become a source of justification for modern ideas and thoughts about notions of individuality, freedom, democracy, etc. The driving forces of the numerous political and religious reformers in the modern West were rooted herein. A group of disobedient peoples emerged, which later led to the birth of citizens and eventually to the birth of civil democratic society. On the other hand, in the Confucian civilization of East Asia, despite the Confucian rhetoric of the possibility of the so-called dynastic revolution(易姓革命) suggested by Mencius, it was practically impossible to practice revolt against the traditional and secular authority or ideological premises.

Again, the narrative of the tragic life and death of the two great intellectuals representing both religious traditions reveals clearly the difference in the level of the transcendental horizon. And this difference has affected and still does the collective disposition that forms the underlying structure of both cultures, and acts as the ‘cultural habits of the heart’ unique to each culture. In this regard, one can predict that, despite of the implications of both religious secularization thesis and Confucian turn thesis, even in the context of the 21st century, East Asian culture and Western culture will likely continue to sustain respectively their cultural disposition that reflects the distinctive ‘habits of the heart’ inherited from the ‘transcendental horizon’ of each historical religion.
The Cultural Habits of the Heart of Confucianism and Christianity - Focused on ‘Transcendental Horizon’ of Zuo Guangdou’s and Thomas More’s Religious Life -

Francis Jae-ryong SONG
(Sociology, Kyung Hee University, Seoul)

I. Culture and Religion
1. Perspective 1:
   - Paul Tillich:
     “Religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form of religion”
     (Theology of Culture, 1959)
   - Clifford Geertz:
     Culture is “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life” (Interpretation of Cultures, 1993[1973]).

   ➢ Significance of Religious Dimension in understanding Culture (Civilization)
   European Culture ➔ Christianity / Middle East Culture ➔ Islam
   Indian Culture ➔ Hinduism(& Buddhism)
   East Asian Culture : Confucianism (Buddhism, Daoism) etc.

2. Perspective 2: What is religion?

   Functionalistic view:

   E. Durkheim: Elementary forms of Religious Life
   Religion is “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things”, i.e., things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them.

   Peter L. Berger: The Sacred Canopy
   Religion is one type of symbolic universe, which provides integration and legitimation at the highest level. This integration and legitimation is necessitated by the limited character of everyday reality itself. In such a manner, religion imposes order(cosmos) on the entire universe, on life itself, and thereby holds chaos at bay.

   Clifford Geertz: Interpretation of Cultures
   Religion is a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.
II. East Asian Culture and Confucianism

China, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam etc.

1) Developed from the teachings of Confucius (孔夫子, Kǒng Fūzǐ, or K'ung-fu-tzu, 551–479 BCE).
2) It was originated as an “ethical-sociopolitical teaching” during the Spring and Autumn Period (春秋戰國時代), but later developed metaphysical and cosmological elements in the Han Dynasty.
3) A Confucian revival began during the Tang dynasty. In the late Tang, Confucianism developed aspects on the model of Buddhism and Taoism and was reformulated as Neo-Confucianism.
4) This reinvigorated form was adopted as the basis of the imperial exams and the core philosophy of the scholar official class in the Song dynasty.

- become widely diffused throughout East Asian countries.
- With its emphasis on Ethics and the government’s moral authority, it provided considerable rationale for aristocracy, and guiding principles for nation building, ideological and institutional basis for government and for ordinary life guidance.

Confucian Socio-cultural Disposition

- The fundamental virtues:
  - ‘Filial piety’ (Hsiao, Xiao): ‘Loyalty’ (Chung, Zhong, 忠) to superiors, state]

“Filial piety: the root of (all) virtue out of which grows (all moral) teaching…”
“The duty of children to their parents is the foundation from which all virtues spring”

[Heisan Ching, 孝經]

Filial piety is the root of virtue and that from which teachings comes (ch. 1)

Filial piety is heaven’s pervading principle, earth’s fundamental meaning, and the people’s duty (ch. 7)

Serving parents when alive with love and affection when dead with grief and sorrow – this completely exhausts the basic duties of living men (ch. 18)

⇒ clan rules; culture of patriarchism.
⇒ clanish familism ⇒ (Quasi-)familism: kinship, regionalism, school connections, company connections, military connections, etc.
⇒ Loyalty to the superior (Lord) ⇒ Loyalty to company in modern societies.

Confucian ethical virtues

- 忠: Loyalty to the state, etc.
- 信: Honesty and trustworthiness
- 智: Knowledge
- X: 質: Knowledge
Christian ethical virtues:

- Creation and Salvation of the World: God’s transcendental position
- Faith of Immortality: the Messiah and the (Vicarious) Atonement.
- Salvation of the world: treat this world as an object for healing ⇒ Christian believer’s mission/calling for this worldly intervention.
- Faith, Hope, Love: Sermon of the Mount (Matthew 5-7 and Romans 12-21) ⇒ teachings of ethical (behavioral) virtues:
  - Agape of a community transcending boundaries of blood relations, regions, and nations ⇒ Spirit of “Christian Cosmopolitanism”

Globalization of Christianity

2.18 billion as of 2010 (32% of world population 6.9 billion) [wikimedia Commons, 2014]

IV. Comparison between Confucianism and Christianity

All religions are ‘transcendental’ in nature, but two great religions are different in terms of the character and level of their transcendences.

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<th>Confucianism</th>
<th>Christianity</th>
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<td><strong>Founder</strong></td>
<td>Jesus Christ and his followers, formed around AD 30, Israel.</td>
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<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Clergy, and lay people as followers.</td>
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<td><strong>Texts and readers</strong></td>
<td>The Bible (Old and New Testament).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core virtues</strong></td>
<td>faith, love, hope, justice</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>God(s) or Universe</strong></td>
<td>The Bible teaches about God’s love for people and about how God reconciled people to him through his Son Jesus.</td>
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<td><strong>Afterlife</strong></td>
<td>Focus on salvation, death, or eternal judgment. It is more of a moral code for life on this world.</td>
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Christianity (Protestantism)

- Rational adaptation to the world
- Purpose of life is to fulfill one's role in society with propriety, honor, and loyalty.
- to build harmonious society

- Loyalty to family and ruler(rking, nation).
- (Treating Heaven(天, 上帝) as nominal Being)
- Nothing could be superior to familialistic value or King’s authority
- Quasi-familism:IMS(Weisen/Weiness) → forming low trust society

- Loyalty to family and nation is inferior to that to God, (Treating God as real Being)
- Any secular authority(even King’s or father’s) should not be superior to God’s authority.
- Breakthrough the (quasi)familistic disposition → forming high-trust society.
V. Zuo Guangdou's and Thomas More's Religious Life

1. Why 'Zuo Guangdou' and 'Thomas More'?
   - Zuo Guangdou and Thomas More were both scholars and politicians in the 16th and early 17th century, both of whom had a thorough knowledge and faith in the core doctrine and thought of Confucianism and Christianity respectively.
   - Having acted from their devout faith and moral resolve, they devoted themselves to the unbearable life to resist injustice. Both were executed by the King who once trusted them wholeheartedly.
   - Their strong-evaluation frameworks reflect the 'transcendental horizons' of their religions.

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<th>Zuo Guangdou (左光斗)</th>
<th>Thomas More</th>
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<td>1575 – 1625</td>
<td>1478 – 1532</td>
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<td>Assisted the three Emperors (神宗, 光宗, 熹宗) in the period of late Ming dynasty</td>
<td>October 1478 – May 1532</td>
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<td>Great Confucian scholar (leader of donglin dang 東林黨), Bureaucratic intellectual politician</td>
<td>Served in the reign of King Henry VIII, 15,6C, England</td>
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<td>Supreme Censor of Imperial court</td>
<td>Christian humanist scholar, theologian, politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian humanist scholar, theologian, politician, Treasurer of England's exchequer; Lord Chancellor; Henry's intellectual courtier; speaker of the House of Commons</td>
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<td>In opposition to Wei Zhongxian- led 'eunuch faction' (閹黨) 's monopolization of Imperial court administration, prosecuting them to be expelled according to his Confucian norms and conscience.</td>
<td>Based on his religious conscience, objection to Henry VIII's application to the Pope for an annulment and the Acts of Supremacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imprisoned by the fabrication by 'eunuch faction' (閹黨) and cruelly tortured to death under the King, Yingzong's ascendent in 1625.</td>
<td>Never withdrew his position and choice with his religious conscience =&gt; imprisoned in the Tower of London for 15 months and beheaded in 1535.</td>
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2. Zuo Guangdou's and Thomas More's Religious 'Transcendental Horizon'

   - **Zuo Guangdou's faith and integrity**
     - Zuo Guangdou's twelve letters: Written in prison with tears of his blood caused by severe torture in 1625, reflecting the Confucian transcendental horizon based on his deep faith in virtues of 'filial piety' and 'loyalty'. Ninth and tenth letters were written to his son, Zuo Kukzou.

   - **The 9th letter**
     - "遍身骨斷,血肉淋漓,性命身家久已置之不問, (…) , 乃以一片忠心與權奸爭是非。釀成重禍百般刑罰受盡也,是甘心。既已拼命而爭何辞,觸鋒而死,身歸君父,幸不死於妻子之手,得死所矣。惟是血心未能報主(皇上),老親(父母)不得一面,又是九泉之恨也".

   - **The 10th letter**
     - "苦極痛極,何緣得生,何苦求生,死矣!死矣! 原以此報皇上,並報二祖(萬曆、泰昌兩帝)列宗於天上,獨如太爺太太(父母)何!" 在其餘血書中還有下列字句 (…) "但男赤心爲國" "我死杖下矣,性命歸朝廷" "人生世上做得些事業,也不枉生一場" "我做清官無家私(產)授汝" "曾受顧命,今妄趨死路" "虛存忠直肝腸,何以見先帝於在天" "癡愚念頭到死不改,還望在朝諸臣共從君父起見,祖制國體,大家留心。自恨三朝(萬歷、泰昌、天啟)豢養,一念獨盟毫無補於今日,大有負於先帝,徒作明時累,臣死且不瞑目也".

   - **The 10th letter**: My misery is extreme. My pain is extreme. Why do I live on? Why do I cling to life? Death! Death! Only thus can I make recompense to the Emperor and the two imperial ancestors in Heaven. (…) But ….
Thomas More’s Prayer at the Tower of London

Give me the grace, Good Lord,
To set the world at naught. To set the mind firmly on You and not to hang upon the words of men’s mouths.

To be content to be solitary. Not to long for worldly pleasures. Little by little utterly to cast off the world and rid my mind of all its business. Not to long to hear of earthly things, but that the hearing of worldly louises may be displeasing to me.

Gladly to be thinking of God, pitifully to call for His help. To lean into the comfort of God. Bawly to labor to love Him.

To know my own vileness and wretchedness. To humble myself under the mighty hand of God. To bewail my sins and, for the purging of them, patiently to suffer adversity.

Gladly to bear my purgatory here. To be joyful in tribulations. To walk the narrow way that leads to life.

To have the last thing in remembrance. To have ever before my eyes my death that is ever at hand. To make death no stranger to me.

In doing this His Majesty has done me such great good with respect to spiritual profit has taken from me nothing but my liberty.

That Christ suffered for me. For His benefits unceasingly to give Him thanks. To buy the time again that I have lost. To abstain from vain conversations. To shun foolish mirth and gladness. To cut off unnecessary

Of worldly substance, friends, liberty, life and all, to set the loss at naught, for the winning of Christ. To think my worst enemies my best friends, for the brethren of Joseph could never have done him so much good with their love and favor as they did him with their malice and hatred.

These minds are more to be desired of every man than all the treasures of all the princes and kings. Christian and heathen, were it gathered and laid together all in one heap.

Amen

VI. Summary and Implications

1. Zuo Guangdou’s and Thomas More’s ‘Transcendental Horizon’

- Confucianism is not as powerful as Christianity in its operation of ‘transcendental horizon’ in the sense that it tends not to go beyond the earthly secular horizon. Rather, it tends to justify the secular horizon which has temporal superiority.

2. Christian culture and its habits of the heart:

The strong transcendental orientation of Christianity has become a source of legitimation for modern thoughts and ideologies about such notions as individuality, freedom, democracy, etc. The driving forces of the numerous political and religious reformers in the modern West were vested herein. A group of disobedient peoples continued to emerge, which later led to the birth of citizens and eventually to the birth of civil democratic society.

An absence of ‘a point of leverage’ in the Confucian ‘transcendental horizon’ from which challenge or disobedience to secular authorities like Kings or parents (father) could be justified. (They are of course advised or criticized positively, but not disobeyed eventually. There is little in the Confucian transcendental horizon to justify going beyond that level)(see, Confucian culture and its habits of the heart: 1. Zuo Guangdou’s and Thomas More’s ‘Transcendental Horizon’

A conclusion:

The narrative of tragic life and death of the two great intellectuals representing both religious traditions reveals clearly the difference in the level of the transcendental horizon. And this difference has so far affected and still does the collective disposition that forms the underlying structure of both cultures, and acts as the ‘cultural habits of the heart’ unique to each culture.

One can predict in this regard that, despite of the implications of theses of both religious secularization and the ‘Confucian turn’, even in the context of the 21st century, East Asian culture and Western culture will likely continue to sustain respectively their cultural disposition that reflects the distinctive ‘habits of the heart’ inherited from the ‘transcendental horizon’ of each historical religion.

- Confucianism is not as powerful as Christianity in its operation of ‘transcendental horizon’ in the sense that it tends not to go beyond the earthly secular horizon. Rather, it tends to justify the secular horizon which has temporal superiority.

Christian culture and its habits of the heart:

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Confucianism is not as powerful as Christianity in its operation of ‘transcendental horizon’ in the sense that it tends not to go beyond the earthly secular horizon. Rather, it tends to justify the secular horizon which has temporal superiority.
The Changing Face of Christianity — Findings from Christian and Congregational Surveys in Taiwan
Hsing-Kuang Chao

Abstract:
Since 1994 the annual Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) has repeatedly conducted a religious survey every five years. The latest religious survey was completed in 2014. These Taiwanese representative religious surveys have provided abundant data for understanding the long term religious change in Taiwan. Due to the low percentage of Taiwanese Christians in the population, it was not possible to obtain enough samples to map the entire picture of Taiwanese Christians and their communities.

In order to understand the interaction between Christians and Taiwanese society, a group of sociologists, supported by the Chunghua 21st Century Think Tank, conducted a Christian survey entitled “2012 Christian Faith and Society Survey” in 2012, as the first Christian representative survey of the Chinese society. The "2016 Congregational Survey” was constructed to understand the Taiwanese Christian communities. The second Christian survey, “2017 Christian Faith and Society Survey,” will be finished at the end of May 2017.

Based on three Christian and Congregational surveys, this presentation will focus on the change of Taiwanese Christians and their communities after World War II, including the change of Christian demographic statistics, the development of different denominations and churches, and social attitude among different churches.
The Result of Population Census and the Trend of the Protestants in Korea

CHONG, Chaeyong

(Graduate School of Practical Theology)

At the end of last year, the result for the religious statistics and demographics of the census was released. The Protestant population, 19.4% in 1995, 18.2% in 2005, and 19.7% in 2015, rose again after a decline in 2005. It was a 1.5% increase in ratio but a 1.2 million increase in numbers. The Catholic population, 6.6% in 1995, 10.8% in 2005, and 7.9% in 2015, decreased a little. The Buddhist population, 23.2% in 1995, 22.8% in 2005, and 15.5% in 2015, is in a continual decline trend, and during the past 10 years, decreased by 3 million. A significant note is that the Protestant population for the first time in national census came out as the dominant religious group with 9.68 million. If Catholic population of 3.89 million were included, then the Christian population would rise over 13 million.

The census result that the Protestant population increased by more than a million and stands as the nation’s top religion is quite amazing. The reason is that the statistics reported by the major denominations, the Presbyterians, Methodists, the Holiness, and the like, all showed a trend of continual decline. If the Protestant population increased despite the decrease in the major denominational churches, it must be that besides the reason of natural population increase, we can attribute to the increase of Christians leaving church and the increase of cults and growth of minor denominational churches.

In regards to this, I conducted a research last year to grasp the trend of the Protestant members, and that study was called ‘The Selection and Satisfaction of Churches by the Lay People’. The study had shown that among the 33% of the responders who showed an intention to leave the church, 22% had said that they would not go to another church but remain churchless, predicting a continual increase in churchless Christian numbers. Also the lowest satisfaction in churches came from the 20s in age group,
the blue-collar in occupation, the low-income in economics, and thus showed the greatest intention of leaving the church. This paper attempts to study the trend of the Korean Protestant population based on this research and discuss its meaning.
The Trend of the Protestant Population in Korea - Based on the 2015 Korean Census -

Chae-Yong Chong
(Graduate School of Practical Theology)

![Change of Religious Identification in Korea, 1995-2015](image)

- The census result showing that the Protestant population increased by more than a million and stands as the nation’s top religion is quite amazing. The reason is, statistics reported by major denominations, the Presbyterians, Methodists, the Holiness, and the like, all showed a trend of continuous decline.

- If the Protestant population increased despite the decrease in major denominational churches, it must be that aside from the natural increase in population, Christians are increasingly leaving churches while cults and minor denominational churches are increasingly growing.

- Many view that a change in performing research from ‘census survey’ to ‘sample survey’ centered online had a tendency to change the final result. Housewives were the representative survey participants in the ‘census survey’, while younger people responded to the online survey, resulting in differing answers from parents who believed in different religions.

Survey for Lay People’s Religious Preference of Churches in Korea

**Research Goals**

- To inquire about the trend of the Protestants before the release of the census results

- Through the results of the research, we were able to obtain insight into not only the preference of the laity for churches but also the religious landscape of the Protestant churches in Korea.
Survey and Sample Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Protestants aged 20 or over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample #</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Method</td>
<td>Random Sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Error</td>
<td>±4.4% at 95% confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey method</td>
<td>Online survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software</td>
<td>SPSS 13.0 for Windows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Period</td>
<td>2016.9.30 ~ 2016.10.5 (6 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Institute</td>
<td>Ji&amp;Com Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Current Church Activity and Evaluation

Current church attendance (N=500, %)

- Attend one church regularly: 73.3%
- Attend one church irregularly: 18.6%
- Attend multiple churches simultaneously: 3.1%
- Do not attend church: 5.0%

The reason for attending the current church (N=460, %)

- Distance from home: 20.1%
- Born into religion/attended from young age: 17.7%
- Senior Pastor’s sermon: 17.4%
- Parent/marriage or family suggestion: 13.5%
- Worship atmosphere: 7.1%
- Fame of the senior pastor: 5.0%
- Social participation and service: 4.5%
- Denomination: 4.2%
- Overall educational atmosphere: 3.0%
- Small group meetings: 2.4%
- Convenient church facility: 2.1%
- Church program: 1.1%

Frequency of Church Attendance (N=460, %)

- Attend weekly: 68.5%
- Twice a month: 22.3%
- Once a month: 3.7%
- Less than once a month: 5.5%
1. Current Church Activity and Evaluation

Frequency of Church Attendance in the Last Week (N=460, %)

- Less than once: 58.4%
- Twice: 16.7%
- Three times: 9.3%
- 4-5 times: 7.8%
- More than 6 times: 7.9%

Average: 1.84

Satisfaction Level of the attending church by segment (N=460, %)

- Worship Atmosphere: 65.2%
- Senior Pastor: 62.2%
- Church facility: 59.2%
- Fellowship among members: 49.7%
- Social service and relief: 49.1%
- Relationship with the local community: 47.8%
- Bible study/Discipleship Training: 47.8%
- Evangelism and Mission: 46.3%
- Small group (District): 44.8%
- Education atmosphere for children: 44.5%
- Overall satisfaction: 58.4%

Overall satisfaction on current attendance (N=460, %)

- Satisfied: 58.4%
- So-So: 33.7%
- Dissatisfied: 7.8%

Research by Korean Pastors Association in 2012: 77.5%
2016 Census: 53.1%

Categorical Satisfaction Level of the Senior Pastor of the Current Attending Church (N=460, %)

- Overall Satisfaction: 68.8%
- Character: 70.5%
- Spiritual Example: 70.7%
- Leadership: 69.6%
- Sermon Content: 65.0%
- Pastoral Care: 71.0%
- Church Administration: 63.5%

Avg 100
1. Current Church Activity and Evaluation

Analysis of the Effect of Categorical Satisfaction (Multiple Regression)

The Result of multiple regression on Senior Pastor Satisfaction

The Result of multiple regression on Church satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Satisfied</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Sp Avg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>(460)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>(179)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-color</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Others</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Economic Level            |            |                |                    |       |                       |                   |       |
| High/middle-high income   | (41)       | 22.1           | 48.7               | 19.9  | 7.3                   | 1.9               | 3.82  |
| Middle                    | (219)      | 15.4           | 50.6               | 27.2  | 5.8                   | 1.1               | 3.73  |
| Low-Mid/Low               | (199)      | 16.1           | 31.5               | 43.8  | 7.4                   | 1.2               | 3.54  |

Low Satisfaction Level of the 20s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Satisfied</th>
<th>So-So</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Sp Avg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>(460)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>(119)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lower Satisfaction of Blue-Color and Low-Income Group

2. Awareness and Attitude towards Changing Churches (Church hopping)

Continued attendance at currently attending church (N=460, %)

Want to continue to attend | Somewhat think about leaving | Thinking about leaving much | Don't know
---|---|---|---
55.0 | 28.0 | 4.8 | 12.2
2. Awareness and Attitude towards Changing Churches (Church hopping)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for leaving the currently attending church (N=151, %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Education/training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem with worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive push for evangelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance too far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues with pastors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues with other members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of fellowship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive push for offering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Altercation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconvenience of Church Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with Educational atmosphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Awareness and Attitude towards Changing Churches (Church hopping)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plans after leaving church (N=151, %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will attend another church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(will remain as a Protestant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But will not attend church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will switch to another religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion and Discussion

- That the satisfaction level of church is relatively low and that one third of members are considering to switch churches is a big issues to contend for the Korean Churches.

- That the Protestant numbers increased despite the low satisfaction level of church is still unexplainable.

Conclusion and Discussion

- That the overall religious population decreased can be attributed to the fact that the current religion or organized religion cannot satisfy the religious desires.

- That the religious population was counted low can be attributed to the fact that the survey considered ‘religiosity’ based solely on the belongingness to a religious organization.

- Although one does not belong to a religious organization, many involve in religious activities or strive for religion, and therefore, there needs to be a more precise instrument to assess religiosity.
This article attempts to re-inscribe Korean Protestantism as an embodied form of Christianity that has achieved cultural hybridity within the Korean socio-cultural context. In regard to contextualization process, this article characterizes the religious cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism into two aspects. One is dynamic interaction with a multi-religious tradition. Some existing evidences as religious cultural hybrids such as Hananim, Chudosik, Buhunghoe, and Kiboksinang are evaluated. The other is economically-biased modernization which affected the contextualization of Protestantism and its remarkable growth. Also, the hybridity empowered the development of Protestantism in modernizing Korea, namely “Korean Protestant enchantment”, as a local phenomenon. The whole process of contextualization took place in Korea and was performed by Koreans, not just by external enforcement. Koreans as socio-cultural agents have actively practised Protestantism within their unique context and did not just accept a world religion, ‘western modern Christianity’.

I. Introduction

This article attempts to discuss the cultural particularity of local Christianity. More specifically, it analyzes the cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism. When western Christianity arrived in Korea, it was packaged with western modernity and cultural imperialism from the 19th century. Calling this ‘western modern Christianity’, I assume that Protestantism in Korea is not simply a copy of it. But it is contextualised in Korea. If this is so, there will be a necessary question about the nature of this contextualization of western modern Christianity, and how it can be processed. In other words, how is western modern Christianity as a globally expanding religion contextualized in Korea? To answer this question, an examination of Korean Protestantism is needed. Thus, this article establishes an account of Korean Protestantism through examining the contextualization process and evaluating its characteristics, namely cultural hybridity.

In this article, I categorize the characteristics of the cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism into two aspects and will analyze them. Firstly, this article attempts to
explore the interaction of Protestantism with other religious traditions. Korean religious tradition has effects on the process of contextualization. Korean religions had an influence upon Korean Protestant features, representing the characteristics of Korean Protestantism such as Hananim(Name of God in Korean), Kiboksinang(a prevalent type of belief), Chudosik (memorial service/ceremony for ancestors), and Buhunghoe(Korean revival meeting). Then, the modernization process which affected the contextualization of Protestantism and its growth will be discussed.

II. Korean Protestant Hybridity 1: Multi-religious Culture and Protestantism

II-1. Religious diversity and Protestant features in Korea

Korean Protestantism not only co-operated with other religions under the issue of reconstructing national identity and independence, but was also contested and affected by other religions in attaining its own characteristics and features. To explore this matter, it is necessary to appreciate the profile of religious traditions in Korea.

Korea is multi-religious society, embracing Shamanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism). The multiplicity of religions can be clearly demonstrated by the fact that, in Seoul, it is not difficult to recognise the many kinds of religious institutions and sacred places such as Myung Dong Catholic Cathedral, Jogaesa (one of the largest Buddhist temples in Korea), Guksadang (the Shaman centre), Jongmyo (the Royal Confucian shrine), and Yoido Full Gospel church (the world’s largest church, whose church members numbered about half a million in the 1980s).

Each religion has its own chronological stage of flourishing and decline within Korean history. Shamanism is a large part of Korea’s folk religious traditions, having existed in Korea long before Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity were introduced. Shamanism is a belief that was influential over the common people through the full length of Korean history. Buddhism was formally introduced by Chinese monks in the 4th century, and flourished in the time of the Koryo dynasty (935-1392). However, during the Chosun Dynasty, Buddhism underwent a period of submergence because of the dominant influence of Confucianism. Nevertheless, it did not decline socially and culturally. Indeed, Buddhism has not only influenced Korean culture, but it also led to the development of Korea’s own Buddhism. In the 4th century, Confucianism was also absorbed, being the foundation of social systems and the ruling ideology of the Chosun Dynasty(1392-1910). Catholicism was accepted by Confucian intellectuals at the initial stage and spread out on the grassroots from the 18th century in Korea. And Protestantism
was arrived when *Chosun* was on national crises because of the intrusion of western power countries and Japanese in the 19th century.

Korean Protestantism has been affected by this multi-religious tradition, particularly Confucianism and Shamanism. During the remarkable growth of Korean Protestantism in the last century, important characteristics and features arose, such as *Hananim* (the name for the Christian God in Korean Protestantism), *Chudosik* (memorial service/ceremony for ancestors), *Kiboksinang* (desire for blessing in this life), and *Buhunghoe* (revival meetings). They are products of interaction between Protestantism as a new religion, and other religious traditions. In other words, they are both global (expanding ‘western modern Christianity’) and local (Korean religious traditions within historical context) products.

Regarding these features as Protestant accommodations, Grayson argues that the process of the rejection of the past and the acceptance of the new religion (Protestantism) results in the new religion accommodating itself to certain key features of Korean cultures. Grayson suggests four factors of the conditions for these Protestant features, which are as follows:

1. the rejection at the end of the last century of the Confucian values of *Chosun* Dynasty by the younger, progressive elements of the social elite which in turn predisposed them to accept novel, non-traditional ideas,
2. the lack of any essential conflict between Christianity and the key values of Korean society, and the highlighting of parallels between Christianity and certain elements of the folk religion,
3. the early achievement of tolerance for the new religion by the elite, and eventual close association of that religion with Korean nationalism during the Japanese colonial era,
4. the lack of any organised religious resistance to the advent of Protestant Christianity (Grayson, 1995a:44).

Grayson even proposes that Confucian dominance had created a situation of “spiritual hunger” (1995a:82).

Although, following Grayson, it is conceivable that the collapse of the *Chosun* Dynasty can imply the fall of ‘Confucianism as ruling ideology’, and that there were no serious counter organisations and movements against Protestantism, I still suggest that ‘Confucianism as socio-cultural values’ remain viable in contemporary Korean society. During the five centuries in which it flourished, Confucianism was deeply embedded within Korean culture and society, and even most Protestant leaders and converts to
Protestantism were formerly Confucians, or had at least been educated in a fervent Confucian background. They did not totally surrender and forget their Confucian socio-cultural values, but rather attempted to dialogue with Confucianism and other religious traditions, rather than being exclusive.

For example, Choi Byung Hun (1858-1927), as a former Confucian, the first Korean Christian apologist and a philosopher of religion, produced a certain volume of work on other religious traditions in Korea (Rhie Deok Joo, 2000:222-63). Orienting his argument to conversion, he understood Christianity as the completion of every religion in the world. Choi Byung Hun suggested;

If Confucius realised the truth of Christ, he would follow it. Buddha would also not practise such a hard mortification for six years in the deep forest, if he already realised the fruit of self-sacrifice and real taking care of others (Quoted in Ryu Dong Sik, 2000:66-67).

Thus, contra Grayson, rejecting Confucianism by accepting Protestantism may falsify the motivation of converts to Protestantism since accepting Protestantism does not automatically mean a definite rejection of ‘Confucianism as socio-cultural values’. This sort of perception can over-simplify Korean conversion to Protestantism, which implies a total loss of Confucian traditional identity, and a sudden accomplishment of a new identity as a Protestant. It seems that Grayson devalues the Confucian tradition. Furthermore, Shamanism, as another major religious tradition, has had its own vivid social function at grassroots level through Korean history (see next section).

I would like to propose that the Korean identity which accepted Protestant faith was divided: on the one hand was the demand for new socio-cultural values, while on the other was the need to exist in a multi-religious tradition and context. It seems that cultural hybridity is the sign of colonial power and local authority. In turn, the hybridity of Korean Protestantism does not only imply the intrusion of western Christianity within the package of western modernity and capitalism, which I call ‘western modern Christianity’; but it is also a presentation of the Korean multi-religious tradition at the level of everyday life. The religious traditions of Confucianism and Shamanism must function in Korean converts’ minds and spirituality as the base of absorbing Protestantism.

Furthermore, the religious traditions of multi-religious culture in Korea surely operated on the process of the contextualization of Protestantism. Locality is ambivalent because of contestation between the local traditions and the external forces. Through this contestation, locality as local cultural hybridity is generated. Thus, locality is neither just a repetition of local tradition nor a copy of the global. From the religious perspective, a local religious tradition can influence the characteristics of another religion in a certain
context. This kind of notion can also allow us to see how Korean religious traditions, including Confucianism and Shamanism, influenced the contextualization of Protestantism in Korea, rather than simply tolerating a foreign religion, as Grayson suggests.

To put it another way, in terms of cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1990:53; 1986:460), Korean Confucian and Shamanistic traditions and their socio-cultural values are practised by ‘structured’ Korean religious cultural habitus, which was newly ‘structured’ by means of accepting the Protestant faith. This is how we can see Korean Protestantism as cultural hybridity which is neither a copy of western modern Christianity, nor just a repetition of other religious traditions in Korea. Furthermore, any understanding of religion in a specific place must include an aspect of believers’ practices in their own context.

To support my argument concerning religious practices transforming Korean religious habitus, here I provide some evidence in this section. For example, naming the Christian God in Korean was involved with considering the Confucian Heavenly Mandate and a transformation of the concepts and meanings of the highest god in folk religious tradition, namely Shamanism. Creating a Korean memorial service/ceremony for ancestors, Chudosik, was motivated by a crucial Confucian ritual, Chesa. Kiboksinang can even be regarded as a reflection of the strong demand for well-being in this world which is common in Shamanism. This Kiboksinang was clearly exposed by the performance in Korean revival meetings, Buhunghoe, which contains many similar features of shaman ritual, Kut. I will examine Hananim, Chudosik, Kiboksinang, and Buhunghoe in the following subsections.

Having regarded Korean Protestantism as local religious cultural hybridity, I understand these Korean Protestant features are specific products of contextualization, witnessing embodiments of Protestantism in Korea. Locality is flexibly structured and determined by the interaction between the external (the global) and internal forces (the local). In this sense, the Korean Protestant features are produced by Korean religious practices through the contestation and interaction between multi-religious traditions and western modern Christianity. Furthermore, Korean Protestantism would not halt its own transformation and re-establishment of Korean religious culture because there is no end of human cultural practices.

II-2. Cultural translation of the name of Christian God: Hananim

Early Korean Catholics used the term ‘Chun Ju’ to refer to the Christian God. This can be called the first translation of the Christian God in Korean. But this translation was not entirely a Korean name because it came from the Chinese translation ‘Tien Chu’ (Lord
of Heaven). There had been debates in Chinese Catholicism about the translation of the ‘Christian God’ into Chinese, as a result of which, the term ‘Tien Chu’ emerged. Later than this Catholic terminology, Chinese Protestants also decided on the term Sang Ti (The Emperor in Heaven). ‘Chun Ju’ was merely the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese character ‘Tien Chu’.

Nonetheless, there was also a Protestant decision in favour of the term, the ‘Christian God’ by the Scottish Presbyterian missionary, John Ross, in Manchuria and his Korean helpers such as Lee Huing Chan, Suh Song Ryun, Lee Ick Sae, Lee Sung Ha, Choi Sung Kyun, Back Hong Jun, Kim Jin Ki (Kim Dae In, 1995:130). Knowing of the former debates in China, he and his helpers translated the Gospel of Mark into Korean in 1882 before the first Protestant official missionaries arrived in Korea in 1885. The choice of the Korean word for the Christian God was “Hananim” (Master of Heaven or The Most Honourable One in Heaven) and this word is still used now in the Korean Protestant church. However, this translation was not immediately settled. The debates surrounding the name of the Korean God in the 1890s were problematic. During the debates, Korean Protestants used the terms Sang Je (The Emperor in Heaven), Chun Ju (The Lord of Heaven), and Hananim. Reflecting the disagreement, some Korean hymn books even had blanks in place of the name of God.

Thus, the translation of the Christian God in Korean is not derived just from one proper word from the folk religious tradition which is most similar to the Christian deity. It needed to be appointed and also popularised. Further, it implies understanding the Christian concept of God and worshipping that God within the Korean context, reflecting Korean Protestant practices and rituals. I call this “cultural translation”, implying translating the missionaries’ religion into the Korean context.

This cultural translation could have only been processed by Koreans. It could not have been the responsibility of the missionaries. In fact, western Protestant missionaries accepted the appropriateness of the word Hananim as a reference to the Christian concept of God. However, they overemphasized Hananim to have a monotheistic character. Hullbert(1906:404) thought that the Korean meaning of Hananim was entirely separated from, and outside of, the circle of the various spirits and demons that infest all nature. And so to him, most Koreans were strictly monotheists in that they accepted the word. He maintained that it is because the attributes and powers ascribed to this Hananim are in so consonant with those of the Christian God, that the Protestant missionaries have almost universally accepted the term for use in teaching Christianity. Clark (1930) traced back this Korean indigenous concept of god, Hananim, to a Korean primitive monotheistic concern which can be related to the Christian concept of God. He
defined Hananim as being at the head of the Korean’s Shamanistic pantheon or rather up above the head of it. He understood that the Korean attitude toward Hananim was strong evidence for the idea that Korean religion was once a primitive monotheism which degenerated. This monotheistic concern about Hananim was already demonstrated by Hullbert, with whom Clark agreed. Thus, he concludes that “the Protestant Christians of Korea seized upon this word Hananim, defining it in such a way which holds all the content of the English word God” (Clark, 1930:195-197).

However, what I would like to point out is that Hananim, in the history of Korean religious diversity, has never been the dominant religious concept of the Korean people. Although Koreans frequently refer to Hananim, this can be conceived as a cultural reaction which is to be understood more in the context of the English reaction “Oh my God”, rather than as part of a structured theological system. If Hananim had been a significant deity, then Hananim would have been worshipped. However, it is not easy to find any certain worship for Hananim. And it seems more likely that Hananim was not developed into a dominant concept within the Korean pluralistic religious culture and context of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shamanism as a main folk religion.

Rather, the concept of Hananim became highly synthesised with other religions in Korea; it does not just appear as a hollow concept in Korean religious tradition. An example of this synthetic activity can be found in the Chosun period when Hananim was identified with the Confucian term Sang Je. Sang Je legitimised the rule of the King, being clearly expressed in the idea of Chunmyung (The Mandate of Heaven) when Lee Sung Gye founded the Chosun Dynasty in 1392. Sang Je is the supreme authority in the Confucian order. Its authority was represented by the Confucian rulers such as Kings through the Chosun period. Thus, even though the concept of Hananim looks like the concept of the deity on the monotheistic basis, it has existed in a synthesised way in the multi-religious context.

It is possible that western missionaries missed this point. It looks as though they only discovered that Hananim was the Supreme Being, and that it did not look like an idolatrous being because Koreans did not ostensibly worship Hananim. This lack of worship was a reason why western Protestant missionaries confirmed Hananim as the best word to refer to the Christian God. Hullbert reported:

The Koreans have never attempted to make any physical representation of Hananim. Hananim has never been worshipped by the use of any idolatrous rites, and the concept of him in the Korean mind is, so far as it goes in no way derogatory to the revealed character of God himself (1906:405 my emphasis).
Also Clark remarked:

*Hananim* seems to dominate their lives, since his name [*Hananim*] is continually on their (Korean) lips, but curious to note, they seem never to really worship him ----- They say that he sends the harvest, yet in the Fall they offer their sacrifices not to him, but to the gods of the hills, or to the house gods, or to the ancestral tablets. He seems *everything* to them, and then again he seems to be *nothing*, judging from the way in which they disregard him when all goes well (1930:196 my emphasis).

Therefore, it seems there is a paradox since the Korean concept of *Hananim* appears to be the most significant concept of deity, but is rarely worshipped.

In contrast with these western missionaries’ observation, it would be arguable that the concept of *Hananim*, synthesised through the history of Korean Shamanistic and Confucian tradition, was transformed into the Christian God. This transformation cannot be identified with a dogmatic decision of translators, as we can see that the decision of Ross and his Korean helpers was not settled immediately. Rather, this transformation took place by the contribution of Koreans as the subjects of cultural translation. This cultural translation can be more plausible through transforming the religious practices of Koreans in the aspects of prayers and rituals in their own life. Because human cultural religious practices are always creative, inspirational, and even capable of being revolutionary, they can construct new religious cultural *habitus* which is not like the former *habitus* of practising Confucianism and Shamanism. By these embodied and specific practices of Korean Protestants, *Hananim* turned into the Christian concepts of God such as lord, creator, mighty warrior, absolute helper, love, justice, the holy, and the liberator, which are to be found in the New Testament and Old Testament. This act of transformation is not in the sense of the transplantation of the meanings and concepts of the Christian God into Korea, but rather is more in the sense of grafting the meanings and concepts of the Christian God onto the Korean *Hananim* by transforming Korean religious cultural practices. In this sense, *Hananim* as the Korean Protestant name of the Christian God can be regarded as evidence for proving how Korean religious traditions have affected Protestantism.

**II-3. Protestantism conserves Confucian values: Chudosik**

*Chudosik* is a unique Korean contribution to Christianity, which is inspired by a Confucian ritual, the *Chesa* rite (Confucian rite for ancestors). In Confucianism, *Hyo* (filial piety) is one of the crucial doctrines, and is given common expression through the
practice of *Chesa*. The *Chesa* rite was seen as a sign of the acceptance of the entire Confucian system of values. However, from a Christian perspective this can be seen to be participation in idolatrous rituals, like worship of spiritual beings or dead people. This contradiction was the motivation for creating a new kind of liturgy in the Protestant church. *Chesa* consists of such rituals as Korean full bowing, displaying food on the dinner table, putting a spoon in the bowl filled with boiled rice, *Jibang* (writing the ancestor’s status and name in Chinese characters on paper) and chanting to call up an ancestor’s soul. *Chesa* is forbidden in most Korean Protestant denominations (except the Anglican church), as well as in the Roman Catholic church which had severe persecution over this matter, and which now regards the ritual merely as a cultural custom. *Chudosik*, however, is held in the family home on the same day as *Chesa*, but the activities in *Chudosik* do not contain some of the main ingredients of the *Chesa* rite. All the process of *Chudosik* is different from *Chesa*. Thus, *Chudosik* is a new production of Christian service in Korean Protestantism, which nevertheless conserves Confucian values.

In *Chudosik*, we can see how Confucian *Chesa* as a vital traditional value is transformed by the practices of Korean Protestants. Like *Hananim* as the name of the Christian God, *Chudosik* also recreates the structured cultural *habitus* of Confucianism by means of transforming cultural practices. Thus, in *Chudosik*, we can see how Korean Protestantism appears as a cultural hybrid in its ambivalence towards Confucian tradition and Protestantism. Because *Chudosik* as a ritual is considered and occurs in everyday life, I conducted an ethnographic fieldwork in order to examine it (Jang, 2007)

### II-4. Shamanistic reflection of the Korean demand for well-being

* : *Kiboksinang* and *Buhunghoe*

In Korea, many Protestants have emphasized not only heaven after death but also blessings in this life. This type of belief concerns very individual and specific material needs such as housing, money, food, a good job, good luck, supernatural healing and so on. In short, it is a belief that God will support everything required for a better life, namely being blessed in this life. The blessing is to live successfully in this world. All items of blessing are connected to family issues as well as being focused on material well-being. For example, Cho Yong Ki (1997) of the *Yoido* Full Gospel Church preaches Korean prosperity Gospel and teaches three-fold blessings, which consist of salvation for spirits, health for the body, and prosperity for general life, based on ‘Beloved, I wish above all things that thou mayest prosper and be in health, even as thy soul prospereth’ (3 John 2 KJV). Cho understands that the fundamental desire of God toward those who worship God is spiritual blessing, circumstantial success in this world, the health of mind
and body; in other words, well-being in all aspects of human life. This prevalent type of belief is called *Kiboksinang*.

I would like to discuss this *Kiboksinang* from two points of view. One is that it is affected by Korean Shamanistic milieu and tradition. Most of the thinkers who examine *Kiboksinang* reach the conclusion that it originated from Shamanistic belief. The notion of material blessings is very similar to that of the Shamanistic concept of blessing, in terms of the areas in which blessings are sought. The main areas of blessing which Koreans seek are health, material prosperity, meeting a good spouse, having good jobs, business property, and a peaceful life in this world. Grayson (1989:205) understands *Kiboksinang* as desire for blessings in this life as a reflection of the Shamanistic tradition. Martin (1990:140) also underlines the combination of Christianity with the aura of the most archaic layer of Korean Shamanism.

This effect of Shamanism on Protestantism in Korea is clearer in certain aspects of religious practice and behaviour. Jang Byung Ill articulates the phenomenon of it as follows;

> Like the performing Shaman’s *Kut*, Christians do: inviting a revivalist, experiencing possession, leaping, clapping, and dancing in the way of following the heart’s feeling all night. Then, they feel much consoled. They believe God answered them and all their life problems are solved (Jang Byung Ill, 1961:58).

Ryu Dong Sik also argues;

> Christians call Jesus, and proceed with rituals and church events. However, in fact, it is difficult to discern this from Shamanism. Just like performing *Kut* for their own life in Shamanism, Christians want to capture their own wishes in their real life such as long life without illness and the success of their own business by the force and power of Jesus. To satisfy their wishes, they are coming to church. They do not pay attention to Kingdom of God in coming. If this is true, this is not Christianity but Shamanism (Ryu Dong Sik, 1970:27).

This claim that Shamanistic belief and behaviour still endure in Protestantism, can be vividly exposed in the performance of Korean revival meetings, called *Buhunghoe*, which were modelled on the western, particularly American, revival meeting. *Buhunghoe* focused upon not only moral and spiritual regeneration or conversion, but also on physical healing and material blessing. Even during *Buhunghoe*, the participants are
often asked for a great amount of money, and are willing to donate the money for a more blessed future life and for the resolution of problems in their life. All these features of *Buhunghoe* are similar to *Chesu Kut* (the ritual for good fortune) in Shamanism. Also, in order to maintain a lively service, some church services contain active motions like clapping, praying like screaming, crying out, leaping, dancing by following heart feeling, and pastors walking around the people, unlike the ordinary western style service.

Grayson (1995b:53) argues that although faith healing has a long tradition in Christianity and is a common practice of many American ‘televangelists’, the particular form of faith healing taking place in Korea is a direct result of the influence of the Shamanistic traditions within Korean folk religion. For example, when practising *Ahnsu* prayer (*anchal* is another name for it), a certain power is believed to be transferred from the one who prays to the one prayed about, by which power the fire of faith can be ignited or disease be cured. At the same time, *Anhsu* prayer definitely brings ecstasy to both, which is a common Shamanistic phenomenon. However, *Buhunghoe* does not overcome the matter of materialistic demands (fetishism), namely a flourishing of the prosperity Gospel.

The other point of discussing *Kiboksinang* is that it implies the Koreans’ strong desire for well-being and a secure life because Korea has undergone a sequence of disastrous and destructive historical events such as the end of the *Chosun* Dynasty by the Japanese (1910), the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and subsequent dictatorships after the military coups in 1961 and 1980. In contrast with the western prosperity Gospel, *Kiboksinang* may have resulted from this historical background, since it began to be widely seen after the Korean War. Researching the increasing *Kiboksinang* in Korean Protestantism in relation to the impact of the Korean War, Kim Heoung Soo (1999) argues that Protestant churches emphasized messages of comfort and material blessings to meet church members’ struggle for survival in post-war Korea. The poor living conditions of the post-war days increased the Korean people’s worldly desire for material wealth, health, and the resolution of personal problems. There has been such a Korean religious temperament to pursue this desire for well-being which can be vividly seen in the tradition of Shamanism. This temperament might be the foundation for this contextualization of Protestantism in Korea.

Furthermore, *Kiboksinang* as a reflection of the Korean religious temperament was more strongly active in consequence of the haphazard modernization (see more in the next section), particularly biased to rapid economic development after the Korean War. *Kiboksinang* helps believers to live in safety in a society going through poverty and anxiety in post-war days. One of the consequences of the War was that it made Koreans
base their behaviour and thinking on a survival motif. *Kiboksinang*, supporting this survival motif and the people’s hard work, has been emphasized in the church. Presumably, social disorder, stirred by speedy industrialisation, and the desire for material success, were factors contributing to the accelerated spread of *Kiboksinang* and the remarkable development of Protestantism, particularly from the 1960s to 1980s when Korea was experiencing rapid economic development. Consequently, *Kiboksinang* was highly instrumental in Protestant development in those three decades. This function of *Kiboksinang* within the Protestant church may have led to the numerical, quantitative growth, such as the number of churches and believers. The percentage of Protestants within the population sharply increased from about 3% in the early 1960s up to 16% in the late 1980s. During these three decades, Protestant churches functioned as a sort of religious institution for psychological consolation and the conviction of a better life in this world.

Regarding these two discussing points, I would like to propose *Kiboksinang* is as another feature witnessing characteristics of religious cultural hybridity in Korean Protestantism. *Kiboksinang* shows how Korean religious practices of Shamanism within its particular Korean history impacted upon Protestantism. However, it differs from the case of *Hananim* and *Chudosik*. We can see how Korean Protestants’ practices transformed Shamanistic and Confucian *habitus* in the case of *Hananim* and *Chudosik* whilst *Kiboksinang* impacted upon the formation of a new *habitus* among Korean Protestant practices.

**III. Korean Protestant Hybridity 2: Modernization and Protestantism**

Besides the multi-religious culture, there is another important factor in examining the contextualization of Protestantism. It is the process of modernization. Chronologically, when Korea was on the modernization process, Protestantism was also contextualised by the concern for the reconstruction of national identity and the significance of multi-religious traditions.

First of all, Korean modernization as the process of economic, political and social transformation did not really proceed in the same manner as western modernization. In contrast to the modernization in the west, which was informed by Enlightenment rationality, Korean modernization began in the period of crisis of the *Chosun* Dynasty with the purpose of regenerating the nation, such as the *Kabo* Reformation (1984-96) by the government and some other national movements led by Korean nationalists. After the end of the Dynasty, it took place in the time of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945). This historical difference lead an assumption that the Korean modernization process had
two contradictory forms until national independence (1945). Those are the impact of Japanese modernity and the Korean national struggle.

As far as the impact of Japanese modernity is concerned, what we need to recall is that the Japanese were successful in constructing their own modernity, which needs to be conceived as a modernity of the east. Morley and Robins (1995:159) argue that although modernity was initially produced in western social contexts, Japan can be regarded as evidence of an eastern modernity which can refute the assumption that modernity can only be articulated through the forms that the west has constructed. This Japanese modernity was certainly influential in the process of modernization in Korea. For example, Japan’s extensive use of modern means of cultural production, such as education and media for domination, further complicates the effort to understand colonial modernity and hegemony. In fact, education, media, and their support for a modern popular culture interacted to create, transform, and maintain colonial hegemony in Korea (Shin and Robinson, 1999:10).

Meanwhile, Korean nationalism was also an important part of Korean modernization. Korean nationalism against Japanese colonialism was engaged with Protestants who were looking forward to reconstructing nationality. Their national movements, such as the March First Movement were the first experience of modern concepts, such as the western notions of liberal democracy, freedom, and equality.

Furthermore, the above two contradictory ways were not separate, but were rather entwined with each other. Shin and Robinson(1999:7) argue that a major feature of the complicated Korean modernization process is for it to have emerged from colonialism and national liberation struggles against coercive Japanese political repression accompanied by economic exploitation.

However, while Koreans were politically oppressed and economically poor during the period of Japanese annexation (1910-1945), the experience of extreme poverty and a harsh life reached its zenith after the Korean War (1950-1953). It is apparent that the experience resulted in a strong motivation for successful economic development. Thus, Koreans had to work hard in order to satisfy their basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. Consequently, modernization turned into the central national issue of ‘economic growth’. In the 1960s, the 1970s and later, Koreans made rapid economic progress in the field of manufacturing work, especially chemical and heavy industry.

However, this modernization, overemphasizing economic growth, led to social problems. According to Kim Byung Suh (1985:67), economic growth was achieved under the tight government control of military dictatorships such as Park Jung Hui, Jun Du Hwan, and No Tae Woo. Moreover, industrialisation and urbanisation created urban congestion,
particularly among the poor who left the rural areas for jobs in the cities. The following population distribution between rural and urban areas from 1955 to 1980 shows the movement of people to the urban centres, especially Seoul (Frederian, 1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Pusan</th>
<th>other cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>21,502,000</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31,435,000</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>34,706,620</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>37,448,836</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pusan is another Korean mega-city

This mass migration led to the creation of large slums where rural migrants often lived in abject poverty as they cannot find jobs easily. Once they find jobs, mostly in the manual labour sector, their aspirations in life are extremely high. These people, toiling in factories, made possible South Korea’s economic growth despite their low wages and the denial of their human rights and dignity. Lee Man Gap (1982: 84) argues that conflicts and destruction, rather than unity and construction, would become stronger because of social corruption, population pressure, economic difficulty intensified by inflation, and a widening economic gap among the new upper class, middle class and the poor in suburbs and the countryside. Lie (1998) also argues that it is misleading to stress only the positive aspects of South Korean development. In 1986, South Korean manufacturing employees worked the longest hours in the world, their wages were lower than those of their counterparts in Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong and Singapore, and their industrial accident rate was one of the highest in the world (Lie, 1998:viii). Workers in urban cities encountered bleak housing conditions, farmers faced rising debt, and the environment was becoming devastated. Indeed, from the 1960s to 1980s, the military dictatorships egregiously abused human rights and their government caused social, cultural, political and environmental problems. These are also crucial and constitutive parts in the drama of the South Korean economic miracle, revealing the dark side of it.

Understanding the Korean modernization process from the perspective of colonisation, Korean nationalism, and economic growth as the prime interests, I suppose that the cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism was affected by this process of modernization. Initially, we can see that the period of rapid economic growth from the 1960’s to the 1980’s overlaps with the period of rapid Protestant growth. In regard to this period, it is worth noting that Protestant churches can be divided into two types by their social character. One type is a minority of liberal churches in the urban slum areas paying attention to, and speaking out on, social issues such as human rights for the poor and
the oppressed. These are the minjung (the poor or the oppressed) churches, which is engaged with minjung theology (a political theology in Korea).

The other is the mainstream Protestant conservative churches, particularly mega-churches in cities, which is vulnerable to critiques on how they are taking social responsibility. Their motto was growth, and they promoted the idea that the bigger church is the better. Indeed, the desire for a great size church has been one of the main tasks of most Protestants. For example, many Protestant churches in urban areas were actively involved in fund-raising to extend their church buildings and to own property such as prayer halls in the countryside. Their prime interest is gathering more and more people into the church. One of the effective strategies of attracting people is to overemphasize ‘God’s material blessings in the present life’, namely Kiboksinang, as discussed in the above. By successfully attracting people and encouraging a great amount of donation to church, they became mega-churches. Indeed, Korea now has many mega churches in terms of church members such as the world biggest Methodist, Presbyterian, and Pentecostal church.

Furthermore, it is possible to claim that this quantitative growth as one of the characteristics of cultural hybridity in Korean Protestantism was an apparent mark of the penetration of capitalism as the modern economic system. Rapid Korean Protestant growth could be a consequence of absorbing business marketing systems implying entrepreneur behaviour as the meaning of capitalistic activities in Korean Protestantism. Cox (1995) also emphasizes that Korean Protestantism, Pentecostalism in particular, has accepted grassroots organisation from a business ethos as well as representing Shamanistic spirituality in the form of Kiboksinang. Indeed, rapid Protestant growth has a relationship with the economic growth. However, it sounds as if this growth of Korean Protestantism is in contrast with Weber’s thesis of the relationship, namely ‘elective affinity’, between Protestantism and capitalism. I assume this makes the hybridity of Korean Protestantism more distinctive and contextual because it does not have any similarity in other cases, particularly in western Christianity.

I would like to further evaluate this cultural hybridity in Korean Protestantism in relation to capitalism. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber (1971[1905]) argued that capitalism, including rational thought, antipathy to magic, an ascetic calling and individualism, was encouraged by the development of a Protestant ethic promoted most forcefully by the doctrines of Calvinism, namely pre-destination. Weber thought that this worldly asceticism of Calvinism instilled the seriousness of life with some degree of rationality. As a result, Weber suggests that the causal motivation of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ can be founded in the transformation of religious ideas brought about by the
Reformation, particularly the impact of Calvinist doctrine. Hughes, Martin and Sharrock (1995:98) argue that, in Weber, the only real difference between the ‘spirit of capitalism’ and the ‘Protestant ethic’ was that the latter spoke in the name of God whilst the former speaks in entirely secular terms. It was Weber’s thesis that ‘the spirit of capitalism’ is the secularised successor of the ‘Protestant ethic’, and that the latter was a cause of the former.

However, because of the difference between ‘ascetic’ in Weber and ‘demanding prosperity’ in Korean Protestantism, Weber’s approach may be not appropriate to evaluate the sociologically-distinctive and drastic patterns of change that have occurred in Korea, such as from pre-modern to modern through the experience of the end of Korea’s last dynasty, Chosun, (1910), Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953) and subsequent dictatorships after military coups in 1961 and 1980, which have all occurred only in the 20th century. Webster (1991:56) also argues that the principal terms of Weber’s theory do not give any indication of the importance of the great variety of societies that have exceedingly different socio-economic and political systems such as feudalism, bureaucracy, colonialism, imperialism and capitalism of individual countries, especially in the Third World. In other words, a much more careful analysis is required in order to have any understanding of the relationships between religion and modernization as social change. Thus, Weber’s understanding of the Protestant ethic as the spirit of capitalism might not be applicable to Korean society. Rather, it might be reasonable to say that economic growth helped the growth of Protestantism in Korea. Martin comments that “whereas the Protestant Ethic was once supposed to assist business, in these (Korean and South Africa) cases the business ethos helps reconstruct the churches with efficient organisation and undeniable consumer gratification” (Martin, 1999:160).

IV. The Power of Hybridity: Korean Protestant Enchantment

In the previous sections, I have examined the cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism as a consequence of processing contextualization. Through the examination, it can be said that Protestantism in Korea is neither an immediate appearance, nor simply blended with other religious traditions, or even the product of the new economic system, capitalism. Rather, Protestantism was contextualised by Korean people as local subjects and agents in the period of modernization and economic growth. Through this contextualization, Korean Protestantism become a form of Christianity as something transformed and embodied, which is structurally made from (into) the Korean context and other religious traditions. I call this characteristic ‘cultural hybridity. And here I
propose that this hybridity empowers Korean Protestantism and accelerates its development. However, the term 'development' which I am using here, does not merely include quantitative growth such as the number of believers in the total population\(^1\), but also signifies the transformation of Protestantism in the Korean context and the further re-establishment of a Korean religious culture.

I divide Protestant development into three periods depending upon different phases of hybridity in Korean Protestantism; the late 19\(^{th}\) century to the 1950s, the 1960s to the 1980s, and the 1990s to the 2000’s. In this diachronic division of Protestant development, it can be seen which character of cultural hybridity in Korean Protestantism mainly emerged in each period (Jang, 2006).

VI. Conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to re-inscribe Korean Protestantism as an embodied form of Christianity that has achieved cultural hybridity within the Korean socio-cultural context. Calling this process “contextualization”, I characterize the religious cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism in two aspects: dynamic interaction with a multi-religious tradition and economically-biased modernization. In relation to these characteristics, I dealt with some existing evidences as religious cultural hybrids such as the translation of crucial Christian term like *Hananim*, rituals (Chudosik and Buhunghoe), and prevalent type of belief (*Kiboksinsang*) as consequences of contextualization. Then, the modernization process which greatly affected the contextualization of Protestantism and its remarkable growth was discussed. Furthermore, I suggested that this hybridity empowered the development of Protestantism in modernizing Korea, namely “Korean Protestant enchantment”, as a local phenomenon.

Also, what is important to note here is that this whole process of contextualization took place in Korea and was performed by Koreans, not just by external enforcement. Even if Protestantism was accompanied by western modernity and capitalism, Koreans as socio-cultural agents have actively practised Protestantism within their unique context and did not just accept a world religion, ‘western modern Christianity’. Presumably, the contextualization of Protestantism in Korea can be conceived as a form of cultural hybridization in its religious aspect. In contrast to the long western Christian history and

\(^{1}\) Statistically, by 1910, the first generation of Korean Protestants represented 1\% of the Korean population. The percentage representation within the general population during the Japanese colonial period increased to 3\% and remained at that level until the early 1960s when it increased to 6\%. This figure rose throughout the three decades (the 1960s - 1980s) of Korean economic growth. The Protestant percentage representation within the population levelled up about 20\% in the late 1980s (Grayson 1989:194-207). From the 1990s to 2000’s, the percentages fluctuated between 14\% and 19\% (Korean Statistical Information Service, kosis.kr/).
extensive Christian tradition, the history of cultural hybridity of Korean Protestantism is just over a century. Surely, there are many expectations for Christianity in the future.

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The Rise of Contemporary Chinese Christianity:
A Discussion of Its Contextual Characteristics in Relation to World Christianity

Yen-zen Tsai
Professor of Religion
Graduate Institute of Religious Studies
National Chengchi University

Abstract

The rapid growth of contemporary Chinese Christianity since the launch of China’s Reform-and-Open era has caught world-wide attention. How to delineate, analyze, and appraise this newly-risen religion, however, has posed a great challenge to interested scholars due to its enormous size, inaccessibility to many primary data, local variations, and, most saliently, the government’s restrictive religious policy and close surveillance of religious activities. With these obstacles in view, this paper proposes to depict contemporary Chinese Christianity by highlighting its contextual characteristics. It will do so by focusing upon the rural church, migrant workers’ church, businessmen’s church, and intellectuals’ church as four prominent forms of Christianity in present-day China. The paper then proceeds to discuss the concept of world Christianity to which Chinese Christianity is intimately related and of which the latter is an inalienable part. In particular, it considers Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity that has swiftly spread across the globe and argues that it is heuristic to understand contemporary Chinese Christianity in light of this form of world Christianity. To further the study of Chinese Christianity, the paper affirms the usefulness of the insight of phenomenology of religion that emphasizes multidimensional coverage of and polymethodic approach to religion. It also proposes that anthropology of Christianity, an approach that has been recently adopted by cultural anthropologists and scholars of religious studies, deserves our careful attention. The paper will end with a call for scholars of diverse disciplines to participate in the study of contemporary Chinese Christianity, the attraction and importance of which are too immense to ignore.
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National Chengchi University

Introduction

The rapid growth of contemporary Chinese Christianity since the launch of China’s Reform-and-Open policy in 1978 has caught worldwide attention. How to delineate, analyze, and appraise this newly-risen religion, however, has posed a great challenge to interested scholars due to its enormous size, inaccessibility to many primary data, local variations, and, most saliently, the government’s restrictive religious policy and close surveillance of religious activities. With these obstacles in view, this paper proposes to depict contemporary Chinese Christianity by highlighting its contextual characteristics. It will do so by focusing upon the rural church, migrant workers’ church, businessmen’s church, and intellectuals’ church as four distinguishable forms of Christianity in present-day China.

After presenting these four types of church, the paper will proceed to discuss the concept of world Christianity to which, I contend, Chinese Christianity is intimately related and of which the latter is an inalienable part. In particular, it will consider Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity that has swiftly spread across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and many countries of Asia and argue that it is heuristic to understand contemporary Chinese Christianity in light of this form of world Christianity. To further the study of Chinese Christianity, the paper affirms the usefulness of the insight of the phenomenology of religion that emphasizes multidimensional coverage of and polymethodic approach to religion. It also proposes that the anthropology of Christianity, an approach that has been recently adopted by cultural anthropologists and scholars of religious studies, deserves our careful attention. The paper will end with a call for scholars of diverse disciplines to participate in the study of contemporary Chinese Christianity, the attraction and importance of which are too immense to ignore.

Contemporary Chinese Christianity
China was undergoing intractable upheavals in the early part of the twentieth century when Western powers impinged upon this newly-founded Republic for their respective ambitious gains. At the same time, missionaries of various denominational backgrounds from the imperialist West fervently preached and converted Chinese people. Christianity, Protestant Christianity specifically, was thus viewed with ambivalence. Many Chinese saw this foreign religion as an expression of modernity, evidenced by the advanced Western countries which had been immersed in this religious tradition for centuries. To convert to Christianity in this connection meant to keep abreast of the times. But more Chinese held hostile attitude toward it, regarding it as an instrument of Western aggression. To maintain Chinese identity and integrity, it is necessary to expel it from the Chinese land. This complex of national sentiment, paradoxical as it is, was inherited when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over China in 1949, and it has persisted in Chinese mind up to this day (Lee 2007; Liu 2010).

Christianity not only survived the harshest years in PRC’s early reign, even during the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), but remarkably flourished (Bays 2003; Chao and Chong 1997; Dunch 2001; Kao 2009; Yang 2012). It attracted millions of followers when the government’s repressive measures were loosened. An official survey made in 1949 reported that there were 3 million Catholics and 1 million Protestants. In 2010, according to the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, the Christian population exponentially increased to 67 million, Catholics and Protestants combined.¹ Fenggang Yang estimated that if this growth rate would go unaltered, China would have 250 million Christians by 2050, distinguishing itself as the largest Christian country in the world.²

The different groups of the current Chinese Christian community are complex, with diverse origins, belief systems, and political stances. Although the CCP government has tried hard to subsume them under the official organizations such as the Three-self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) for the Protestants and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) for the Catholics, thus creating the official church versus the unregistered or “underground” church, their effort was successful only to a limited degree (Homer 2010; Tsai 2017). One may also divide the present Chinese Christians into four trends: Catholics, Euro-American Protestants, pre-1949 independent churches, and sectarian Christians (Lee 2007:294). They tell the general distribution of Chinese Christians from the historico-theological perspective. However, as mentioned, I intend to select four Christian communities composed, respectively, of peasants,

migrant workers, businessmen, and intellectuals, to illustrate the contour of contemporary Chinese Christianity as a whole. This is because, as believing agents, they vividly reflect how this religion has evolved in the past thirty some years with their own characteristics, important features that are relevant to our linking to world Christianity.

Rural Church

Christians in the rural area took and still take up a proportionally high percentage in contemporary Chinese Christian community (Liang 1999; Ouyang 2009). This was prominently so especially in the years when the Reform-and-Open policy kicked-off and “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period”, commonly named Document 19, was officially publicized in 1982 (Tsai 2017). As religious freedom was partially released to the people, chapels and Christian meeting points suddenly mushroomed in many villages and local towns. Observers found that the rural Christian population was characterized by old people, women, the poor, and the sick, aptly called “four manys” (Ouyang 2009:260). They packed the chapels, officially registered or not, on regular services and enthusiastically spread the gospel and shared their personal testimonies with their fellow Christians and the non-believers.

Scholars of Chinese Christianity wondered why so many peasants were attracted to this foreign religion, even in the years when the government vehemently denigrated religion as superstition and banned religious activities with all means. One possible explanation is that the CCP government, based upon its atheist ideology, denied the existence of gods and ghosts and attempted to blot out all types of religion. This dealt a deadly blow especially to Chinese traditional beliefs, including ancestral worship. Christianity, although severely suppressed but not entirely uprooted, encountered no competitors in this context of religious vacuum. Through the effort of some faithfuls, notably uneducated old women who clandestinely kept their faith and assumed the responsibility of evangelization in the absence of imprisoned male church leaders, the Christian message was continued without interruption (Kao 2009). In addition, on the organizational level, elimination of Chinese traditional beliefs undermined the foundation of the clan system that had functioned to consolidate the rural community. The system of commune, previously created to replace the traditional family and summon the rural members to live and work collectively, proved to be a failure. The disintegration of the social structure in the rural area thus cleared the way for the Christian church which was renowned for its skillfulness in organization. Collaborative work such as worship, family visit, care of the aged and the sick, celebration of sacred
and secular festivals, cross-regional coordination between villages, and the like, distinguished the church to be a magnetic center. Christianity in this way exerted its power of influence and became a new organization which many peasants would want to associate with but the local government would guard against (Ouyang 2009:221-245).

Seeking an identity in the church is important for the Chinese peasants in contemporary China, but that may not be their original motivation. Some scholars noted that many rural non-believers who came to the church were triggered by the intention for physical wellbeing. The sick prayed for healing. Miraculous experiences were thus reportedly abundant in the rural church. And these are akin to the spiritual manifestations in Chinese traditional religions (Inouye 2010; Lian 2011). Quite a few thought that Jesus, more potent than the gods or goddesses who had been formerly worshipped but were now defunct, could offer peace to or bestow wealth upon the pious. Earnest prayers, they believed, would pay off. Others attended the church because they were urged by their relatives or friends; as well known, the maintenance of human relationship is crucial to one’s living in the village. In all, pragmatic considerations are prevalent in the rural church, as far as reasons of conversion and church attendance are concerned. This may appear, however, repulsive to the scholar-observer who would treat theological reflection or doctrinal deliberation as the basis of a genuine Christian faith (Huang 2012:75-76; Ouyang 2009:275-284, 316-322).

**Migrant Workers’ Church**

The accelerating economic development since 1990s has resulted in large-scale urbanization in contemporary China. Big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou quickly expanded their municipal boundaries, and many cities on the provincial level have been established or renovated. A statistics shows that China’s rate of urbanization went from 10.6% in 1949, 18% in 1978, and up to 36.9% in 2000. It is the government’s goal to reach 50% in 2020 (Huang 2012:30-32). The demand for massive laborers thus went along with this fast geo-economic transformation, and the huge human resources in the rural area, almost 80% of the national population in 1980, in time provided this need (Huang 2012:29).

A large number of young peasants, male and female, have entered the cities as labor hirelings in the past decades. Most of them worked in the factories or at the construction sites; some of them served as waiters or waitresses at the hotels or restaurants. Only few of them were able to become small business owners (Huang 2012:131-180; Tsai 2015). Although they are urban workers by job, they are nonetheless peasants by identity. As migrants, they are not recognized as legitimate
urban residents. The local governments usually lay down restrictive laws that proscribe
them from household registration. Without a city I.D., they do not enjoy, as the native
residents do, the privileged welfare such as education for their children and quality
medication in the public systems. Heavy workload, low income, and discriminated
status all together have made their life in the city grim and precarious. Power abuse
on the part of the local government administrators has further aggravated their
situation and often become the hidden cause of crimes committed by the new city
dwellers (Huang 2012:29-45).

Many rural Christians joined the legion of laborers and moved to the city to search
for a better life. Given the living context aforementioned, to maintain their religious
faith would demand a high cost. In the first place, the local government normally does
not permit the unregistered outsiders to establish their own church. The migrant
workers’ church is thus illegal, if there would be one, and often subject to close-down
or removal. But before this would happen, the Christian workers treat their meeting
place as a center of support and coordination. They go to the church very likely for the
purpose of strengthening their human relationship and having access to information
about practical needs. Parallel to the church in their home village, the migrant workers’
church in the city serves to provide their members with timely help and consolidate
those who have no other means to resort to.

Similar to the rural church, the urban migrant workers’ church also reportedly
abounds in miraculous manifestations. Many peasant-immigrants come to the church
expecting the occurrences of spiritual healing and exorcism. They pray hard hoping
that their worldly concerns may be quickly answered on account of their sincerity and
piety. In this sense they highly regard their spiritual experience in relation to their
everyday life and promote sharing of testimonies of this nature in the church gathering
(Huang 2012:67-85). Further, the migrant workers’ church, with few full-time pastors
equipped in solid theological training, has difficult time in ministering to its members.
Many a lay person joins the church work to help, as a result. Relative loose organization
like this has created a double effect. On one hand, the church has become open and
receptive, hence attracting many people to come and participate. On the other hand,
its development or “planting” appears unstable, often experimenting along the way.
For example, since it is not affiliated with the official TSPM, its format of worship and
style of church management are up to the decision of the congregants or their
leader(s). And it is prone to imitating from other urban churches whatever beneficial
to its survival. The process of adaptation, consciously or unconsciously, would then
take place in the urban environment. But, significantly, when migrant workers have
chances to return their home village, they would bring what they have seen and learnt
in the city back to their native churches. This kind of cross-regional interaction would
inevitably impact the rural church, no matter positively or negatively evaluated (K. Huang 2013).

**Businessmen’s Church**

The pursuit of wealth and power is the primary goal in the Reform-and-Open agenda. Not only the CCP government but also the Chinese people in general have been engaged in it most strenuously. In the drastic socio-economic transformation of China’s past decades, commercial activities have driven a great number of Chinese toward this target. Ordinary people, with their limited capital and ability, may become small business owners; the more fortunate urban immigrants mentioned in the preceding section are an example. To run a medium- or large-size business, however, it requires opportune conditions such as substantial capital, favorable investment environment, high-end technique, efficient organization, strong marketing, smooth public relation, and the like. There are indeed quite a few who have won out and made a great fortune in the Chinese business world. For Christians whose religious beliefs emphasize spiritual benefit over material gain, modesty, peace, and church devotion, how they survive or even succeed in this living context appears eye catching in the scene of Chinese Christianity. Cao Nanlai’s presentation of the Christian entrepreneurs or “boss Christians” in Wenzhou offers us a vivid illustration (Cao 2007, 2008, 2011).

Chinese Christian businessmen understand and express their faith from a rather pragmatic perspective. Their success in the business world has emboldened them to deal with the secular authority as well as the church management in a novel way. Negotiation, not confrontation, is the principle they follow in establishing their human network in society. Unlike their rural fellow Christians who reside either in the country or in the city, they do not shun away from the government. Instead, they comply with the state ideology and choose to cooperate with the CCP functionaries. When necessary, they even take the lead to make contributions; charity donation in time of natural disaster is a case in point. With a good connection to the local party cadres, they find it easier to carry out their religious activities.

With respect to church management, the successful entrepreneurs assume an influential position. Many of them, not the ordained ministers, decide the organization and development of the church. For instance, they prefer the top-down mode of administrative operation, considering it, after the model of managing a company, more efficient than democratic participation. They outsource the church work, adopting the mechanism of division of labor in order to save human resources and financial expenses, a feature popular in business management. They are fond of inviting Christian celebrities in diverse professions to lecture on special topics, thereby
enhancing their own and, as well, the church’s social status. Thus they have incorporated the familiar way of their business practices into the church community with dexterity.

The Christian entrepreneurs are enthusiastic about evangelization, but the message they want to convey to the non-believers is not Jesus’ salvific grace to the physically ill or the spiritually weak. Rather, they opt for promulgating wealth and prosperity as a sign of the Lord’s blessings. To become a Christian does not necessarily have to be humble and marginalized. As they themselves have demonstrated, he or she can be materially affluent and act on the center stage. They have thus carefully reformulated the Christian gospel such as this after the manner of marketing a new brand released from a competitive company (Cao 2007).

Paradoxically, the “boss Christians” may be bold in dealing with the government, generous in donation, skillful in church management, and intrepid in preaching the gospel, many of their activities are imitative than original. The Jerusalem they chose to build in Wenzhou is merely miniature of the real one in Israel. In the first place, as most of the successful Christian businessmen are not well-versed in the Bible nor are they knowledgeable about the history of Christianity, their understanding of this religion is derived from the Chinese context in which they live and the sporadic foreign impressions they have obtained while traveling in Europe or in the US. To create a domestic Chinese church, they expressed the need to replicate what is practiced in the West. Thus constructing a magnificent chapel, for example, after the church architecture of the theater-style popular in the nineteenth-century US is imagined to promote the genuine Christianity. They have in this way brought forth a Chinese Christian church through introducing and copying, resembling the process of making their business products. It is unmistakable, however, that this church of theirs contains simultaneously domestic and transnational elements, a synthetic feature reflecting well their businessmen identity in present-day China (Cao 2008).

*Intellectuals’ Church*

In the process of rapid socio-economic transformation in the past decades, a group of Chinese intellectuals converted to Christianity and formed their own churches. Their numbers are few, in comparison with the Christians of rural or mercantile backgrounds, but their influence is deep and far-reaching in present-day Chinese society. These Christian intellectuals stand independently from the official TSPM and are unyielding critics of the CCP government.

Theologically, many of the Chinese Christian intellectuals subscribe to Calvinism. They believe that the Calvinist emphasis on law and discipline is what China today
badly needs. Indeed they contend that democracy can be realized by studying the Bible and analyzing Calvin’s works. A heavy leaning toward intellectual discernment precludes charismatic experiences that are prevalent in Chinese Christian scene. With regard to church organization, their elitist conviction does not grant equal right to all church members. They uphold Presbyterian polity, asserting the necessity of ruling by the chosen few and of submission from the congregation. Women, in this regard, are supposed to obey the church authority and are not qualified, for instance, to be ordained ministers. This Calvinist intellectual formation is hence mixed with progressive and conservative elements in the Chinese context (Fällman 2013).

The Christian intellectuals are distinguished by their concern with China’s cultural, social, and political situations. According to them, the value of Christian gospel lies in its power to awaken human sense of sinfulness. Only when a realization of one’s sinful root and its radical transformation takes place, expectation of the society to be transformed can happen. Against the theology of success that embraces materialist joy and blessings, it advocates sympathy with and service for those who are suffering under authoritarian dictatorship. The Christian intellectuals therefore harbor the ideal of Christianizing China, regarding it the only way to save Chinese people from current predicaments. To achieve this end, many of them are devoted to social action. For example, they publish periodicals online with the purpose of educating the less educated rural Christians. Some Christian lawyers have formed associations for human rights defense, particularly for those who are persecuted for the sake of their Christian faith. They are convinced that resorting to the constitutional laws is far more effective than relying upon human relationships, as commonly understood in Chinese society. Further, as universalists, they reject the idea of presenting a church with Chinese characteristics. On the contrary, they envision a Chinese church to be part of ecumenical Christianity, an ideal state that would testify to China’s democracy and modernity (Wielander 2009).

The Chinese Christian intellectuals are exclusivists and inclusivists at the same time. They are exclusivists because they selected Calvinism as the focus of their theological devotion. Pentecostal and evangelical types of Christianity, which form the majority of current Chinese Christian community, are sidelined. Women, too, are relegated to the inferior status and excluded from equal participation in the church construction. They are inclusivists because they treat active social engagement as part of their Christian calling. They extend their vision beyond the Christian boundary and take China as a whole into their deliberation. Further still, they anticipate to join world Christianity by and through which the birth of a democratic China would be actualized. These elitist Christians are able to combine the theoretical and the practical to a far extent that, although only a handful, their voices constantly sound in the present
The four churches just delineated do not entirely encompass the multiple aspects of contemporary Chinese Christianity, but they are heuristic representatives which can guide us into a fuller picture of this religion in China today. Some collective features about them should be noted. First, these four different Christian communities are the products of China’s social, economic, and political developments in the past three decades or so. To understand them, one has to do that with sensitive attention to the general living context in which they have evolved. Second, the rural church appeared first, chronologically followed by the migrant workers’ church, the businessmen’s church, and the intellectuals’ church. At present, each of them does not stand independently; rather, they constitute a historical continuum and closely interact with each other. Third, from the rural church to the intellectuals’ church, one sees progressive unfolding of self-assertiveness on the part of the believing agents. This happened thanks to the increase of their economic or intellectual empowerment. In particular, the yearning for transregional or even transnational connections beyond their local boundaries merits our attention, and this should lead us to discuss their relationship with world Christianity.

**Word Christianity**

Many Chinese today regard Christianity as a religion imported from the West and, as such, it cannot be anything but part and parcel of the West. They ignore the fact that in the fast secularized Europe and North America, fewer and fewer Westerners would go to the church or take this “native” religion of theirs seriously (Bruce 2006; Davie 1994; Fuller 2001). Some scholars of religion noted that the center of gravity of Christianity has already shifted from the West to the “global south” where the majority of Christians currently reside (Jenkins 2011; Walls 2002). In 1900, a statistics shows, 90 percent of Christians lived in Europe and North America. But around 2000, over 60 percent of Christians worldwide lived in Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, and Asia (Walls 2002:31). According to another statistics, only 25 percent of the world’s Christians lived in Europe in 2010, and the figure will drop to less than 20 percent by 2025 (Jenkins 2011:2). These sheer numbers should waken us to realize that Christianity is no longer a religion monopolized by the West. Instead, it is a religion belonging to the majority world or, to state it more accurately, it is one of the world religions shared by one-third of our global population of diverse racial and cultural backgrounds (Jenkins 2011:1-20).

Starting from its very inception, one should be reminded, Christianity developed as a form of world religion (Kim and Kim 2008; Sanneh 2008). Driven by the
urgency of apocalyptic vision, disciples in the early age of Christianity traveled to different directions to spread the gospel of the coming of the Kingdom of God. The fruit of the labor of the apostle Paul who, with his evangelist companions, moved through Asia Minor and eventually to European continent, was only one of the successful stories of the Christian missionary enterprise. Other disciples also fiercely devoted themselves to the work of evangelization, with the result that different forms of Christianity, such as Syrian, Ethiopian, Coptic, and Armenian, were established in the first centuries. Diverse expressions of Christianity continued down through the Middle Age, expanding into more multiplications in broad geographical areas; Slavic and Arabian Christianities are two good examples. This pluralistic picture, however, was overshadowed by the Western missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, who, from the Reformation downward, went to the Americas, Africa, and Asia to preach the Christianity of their own likeness. The imperialist domination of the Western powers through the colonial period strengthened the stereotyped impression in the “third world” that Christianity as such was the one represented by the modern West. Challenge to this conventional image emerged after World War II when nationalism arose and decolonization movements went rampant. In the following decades, picture of Christianity was further complicated by the splitting or merging of traditional Protestant denominations, independence and indigenization of local churches, and hybridization of local religions and Christian beliefs at the grassroots. The powerful trends of globalization, advanced by science and technology, all the more widened the scope of this complication. As the form and content of Christianity were no longer Western than it had been, recognition of its new face requires a perspective different from the old one (Robert 2000).

Revamping the understanding of Christianity should begin with the emphasis that this religion is not narrowly Western but worldwide. As such it is not a replication of the Christian form that the West has implanted across its colonial territories in the past hundreds of years of history, but refers to multiple manifestations of responses from believing agents to the Christian gospel as they heard, understood, and experienced it. To be more precise, as Klaus Koschorke advocated, world Christianity should lay its focus

not on Western missionary endeavors, which would reduce the history of non-Western Christianity to a sequel of Western church history, but on the reception of the Christian faith by local actors and the multiplicity and plurality of Christianity on all continents, not only but specially outside the context of the missionary movement (Hermann and Burlacioiu 2016:9).
Agreeing to this new understanding, Peter C. Phan proposed that we re-present relevant and significant themes to the repertoire of our study. What once was emphasized as Church History should be replaced as History of Christianity. And within the latter, the inculturated or contextualized elements, including local laity, marginalized women and children, non-Western cultures, miracle stories, spiritual experience, and the like, should be taken into serious account. Only then the name of world Christianity, instead of Christendom, and its content would suitably match with each other (Phan 2008, 2012).

The initiation of the concept of world Christianity allows scholars to investigate how Christians live up to their faith in different socio-political contexts, for instance, Malaysian Christians’ response to the official policy to Islamize the country or the convoluted Hindu-Christian conflict in India (Riddell 2004; Bauman 2013). It also urges scholars to explore other complicated Christian manifestations across the continents among which the rise of Pentecostal-charismatic movement is one of upmost importance. Indeed this powerful religious movement has changed the map of Christianity, and its impacts in the recent decades have challenged scholars to redefine world Christianity anew. In this connection we need to deliberate upon it more extensively.

The Pentecostal-charismatic movement has its root in the Bible and has appeared periodically in the Christian world through the past two millennia (McGinn 1998; Weber 1999). But scholars tend to trace its recent manifestation to the spiritual revivals in the beginning of the twentieth-century US which eventually led to the establishments of ramified Pentecostal groups (Anderson 2004; Synan 2001; Hollenweger 1972). The Third Wave Awakening in the 1980s, latest sequel of this series of spiritual movement, was often singled out as the immediate cause of the present global Pentecostal-charismatic phenomenon (Sanneh 2008:271-87). As it now stands, Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity is the most dynamic and fastest expanding religion in the world, with the increase rate of over nine million converts every year the majority of whom reside in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Allan et al 2010; Robbins 2004:118). In contrast to the major Protestant denominations such as Congregationalist, Methodist, and Presbyterian that are fast declining, the conspicuous growth of this sector of Christianity is astounding (McGrath 2004).

Taxonomically, it can be classified into four types, according to Allan H. Anderson. The first is the classical Pentecostals which cover those churches or denominations originated from the early twentieth century. The second includes older church charismatics who are affiliated with, for example, the Catholic church, Anglican church, Orthodoxy, and established Protestant denominations. The third contains the older independent churches which, unconnected to the big Pentecostal denominations,
have practiced the charismatic rituals or activities for a long time. The fourth refers to those Neopentecostals or Neocharismatics who have formed megachurches and preached the gospel of capitalist success in conjunction with spiritistic engagement. In the present context of globalization, these four types do not maintain fixed, respective boundaries but interact among themselves in a flexible and adaptable manner (Anderson 2010, 2013:4-7).

For all their differences, the Pentecostal-charismatics commonly emphasize the working of the Holy Spirit through personal experience of the spiritual gifts, notably speaking in tongues, healing, prophecy, and revelation through dreams and visions (Anderson 2010:15, 2013:8; Yang et al 2017:4). The charismatic exultation, however, is not upheld purely for its own sake. Rather, it is regarded as the driving force necessary for sweeping evangelization. The Pentecostal-charismatics believe that if that would have happened in the rise of Christianity two thousand years ago, it should likewise take place in our time (Anderson 2013:2-3). Thus based upon their conservative or Biblicist conviction, they actively engage in the work of conversion and thereby quickly expand this form of world of Christianity (McGrath 2004).

Socio-politically observed, Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity lays a great emphasis on equality of church members and lay participation. The call for all-out devotion often galvanizes the Christian community in unity. It is often seen that many more women than men show up in the church, although organizationally they are still subject to male domination in the existing patriarchal polity. Equal regard given to all church members and gender inequality thus paradoxically coexist (Robbins 2004:124-25). Likewise, Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity teaches ascetic ethics, disparaging human desires and the accumulation of worldly wealth, but it at the same time preaches material prosperity as a sign of divine blessings. It embraces the material and the spiritual, two opposing conceptual realms, into its dualistic mode of worldview. How well it can reconcile them and put them into practice depends upon the degree of flexibility each Pentecostal-charismatic community adjusts itself to the changing globalizing environment (Anderson et al 2010:1-9; Robbins 2014).

To depict the contour of Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity, examining the local variations that constitute the whole picture is essential. Scholars over the past decades have endeavored to do that, especially looking into its complex manifestations in Latin America, a region where this form of Christianity started early and has swiftly spread deep and wide (Burdick 1993; Cox 1996; B. Martin 1998; D. Martin 1990). For example, John Burdick explored reasons behind the powerful attraction of Pentecostal-charismatic churches in urban Brazil by comparing the characteristics of the traditional Catholic church, the indigenous Umbanda, and the Pentecostal Assembly of God in the local context. He found that factors such as elevation of the status of female members,
conversion of their husbands, relative equality among different races, and extensive lay involvement in the church work, all contributed to the causes. Focus on the splitting process and comparing the branched-off churches of the Ewe Presbyterian Church in Ghana (Meyer 1999) or on the transnational networking of the Livets Ord, a Neo-charismatic megachurch in Uppsala (Coleman 2007), also offered illustrative cases in other parts of the world for us to understand Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity.

How then does one contrast contemporary Chinese Christianity to cases like the preceding ones in the context of world Christianity? Recently scholars of Christianity began to touch upon this prospective issue. Liu Yi, after detailing the historical development of Chinese Christianity through the twentieth century, concluded with affirmation that this “foreign” religion has been absorbed into Chinese society and as such has become a Chinese religion. The successful indigenization of Christianity in modern and contemporary China confirmed the necessity of linking it to the purview of world Christianity because of this domestic-international continuum (Liu 2010). Lamin Sanneh opined that the flourishing of Chinese Christianity today helped us to observe the shift of the center of gravity of this world religion from the West. It also provided a striking example for scholars to compare it with the rise of early Christianity in the Roman Empire (Sanneh 2008:282-83). Allan H. Anderson strongly argued that “China is very much part of the story of the influence of Pentecostalism on the character and demographics of world Christianity” (Yang et al 2017:345; Anderson 2013:193-200). Characteristics, he pointed out, such as anti-Western feeling, independence, revivalist and fundamentalist outlook, charismatic fervency, and missionary engagement, stood out conspicuously in the indigenous True Jesus Church, Jesus Family, and Little Flock. At present, famous churches in different regions of China, including the China Gospel Fellowship, Word of Life, and Fangcheng Church, all share these prominent features (Yang et al 2017:345-50). Cao Nanlai detected the prevalent existence of Pentecostal elements in Chinese Christian community and judged it to be a sub-culture (Cao 2015).

Indeed one finds affinities between contemporary Chinese Christianity and world Christianity in general and Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity in particular. In the first place, the Middle Kingdom was once a land of competed missionary endeavors, hence an indispensable section of the “church history” of the West. The adoption of the new concept of world Christianity with an emphasis on regional voices or local autonomy should all the more include the Chinese case. This necessity is reinforced by the sweeping force of globalization that has engulfed the whole world, China included. As summarized in the preceding pages, the four types of Christianity in contemporary China are products of this country’s social, economic, and political developments. Excluded from the contextual characteristics, it is impossible to explain or understand
the rise of Christianity in present-day China. Only by taking these characteristics into consideration would we properly juxtapose Chinese Christianity with parallel cases in other parts of the globe for comparison.

Our presentation of the four types of Chinese Christianity indicates that, reflecting the trend of global, democratic participation, many lay members in China get involved in the construction of their respective churches. Among them, females are indisputably the majority. The large quantity of women’s attendance at church, however, does not yet reverse the general male-dominant patriarchy, as far as church leadership is concerned. And this is similar to the case observed in the Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity in Brazil. Further, the four types of church in contemporary China attempt strenuously to be independent from the government’s control. This decentering tendency is most obvious in the cases of house church which, separating themselves from the official TSPM that restrains rather than broadens its religious domain, enthusiastically evangelize and expand. On the other hand, although autonomous, the four types of Chinese church yearn for connections beyond their geosocial contexts. The rural church and the migrant workers’ church, due to their limited resources, urgently seek for material and human resources from outside. The much more wealthy business men’s church, too, actively invites overseas evangelical preachers or Christian professionals to facilitate its growth. The elitist intellectuals’ church, only minor with respect to membership, expands itself by reaching out to Calvinist denominations past and present. The urge for transregional or transnational networking thus characterizes their respective identity. And this feature of combination of the local and the global resembles that found in the worldwide Pentecostal-charismatic movement.

Another important, notable characteristic among the four types of Chinese Christianity is their strong pragmatic inclination. The Christian intellectuals may be idealistic in terms of their theological choice and ecclesial structure, but their adhering to these aspects is derived from deliberate consideration of efficiently resisting the government’s pressure, pragmatic in intent and in practice nonetheless. Many peasants and migrant workers throng to the church to pray for the healing of physical or spiritual diseases. They indulge themselves in embracing the charismatic gifts of speaking in tongues and prophecy or receiving revelation through dreams and visions to confirm their beliefs and fulfill their wishes. The stress on the experiential dimension is therefore very much motivated by their practical needs. The “boss Christians”, in contrast, are less concerned with charismatic engagements, but their devotion to the church work after the pattern of successful business management is equally enthusiastic. Their pragmatic orientation thus regards the religious and the secular as two aspects complementary and reconcilable, and this would be an
excellent case comparable to that found, for instance, in the Pentecostal movement in Sweden (Coleman 2007).

In all, the new category of world Christianity has opened up a broad field for scholars to explore. And it is timely for contemporary Chinese Christianity to be included into this academic project. Conversely, the inclusion of the Chinese case substantiates the content of world Christianity to a significant degree because the swift rise and expansion of this religion in China has been too gigantic to ignore. Highlighting the Chinese Christian contextual characteristics and comparing them with those outside of China is a necessary step toward understanding the complex relationships between the local and the global. What we just delineated is a minor portion, and it awaits us to proceed further.

Methodological Consideration

If we admit the importance of contemporary Chinese Christianity in relation to world Christianity, how we study this new subject deserves our next consideration. Traditional approach to non-Western Christianity, the main target of so-called missiology, put a great emphasis on the process of historical expansion of this religion outside the West. Although historical study is still indispensable, in the new vision of world Christianity, it is inadequate. Since world Christianity is a world religion with multiple expressions across the globe, our study should include them in a more comprehensive and systematic way. For this purpose, the phenomenology of religion can offer its insight.

Simply put, the phenomenology of religion presupposes a hidden human faith that exists in all forms of religion universally. How to reveal this faith is subject to varied interpretations. But what appears to us is something we scholars can and should consider in the first step. We then should treat all religious manifestations, be they culled from the “great”, “little”, “advanced”, or “primitive” religions, with equal regard. It is essential that we suspend our bias and refrain from making value judgment about them if we would want to maximize the religious materials and bring them into our intellectual ken. With an objective viewpoint, we systematize all the religious phenomena according to some major categories, for example, subject of religion, object of religion, interaction between the subject and the object, and the world in which their interaction takes place. Within each category, ramified themes or types can be formulated, such as power, organization, ritual, myth, symbol, scripture, violence, pilgrimage, mysticism, conversion, festival, and the like. Following this typological approach, scholars can further create sub-themes, depending upon the extent we explore in different religions either diachronically or synchronically. The
purpose is then to scientifically establish a meaningful taxonomy out of confused raw materials which, after analysis and interpretation, would make sense to us (Van der Leeuw 1967:671-95).

In view of the complicated manifestations of world Christianity, we may extend the preceding academic agenda to include more what appears to be religious. As Ninian Smart advocated, what is religious today may not necessarily fall into the realm of a traditional religion. An ideology, for instance, often serves as the functional equivalent of religion because an individual or a group of people may believe it and attempt to actualize it in a spirit of ultimacy. It is apt to use worldview to describe human belief systems, because it is more flexible and inclusive as far as the phenomenon we intend to examine is concerned (Smart 1983). The application of worldview as an operational definition to the project on the “cultural explorations of human beliefs,” to borrow the subtitle of Smart’s book, exhibits the benefit of avoiding the blurred divide between the sacred and the secular and pointing to what matters the most to the believing individuals. The gamut we scholars want to deal with and the data we have to analyze enormously increase accordingly.

To explore the rich religious phenomena in our globalized age, following Smart again, we can categorize them into different “dimensions”. These may include the doctrinal, ritual, mythic or narrative, experiential and emotional, ethical and legal, social, material, and political (Smart 1996). In general, the doctrinal, mythic or narrative, and ethical and legal tend to be metaphysical constructs, whereas the other dimensions are constructed on the basis of human physical experience. A religion, an ideology, or a belief system of whatever nature may not necessarily cover all of them. There is a likelihood that it is strong with respect to some dimensions whereas weak to others. A dimension, further, is not a fixed grid that compartmentalizes phenomena into insulated units. Rather, it is permeable, able to overlap or interact with each other. For example, a ritual is a performative act, but it is always originated from a myth, which is often formulated as a doctrine. Believers in the ritual context may undergo a special emotion, and how well or in what aspect they experience it is much shaped by how well or in what aspect the religious organization is conducted. Hence the ritual dimension is inseparable from the mythic, doctrinal, experiential, and social ones (Smart 1996:71-73). Dimensions here presented are devised out of religious phenomena. As a conceptual frame, they function to guide our thematic choice when facing the massive religious data. In this way, dimensions as types and religious phenomena as contents coexist in a dialectic relationship, an understanding of which should help us approach world Christianity more methodically.

Related to the exposition brought forth above is the anthropology of Christianity. Anthropologists in the West used to apply their discipline to the study of cultures or
religions other than Christianity. As insiders, they seldom approached their own religion the way they did to “others”. One of the main reasons is, as Joel Robbins argued, that general consensus among anthropologists assumes cultural continuity and structural coherence within a community. Change, discontinuity, or rupture takes place but exists only temporarily. It would be overcome by the more permanent cultural mainstay the features of which are the anthropologists’ major interest. Christianity, based upon its dualistic mode of thinking, emphasizes radical transformation, and this contradicts the anthropologists’ agenda. A cognitive discrepancy thus occurs that views the non-Christian tradition or community as stable, stagnant, and predictable, and Christianity as changeable, progressive, and dynamic (Robbins 2007). This misconception was recently challenged, especially when anthropologists began to study Pentecostal Christianity in Latin America (Mariz and Campos 2011; Robbins 2007:29-33).

Mariz and Campos, anthropologists from Brazil, expounded the renovated perspective about their own discipline:

We understand the anthropology of Christianity to be a methodological agenda that recognizes the legitimacy of the anthropological study of different expressions of Christianity as well as cultural changes that Christianity may have brought about in different social and cultural scenarios (Mariz and Campos 2011:106).

In this light, one has to squarely face the multiple changes or discontinuities not only in Christianity but also in other religions and cultures across the globe. Particularly when Christianity and other religions meet, either confrontation or negotiation naturally ensues. Through the process of interactions, the religious or cultural milieu of that specific region is enriched. And it has become a valuable repertoire from which anthropologists can choose their themes to highlight the local characteristics vis-à-vis the globalized environment. Since around the year 2000, Joel Robbins explained to us, themes such as materiality, cultural change, nature of religious experience, schism, Christian social organization, gender, space, and the like, have been examined, and they are by no means exhaustive (Robbins 2014:S158). Once Christianity was released from its state of being “repressed”, the anthropology of Christianity has opened up a variety of possibilities that await us to explore (Cannell 2005, 2006:1-50).

Both the phenomenology of religion and the anthropology of Christianity recognize the importance of facing up the complicated religious phenomena the globalized world has brought to us. They maintain that scholars hold an objective perspective toward different forms of religion on equal footing, therefrom generating
more data for us to investigate and compare. A local case, then, is linked to transregional or even transnational family resemblances. To accomplish this vision, they, in particular the phenomenology of religion, propose typological approach to the vast religious phenomena by carefully categorizing them into taxonomic order. Corresponding to a theme scholars choose, we apply appropriate research method to it. And as themes are many and varied, “polymethodic” in our methodological consideration seems the most suitable choice (Smart 1983:3-5, 1996:15-21). These theories and practices should contribute to our study of contemporary Chinese Christianity.

Conclusion

Christian missionaries entered the Chinese land along with the invasion of the Western powers in late imperial China and early Republican period. Since then Christianity went through a history of suspicion and hostility. When the CCP took over China in 1949, the new government began to suppress this foreign religion, harboring the intention to eventually eradicate it. Christianity, however, not only survived but thrived after a series of repressive political movements. Aided by the Reform-and-Open policy in 1978, it has rapidly grown, expanding its domain and attracting numerous followers to a state never before. The sharp rise of Christianity in sync with the formidable rise of China has challenged scholars to rethink this religion in relation to its domestic context and, simultaneously, against the world of globalization.

To meet this challenge, this paper proposed to first depict the contextual characteristics of contemporary Chinese Christianity by focusing upon four types of church: rural church, migrant workers’ church, businessmen’s church, and intellectuals’ church. We found that the establishments of these different Christian communities are firmly related to their respective environments shaped by geo-economic as well as socio-political factors. However, these churches, although each distinctive, have formed a continuum and interacted with each other. They are pragmatic in belief and in practice, all demonstrating the intention to reach beyond their local boundary to transregional or even transnational connections.

To evaluate Christianity in China today, this paper proposed that we change our understanding of this centuries-old religion that was once West-centered to a new concept that sees it with diverse centers surrounded by people of multiple cultural, social, and political backgrounds. Indeed it is no longer Western Christianity but world Christianity we are facing, and as such it is a world religion the scope of which is transnational and transcontinental. The complex manifestations of world Christianity, especially evidenced by the Pentecostal-charismatic movement, deserve our attention
when we intend to explore its rich contents. An examination of religious phenomena such as speaking in tongues, faith healing, revelation through dreams and visions, and prayer for wealth and worldly success has demonstrated that they take place popularly in many parts of the world. And it is academically fruitful to compare Chinese Christianity and its overseas counterparts with reference to these spiritual activities for a better understanding of their relationships.

In view of the proposed goal, the paper suggested that we take the theories and practices of the phenomenology of religion and, as well, the anthropology of Christianity for methodological consideration. The phenomenology of religion presupposes the equality of all religions and belief systems, attempting to comprehend what they appear to us by systematically categorizing the data according to themes or dimensions. It advocates the importance of exploring human faith by objectively analyzing religious data without intellectual bias. Its emphasis on broad and inclusive vision toward religious phenomena can be supplemented by the anthropology of Christianity which highly regards local religious variations impacted by Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity. Scholars in this field pay close attention to different local cases by detailing the formation of their respective characteristics, providing many useful examples for us to contrast and compare. Significant of all, both the phenomenology of religion and the anthropology of Christianity affirm that world Christianity is an area that requires interdisciplinary or even multidisciplinary participation. Research method, then, cannot be fixed but should be determined by the type of theme one chooses, and adoption of multiple approaches is often the norm. Scholars of diverse backgrounds, including the humanities and social sciences, are called to join this academic adventure (Anderson et al 2010:20-21; Mariz and Campos 2011:116; Phen 2008; Yang et al 2017:350-52). This call, I believe, similarly applies to the study of contemporary Chinese Christianity as it is an essential component of world Christianity today.
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社会急速变迁中的宗教群体个案研究

Case Studies of Religious Groups in a Rapidly Changing Society

“官家教会”与“私人老爷”：

题       目：邓村信仰格局

作者姓名：刘大为

作者单位：华东师范大学社会发展学院

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Abstract: The interaction and relationship of different types of beliefs in an area, is bound to become a pattern, or close, or differ greatly. The formation of the existing pattern is a product of regional resources, rules of operation. Master about resources and the rules include culture, society, and administrative power. This article is on the basis of the fieldwork from a city village, and take the conflict between Christian churches and "master temple" as a starting point, from the perspective of management system, analysis of the interaction and conflict between the "administration" Christian church management way and the "personal" folk belief management way, explore the allocation of resources on the basis of the different management system formed, and explore its impact in both management, then try to make a comment on the way of legalization and socialization management of religion. It should be said that the legalization and socialization of religious management are direction and goals.

Key words: Christianity; Folk beliefs; Administration; Private
中国是一个多民族、多文化、多宗教的国家，多元的交流互动构成了现有的信仰局面。宗教作为人类意义根据、价值取向及道德基础的重要来源，影响着个体与社会的关系逻辑，关涉到国家的和谐稳定。多元宗教的并存，既是现代社会的一种常态，也是现代社会的特征。如何看待和应对这一现代社会的常态，引起了学界的广泛关注。有学者强调宗教间的制衡，认为宗教格局呈现一种宗教生态，强调宗教间相互制衡的关系，即“宗教生态论”；有学者强调宗教间的自由竞争，认为宗教格局是一种市场行为，即“宗教市场论”；有学者揭示权力场域对宗教间关系的影响，认为中国的宗教格局是一种权力关系的建构；以及其他许多涉及宗教格局的探讨，比如宗教格局与民族文化、地理分布等等。

应该说，上述几个研究路径是将宗教作为因变量对其格局进行研究。这种路径有其优势，即充分考虑到社会对宗教的作用，然而其缺陷也较为明显，即忽视了宗教作为社会子系统的能动性。为此，本文试图从国家宗教管理制度与宗教自身组织形式，即宗教作为因变量和自变量两个方面，分析一个村落的现有信仰格局。研究方法上主要基于田野调查，以个案研究的形式，探讨不同管理方式对区域宗教格局的影响。

一般认为，宗教的健康发展很大程度上取决于其与政权的关系。然而，这一关系以什么方式、什么程度呈现，将会产生何种逻辑，似乎并未形成某种共识。是否与行政部门保持密切交往，甚至“官方化”，从而有利于自身的发展？抑或远离政治，退到“私人范畴”，即“私人化”，更为可取？通过对一个村落宗教格局的个案研究，或许会有所启示。

一、田野及个案介绍

2014年7、8月本人前往广东省汕头市南镇⑤（2003年已改为“街道”）进行有关“基督教与民间信仰关系”的田野调查。调查主要以参与观察、半结构性访谈、文献收集等形式为主。访谈人次约为50人，其中深入访谈为27人，收集文字、照片材料200余份。访谈对象从宗教信仰背景上主要分为三大类：一是基督教徒，分为外地基督教徒和本地基督教徒、教会管理人员与普通教徒；二是民间信仰者，分为老爷庙管理者、仪式专家和普通信众；三是无宗教信仰者及其他宗教信仰者，包括基层行政人员。另外，在访谈对象的年龄、性别上皆兼顾均衡，但实际上真正能够进行深入访谈的多为中老年男性，这与当地男尊女卑、论资排辈传统习俗的约束有关。

调查主要围绕一个发生在15年前的冲突事件展开。冲突是指1999年前后基督教堂与

①高师宁：《试论宗教的多元、对话与和谐》，《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》，2009年第4期。
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④李向平：《信仰是一种权力关系的建构——中国社会“信仰关系”的人类学分析》，《西北民族大学学报》，2012年第5期。
⑤文章中市区级行政单位以下具体人名、地名均做了技术处理。
其邻居“老爷庙”为主的民间信仰者的一次“拆保十字架”事件。基督教与民间信仰的矛盾冲突在素有“信鬼尚巫”之风的潮汕地区并不少，但是引起行政权力高度重视并迅速介入的案例则不多。十几年前的这起教案是在市级行政部门“谁要想继续当官，此事就到此为止”，“哪个辖区有人出来闹，就撤掉那个书记”的行政命令干预下强行平息的。冲突的缘由；行政权力强行介入之后对信仰关系的影响；信众对此的看法等相关问题是我们的主要关注点。

我们的调查对象是一个城中村——邓村，面积 2.25 平方公里，人口 9000 余，90%以上都姓邓，由同一祖先于明洪武年间（1368-1398）创村繁衍至今，是一个典型的宗族村落，位于广东省汕头市南镇。该镇 2003 年在行政建制上已改为城市街道，城镇化水平比较高，外来人口多，由于属于就地、就近城镇化，故而本地人在习俗文化上仍较为传统，血缘和地缘的初级社会关系保存较好。经济方面，该镇上世纪 80 年代即有“小香港”之称，是有名的纺织重镇，邓村曾获市里颁发“亿万村”的称号，可谓富甲一方。然而，亿万财富仅仅掌握在极少数人手里，贫富分化非常严重，用一位村民的话说“富有的人几辈子用不完，贫穷的人只能靠救济”。在基层干部政治作风方面，比较突出的特点是腐败案件频发，土地问题纠纷不清，民众对基层干部怨言颇深。总的来说，个案的主要外在环境特征是：经济上贫富分化、政治上灰色政风、文化上崇祖崇神、社会结构上正由初级结构向次级结构转化。

表面上看邓村已经是一个现代化的城市社区居委会，然而深入接触，可发现家族伦理、崇祖信巫传统比之一般传统村落有过之而无不及。村内分布着“老爷庙”14 处，宗祠 20 余处，其中耗资百万以上修建的宗祠有 11 处，更有一栋高 7 层、可容纳 1700 人的基督教堂。如此密集的宗教活动场所可谓少见，这体现了邓村人对宗教信仰的热衷。

文章的主角之一——“老爷庙”是指一个土地庙，也称伯公庙，具体名称为“田福德老爷庙”，据称 1445 年已有此庙，地处该镇仅有的一处风景区内，与基督教堂隔墙相望，原是一小块地方，后毁于文化大革命，上世纪 90 年代由 4 个村中经济精英筹资重建。重建后的福德老爷庙扩宽了许多，庙中供奉“福德老爷”，同时庙外立有“关公像”，还设有一处纪念上世纪战乱灾荒时期在附近去世无名人士的“古人墓”，庙里没有神职人员。该庙每年定期举办多次宗教活动，信众很多，香火旺盛，由于地处繁华商业区，信徒中生意人较多，资金比较充裕，据其公开数据显示，截止 2014 年 1 月 30 日剩余资金为 77 万余元。庙是由 4 位村民合伙筹建的，表面上是村民集体所有，实际上庙里人、财、物的支配权都在筹建人，因而实际上是私人庙。日常清洁维护专门请有一位老人打理，按月支付工资，据其数据 2013 年一年共支付工资 19300 元。绝大部分时候几位“老板”都会在庙里“办公”，当然其本人将之称为“做义工”，包括收香油钱，与前来拜老爷的信众聊天、喝茶、打牌等。

高大雄伟的基督教堂是邓村也是南镇唯一的基督教堂，始建于 1894 年。1958 年后停
止聚会，同时原教堂被政府征作他用，直到 1984 年随着国家宗教政策的落实，教堂开始
正常宗教活动。1993 年，由海外华侨捐款 700 余万重建，建成后的基督教堂高 7 层，可容纳
1700 人。并建有配套附属楼，包括教学楼，教牧宿舍，公共食堂，幼儿园，儿童活动
室，停车场，小花园等，总建筑面积 3178 平方米。该堂现有登记教徒 560 余人，主要来
自南镇的 20 多个自然村。由于城镇化的推进，外来人口剧增，为了便于外地基督徒聚会，
从 2003 年起，教堂于每个礼拜日下午开设普通话讲道，现有外来信徒 100 多人，多数为
非本堂信徒。南镇基督教堂现为区基督教“两会”会址所在地。

需要特别指出的是改革开放以来，邓村历任了三位乡党委书记（由于邓村人口、经济
繁荣，故而一村与一乡的辖地基本重合），前两届被撤职，均与土地买卖有关。邓村原有
集体所有土地约 4000 亩，如今不足 40 亩。土地所有权和使用权的巨大变迁带来了邓村资
源的迅速集聚和贫富阶层的急剧分化。土地腐败问题折射了当地基层政府腐败、勾结、庇
护等“灰色政风”，大大降低了政府的威信，同时也疏远了干群关系。基层干部的腐败对
一个区域来说，绝不仅仅是物质方面的损失，更多的是腐蚀了区域的道德观念、价值取向，
乃至信仰关系。

二、老爷庙与基督教堂的冲突：“官方”的威服

1999 年，在邓村发生了一件引起汕头市市级行政部门介入的冲突事件。冲突双方是“田
福德老爷庙”为代表的民间信仰者与其“邻居”基督教堂。提及当年的这件事情，“老爷
庙”一方认为是由基层干部私自买卖土地所引发的“土地之争”，是一件关于争夺土地资
源的事件；而“基督教堂”一方则认为是由村落精英导演、无知民众参与的“风俗之争”，
是一件关于拆保十字架的事件。而对于市级行政部门来说，则是一场关涉到一位重要人物
的事件，是必须予以强有力干预的事件。

（一）灰色政风下的土地之争

基督教堂 1994 年以每亩 5 万元的价格在老爷庙旁边征地 6.754 亩。一部分村民，尤
其是老爷庙管理者对价格和面积有强烈质疑，但出于对基层干部的畏惧，并未明确提出或
采取行动。而且他们在得知征地是要建一个“带十字架”的建筑后，认为可能是要建造医
院，觉得有利民生，也就乐观其成。在征地补偿方面，一位村民说：“乡里给的征地补偿
是每棵潮桔补偿 20 元，没种树的不补偿，村民有的不愿意，去闹了的就加到每棵树给 200
元。” ①

在这一征地建基督教堂的过程中，有三个点使村民心有不快，一是征地并未通过村民
代表大会，而是由乡干部私自决定，这在当时当地是个比较普遍的现象；二是被征地的农
民并未得到合理的补偿；第三点也是最为关键的一点，征地投建的是基督教堂，但是当时

①2014 年 7 月 28 日对 MWQ22 的访谈。
村民们并不清楚，多数以为是在建一个医院。这几点加上该村当时干部们私卖土地猖獗，老百姓敢怒不敢言。这些怨怒慢慢转变为对新建基督教堂的仇视，访谈中一些村民甚至认为基督教堂是上级政府建的，是政府行为。

“政府里面，他们有个专门基督教教会啊。开始要办个医院这里，要办工厂，后来就盖了这个起来了，盖起来对我们都没有利的。没有办法，上级来吗，上级来搞的，政府人来搞的。”

1998 年，几位村落经济精英开始筹资重建老爷庙，计划要建一个供奉老爷的神殿，还要建一个小花园，一个办公楼，及公共厕所。然而土地有限，要完成规划需要占用一部分已经卖给基督教堂的地。对于占用一小块基督教堂土地的事情，老爷庙方面并不觉得理亏，反而理直气壮，原因就在于他们对基层干部与基督教堂的土地交易不认同，反过来甚至觉得基督教堂占用了本该属于老爷庙的土地。放到当地的乡土逻辑中，建造老爷庙是积德积福，使用土地无需任何手续，用地范围也可以随心所欲。试想如果不是基督教堂在旁边用去了大部分土地，如今建老爷庙焉能如此土地局促？

当然，教堂有教堂的道理，正规手续、合理合法买来的土地，显然没有理由不明不白被占用。僵持不下之时，老爷庙理事会人员于是提出丈量教堂的土地，他们认为教堂实际所用土地肯定比公开表示所买土地要多。丈量结果的确认证了这一看法，于是更加理直气壮，并发动了一部分村民施压。在调解过程中，时任乡政府曾私下承诺将设法在别处补偿教堂所让出土地。这一承诺，直到约 5 年后的第二任乡政府班子上任，新任乡党委书记与教堂的一位执事是战友关系，凭着这一层私人关系，教堂在东南侧获得了土地补偿，并建成了现在的公共厕所和保安亭。

在访谈中，知道此次土地之争且愿意提及的人不多，村民和老爷庙相关人员侧重于将“十字架之争”归入“土地之争”来讲，而基督教堂方面一般将此次事情归类到“十字架之争”。双方对该事件的看法各有所表。老爷庙一方将此事定为：干部腐败，与基督教堂串通一气侵占村里土地，同时对建教堂没有明确与村民沟通愤愤不平。而基督教堂则认为，老爷庙一方蛮不讲理，不依法依规，明明是基督教堂购买的土地，说侵占就侵占。公有公的理，婆有婆的规。

（二）“拆保十字架”之争

在土地纷争过程中，有人就提出“老爷庙完全在基督教十字架的映射范围内，一抬头就是十字架，这不行啊，会影响老爷的灵验啊”，而经常在老爷庙办公楼内喝茶休闲的村民们也提出“教堂的那个大喇叭很吵，恐怕会把老爷吵走，让他们关了。”同时教堂对面村民也有人提出了“教堂的十字架正对着我们村，这个外国的东西恐怕会影响我们的风水，

① 2014 年 7 月 22 日对 MFQ13 的访谈。
让他们拆了”，各种各样的说法，加上对教堂在土地问题上的不满，于是以老爷庙理事会为首的一些民间信仰者就联合起来向教堂提出了，务必在7天之内将十字架拆除，把喇叭关闭，否者将强行拆除。

基督教堂执事在得知这一说法后，立即向市宗教局和市基督教两会报告此事。宗教局和基督教两会领导则向市委统战部和分管副市长报告，并着重强调南镇基督教堂是由有着“潮人之光”荣誉的海外华侨全资捐建，此事干系重大，处理不好将会严重影响市里的形象，影响到市里招商引资的前景。针对这一情况，该市副市长亲自安排相关单位，包括当时的县级领导班子、市公安系统，并派工作组到南镇蹲点，召集镇干部开会，明确指示“谁要想继续当官，此事就到此为止”，并对乡党委书记明确指示“哪个辖区有人出来闹，就撤掉那个书记”。经过南镇领导班子及乡、村干部走村串巷疏通，在基督教堂关闭了楼顶高音喇叭和钟声之后，事件得到了平息，十字架得以保存。10多年来，双方再无冲突，同时也不曾来往，处于一种“老死不相往来”的状态。

在这个事件中，邓村人绝大多数都与“老爷庙”一方构成统一战线，即使不站出来公然反对基督教，但也始终无人为基督教一方说话。因此，邓村民间信仰呈现出一个与拥有官方背景的基督教的矛盾关系。

显然，老爷庙一方人多势众，且从当地习俗上来说也可谓有理有据，若非行政权力的强行介入，教堂的十字架很难保住。直到如今，老爷庙管理者一提及此事时仍然有些愤愤不平，有强烈的不满心理。我们在访谈过程中的经历充分显示了这一点。本来和风细雨的访谈，当提到当年的这件事情时，在场8位村民，包括两位当时参与处理这一冲突的老爷庙管理者，马上就对访谈者戒备起来，并质问为何询问此事，其中一位老爷庙管理者甚至一度语无伦次的高声埋怨基层干部的处事不公、贪污腐败，尤其是当看到我们所持有的宗教部门介绍信时，更是不再接受我们的访谈。

“现在这个基层政府嘛，有问题，这就是为什么现在习近平上来要抓腐败。那以前这个就是腐败嘛。因为他们是请什么宗教局来，但是我们是地方，我们有我们的信仰，我们信仰这个福德老爷，什么基督教啊，什么外国的啊，各有各的信仰。刚才第一句话说了，地是国家的，但是也是本乡本土的土地，你们管不了我们，是吧？”

可以看出，在这位老爷庙所有者的埋怨中，更多地是对基层政府的不满，不管是信仰分歧也罢，土地争夺也好，都是因为基督教的官方背景引起。考虑到“官方”在邓村人心目中的不良形象，这或许在一定程度上与基督教堂在邓村的边缘化也有关系。

三、不成比例的信仰格局：“私人”的抗争？

(1) 2014年7月25日对MFQ15的访谈。
关于邓村的宗教信仰格局，当地人是这么说的。一位基督徒说：“拜偶像的人多，信主的少，一百人不到一个人信主，1%都不到。” ①一位邻村年轻人说：“信老爷占绝大多数，约占80%，信基督教的很少。” ②一位本村老人家说：“我们村信耶稣的不多，0.1%这样子，没几户人。” ③

（一）香火旺盛的民间信仰

邓村民众绝大部分都是邓氏家族人，以祖宗崇拜、鬼神信仰为特征的民间信仰极为盛行。村里现有各类老爷庙14处，宗祠20余处，其中耗资百万元以上的在新修建的宗祠11处。邓氏家族有8个房支，每房支有1个福德老爷庙，分别称为“齐尾房支福德老爷”（创村第一个老爷庙，原老爷像被人偷去卖了④）、广胜福德老爷、南厝福德老爷、北厝福德老爷、桥头伯公、中房支福德老爷、桥子头伯公、树底福德老爷（原来有一颗大树，后被挖走）。我们所讨论的完全由私人修建、管理的田福德老爷庙不在其列，“田福德老爷庙”则主要是周边新建房子和外地生意人供奉，管理完全私人化，向所有人开放，由于所处地段较为繁华，故而香火比其它福德老爷庙兴旺许多。此外，另有6个规模较大的民间信仰庙：邓村古庙、将军庙、乐真宫、齐天大圣庙及两个太上老君庙。其中，邓村古庙是村集体所有，其它几个均为私人庙。

“像我们村里的那个古庙，就是由村里的8房支供奉，一个房支就两个人负责管理，组织神事。比如3月半老爷生日，很浓重，演戏要演3个夜晚，再加上福德老爷，就是4个晚上的戏，挨家挨户收香油钱，随便给，一般最少20，多的几千几百，全村8房支凑到一起，组成一个神会。”⑤

从老爷庙的格局和分布来看，邓村有着一个完整的类似于村委会与村民小组的神圣系统。全村共分为8个房支（村民小组），每一房支有一个共同的福德老爷庙，即土地庙，各个土地庙由各房支分别供奉，在村民的观念里土地庙关系着自己的“衣食住行”，是自己的衣食父母。同时，8房支共有一个全村的老爷庙“邓村古庙”，该庙由全体村民供养，每年每家每户需要上交“香油钱”，并雇有一名管理人员负责庙宇的日常维护管理，邓村古庙供奉的是“吴真君”，被村民们奉为保护神，保佑着村民的平安福禄。该庙类似于村委会，管辖着全村，其“会首”往往由村里面最有势力、最具号召力的人担任。如果说，老爷庙是类似于行政系统的神圣分布，那么另外一个神圣系统“祖祠”则类似于宗族系统

① 2014年7月27日对MCQ4的访谈。
② 2014年7月24日对MFT18的访谈。
③ 2014年8月3日对MWQ22的访谈。
④ 2014年7月31日对MWG21的访谈。
⑤ 2014年8月3日对MWQ22的访谈
的分布。邓村大大小小有20余个祠堂，有“总祠”即第一世祖宗的祠堂，全村共奉，下面按房支分为10个分祠。祠堂的华丽与否反映着该房支人员的兴旺与否，“光宗耀祖”的观念仍然深深影响着邓村人。

那个邓村古庙是全村的，8个房支都有份，拜神啊，年底谢神啊，家家户户都要出钱，收上来的资金全部由邓村最大房支的一家，他几个儿子都是搞建筑的，不是在外地搞，而是在村里面搞，村里所有的建设都是由他们家承包，是邓村的一霸，建政府楼房啊，学校啊，都是他们做。现在古庙的资金是由他在管。庙的管理就是资金凑起来，一个月请个人在里面管理，打扫卫生什么的。①

随着改革开放后经济的迅速发展，邓村绝大多数村民已经搬出老房子，往村子西边“石山”方向聚集新建房子。全村老房子绝大部分已经租给外地人，许多上百年的危房仍然有人租住，主要是前来打工的江西人为主。本地人虽然没住在老村子里，但是有一部分人还经常回到各自所在房支的土地庙祭拜，尤其初一、十五或者一些与老爷有关的节日。村民搬出原来的老村，意味着一定程度的脱离了原来的神圣系统。然而，村民对神圣资源的需求似乎并未减少。改革开放以来，邓村又新建起了6个私人的“老爷庙”。私人建庙在村民中间有多样的看法，绝不是简单的“积德行善”。事实上，大部分的私人庙，其所有者在村民中的名声并不好，多为村民口中的“地痞”。“地痞”能建庙，而且香火还很旺，这与城镇化的进程是分不开的。正是城镇化所带来的“半熟人社会”以及村民的“个体化”发展，为私人庙提供了生存的土壤，其合法性有别于传统的“道德、名声”，而来自于庙主所掌握的资源。这其中就包括我们文中所讲的“田福德老爷庙”。

老爷庙在当地除了具有供神的功能之外，还有一个非常显著的功能就是娱乐议事功能。在当地建造一座老爷庙，除了供奉老爷的神殿之外，必须要建一个配套的理事会办公室，如果资金有限，“老爷”就委屈点，把神殿的空间缩小，腾出一块隔间用于理事会工作。而实际上所谓理事会办公室，绝大部分时候是用于当地“闲杂人等”（多数时候是50岁以上的人家）喝茶、看电视，甚至是打牌、下棋、买六合彩之用。因此，当地老爷庙必备的除了老爷神像外，就是潮汕功夫茶具、电视机。相当一部分老爷庙，老爷的神殿很小，而用于娱乐议事的办公楼却很宽敞，比如田福德老爷庙即是如此。

实际上，这种功能设置恰恰反映了“老爷庙”在当地所起到的地方社会秩序建构的功能，这也就是为什么公共庙——“邓村古庙”是由村中最有号召力的人来管理，而私人庙的所有者也往往是村中政治经济精英，从而对庙的控制成了权力的象征。

① 2014年7月31日对MWG21的访谈。
庙呢，主要是几个有钱人，把庙占住，然后重新建设，建个新庙，说起来，有些像西藏那个一样，变成神权。那些占庙的人，说得不好就是村里的地痞流氓，他们组合在一起，搞个庙，谁都不敢反对。建起来之后，他们就有一种权利，那个香油钱就由他们分配。

显然，筹资建庙在当地已绝非简单的“行善积德”，而民间信仰的一派繁荣也绝非所谓的宗教复兴。其关键因素，就在于“老爷”的私有化。正如一位被聘来看庙十余年的外地人所说“都是为了钱，你要有钱，建个庙，弄点花花草草，你也能赚钱，建庙为了钱，来拜的人也是为了钱！”

（二）福音不兴的基督教会

相对于庙宇林立、人头攒动的民间信仰盛况，基督教会就显得冷清落寞了许多。邓村，虽说当地人仍然习惯性的称之为“村”，但实际上见不到“小桥流水人家，枯藤老树昏鸦”的农村面貌，已经开发为商业街，有大量外来人口，人员比较密集，流动性也很大。然而，南镇基督堂在此建堂已近 20 年，来自本镇的教徒却非常少，而且越是靠近教堂信徒反而越少。比如与教堂比邻而居的邓村和翁村的信徒显得尤其少，在村中的比例几乎可以忽略不计。从 2014 年南镇基督教会受浸名单来看南镇本地人也只占受浸洗人数的一半，仅 55 人，其中教堂街对面的翁村有 4 人，而教堂所在村的邓村这三年里没有人参加受洗。

从 2014 年南镇基督教会受洗人数的相关情况中可以看出，在教徒来源方面南镇本地人与外地人各占 50%，其中外省人占到了 22%，附近镇的人数约占 26%，这与南镇常住人口分布基本相符，反映了南镇人口结构的地区分布多样性，是一个典型的半熟人社会结构的城中村模式。然而，最为特别的是教堂所在地——邓村却三年中无一人参加受洗。

在性别上，女性教徒占 63%，男性为 37%，与一些学者对我国宗教信徒探讨中所提到“妇女多”的情况相符，也比较准确的反映了南镇当地的信徒性别结构，与笔者参加的多次礼拜活动中，所见到的女性居多的情况是相符的。

① 2014 年 7 月 31 日对 MWQ22 的访谈。
② 2014 年 7 月 23 日对 MWQ24 的访谈。
在年龄结构上，呈现了明显的年轻人占大比例的情况，16 岁至 39 岁这一年龄段的人占到了总数的 77%，随着年龄的增长逐步减少。当然，要指出的是这一份受洗名单，而非全体信徒的年龄分布，新入教的多为年轻人本也实属自然。结合参与观察及访谈的感受，这多少也能够一定程度反映出年轻人思想更为开放，对信仰的追求更为自主，当然其中也有一部分是受家庭传承的影响而参加受洗。

此外，我们反复对信徒的地域分布进行关注。事实上，作为滨海地区，又是全国最大的华侨输出地，潮汕地区的基督教有着 160 余年的历史，而且人数相对较多，邓村所在镇的基督教最早可以追溯到 1894 年。问题是，高大雄伟的基督教堂在邓村虽已建成近 20 年，然而如以上资料所示，基督教在邓村仅有两三户边缘化的村民信仰，而且趋势是越来越无人问津。

基督教堂与田福德老爷庙一墙之隔，一些年轻人经常到老爷庙烧香，即使一抬头就能看到教堂的红色十字架，却不知道隔壁有个基督教堂，有些人知道，但是从未进去过，不知道基督教是做什么的，一些村民用“无神论”来形容基督教，说他们不拜神、不拜祖宗，什么都不信，就是聚会唱歌。

我们村很少人信基督教，听说有那么一两户人信。他们信了教就不用拜了嘛，什么都不用拜，祖宗的香炉啊什么的都不要了。听说信教的人啊，拜的东西都不能吃的，拜完的他们不吃。①

基督教在当地被边缘化，被排斥的状况是普遍存在的，这种排斥很多时候还会演化为家庭矛盾，甚至是家庭暴力。

“在这边信基督教很崎岖的，会被家人打。我以前信主就是被我的家人绑住好多年，而且被他们打，我当时有 20 出头了。我前不久遇到两个女的，一个 22 岁，一个 25 岁，她们来祷告，被家人反对，打啊，骂啊。他们家人让她们跪下，让她们承诺以后不再去信上帝了，要不然就不认她们，不给她们饭吃。对她们上班下班的时间要求很严，不准她们下班后随便走，防止她们来教堂。”②

这种对子女改宗的恐惧与暴力，多数情况下并非简单的信仰问题，而是一种来自于社会关系、舆论的压力所致。

“他们去拜也是因为别人都拜，怕别人说闲话，还有就是相互攀比，比供品和捐款，越

① 2014 年 8 月 2 日对 MWQ23 的访谈。
② 2014 年 8 月 7 日对 MCQ2 的访谈。
多越有面子。是一种社会交际需要，真正信的人很少。”

在改革开放的前沿，在基督教最早传入的海滨地区，而且是外来人口激增，异质性较显著的城中村，仍然呈现出一个单向度的“老爷”垄断信仰的格局，初看起来多少有些不太寻常。其间的原因自然繁多，与两种信仰方式的管理制度也有着一定的联系。

四、官家与私人：两种管理模式

基督教、民间信仰，应该说都属于宗教管理范畴，然而在实际操作中两者的管理方式迥然不同。可姑且称之为“官家教会”与“私人老爷”。所谓官家教会，这里主要是指在管理制度上的官方化、政治化、行政化，从而使人感觉到基督教有“官家”身份；而“私人老爷”则是指，民间信仰场所的私人化、私有化，在一些村落，村民随意占地建庙，私人管理、私人经营，有些私有化的老爷庙就像商业面铺一样，可以出租、转让，甚至一些不法之徒利用“老爷”开夫妻店，行骗牟利。这种管理方式，用一位村民的话说就是：“老爷庙是村里人的，教堂是市里的。”

（一）“官家教会”：基督教管理的官家化

基督教，作为一个具有两千多年历史的制度性宗教，完备周密的制度安排是其特征。在传入中国后，基本沿袭了原有组织机构和管理制度。新中国成立后，其在组织结构上进行了改革，在政府主导下分别于 1954 年建立了“三自爱国运动委员会”及 1980 年成立了“基督教协会”，即通常所讲的基督教两会。两会的设立既统一了全国基督教组织，也理顺了与宗教管理部门的关系。就本案例而言，邓村基督教组织结构大致如图 2 所示：

![图 2. 邓村基督教堂组织机构示意图](attachment:image.png)

从邓村基督教的组织结构中可以看出基督教有着较为清晰的层次化科层制结构。区基督教“两会”下辖 18 个堂点，对各个堂点进行教务上的指导和安排，在有较大自治权的基础上，向市两会负责。在堂点层面，日常事务由“堂委会”选举产生的长老、执事负责，重大决策则必须通过“堂委会”集体讨论通过。在堂委会之下，设有各类教务、职能

① 2014 年 7 月 25 日对 MCQ1 的访谈
② 2014 年 8 月 7 日对 MWQ27 的访谈。
事工部门，这些事工部门除了完成本堂点的相关教牧事务外，在原则上还得接受区两会的工作指导，配合它们开展一些跨堂性的宗教活动。

值得注意的是，就本区域而言，由于“堂委会”掌握着教堂的资源管理与分配权，所以教堂长老、执事较之“两会”人员与普通教牧有着更为实质性的权力，在邓村基督教堂尤其如此。当然，由于堂委会主任必须是由“两会”任命，因而多数情况下堂委会对“两会”较为配合。也有发生矛盾的时候，尤其是当出现“两会”所任命的人员与信众所认同的人员不一致时。从已经出现的几次矛盾来看，最终堂委会主任的选择还是由“两会”决定。从而也说明，虽然日常事务中，教堂保有着较大的自主权，但终归听命于“两会”，尤其是涉及到重要人事安排的时候。

宗教机构的官僚化为“宗教普世主义联合”打下了社会—心理方面的基础。这种科层制结构模式，使得基督教呈现出一种世俗的独立系统，具备了追求自身政治、经济利益的一面。教会与政治制度和经济制度之间的关系，包括从相互支持、到部分适应、到竞争、到公开冲突在内的关系脉络中，教会不可避免地建立起自己的“世俗”利益。由此，不论在行动动机上还是在组织架构上，基督教都具备了自身政治化的条件。这种政治化的条件在一贯将宗教问题视为意识形态与上层建筑的中国，从其传入起就获得了政府的格外关照。

改革开放以来，中国政府对基督教的管理，是一个不断调整、不断完善的过程。主要路径是一个从行政领导到社会治理法制化的进程。可以说，当前还只是采取了法制—行政化的管理模式，离真正的宗教法制化还有相当大的距离。这种法制—行政化主要体现在，各级宗教事务部门往往依据领导讲话、政策条例以行政手段直接干涉宗教场所的教务、堂务，大部分时候并不是按照法律程序、依照法律条文进行工作指导与调控。

在邓村基督教堂方面所体现的就是，教堂的相关工作接受潮南区基督教两会的领导，区两会一方面接受市两会的指导，另一方面还接受区宗教局的行政领导，而且实质上宗教局的行政命令往往比市基督教两会更为不可抗拒。如此一来，基督教的管理制度从两方面显现出一种行政化、官方化的特征：一是自身组织架构的科层制与管理方式的层级制；更重要的是基督教两会实际上接受着各级宗教事务部门的行政领导，呈现出一种“官家”的特征。

（二）“私人老爷”：民间信仰管理的私有化

相对基督教组织架构与管理制度的正式化、官方化，民间信仰则要简单得多。用一位
基督教两会人员的话说：

他们没有什么组织管理，他们比我们基督教“三自”还多一自，就是“四自”——自治、自养、自传、自管，政府不管他们。而且我们潮汕地区很多，到处都是，高速路旁边也都是“南无阿弥陀佛”，我们基督教不能在那些地方树立这些东西。这些都是当地的寺庙做上去的。

民间信仰的管理在我国一直属于不清不楚的灰色地带。这与人们对民间信仰的认识有关。长期以来，民间信仰是不是宗教存在较大的争议。在一些地方政府的行政过程中，民间信仰往往被当作习俗、文化对待，在不触及地方治安的情况下通常任由发展。随着近年来国家对非物质文化遗产的重视，被定为地方文化习俗的民间信仰一定程度上也得到了政府的关照和支持，甚至是直接参与组织，鼓励发展。邓村高密度的民间信仰场所就是一个例证。

至于民间信仰到底是不是宗教，这个问题杨庆堃在《中国社会中的宗教》一书中作了详细论述，他将“超自然”因素作为区别宗教与非宗教的核心因素，从而用“扩散性宗教”的概念正式提出了民间信仰也是一种宗教。韦伯也认为，在中国，民间信仰是“功能性神灵的大杂烩”，而这即是中国宗教的特征。应该说，民间信仰虽有别于基督教式的“制度性宗教”，但其本质上也是一种宗教。

即使政府不这么认为，至少普通民众是这么认为的，所谓“其在君子以为人道也，其在百姓以为鬼事也”①。这一现象在潮汕尤甚，“拜老爷”是人们日常生活一部分。祈福、祛病、求财、问安、逢年过节，都要去“老爷庙”拜拜。“拜拜总是好的”是当地人普遍的观念。如此广泛的社会基础，有着一呼百应、一点即燃的潜在力量。这股力量需要政府加以正确的引导。

就邓村来看，目前有 6 个较大的“老爷庙”，其中一个是由集体所有，实际掌控者是村中 8 个房支中最大一房的族长，同时也是村里的政治、经济精英。另外 5 个分别由村里不同的个人经营管理，比如上文所讲老爷庙即是由三位包工头合伙管理。取得庙的所有权，说来简单，不需要任何手续，只需要用明争暗斗的各种手段占据一块地方，这个地方或许曾经有过老庙，或许未曾有过，之后募集资金修建或修缮改造一番即可。谁领头建的庙，庙也就被认为是他的。当然，在名义上庙是“老爷”的，庙里所有的财产物资也均属于“老爷”所有，但实际上，这些庙是私人的，而且是世袭的。

“鬼神在我们是权力，不是理想；是财源，不是公道”。③关于民间信仰功利性的论
述可谓汗牛充栋，在此不赘述。此处想强调的是，不仅大部分信仰者是一种世俗和功利之心，多数管理经营“老爷庙”者亦是如此。正如一位老者所言：

名义上是做善事，但是也不知道做了多少善事。就是等于，他们控制了那个庙，他们就有这个神的权力，利用这个神，就有了资金，用这资金就能体现出他们的权力啊，他们要做什么他们有选择。所以乡里的干部对他们就有所求，就比较尊重他们，也不敢得罪他们。而且，他们可以煽动组织一批人去告干部们，对干部们就有威胁。他们想做些自己的事情也就比较好做。①

村落精英充分的利用了民间信仰的“敬祖收宗、祭神聚力”的功能，形成一股势力，这股势力超脱于公权力之外，既可使力于普通民众，亦可设阻于基层政府，呈现出一种实实在在的私人性。这种私人性既不受《宗教事务条例》约束，也不受某个具体政府部门管辖，可谓随心所欲。

这两种管理制度对两种信仰方式的影响，用一位基督教两会人员的话或许可以有所启发：“我们基督教做事情都很规范的，有些感觉做什么的畏手畏脚；而拜老爷的没什么道理讲的，想怎么就怎么，可以说有些无法无天。” ②一个“畏手畏脚”，一个“无法无天”，语气或许有些过重，但多少反映了在政府管理方面规则的不完善。基督教有明确的规章和相应的部门加以管理，组织与管理关系较为清晰；而民间信仰当前仍属于“四不清”：属性界定不清、管理主体不清、管理依据不清、发展方向不清，正是这“四不清”使得政府在面对民间信仰时被动和滞后，私人化成为了某种必然。

五、邓村信仰格局的构成因素分析

信仰格局的形成，其核心是人与社会秩序之间的关系，其中涉及人人关系、人神关系、教教关系、政教关系，揭示的是一个区域各类资源、规则互动的结果。从上述分析中，我们或许可以将这一格局归结为以下三个主要缘由。

（一）作为社会认同方式的信仰

大量社会学研究显示，人们倾向于井然有序地沿着社会网络、关系纽带及个人的情感依附所指示的线路纬度，去做出他们的宗教选择，并追求他们的宗教生活道路。③宗教作
为一种象征意义共同体，既制约着人们的现实生活，也是对现存人类生存条件的反应，如若不出现特别的插曲，人们多倾向于与周边亲近的人选择相同的信仰。即使在个体化比较显著的美国，改变宗教信仰也很罕见，据估计改信全新宗教的美国人不足1%。更何况，不像西方那种“独立的自我”（independent self），华人生活在这种有延续性的稳定关系网之中，是一种“互依的自我”（interdependent self）。这种关系中的自我在信仰选择上表现出更为有限的选择性。父子关系是这一关系的核心，其他所有关系都是父子关系的延伸或补充，或是从属于父子关系的。整个亲属关系内的各种关系都是为了延续家族的父系。“父子同一”的关系网络一定程度上决定了“子承父信”的必然性，如有违背，则被视为“忤逆不孝”。

为此，为了自我能获得一种有序的日常生活，保有基本的本体性安全感，保持与社会互动网络的同一社会认同，显然是明智的选择。这种选择既出于现实生活需要，也是一种感情需要。因为，在邓村，不论是民间信仰、基督教，还是天主教都有着明显的家族传承关系，且多数人将此视为理所当然，毋庸置疑。这体现出有着“历史居先”性制度结构对行动者制约性的一面。然而，在这种家族传承的信仰中，其信仰的虔信度变得退居其次，转而更为重视信仰的象征、仪式，通过积极参与信仰仪式，明确共同体成员身份，展示和激励关系网络，从而发挥更多的世俗功能。

不论是民间信仰者还是基督教徒，在祖传的信仰中，都一定程度地表现出了个人虔信的弱化。当然，相对来说，民间信仰者更为明显。许多民间信仰者其实仅仅是将民间信仰视为社会交往的平台和方式，将信仰仪式作为一个炫富、展示自我的手段，他们认为基督教那种简朴的仪式是穷人的选择，民间信仰的烧大炮才显得“有面子”。这种信仰方式的逐渐扩散也在形塑着宗教信仰本身，即体现出作为行动者的“使动性”一面。例如，基督教葬礼不磕头、不烧纸、不哭灵、不吹不唱等行为，使非基督徒对其评价从“不热闹、没意思”的就事论事，到不孝顺、藐视祖先，进而再上升到违反中国传统文化，使其处于高张力之中的基督教面临着极大的压力。通过一段时间的形塑，“富拜老爷，穷信基督”的观念已经在邓村形成，这也一定程度上影响到了双方的发展格局。也就是说，基督教在“面子”上输给了民间信仰。

（二）村落精英对现有秩序的维护

基督教在邓村所面临的阻力直观地体现在村落精英对现有秩序的依赖及对神圣资源的掌控。这种依赖和掌控源于村落精英阶层的天然属性，即他们权威性与合法性的保障——
信仰资源所发挥的类似于世界观的意义根据、价值取向及道德基础功能。通过上文的分析可以看出，邓村民间信仰以孝道伦理和差序格局为特征，这种从差序格局出发的神人关系和信仰秩序无疑奠基于儒家伦理实践，这既是邓村神伦、神人关系的基本特点，也是邓村社会秩序构成的基础。这一基石主张个人和任何其他人交往时，都应当从“亲疏”和“尊卑”两个认知向度来衡量彼此之间的角色关系：前者指彼此关系的亲疏远近，后者是指双方地位的尊卑上下。一个合乎秩序规范的行为应当是依“亲亲之杀，尊贤之等”所作出的差序性反应。

正是这一秩序构成规则，通过“村公庙、家族总祠堂——房支庙、房支祠堂——私人庙、家祠”三级两线的精神空间认同等级结构，成就了“村长/族长——组长/房支长——寺庙所有人/家长”的三级网络村落精英阶层。这一秩序构成规则与村落精英阶层无疑是一种互依互存的关系。村落精英一方面有天然维护现有秩序的动力，另一方面有不断壮大村落组织和扩大自身影响力的动机，即其有与家族、信仰组织等共生共长的一面。通过举行祭祖仪式敬祖收宗，通过经营庙宇从事灵力生产，则是达到这一目的的有效方式。如有学者所指出的，“对信仰资源的控制，其意义已不仅仅是家族的认同与凝聚的问题，更多地是出于巩固家族在村落和区域中政治、经济地位的目的”。也因为如此，祭祖拜神已不仅仅是一种信仰行为，它在更大层面上表达的是一个家族、村落、区域的政治、社会影响力，它在某种程度上是一种政治行为，一种展示组织号召力、凝聚力的仪式和象征平台。任何背离这一平台的行为都被认为是对所在共同体的背叛，是对精英阶层的挑战。毫无疑问，转信基督教意味着一种背离。

另外，信仰者在信仰选择上的功利性、此岸关怀，反过来使得村落精英在信仰资源的掌控方面有着更为明显的成效。某种程度上说，村落精英有着优于神灵的一面。之所以如此，如韦伯所言：“中国的宗教，不管它是巫术性的或是祭典性的，究其意义而言是面向今世的……无论如何，一般而言，正统的儒教中国人，是为了它在此岸的命运——为了长寿、子嗣与财富，以及在很小的程度上为了祖先的幸福——而祭祀，全然不是为了他在彼岸的命运。”相对于祭祖拜神所起到改变今世命运的作用，与村落精英保持良好关系显得更为实际。尤其是在改革开放的前沿地带——邓村，村落精英往往掌握着大量资源，他们完全有能力改变任何一个普通村民的命运，可使之富贵荣华，这正是他们绝大多数人求神拜佛所愿，也可使之穷困潦倒。简单地讲，作为普通村民，宁可得罪死去的野鬼，也不

①[德]卢克曼著：《无形的宗教：现代社会中的宗教问题》，覃方明译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003 年版，第 33 页。
②黄国光：《儒家关系主义：文化反思与典范重建》，北京：北京大学出版社，2006 年版，第 206 页。
③刘晓春：《仪式与象征的秩序——一个客家村落的历史、权力与记忆》，北京：商务印书局，2003 年版，第 217 页。
④[德]韦伯著：《儒教与道教》，洪天富译，南京：江苏人民出版社，1995 年版，第 169—170 页
可得罪活着的强人。

村落精英作为现有秩序的受益者和守护者，他们有著不遗余力维护现有信仰格局的动机，而邓村的社会结构无疑为村落精英提供了有利的外部环境。从神伦、神人、人人关系方面来讲，村落精英对现有秩序的维护也的确可行。关键是，村落精英对圣神资源的私人化控制，当前来看，显得是那么无拘无束。“私人老爷”服务私人，岂非天经地义？

（三）宗教管理模式的影响

如前所述，我国当前的宗教管理有着明显的政治化特征，是一种行政管理方式。基督教“两会”虽说是非政府性组织，但在很大程度上行使着部分政府职能。这使得一部分村民把基督教误认为是政府组织，与他们所理解的宗教信仰似乎颇有距离。这种政治化、行政化特征，再加上基督教教堂的建筑往往高大雄伟，使普通民众有一种望而却步的敬畏。而基督教限于定片、定点、定人的“三定”规定也几乎不与教堂外面的人员接触。这样一来，基督教堂虽然在邓村已建成二十多年，但对于多数民众来说它仍然是一个陌生的神秘所在。

截然不同的是，民间信仰组织则完全融入了当地人的日常生活，除了具备给人提供精神寄托的宗教功能外，“老爷庙”还普遍承担着休闲、交际的功能，设有茶点、电视、棋牌等娱乐休闲设施。因而，相对于基督教堂的门可罗雀，“老爷庙”往往信众众多、游人如织、人满为患。宗教的根源在于日常生活的实际事务中。正是在日常生活的交际互动过程中，民间信仰得以维持和发展，并与世俗生活相互渗透、建构，为邓村人提供一个日常生活的秩序。

民间信仰与基督教在组织结构和对外形象上的差异，体现出的是两种信仰方式与民众认识的内在张力。这种张力既源起于两者本身的文化背景，也可归因于两者与行政权力的不同关系。关于文化背景方面的论述已有众多论著涉及，而且也不是本文的关注点。可以认为，就本案例而言，行政权力与两者关系的差异在很大程度上影响了两者不同的发展境遇和格局。

民间信仰具备着较为突出的民间组织特性，既可联合地方精英对行政权力构成挑战，亦可代表民意影响地方行政人员的任免。民间信仰这种非正式的权威，在有着明显灰色政治的邓村扮演着普通民众可供仰仗的政治势力，基层干部越是腐败无能，民间信仰则越是兴盛发达，它们之间呈现出一种反相关性，即所谓“假如有尽善尽美的政府，就不需要神灵”。民间信仰在这里不只是提供了民众在面临危机时候所仰仗的神灵，更重要的是提

① 李向平：《“社团”与“法人”的双重建构——当代中国宗教政策与管理制度改革路线图》，《上海大学学报》，2015 年，第 32 卷，第 2 页。
② [美] 彼得・贝格尔著：《神圣的帷幕：宗教社会学理论之要素》，高师宁译，上海：上海人民出版社，1991 年版，第 50 页。
③ [美] 杨庆堃：《中国社会中的宗教：宗教的现代社会功能及其历史因素之研究》，范丽珠译，上海：上海人民出版社，2006 年版，第 69 页。
供了一个实实在在的组织架构，包括各类“老人会”、“理事会”等民间信仰组织。这类组织一旦集聚了广泛的民意，势不可挡，往往促使地方政府作出政策或者人员上的调整。试想，如果这一势力针对的是基督教呢？那即成了难以逾越的阻力。

反观基督教，不论是其组织机构安排还是普通民众意识，都显现出某种政治化、行政化、衙门化倾向。这种半官方模式，在邓村引发出两个问题，对其发展造成局限。一是与乡镇一级行政权力呈现出一种尴尬的局面。邓村基督教堂既接受区基督教“两会”领导，同时也接受区宗教局的行政领导，这种对区一级行政部门负责的身份等同于乡镇一级行政机构，即是呈现一种同级别假象，然而在日常实践中，毫无疑问基督教堂受制于乡镇行政权力。这种同级假象，使得基督教堂与乡镇行政权力关系不清楚，这种模糊关系更多的是使得乡镇一级行政部门往往将基督教堂撇开在自己的行政职能内，采取选择性行政管理，对自己有利时采取行动，不利时不作为。

这就不难理解当强势的民间信仰对垒弱势的基督教堂时，基层政府往往不作为甚至被民间信仰所俘获的情况了。另一个问题是，即使基督教与乡镇一级行政权力本质上并不相关，然而普通民众往往将其视为同一属性，即便是在本案例中，基督教事实上介入了民众对土地问题的怨怼行列。在民间信仰与基督教产生的冲突事件中，市级行政权力强有力地介入，再一次向邓村民众明确展示了基督教与行政权力之间“密切”的关系。如此一来，引发的现状就是，在灰色政风的背景下，民众容易对半官方特征的基督教产生反感。

应该说，民间信仰所具有的私人化与非政府组织的特征和基督教所呈现的官方化、行政化的特征，在一定程度上对二者的格局发挥着影响，而在邓村这种影响尤为明显。

六、小结

一个城镇化背景下的宗族村落，呈现着表面上的多元特征：外来人口的激增；贫富分化的愈烈；灰色的政风；强权掌控的经济。经由一次民间信仰与基督教的冲突事件，这种多元实质呈现出两元：官家与私人。

作为宗族村落的邓村，渗透着浓厚的差序格局、孝道伦理、崇祖敬神观念，将人人、神人、教教等各类关系整合为“私人关系”。村落精英则通过掌控尽可能多的平台来俘获这一关系，其中即包括“老爷庙”这一神圣资源平台。而“老爷庙”所发挥的神圣资源整合作用，在宗教事务管理过程中并未得到充分的认识，从而出现了治理真空。

同样作为神圣资源的基督教一方，由于其自身组织架构与管理制度的完备性，呈现出一种潜在的政治化特质，从而得到了政府管理的“格外关照”。其管理制度有着明显的行政化与官方化特征。这一特征对内造成多头领导，易生事端；对外世俗化、官方化色彩重，使其失去了宗教应有的特性与功能。

在这种管与不管之间，我们看到，“私人老爷”呈现出的是混乱无序，甚至成为个人敛财与损坏公共利益的工具，而格外“兴旺发达”；而“官家教会”则官僚化明显，失去
本来的亲和性与超越性，反而愈加“福音不兴”。

应该说，不论是“官家”还是“私人”都不是其应然形态，宗教管理的法治化、社会化才是方向和目标。而这，实质上涉及的是一种对政教关系的认识。如阿克顿所讲：“政教分离对自由来说是必要的。如果二者联合，国家是不宽容的；如果二者分离得过分，宗教就不宽容。它们之间相互影响是必要的”。①如何相互影响涉及手段的问题，而法治手段无疑是最为可行的选择，在法治的两端，是公权力与社会化管理的宗教组织。

① [英]阿克顿：《自由与权力》，候健，范亚峰译，南京：译林出版社，2011年版，第67页。
附一：本案例主要访谈对象概况表

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注：性别：F(female)代表女性，M(man)代表男性；
宗教信仰：F（folk beliefs）代表民间信仰，C（Chritianity）代表基督教，T代表天主教，W代表无宗教信仰；
政治面貌：G代表共产党员，T代表团员，Q代表群众；
附二：作者联系方式

刘大为（1986 年生），男，湖南耒阳人，华东师范大学社会发展学院博士研究生
联系地址：上海市闵行区虹梅南路 5800 号研究生公寓 15 栋 312 室
邮编：200241
电话：18930342350；15977388183
邮箱：154593552@qq.com；liudawei86110@163.com
Benefits and Politics:
The Reason of City A and City B’s Christian triple markets’ transformation
LI Hui

Abstract:
In general, state’s religious policies have a great influence on the formation of Christian triple markets. However, on a meso level, the benefits of individual or group is the most important factor in the process of transformation of religious triple markets. When there are lacking of communication between church and government, the government, as a strong side, will take step to suppress religion. However, the consequence of the suppression towards black religious market can hardly achieve the aim of wiping unregistered churches. On the contrary, the harsh religious policies driven the unregistered churches’ development.

Keywords: Christian Triple Markets theory benifits
利益与政治：
以 A 市和 B 市基督教为例的三色市场转换原因探析

摘要：宏观上的宗教政策对基督教三色市场的形成有着直接的影响，但在具体的案例中，个人和团体的利益是导致宗教三色市场之间转换的重要因素。当教会和政府双方在缺乏沟通以及触碰到双方底线时，作为强势的政府会对教会采取严厉的打压措施。但政府对黑色宗教市场的打压并没有起到预期的效果，相反却刺激教会向外发展。

关键词：基督教  三色市场理论  利益
引言

2004 年杨凤岗教授将美国罗德尼・斯达克（Rodney Stark）和罗杰尔・芬克（Roger Finke）的著作《信仰的法则——解释宗教之人的方面》介绍到中国。从而，在中国的宗教社会学界引起了诸多关于“宗教市场论”和“理性选择”的讨论。尽管这部著作是宗教市场理论的集大成者，但依旧面临诸多的批评。作为该书的中文译者，杨凤岗教授认为该理论在中国应用时，需要考虑到中国具体的宗教历史和环境；特别是广泛存在于中国的非制度化宗教和非组织化的个体宗教行为；另外，宗教市场的另一方：政府对宗教的管理，也是在中国检验该理论时需要着重考虑的。2012 年，杨凤岗老师的著作《宗教在中国——共产主义统治下的幸存与复兴》正式出版，在书中杨老师系统论述了宗教市场理论的优点，结合中国的宗教情况，发展出宗教的“三色市场理论（Triple Markets Theory）”。

宗教“三色市场”理论的探讨

杨老师的问题意识非常明确，如书名所言，作者希望探讨的是在共产主义统治下的中国宗教是如何幸存和复兴的。也即，国家在多大程度上可以控制宗教的增减？是什么原因造成严厉的宗教政策并不能减少人们的宗教参与，以及这种政策的结果是什么？作者认为当宗教政策限制非常严厉的时候，宗教不会消亡，而是会使宗教市场复杂化：一些宗教活动会走向地下，另外一些会在模糊的灰色地带中继续存在，从而导致红色、黑色和灰色三种宗教市场的出现。

作者提出三个定义认为：红色宗教市场包括所有合法的也即官方承认的宗教组织、个人和活动。具体到中国而言，红色宗教市场包括在宗教爱国组织控制下的五大宗教。黑色宗教市场宗教包括所有非法的也即官方所禁止的宗教组织、个人和活动。具体到中国而言，黑色宗教市场包括官方所禁止的宗教组织、个人和活动。灰色宗教市场则包括部分合法的宗教组织、个人和活动。具体到中国而言，灰色宗教市场包括部分合法的宗教组织、个人和活动。
个人和宗教活动。包括那些不愿意加入爱国组织的信仰者，像天主教中的地下教会，基督教中的家庭教会。灰色的宗教市场包含所有处于模糊法律地位，属于宗教性或灵性（spiritual）的组织、实践者和活动。这个市场包含两个主要部分，明晰的宗教现象如合法的宗教组织、个人或不明组织所支持的非法宗教活动，以及由政府机构和官员所赞助的宗教活动，如政府为了开发旅游而兴建寺庙；另外一种是含糊的宗教现象，它包括以文化或保健科学的形式所表现出来的宗教，如气功。

作者依据三种宗教市场的划分进而提出了三个命题：一旦宗教组织在人数和运作上受到限制，黑色宗教市场就会出现，尽管黑色市场中的信徒需要承担很高的信仰成本。一旦红色宗教市场受到限制且黑色宗教市场受到压制，灰色宗教市场就会出现。对宗教的压制越厉害，灰色宗教市场就越大，例如，文革期间的“毛信仰”是对宗教的一种替代。6

杨凤岗老师在书的前言中强调，该书的目的是要提供一个在中国共产主义统治下宗教变迁的全景式理解，并为之提供一个理论解释。7不可否认，以无神论为纲的共产主义与宗教之间存在着紧张关系。从宏观上看，宗教处于一种被压制的状态，特别是对于地下教会的控制，一直是政府宗教政策的着力点，希望可以将他们纳入到爱国宗教组织的管理下。尽管在具体的操作层面，国家对地下教会的管控不能达到其预期的结果，但是从宏观上，特别是国家的宗教政策上看，并不能否认地下教会处于黑色市场的事实。

然而，在中观层面上理解宗教的三色市场理论，会看到现实中宗教市场的复杂性。就目前相对宽松的宗教政策而言，政教之间呈现更多的是一种互动的关系。地方政府了解家庭教会广泛存在的事实，在“宗教与社会主义相适应”的口号下，政府对待家庭教会并不会都采取严厉的打压措施。在这种形势下，宗教三色市场的内涵需要重新界定。三色市场之间转换的原因，就显得更为复杂。

在区域内的基督教群体内，同样存在着基督教的三色市场。加入基督教两会的教会得到了政府的承认，属于红色宗教市场；没有加入到三自中的教会也即地下教会则是黑色宗教市场。而灰色宗教市场，则包含了三自教会做的一些政府并

7 Fenggang Yang, Religion in China- Survival and Revival under Communist Rule. pp. XI-XII.
不允许的宗教活动。尽管国家的宗教政策中认定家庭教会的非法地位，但是在目前的实际情况中，家庭教会在当地的发展获得了一定程度上的自由，形成了一种模糊地位，政府知其存在，但在一定程度上允许地下教会的发展，就是所谓的地方政府在经常采取一些“非正式制度”来灵活的处理具体事务。因此，具体到中观层面而言，可以将没有受到地方政府直接冲击的家庭教会划分到灰色市场中，而那些受到政府直接冲击的家庭教会列入黑色宗教市场。

在相对宽松的政治环境下，是什么样的因素导致了宗教市场的复杂化？宗教三色市场之间是如何进行转换的？或者说在转换的过程中呈现出的是一种什么样的机制？这种转换机制对于地方（Local）的政教关系的研究有什么样的意义？笔者选取A市和B市的基督教为例，对个案进行深描式的介绍。结合宏观宗教三色市场理论试图回答以上问题。可以发现，尽管宏观的宗教政策对当地基督教三色市场的形成有着直接的影响，但个人和团体的利益是导致宗教三色市场之间转换的重要因素。当教会和政府双方在缺乏沟通以及触碰到双方底线时，作为强势的政府会对教会采取严厉的打压措施。通过A市和B市两地教会的比较研究可以看到，政府对教会的打压并没有起到预期的效果，相反却刺激教会向外发展。

以A市为个案的基督教三色市场

A市基督教在历史上属于内地会的传教区域，基督教在当地曾经蓬勃发展。改革开放之后，A市基督教信徒逐步发展，到2014年为止，全市基督徒人数已经达到13.2万人，占总人口的3%。

2009年A市一间教会因教产的问题与当地政府发生冲突，这件事引起了不小的国际关注。笔者作为在校学生非常好奇教会和政府双方在事件中所持的观点。当时笔者接触到一位当事人，但他显然不愿意对一个学生多讲这件事情，而是对于向别人传教表现出了很大的热情。当笔者再次接触到这个事件的时候，已经到了2014年。尽管这件事基本上已经尘埃落定，但它产生的地震波式的影响依旧在持续。被捕入狱的教会领袖俨然成为了信徒心中的“殉道者”，其影响力

9 周雪光：《权威体制与有效治理：当代中国国家治理的制度逻辑》，载《开放时代》，2011年第10期，第67-85页。
10 文中“基督教”仅指基督教新教（Protestantism），不包含基督宗教中的天主教、东正教等。
11 数据来源：《A市天主教基督教基本情况》，A市宗教局内部资料，2014年。
已经扩展到了省内其他县市，甚至临近的省份。在一份政府的内部资料中显示：
“自2013年底，该教会的服刑劳教人员全部释放后，目前扩张之势明显。”可以看出，政府对A市的家庭教会依旧非常忌惮。

**从红色市场到灰色市场**

A市现在主要的家庭教会与文革前的家庭教会基本上并无联系，这一点与梁家麟的描述非常类似。现在的家庭教会主要是改革开放之后逐渐形成的。最初大部分教会都处于爱国宗教组织中，也就是处于宗教的红色市场中，直到1992年A市最大的教会——恩典教会，出现了一次严重的分裂，从此A市才逐渐开始形成颇具规模的家庭教会系统，其中恩华是该家庭教会系统中最主要的克利斯玛式教会领袖。

恩华的父亲是一名老传道人，1949年后政府通报恩典教会，不允许恩华的父亲在该教会中牧会。恩华的丈夫朝阳初中毕业后成为当地一名普通工人，朝阳的父亲是本地一所大学的教师。恩华大学毕业后与朝阳成婚，并到朝阳父亲所在的大学任教。随后因学校岗位调整恩华被迫下岗。由于恩华是老信徒家庭，学历又高便到教会中全职侍奉。1992年之前，恩华和朝阳都在恩典教会中讲道，恩华口才非常好，在台上讲道的时候肢体语言丰富，非常有号召力，讲道经常能够将圣经中的道理结合到信徒的日常生活中。对信徒温柔谦卑，能够完全把控住讲道时教堂里的气氛。

上世纪八九十年代，魏长老是A市基督教两会的负责人，同时也是恩典教堂的负责人。据该教堂一位牧者讲魏长老当时犯了个“错误”，他培养了两个接班人，一个是恩华，另外一个是灵鸽，魏长老一直在她们两个之间犹豫不决。而灵鸽在1990年去参加了燕京神学院的同工培训，1991下半年毕业，这无疑大大的增加了她成为教会新领袖的可能性。此时，恩华的哥哥也从神学院毕业，想要进入恩典教会工作，但是教会没有允许，这件事激化了恩华与魏长老之间的矛盾。但实际当时魏长老已经准备在1992年下半年举行换届，将教会交由恩华管理。因为灵鸽作为北京插队到A市的青年，已经获取了调回北京工作的机会。也就是说教会的领导权只有交给恩华。但是恩华事先并不知情，于是恩华联合支持她

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12 梁家麟：《改革开放以后的中国农村基督教会》，香港：建道神学院，1999年。
信徒计划抢夺教堂的实际控制权。事前他们开了一个“筹备会议”，包括行动时，谁去抢夺教堂的控制权，哪位负责去夺取教堂的公章等都布置的非常明了。但是有人把“筹备会议”的会议记录忘记在教堂的办公室里。恰好这个本子被魏长老发现了，这才发现了他们的“夺堂”计划。随后，魏长老把教堂的公章和钥匙藏在了家里。杨荣丽们的计划并没有获得成功。但从此之后就从该教堂里分离出去了，并带走了 80%的信徒。留下来的都是一些老信徒，大约只有二三百人。当时教会的诗班就只剩下 12 个人了。随后几周，恩华都会派信徒到这里“干扰”聚会，在教堂里说魏长老贪污教会奉献款，后经过 A 市审计局的审查魏长老并没有发现贪污，相反自己贴进去很多钱，教会专门为调查结果贴出了公示信。

据教会现在一位经历过此事件的牧者恩丽讲，当时恩华“反叛”教会之后，恩华一直强调魏收了多少奉献款，但却不强调教堂的支出。那时的信徒比较单纯，很多都相信了。恩丽认为恩华“胡搅蛮缠”以树立自己的形象。教会分裂之后，魏长老让年轻的同工到教会服侍，培养教会的新的接班人。这样原本的红色宗教市场因为教会内部权力的争夺而分裂，形成灰色宗教市场。

### 从灰色到红色宗教市场

分离出去后的恩华带领着信徒一直在租借的场地中聚会。由于恩华所具备的宗教领袖的魅力和有效的传教方式，很快便树立起了自己的形象和权威。一位曾经是恩华家庭教会中的王姓信徒讲：“刚分出来的时候，恩华的确为教会奉献了不少，深入基层解决问题，吸引了大批信徒。她传福音方式灵活，信主得救、病得医治，因此深得人心。但是很多人不知道她的内幕，我跟其他信徒说她的内幕，信徒还说是胡说，信徒太单纯了。”“盖教堂的时候，她说花了 800 万，我们都想知道具体的收支情况，甚至是她拿的钱都不知道。我和几个信徒去问她奉献款的去向，她说不要管别人，神知道这些钱怎么用。”“恩华只请自己认识的人来讲道，虽然是出于保护羊的目的，但是这样的讲道非常的单一，虽然热闹，但是真理性的东西少。北京的一位同工到恩华的一个堂点讲道，当时还没有开始讲，大家都在唱诗歌，她派人把人家包围起来。我觉得为什么不让人家来讲，就算讲错了再制止也可以。”王先生和一批人随后离开了恩华的教会。

曾经当过恩华司机的马先生说：“恩华刚分出来的时候，一开始还挺好的，
但是现在做的跟原来差远了”，“恩华非常聪明，又上过大学，管理教会很有一套，在教会骨干中搞相互监督，所以一旦在教会内部斗争中失败，连朋友都没有了。如果反抗恩华，她说你是东方闪电。”“她放高利贷给教会一姊妹做生意，姊妹赔本之后还不上钱，她说这钱不是自己的，以教会的名义将这个姊妹告上法院。她不让别人干的坏事，她全做了。”“我当时办了个工厂，租了村里 40 间房子，租期是 15 年，后来村里说经济不好可以租 25 年，租金 40 万。但是我的经济不行，恩华说教会可以帮忙出资 17 万帮我租下这块地，到时候教会办学习班都可以用，甚至盖教会都可以用。所以名义上我和村里签了合约，私下里我和教会又签了一份合约。但是教会在 2009 年出事之后，就不管我了，教会有困难可以理解。但是现在教会几个主要的人都出来了，他们却不承认这个合约，可是人家村里不同意啊，一直让我交钱。我现在正和他们打官司。政府应该大力宣传他们做的坏事，不然那么多无辜的信徒受到蒙蔽。”

### 从灰色到黑色宗教市场

据恩丽讲，分裂出去后很多年后恩华还在倡导要走“农村包围城市的道路”威胁攻击恩典教会。恩典教会牧者回复他们说“我们会全力以赴等你们过来”。恩丽发现每次恩华“行动”之前都会有非常详细的计划，也很了解相关方面的法律；与此同时，她从恩典教会“分裂”出去之后与当地政府官员的关系非常好，所以政府也对他们一直持“睁一只眼闭一只眼”的态度。

2008 年恩华在 A 市修建新教堂，作为家庭教会建造教堂并没有得到当地政府的批准，恩华让老信徒坐在教堂门口以防止警察强拆，从而将教堂盖了起来，并成为 A 市容纳人数最多的教堂。因为奥运会的缘故，A 市当地政府为了维护社会稳定，没有对建造教堂采取拆除措施。2009 年，恩华以在 A 市另外一个地方以修建鞋厂的名义建造新教堂。随后被当地政府以“并没有得到政府批准”为由将建筑拆除，并导致部分信徒受伤。当日下午，恩华带领信徒到地方政府门口静坐祷告，一轻信徒将现场情况以视频方式传到网上而被政府逮捕。13 时值中国国庆 60 周年庆祝，A 市为了消除影响，市信访办与恩华达成协议，政府赔偿 140 万人民币，但政府拒绝释放逮捕的信徒，并要求信徒承诺不去家庭教会聚

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会，于是恩华拒绝接受赔款进行上访，让更高层政府参与解决。随后，在恩华
在上访山西省政府的路上被A市政府截回并被逮捕。

法院在审理这个案件时，恩华这一方的辩护词讲到，政府认为他们的教堂占
用了农保地，并且建堂的时候没有得到宗教局的批准，因此属于非法建筑。恩华
教会另外一位负责人认为，宪法中规定公民享有宗教信仰自由权力，而家庭教会
人数在增加，已经多达一万人，缺乏教堂聚会，而通过正当渠道向政府登记、申
请，政府又不批准，所以根本上导致事件发生的原因不在被告。15

**政府压制宗教的后果**

2009年在这次事件中被判刑的几个人中除了恩华之外都已出狱。但是这并不
意味着恩华的影响力彻底消除，反而有扩大之势。A市周边的城市中都已经发现
了恩华教会在这些地区的影响力。尽管恩华到笔者调研结束时仍旧在狱中，但经
常有信徒借看望之际向恩华咨询教会中的重大事务。经过这次事件，一些信徒也
将恩华视为教会的圣徒，从而更加的坚信自己的选择。现任宗教局官员对于“浮
山事件”的处理也颇为不满，认为这样的执法形式只能“成就”了恩华，使其成
为新时期的圣徒。而A市宗教局局长一职也似乎成了烫手的山药，无人愿意担当。

从A市的案例中可以发现，恩华最初在三自教会中聚会，并且在教会中拥有
很高的威信。但是在竞争教会管理者的过程中处于弱势地位。最终，在1992年
发起了夺取教堂的计划，计划失败后带领信徒从教会中分离出去。2009年恩华
带领的家庭教会与政府发生严重冲突，政府对其采取打压措施，并被政府定性为
“极端家庭教会势力”，恩华等人被投入狱。然而政府的打压并没有消弱其势力，
反而增加了家庭教会的凝聚力。恩华带领的家庭教会经历了从红色市场到灰色市
场，又从灰色市场到黑色市场的转变过程。同时，由于恩华家庭教会内部的矛盾
而从中分离出来的信徒，则经历了黑色市场到红色市场的转变。

14 Chinese Christian Rights Defense Lawyers Association, “Summary of the Seminar on A Church Case and
6(1), pp.53-58.
B市基督教三色宗教市场

历史上在B市影响力较大的两个基督教派是内地会和挪威的路德会。目前在市区中，主要的基督新教教堂都是在挪威路德宗建造的教堂的基础上发展而来的。与此同时，B市的基督徒普遍具有“认罪”和“重生”的思想，这与历史上古约翰（Jonathan Gorforth）和孟慕真（Marie Monsen）在河南地区的传教有关。文革期间基督教处于隐蔽状态，文革后期，一些当地的老牧者开始秘密巡回传教，并培养了一批年轻教会领袖，他们对文革后当地家庭教会的复兴至关重要。根据B市地方志记载，上世纪八十年代当地“呼喊派”人数众多，1983年7月当地政府宣布呼喊派为反动组织，明令加以取缔。八十年代初，B市市内最大的教堂重新开放。在B市宗教局官员那里了解到，截止2011年，B市基督教人数将近25万。2012年圣诞节，当笔者再次去采访时，当地基督教两会人员向笔者透露，B市基督徒人数应该在80万左右，其中三自教会信徒将近50万。

改革开放以来，河南成为了中国基督教人口增长最快的地方，被称为“中国的加利利”。但是由于信徒普遍文化水平不高并缺乏系统的神学训练等因素，导致河南兴起诸多的“邪教”。兴起于河南的方城团契、中华福音团契、生命之道教会等吸引了学界和基督教届的众多关注。2012年末东方闪电“世界末日”的谣言四起，12月22日至28日笔者到A市参与基督教的田野调查，初次了解到了A市教会的复杂性。2013年2月笔者再

21 参注24.
次来到 A 市，调研以深度访谈为主，通过这几次调研获得丰富的田野资料。

由于 A 市庞大的人口基数，三自教会里信徒也有将近 50 万名。而城区基督教堂无疑是人数最多的。A 市福音堂由挪威路德宗传教士所建，改革开放之后教堂重新开放，是为 A 地区开放最早的教堂。福音堂由于地处旧城区，教堂院子不大，门口道路也很狭窄，周日做礼拜的人们将汽车停在附近繁华商圈的停车场，然后步行五分钟到教堂参加礼拜。似乎附近这些豪华的商圈，给地处旧城区身处的教堂一丝丝人气。存在近百年的两间牧师楼，现被当做贵宾接待室继续发挥着余热。

### 红色到灰色宗教市场

福音堂周日有三场崇拜，由于历史悠久且处于市中心，市民提起基督教堂，首先想到的就是福音堂，所以福音堂顺理成章的成为 A 市信徒人数最多的教堂。该堂目前的主任牧师是王江山，为人非常热情，讲道时针对不同类型的信徒，结合相应的生活实例以帮助信徒理解经文。教堂内男女信徒分开而坐，留给男性信徒的位置大至有六分之一，教堂牧者解释这样做是为了防止讲道时男女说话过多，错过真理。上世纪九十年代初，教堂的年轻人比较少，教会亟需年轻血液来补充。东堂负责人康牧师认为王江山在教会比较热心又年轻，便让他参与讲道。王江山刚开始自己写讲章，时间久了便可以上台讲道。王比较机灵又很有能力，很快便参与到教会的管理中去。由于其灵活且有针对性的讲道方式，使其在信徒中获得了较高的人气和信任度。

康牧师在文革前出生于信徒家庭，曾经在路德宗神学院读过书，文革结束之后，教会亟需教牧人员，于是被按立为牧师。但康牧师是一位比较木讷老实的人，不善于教会的管理。王江山因病信耶稣之后便来到了教会，随着王在信徒中威望的累积，与康之间发生了严重的矛盾。当时康属于市两会的负责人，办公地点就在福音堂，但是福音堂实际上已经由王江山控制。所以在按立牧师的时候，康牧师提交的名字是教会中一位在金陵神学院毕业的传道人刘牧云。

当教会要建敬老院的时候，康牧师认为不能收取信徒的费用，而王则认为多少要交一点从而缓解教会财政困难。敬老院建成后，住在里边的信徒没有给教会交钱，王认为康牧师将这些钱贪污了。据当时教堂里的会计文华讲，康牧师没有
贪污，只是在投资敬老院以及建诊所的时候有矛盾。王江山发动信徒说康牧师贪污教会钱财，最终康牧师被赶出教会，自此，王江山管理着市区内最大的教堂，并从市三自退出，不再参加三自的会议。两千年初，刘牧云从金陵神学院神学研究生毕业，并成为新一任的两会负责人。由于之前双方的矛盾，市两会不得已搬出福音堂，但是一些信徒认为王江山做事不清白而且很有诡计，发动信徒清除异己，于是他们跟随王牧云离开了福音堂，教会出现分裂。两会的办公地点也固定在了市区另外一个小教堂内。

福音堂没有任何的教牧人员参加到政府的三自组织中，政府可能是鉴于东堂的知名度和众多的信徒不敢采取强制措施。而普通信徒对于这样的分歧并不清楚。这样，福音堂这个市内最大的教堂，从原来的三自教会即“红色市场”转变成了“灰色市场”，除去教堂规模大小和信徒的多少，福音堂的性质已与普通的家庭教会没有区别。

随着城区的扩大，对于那些居住的距离比较远的老年信徒来说，太不方便。于是王江山利用东堂“雄厚”的财力在城南建造了一所非常现代化的教堂。可以说该堂无论是从建筑面积还是现代化程度上来讲，在 A 市都是首屈一指的。教堂中配有电脑室、琴房以及基督教藏书丰富的图书馆。教堂的上层是一个小型“神学院”，学生吃住都在里边。由于他们并没有参加三自，因此这样的神学院在政府看来是不允许的。教堂值班的阿姨对于这间小型“神学院”是三缄其口，不愿告知详细情况。与此同时，以福音堂为基础，王江山在市区周围扩展了很多聚会点，每周派传道员去讲道。可以说王江山这一派教会的势力远远超过了三自的力量。

灰色到红色宗教市场

恩典堂的建立可以说是王江山与市两会博弈的结果。福音堂会计文华住在城北，于是早在 2003 年的时候，在福音堂的支持下由文华负责在城西租下一处旧厂房当做礼拜堂，以方便城北的信徒做礼拜。刚开始的时候只有三四十个信徒，后来随着信徒人数增加，福音堂决定出资 60 万将旧厂房买下，并修葺了旧厂房。但是一年后旧厂房依旧太小不能满足信徒的需要。文华想在扩建教会，这样信徒
礼拜时不至于在外边淋雨。当时没有资金，准备盖成石棉瓦简易房，建筑公司的人做出预算认为石棉瓦房子和楼房的花费差不多。但王江山考虑到资金问题不同意坚持要盖石棉瓦房，文华坚持盖平房。王书彬和王江山至此矛盾扩大。

2007年时，王江山要求文华全职在福音堂当会计，否则就不再让她继续在福音堂工作。倔强的王书彬辞掉了福音堂的会计职务，全身心于恩典堂的发展。但是随着信徒的不断增加，西堂亟需一座大教堂来满足教会的长远发展，于是文华决定修建大教堂。2008年4月，王江山到恩典堂来宣布恩典堂财政独立，但讲道仍由东堂安排。文华认为王江山是担心修建恩典堂会拖累东堂。当时福音堂出资60万买地的资金，恩典堂偿还了52万，其余的要继续偿还。但是更大的问题是建造教堂预计花费500万，但恩典堂仅有20万，已用于支付教堂的设计和奠基费用。恩典堂一个信徒的丈夫是建筑公司的老板，于是同意垫付200万修教堂。2010年教堂开工，恩典堂每周的奉献款除了教会自用之外，其余的都拿去还款。两年后，在花费将近六百万之后教堂终于建成。

教堂在建设的时候，两会主席刘牧云找到了文华，恩典堂在刘牧云的帮助下办理了合法的土地使用证等手续。教堂刚建好，恩典堂的财政还由文华负责。这时，王江山派福音堂的会计、出纳到恩典堂来宣布接管恩典堂的财务。文华说：“如果让我交出教堂也可以，那要等大殿的钱全部还完后再说。”随后，又有福音堂的一些人堵在恩典堂门口骂文华把恩典堂出卖给了刘牧云。文华回称：“人家刘牧云拿走一块砖没有？教堂盖起来还不是弟兄姊妹聚集的，人家刘牧云帮忙把证给批下来了。国家设立这些注册程序，是必须要经过的。”随后，文华找到恩典堂所属的区宗教局，向宗教局官员反映这件事。由于福音堂属于另外一个区，所以恩典堂所在的区宗教局官员回复称不要把教堂交出来，如果他们下次再来闹事，直接让他们来找宗教局。这样王江山没有办法，只有和文华达成协议，每月第一个周日讲道由福音堂指派，其余礼拜日的讲道实际上由市两会负责。

在B市的案例中，王江山凭借其讲道和个人能力在教会中获得了他的地位。但在教会领导权的竞争中处于下风，因此退出了三自组织。他没有采取激进措施，而是依靠信徒的支持排除了三自组织的竞争对手。这样他带领的教会从一个红色市场转变为灰色市场。起初，恩典堂在王江山的支持下获得发展，但是随着恩典
堂与王江山矛盾扩大化，加之三自组织的介入，最终使恩典堂这个灰色的宗教市场转变为红色市场。

宗教市场持续复杂化
随着年龄的增大，王江山也开始为福音堂培养接班人。年轻有为且在海外神学院获得硕士学位的恩强目前已经是福音堂的主任牧师，但他对于三自的态度与王江山相比，已有所差异。他认为目前所属福音堂的教会数量和信徒数量都非常巨大，最终不加入三自是不可能的，教会的神职按立都是非常大的问题。

市三自这以方面对福音堂的扩张并不是无动于衷。他们筹建了政府所承认的神学培训学校，为A市和下属县提供神职人员培训和教育。在王牧云的带领下，三自所在教堂逐渐发展，并买下另外一块地，准备建造自己的教堂。但是随着城市化和全球化的发展，教会之间的联系增多，特别是面对全球灵恩运动的发展，当地教会并没有做好准备。一位三自的牧者在与其他教会的交流过程中接受了灵恩派的敬拜方式，回来之后便遭到了三自教会以及福音堂的反对，不得已这位牧者便从三自中退出，回到家乡建立了自己的教会，三自和其他家庭教会面对这个灵恩派新兴教会抱守的一种反对态度。

讨论与结论

如杨凤岗教授所言，三种宗教市场并没有严格的界限，而是不断的转换。从宏观上看，三色市场转换的原因与政府对宗教的管制密切相关。但在A市和B市基督教的案例中，可以发现三色宗教市场之间转换的原因更为复杂。

三色宗教市场之间的转换关系图

在两地的案例中，恩华和王江山都是因为教会内部的矛盾从原来的三自教会转化成了家庭教会，政府并没有马上采取措施镇压家庭教会，而是使其继续存在。这样他们从红色市场转移到了灰色市场中（①）。当政府和教会触碰了双方的底线时，呈现出政府对教会的镇压，教会对政府的反抗，处于弱势的灰色宗教市场被迫转化成黑色宗教市场；这一点在A市政府对恩华所在的家庭教会的镇压中表现的最为明显（②）。在目前宗教政策相对宽松的情况下，政府对教会的打压并不多见，因此从红色市场直接转向黑色市场的案例较为少见；当然另一种情况是红色市场中的一些信徒被“邪教”组织所拉拢，成为政府打击的对象，从而转向黑色市场（③）。在A市的案例中，以恩华为首的家庭教会逐步发展，但是部分内部成员不满恩华对教会的垄断，于是退出恩华的家庭教会，但他们自己也不愿意重回三自教会中，于是就形成了从黑色市场转移到灰色市场中（④）；另外一部分与恩华有矛盾的信徒，在三自教会的接触以及宗教局的支持下，重回到三自教会，这样他们从黑色市场直接转移到红色市场中（⑤）。在B市恩典堂的案例中，由于恩典堂的负责人与福音堂负责人建堂观念冲突，于是双方关系僵化；但在市基督教两会和宗教局的帮助下，取得了建造教堂的合法资格，于是恩典堂从灰色市场转向了红色市场（⑥）。从A市和B市基督教的案例中可以看到，一旦红色宗教市场和黑色宗教市场内部，因个人或者团体利益而发生矛盾，灰色宗教市场中的家庭教会作为三色市场的中心，能够起到有效的缓冲作用。

通过对两个案例的深描式分析，笔者尝试回答文章开始时提出的问题。在中观层面或者说在具体的案例中，是什么原因导致了三色市场的复杂化，三种宗教
市场之间转化的因素是什么？政府在三色宗教市场的转化中起到了什么样的作用？

教会内部个人或团体的利益在三色宗教市场的转化过程中起到非常重要的作用。因为利益纷争教会出现分裂，这种所谓的利益纷争，不仅包括占有教会财产、争夺教会管理权，也有教义上的纷争。教会的分裂无论是在三自教会中，还是在家庭教会中都频繁出现。由于外部宗教政策环境的影响，一旦教会出现纷争，有很大的可能会出现所谓的三色宗教市场之间的转化。同样在黑色或灰色宗教市场中，一旦其内部发生利益纠纷，在三自教会或政府的影响下可以转移到其他的宗教市场内。

值得注意的是，三色宗教市场之所以能够出现，其外部条件就是政府对宗教的管制。在具体的案例中可以发现，在三种宗教市场之间的转换过程中，依旧可以看到政府的影子：但是除了灰色市场到黑色市场的转换外，政府对他们的影响并不明显。对于基层政府而言，对宗教管制的目的是为了维护社会稳定，因此，维持区域宗教现状是基层宗教管理部门的底线。宗教局官员多是由部队转业人员构成，可以说很多宗教官员不了解宗教。所以一些官员在不了解宗教的情况下，对家庭教会进行贸然的打压，这样的结果往往事与愿违。另外一方面，尽管一些教会并没有在爱国宗教组织中登记，但是教会领袖与宗教局官员保持着密切的联系，除非上级下达强制性的行政命令或者教会挑战政府的权威，不然政府是乐意维持现状的。基层宗教管理部门的这种状况，一方面使灰色市场中的宗教有了存在的可能性，另一方面灰色市场中的宗教活动和信徒也可能面临压制，被迫转到黑色市场中。

地方政府对教会打压的后果是并没有使黑色宗教市场的信徒和宗教活动减少，通过两地的对比可以发现，政府对 A 市家庭教会施压，导致的结果是该家庭教会向全省甚至省外扩散，而 B 市的案例中，同样是因为个人或团体利益而出现分裂，但政府和教会双方一直处于一种有效沟通的状态中，这种合理沟通显然有助于教会的发展。23 政府对于教会的分裂采取观望态度。宗教局认为教会的分裂是教会内部的事务，政府不会插手。在其可掌控的范围内，甚至乐于看到教会的分裂，这样可以使双方相互削弱，以抑制教会的发展。一旦超出其可控范围，

便采取严厉的打压措施，尽管打压的实际效果并不是政府所期望的。可以看出政府抑制宗教发展的宗教政策一直没有改变。^{24}

Religions and the work of care in the Chinese world

State legitimation of welfare regimes and its responses

Andre Laliberte
University of Ottawa, School of political studies

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Abstract: The different religious world-views in Chinese societies take a variety of standpoint about morality, filial duty, and social justice, and their views inspire a wide range of state policies and approaches to social action that can serve antagonistic views. Countless individuals in civil society organisations are driven by various beliefs or ideals to look after the most vulnerable segment of populations deprived of basic social rights. They refer to values such of charity, compassion, and/or universal love inherent in their theologies, scriptures, and/or rituals as the foundation for their action. Conversely, states’ actors in the fields of education and the media make use of the symbols and discourses of religious beliefs and worldviews to buttress the legitimacy of social policies that generate those very inequalities. The family, as the basic site in which the stakes of care, from child to elderly care, are deploying, represents the terrain in which the effects of state policies and civil society response play themselves out. I provide in this essay the justification for future attempts to map how the practices and values of different religions position themselves with respect to the welfare regime of Chinese societies, paying attention to their discourse and practice on who should care for the vulnerable in the family.
Introduction

In this essay I present a research program on how religions contribute to shape the work of care in Chinese societies, at both ends of the global care work chain. At one end, I suggest we need to look at how states rely on religious concepts, scriptures, and narratives, to frame the work of care as a filial duty, and thereby legitimize social policies that put the emphasis on family-based rather than state-sponsored care. On the other end, I propose to look at religious institutions themselves as alternative providers of care, as well as sources of support for providers of care. What I seek to establish in this research program is to develop a framework for understanding the moral economy of care. This framework is informed in part by feminist scholarship, and will constitute the subject of another paper. In this paper, I want to base the analysis of the moral economy of care by using a scholarship that takes seriously how religion intersects with political economy. To achieve this, the paper will proceed as follows. I will first define what I mean by religion: an important point is that I include social practices that the Chinese government and many traditionalist scholars of religious studies do not consider as religious practices or beliefs. Then, in a second section, using the framework of political economy, I will draw attention to the welfare regimes of Chinese societies, and how the work of care serves to reproduce these regimes. I will address in the following section the main empirical issues that will need to be addressed: what are the doctrines and religious concepts that government can use to legitimize their policies; and how religious narratives can provide support to care workers. Then I will propose ways to investigate how Chinese governments have shaped their specific care policies with religious frameworks. Finally, I will conclude with specific research questions about the policies and responses from civil society upon which to focus.

Chinese religions in the context of compressed modernity

I refer in this essay to Chinese religions in a broad sense. I thereby include along the obvious institutionalized religions recognized by the governments of the region, such as Buddhism and Taoism, other forms of religiosity that are more diffused, because they are embedded in Chinese social practice and make sense to people. These religious traditions are known variously as communal religions, folk, or popular beliefs (Chau 2005; DuBois 2005; Yang 2012). They are often territorially-based, and related to kin. They may be almost invisible in the large urban centers, and the small shrines found at the back of shops or in homes is the only material presence that makes alert observers aware of their existence. This form of religiosity, which is not recognised by the government of China, but acknowledged as ‘intangible heritage’, is important when we consider the attempts of the state to legitimize its social policies. When governments in East Asia want to implement their family-centered social policies, they justify it with appeals to traditional values (Kuo 2006). They usually don’t refer to the institutionalized religions but to these latter forms of religiosity, a move that could be considered divisive, because that would refer to social

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practices to which do not adhere to varying degrees minorities among the population in all the three societies I consider here, particularly migrants who are moving in greater numbers (Cheng 2004; Constable 2013).

The context in which I look at religions in this paper is the strategic challenges raised by Western powers that East Asian societies confronted, in what the Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-sup called a compressed modernity (Chang 1999). This challenge had military, political, and economic dimensions. Underneath them, a set of cultural values became questioned as they had seemed unable to address these challenges. It is important to unpack this concept of compressed modernity because it refers to the strategic challenges that have led East Asian governments to prioritize the imperative of economic development and design social policies serving the former rather than the reverse. Government officials, economic leaders, and the reformers in the spheres of politics and economy at the beginning of the twentieth-century reacted to the strategic challenges their country faced in a variety of approaches embracing the ethos of democracy (Sin 2013), the nation (Callahan 2006), and development (Kwon 2007). All these new political ideals have in common a prerequisite: they questioned cultural values that held sway in society until then and the religious traditions that have nourished them. In the process of compressed modernity, in sum, religions became the object of critiques in a way that reproduced the patterns of secular states in Euro-American societies, but also, imitated the extreme ways of socialist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). No religion was left unscathed, but they also experienced in these conditions important processes of renewal and reinvention (Yang 2012).

In this paper, I pay attention to the different dimensions of religiosity in Chinese societies, mindful that the comparisons between Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong use different methodologies and therefore words designations such as the ‘none’ does not mean the same thing in the three different polities (see table 1). In China, the category ‘none’ would include, along atheists, people who have reported no religious belief other than one of the five that the government recognizes, people who do not consider ‘Chinese religions’ as a religion. In Taiwan, this last category does not exist in the official survey, but many of the religious practices that scholars would consider as ‘Chinese religions’ or ‘popular beliefs’ are put included in the category ‘Taoist’ or, less often ‘Buddhist’. The category ‘non-religious’ is somewhat clearer than that category as it is used in the Chinese survey, as it count ‘atheists’ as well as people who are indifferent and would allegedly thereby acknowledge that they don’t practice ‘popular’ or ‘folk’ religion. Hong Kong’s survey had adopted a methodology similar to that of Mainland China, except that it does not count ‘none’ and presumably it assumes that those who do not identify with the categories ‘Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or Muslim, are practicing Chinese religions. In all three places, the only categories that are less ambiguous are those of Muslim and Christian, the latter including Catholics and Protestants.

Table 1: Religious affiliations

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Sources: Chinese Family Panel Studies (PKU) 2016; Home Affairs Bureau, Hong Kong Government 2016; Pew Research Center 2015; Department of Civil Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, ROC 2007 (see GIO 2007)

These distinctions among the different religions are relevant from the perspective of social policy I will address later. On the one hand, institutionalized religions, especially wealthy ones such as the Catholic Church and the many protestant denominations, that benefit from support from wealthy co-religionists in foreign countries, are well-positioned to receive money from charities, foundations, and wealthy philanthropists, and therefore they have the ability to finance the delivery of social services and pay professionals to perform the complex tasks this may require (Chen and Huang 2004; Cao 2010; Carpenter and den Dulk 2014). In China, this form of international cooperation is often under a cloud of suspicion from the government. In Taiwan, it was for years the reverse: it represented an additional channel through which cement good relations between Taiwan and its allies. In Hong Kong, the logic of Christian involvement responded to a different logic: Churches were simply stepping in because the colonial government was unwilling to extend to Hong Kong the social services offered to British citizens in the metropole. This is an arrangement, as I will explain below, that has suited the Chinese government very well since 1997 after it regained sovereignty over Hong Kong (Leung 2003; Brown 2006). Buddhist charities have emerged, especially in Taiwan, as other providers of social services, followed by Taoists and new religions such as Yiguandao (Hsiao and Schak 2005; Weller 2006; Huang 2009). The involvement of these religions in Taiwan and Hong Kong is acknowledged openly and generally approved by the public for what it is: a positive contribution to society by well-meaning people who are dedicated to general welfare. The fact that the religious organizations that support these services are also generally supportive of the general political and social order since the beginning, during the period of martial law in Taiwan, and during the colonial period in Hong Kong, does not hurt either. And this may constitute a reason why it is difficult to imagine the Communist Party of China (CPC) revising its long-standing policy to allow religions to get involved in the provision of social services (Laliberté 2012). With such activity comes influence, something that the CPC wants to avoid.

The argument I advance in this paper is that the CPC has found a way to ensure that it will receive a religious legitimacy for its social policies, by carefully ensuring that it will not name it for what it is. Under Jiang Zemin, the CPC has celebrated ‘spiritual civilization’, a barely veiled reference to religion (Lewis 2002; Marinelli 2013); under Hu Jintao, it has extolled the virtue of ‘harmonious society’ (Holbig 2009; Joshi 2012), and under Xi Jinping, it has chosen the more loosely worded expressions of ‘the China dream’, associated with older slogans such as ‘rejuvenating the nation’ and ‘the glorious Chinese tradition’ (Wang 2014). In what may seem like a retreat from the tentative recognition of religion sketched under Jiang Zemin, what emerges is the development
of a discourse that centers on China as a big family – a reference to a central Confucian trope, but one that is not acknowledged as such. In other words, Xi and the CPC under his helm are trying to foster a civil religion that is devoid of any reference to the supernatural and therefore unlikely to be attached to any specific faith or religious organization, and does not appear to contradict the scientific foundation of the CPC worldview. The Chinese traditional religions, or what the state prefers to refer to as the ‘intangible heritage’, represent important resources that could help the government resolve that complicated equation of finding shared values to buttress its policy choices while maintaining a façade of being committed to a materialist and non-religious philosophy of government (Oakes and Sutton 2010).

In sum, we found a variety of religious landscapes in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, that is heavily influenced by different approaches by governments to religion. Christian religions, generally, fare better in Taiwan and Hong Kong than in China, where they face constraints on their activities (Bays 2012). This is not to repeat the cliché that religion is repressed, but simply to take note of the fact that religions cannot run schools in China, but they can in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Some recent evolutions in China, however, hint to positive signs for those who believe that religion should be more involved in the provision of social services (Palmer, Shive, and Wickery 2011). Hence, I have observed in Eastern China three organizations, with a Buddhist, Taoist, and a Christian background, one of which run a health promotion center, one a home for the elderly, and the other one visiting patients in long-term care institutions and at home. However, the religious affiliation of the institutions offering these services must remain invisible, a point that was reiterated by a delegation of the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference to the providers of care in one of the institution I visited. For the religious believers I talked to, this is not a major issue: they argue that their caring behavior is better than preaching, and also that the most important point is that they fulfill their religious calling by serving others. The point to note is that the Chinese government will not advertise this reliance on religious organizations to help it address some social issues, but welcome this form of assistance. Thus, it is unlikely that anytime soon religious institutions will perform in China the kind of services they can offer in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Welfare Regimes and the Work of Care

Understanding how religions interact with government’s social policies and welfare choices necessitates a recapitulation of the nature of welfare regimes and the specific characteristics of the East Asian welfare regimes, followed by an explanation of the centrality of the work of care in social reproduction and for the sustainability of existing welfare regimes, in the context of rapidly ageing societies in the post-industrial world, not just in East Asia (Fu and Hughes 2009). Critics have faulted the dominant theories of welfare state for being Western-centric, neglecting the dimension of gender (Orloff 1993), and omitting the important role of religion (van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). The work of Haggard and Kaufman (2008) has opened wide the comparative scope, with studies of East European and post-Soviet societies, Latin America, and East Asia, without addressing the other issues. The critique of welfare orientalism has gone a step further by paying attention to values but has stopped short at looking at gender and religion (Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998; Gough 2004). The vastly expanding literature on care in the
Asia Pacific is looking into the gender dimension of the welfare state in East Asia, but it does not consider religion (Wong 2005). Some essays did write about the Confucian welfare state, but at the time the focus was not China (Jones 1993). This essay proposes ways to fill these gaps.

Welfare Regimes

Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, the literature on the variety of welfare states in contemporary societies remains an unavoidable reference (Wilensky 1975; Esping-Andersen 1990). It offers an important typology to help us analyse the nature of East Asian welfare states, in Chinese societies in particular, that scholars from these societies use. This typology serves as a heuristic device that can help us identify the main orientations of the policies adopted by governments in these countries. Esping-Andersen defined his three models of variants of welfare capitalism. This is a departure point of this analysis that is relevant to all three Chinese societies examined here, including Mainland China after 1978, when its leaders embarking into a policy of reform and opening, a path of economic transformations that incorporate many elements of state capitalism (Tsai 2012; Ringen and Ngoc 2013;). Esping-Andersen distinguished between three forms of welfare state ideal-types: liberal-residual, corporatist-conservative, and social-democratic. I shall briefly outline their main characteristics.

The liberal-residual welfare state offers a minimal level of provision for social services. The European terminology, which is closer to the original meaning of the adjective ‘liberal’, captures very well the idea that this variety of welfare state is inherently individualistic. It emphasizes the importance of individual responsibility in obtaining better welfare outcomes, either through private insurances, through self-reliance, or community support from philanthropy. It is means-tested, that is, people who receive benefits in that case must demonstrate that they deserve it. This approach, that puts so much stress on self-reliance, stigmatise people who receive aid from the state, because the fact that they need help is interpreted as the proof they are individuals with moral failings such as laziness. The United States constitute the closest empirical approximation of the ideal-type liberal-residual welfare state analyzed by Esping-Andersen. In the context of the societies examined here, Hong Kong no doubts represent the most relevant case, and for some of the economists in China, an ideal to emulate.

At the other end of the spectrum in terms of access to social services, Esping-Andersen considered the social-democratic model, implemented in the Scandinavian countries, and for which welfare and social benefits are rights conferred by citizenship. In other words, people do not have to demonstrate that they are sufficiently poor to deserve minimal standards of living, and they should not be punished if life circumstances such as childbirth, illness, accident, or old-age, makes them unable to work, and temporarily unable to contribute to the economy. Another characteristic of this approach is that it is irrelevant to individual marital status and therefore it can strengthen the independence of women. Its critics have faulted the social-democratic welfare state for its high maintenance cost: it is true that Scandinavian societies and those other European states that have tried to emulate them have had to raise taxes to high levels that are difficult to accept for many citizens. The virtual social contracts in these societies between governments and citizens, of high taxes in return for good social services, results from the
confluence of four conditions: sustained mobilization from strong labor movements, responsive
governments run by social-democratic parties, stable democratic politics, and the rule of law.
None of the three Chinese societies have met these four conditions. Taiwan and Hong Kong have
the rule of law, relatively strong labor movements, but there are no major social democratic
parties.

The third approach, identified by Esping-Andersen, is more relevant to East Asian welfare states,
albeit with some significant differences. The corporatist-conservative welfare, historically the
oldest of the three models, if we take as reference the pensions and other forms of social benefits
paid by the Prussian state under Bismarck in the late nineteenth century, was put in place to pre-
empt the attractiveness of the nascent socialist movement. Social benefits are offered by
employers and the state to workers in the formal economy, and to their dependents, including
both their spouses and children. That model was deemed conservative because it was compatible
with the social doctrines promoted by churches that promoted a traditional sexual division of
labor between the male breadwinner and the stay-at-home wife, and corporatist because the
expansion of coverage for social benefits went along with the expansion of the economy. When
most males were incorporated in the industrial economy, in formal employment for the state or
the private sector, their coverage and that of their dependents ensured that almost everyone
would be entitled to some form of economic security in old-age or in case of illness, accidents, or
other circumstances detrimental to wage-earning. Taiwan, and China under the People’s
Commune (1958-1983), were experiencing with two different variants of that model.

The East Asian welfare states, as suggested so far, differed from the Western European ones on
key elements until the late 1980s. In all three, there was no democratic public space for
articulating demands for a more generous welfare state. The quest for rapid economic growth
went along with policy choices in welfare that focused on the reproduction of the labor force in
key sectors of the economy. This meant in particular a strong emphasis on education, and policies
of revenue security and generous pension meant to reward those who enacted the government
policies: civil servants, veterans, teachers, and employees in state enterprises. The East Asian
models of welfare states, in that sense, contrasts with the liberal-residual approach (Holiday
2000). But in terms of ensuring a certain degree of security for revenue to most people, it also
meant exclusion from benefits for people working in low-skilled industries, farming, services, and
for people who were self-employed in many small enterprises. When these societies were poor,
this meant welfare insecurity for a majority of the population. Albeit Taiwan and Hong Kong have
moved away from this situation, China still has to tackle that problem for large amount of people
left behind by the last decades of economic growth.

The Work of Care

China, like other East Asian societies, faces an ageing of the population. However, in China that
is turning into a crisis of elderly care because the state did not have time to prepare for this
enormous demographic transition. Although the ageing of society is a characteristic of all the
three Chinese societies discussed here, they are not equally well-equipped to address the
challenges this raises. In all three societies, the growing proportion of elderly people relative to
the total population results from smaller number of children per family and longer life expectancy. Even though the one-child directive in China has contributed to this change, demographers have noted that the abolition of this policy will not lead to change in household behaviour and therefore the ageing is unlikely to be abated anytime soon by a ‘baby boom.’ In fact, even before that directive was adopted, urban residents had decided they would rather have one or no child because of the cost of living. Many people in the younger generations do not expect to raise a family soon because they could not afford to buy a home, which is becoming in some cases a condition of eligibility for marriage. Taiwan and Hong Kong do not face such conditions, but the cost of living is also high and housing is barely affordable. In this situation wherein the younger cohorts are becoming smaller, the challenges of funding already limited pensions and developing institutions for elderly care is becoming acute. It is in this context of crisis that the work of care is fast emerging as a strategic issue for the region.

The demand for care work in the labor market is expected to expand considerably as the population age. One key component of welfare regimes to which feminist scholarship has paid a growing amount of attention is the centrality of the work of care in social reproduction, which obviously means child care and education, but also takes into account the burden of elder care (Parrenas 2001). In traditional society, this unpaid and undervalued work was most often women’s responsibility, an exploitation disguised in modern time by the discourse of love. In East Asia, Confucian values and the religious beliefs that incorporate them in their world-views sacralise this view of care. Since harmonious relations within the family constitute in Confucian ethics and its religious cosmogony the foundation for political order, the work of care in East Asia represents more than the natural act of filial piety, but also the contribution to the bigger family that is the nation. The obligation to perform the work of care, in this context, constitutes a formidable source of social pressure: someone who neglects to fulfil her duty is likely to be perceived as someone with serious moral failing. However, these obligations are also gendered: although the religious rituals of filial piety and ancestors’ worship are the preserve of sons and descendants, the day-to-day care is provided by stay-at-home women. For a long time, this system has explained in good part the preference of Chinese families for boys: a family without a son, in the context of weak or inexistent welfare regime, meant misery for elderly parent because their daughter was destined to live in her husband’s home and care for his parents.

It is understandable that this patriarchal system received criticism from early on by Chinese modernizers, whether they were liberals, nationalists, or socialists. However, it has remained resilient in the countryside, where a majority of the Chinese population lived through the twentieth century, despite far-reaching social reforms. The early industrialization of Taiwan and Hong Kong after World War Two, by facilitating the entry of women in the labor force, has shaken the foundation of that system, a process that would expand in China for a much larger population a few decades later. But while the waged labor of women liberated many of them from the confines of the household, this approach often ended up with imposing the double burden of occupation in a factory and performing the unpaid work of care at home: raising children, doing the domestic chores, and also looking after the elderly when they lose their autonomy. The People’s Communes constituted an unprecedented experiment that could have contributed to eradicate the traditional patriarchal institution but its duration was too short to overcome the
old order, and it was too ambitious. It aimed to offer universal access to a wide array of social services without the material conditions of economic wealth that could pay for it. The gradual and total dismantling of that system after the beginning of the reform and opening policy in 1978 has nonetheless left behind a high level of expectations for social services from the state that remains a source of discontent, but it had failed to completely eliminate the patriarchal nature of Chinese society. In Taiwan, on the other hand, the process of democratization has lead political parties to overbid each other for offering better social services when elected, and shake the foundation of patriarchy as well. In this context, citizens are less likely to accept any more a limited corporatist-conservative welfare regime.

Social changes have made female paid work a necessity in all three societies, and the many demands of modern life have led to a care deficit caused by the lack of time available for the traditional approach to care provision at home. As the expectations of employers for women in paid work are becoming incompatible with the full-time demands of elderly care, increasing number of women have considered paid care-givers as an acceptable to daughters and wives. For middle class women in Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as a growing number of them in large urban centers in China, out-sourcing the work of care to outsiders at home becomes an alternative solution to offer childcare and/or long-term care in the absence of state provision of state crèche and sufficient nursing homes for the elderly in need of long-term care. But the low status of care-giving as a low-skilled occupation with few chances of advancement has aggravated the care deficit, as too few natives seek to go into this kind of occupation. One of the results of these dynamics is the growing tendency in Taiwan and Hong Kong to open the door to migrant workers willing to take these occupations, which are better paid than the jobs available in their country or province of origins. In China, this means that urban residents take advantage of the large pool of migrant workers from the poor countryside.

Migrant workers in Taiwan and Hong Kong come primarily from Indonesia and the Philippines, and much smaller numbers from Thailand and Vietnam (Lan 2006; Hsiao 2015). These national origins mean that most care workers follow different religious values than their employers, and in the case of Indonesians, this also means specific ritual and dietary obligations such as restrictions about pork and alcohol. The live-in requirements of the domestic workers and care-givers represent an opportunity for labor abuses. It also means that occasions for conflicts over inter-cultural lack of sensitivity can arise. Although very few Chinese household in Shanghai and Beijing rely on caregivers from South-East Asia, the status of migrant workers from the countryside, often from poorer provinces, is often comparable to that of foreigners. Without a status of urban residents, these care workers lack free access to a wide range of social services. In the latter case, the cultural differences between employers and the live-in caregivers they hire may not be as acute as in Taiwan and Hong Kong, but nevertheless, the comments by urban residents about the ‘lack of civility (wenming) or the poor quality (suzhi) of rural migrants says a lot about class and status differences that can turn into cultural gaps. In the next two sections, I will elaborate on how different religious traditions and cosmovisions in the three societies can provide the state with legitimation to reproduce this system but also how they can mitigate its abuses. I will first look at the religious doctrines themselves, the raw material that governments
believe are relevant to their policies, and then turn to how some key policies have made use of religious values or cosmovisions.

**Religious doctrines and the moral economy of care**

Religions matter at the two ends of the care work chain. Their views inspire a wide range of approaches to social action that can serve antagonistic political views. Countless individuals in civil society organisations are driven by various beliefs or ideals to look after the most vulnerable segment of populations, who are often deprived of basic social rights. They refer to values such of charity, compassion, and/or universal love inherent in their theologies, scriptures, and/or rituals as the foundation for their action. Conversely, states’ agents in the fields of education and the media make use of the symbols and discourses of religious beliefs and worldviews to buttress the legitimacy of social policies that generate those very inequalities. On the one hand, religious values contribute in shaping the demand for care in household. For example, appeals to the value of filial piety reinforce socially constructed state preference for care provision at home, but this takes different forms in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Ye et al 2013). The two examples of popular beliefs (minjian xinyang) and Buddhism in China and Taiwan I mention below illustrate how pervasive is this value among Chinese religions. At the other end, religious institutions represent an important component of the support structure that help care givers to navigate the complexity of the care work chain, as I have seen with the Protestant and Taoist associations in China that look after the elderly and the Catholic institutions in Taiwan and Hong Kong that provide support to care-givers from the Philippines.

**Religions and beliefs in the shaping of the demand for care**

Religions frame the demand of care by making claims about specific behavior and social practices as inherently good, sources of moral improvement, if not path to enlightenment, salvation, or deliverance from the cycles of reincarnation. As discussed above, religious can achieved this quite explicitly with a theodicy that decrees a system of rewards and punishment in heaven or hell as retribution for behaviour that is considered virtuous and honorable, or sinful. Most people in Taiwan and Hong Kong are aware of the existence of such system, whether they agree with it or not. For many, it is more than simply a matter a belief and blind faith: it is a form of categorical imperative, the only way to be a decent human being, or a form of natural law. Surveys conducted in Taiwan have demonstrated that a majority of people, even when they do not believe in any religion, believe that they may face adverse consequences if they do not behave properly towards their parents. Surveys in China have led to similar conclusion, despite a very different institutional configuration for religions and their influence in contemporary society. In other words, these surveys have shown that ‘filial piety’ is influential as a value, and failure to abide by it have consequences that have nothing to do with secular logics such as the rule of law or the invisible hand of the market. In other words, it is a value pervasive in the popular religions practiced in Taiwan and Hong Kong, where ancestors are worshiped, gods and ghosts appeased by offerings deposited on tables in the streets at specific times. In China, it is a value in a religion that is not recognized as such by the government and which it prefers to call an intangible heritage, or a national tradition.
As we can see in the numerous temples and shrines that dot the landscape of China before 1949, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the overseas Chinese communities today, the traditional Chinese religions embedded in social life are pervasive. The three teachings (*sanjiao*) of Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism have emerged within an undifferentiated world of beliefs and ritual practices, known variously as popular beliefs (*minjian xinyang*), that has preceded the historical emergence of these schools of thoughts: divination, numerology, geomancy (Bruun 2003), nurtured by concepts of an after-life and the importance of filial piety. While Taoist and Buddhist clerics have tolerated if not promoted some of these practices, Confucian scholars have tended in the past to reject most of the above as superstitions, with the exception of filial piety. In the PRC, the Buddhist and Taoist high clergy in the national associations has tended to embrace this approach, but at lower levels, temple committee leaders look the other way and allow practices that until recently were condemned as feudal, such as the burning of incense sticks and god money. I have observed the latter in temples located in large cities: one of which dedicated to scholars, and the other one to Confucius himself. This practice of a religious ‘popular Confucianism’ is widespread in Taiwan (Clart 2003).

Under Hu Jintao, a new generation of Confucian intellectuals had briefly hoped that their tradition would be recognized as a religion, but the CPC has rejected that option under Xi Jinping (Yao 2000; Sun 2013; Solé-Farràs 2014). Many people in Taiwan and Hong Kong, however, harbour a more ambiguous attitude towards Confucianism, some considering it a full-fledged religion, or its teachings an important element in some of the new religions, such as Yiguandao, Lijiao, etc (Billioud 2009; 2010; Billioud and Thoraval 2015). That is to say that regardless of its status as a non-recognized religion, or as an ethical teaching that makes filial piety a sacred duty with serious penalty for whoever does not practice it, Confucianism is a pervasive influence in Chinese societies (Bell 2010). If care-giving at home is a duty sanctioned by this moral system, an important question for sociologists is to evaluate to what extent people who believe otherwise consider themselves Confucian, or whether people who call themselves Confucian would consider care-giving in a state-sponsored institution an acceptable practice (Adler 2014). As I will argue below, the state in China has orchestrated a series of campaign over the years which reveal that many of its leaders believed that these values matter.

In Taiwan, the pervasiveness of filial piety as a central religious value emerges when we pay attention to the religious literature produced in temples or by associations, as well as to their social actions. Hence, one of the most famous sites of a new religious movement, the Hsing Tien Kung temple in Taipei, variously described as Taoist or folk religious, organizes philanthropic activities for the elderly. In China, I have met with small groups of volunteers from Taoist associations who have recently started to organize bi-monthly visits to nursing home and to elderly’s home to bring them comfort. In both cases, volunteers stressed the importance they attach to filial piety. Even more remarkable is the case of Buddhism. Confucian and Taoist scholars had criticized Buddhism, in classical debates on the centrality of the family, a few centuries after its introduction to China, because of the monastic life of its clergy and their dependence on lay people. They saw in all of this a drain on national resource and they faulted the celibacy of monks as an unnatural way of life. Buddhist apologists sought to justify their
presence in China by over-bidding their critics in their commitment to filial piety and convincingly retorted to them that the monastic life, outside the home (*chujia*), represented a vicarious expression of filial piety, paying respect not only to one’s parents, but also to the parents of others. Buddhists today promote this view unambiguously through the literature they publish (Cheng 2014), but also in their many philanthropic activities, which complement state provision of social services, in particular by providing care to categories of the population, such as people without children, and orphans, that are particularly vulnerable because of the absence of family support. The point in all the above is that these religious movements have appropriated to themselves Confucian classics as part of their own religious teachings, and they stress the centrality of the family for salvation and self-cultivation.

*Religions as sources of support to care-givers*

The three teachings mentioned above, whether they are carried by official associations claiming a monopoly of representation for each of the teaching, relayed by communal religions that refer simultaneously to them, or new religious movements and redemptive societies that incorporate them in their own scriptures, have in common their stress on the importance of family, and such is the centrality of this value that it was historically difficult for outside religions to impose their belief system on the Han people if it did not recognize this. But what makes for the resilience of these religions despite political and social tribulations can create problems for population that claim origins in different ethnicities, if not different nationalities. There are two types of outsiders that are relevant to this: ethnic minorities in Mainland China and the aboriginal people of Taiwan, most of which do not practice the same religions as the Han people. The other types of outsiders are the care-givers coming from countries where the majority of the population practice monotheist and mutually exclusive religions such as Islam and Christianity. Although these religions also valorize their own forms of filial piety and family values, they also stress universal values and inspire activist actions beyond the boundaries of ethnicity and family, at least in principle.

Migrant workers from the Philippines represented the major source of the migrant care-givers labor force when Taiwan and Hong Kong opened their door in the 1990s to outsiders when the local labor force was unable to meet the demand. Their number has diminished relative to Indonesians in Taiwan in recent years, but in Hong Kong they still represent half of all migrant domestic workers. In China, we know less, except for the fact that Filipina ‘nannies’ are popular among the expatriate community and some of the wealthiest Chinese, because of their English-speaking abilities. Filipinas differ from their employers on the ground of language but also of religion, with the exception of the small minorities of Catholics among Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong residents. I do not have data on the religious identity of the employers of Filipina care-givers, but in China and Taiwan, the rather disadvantaged socio-economic situation of most Catholics – poor rural residents in China, close to a third of the aboriginal population in Taiwan - makes less likely that they would employ care-givers or domestic workers in the first place.

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2 Catholics count for less than 1% of the population in China; between 1.5 and 2 % in Taiwan; and around 5 % in Hong Kong.
Migrant care-givers in all three places are subjected to draconian working condition that amount to labor rights’ violation, and one of the limited source of support Filipinas can turn to is the Catholic Church in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Church in both places had a history of compliance to authoritarian rule in Taiwan and colonial rule in Hong Kong, but in the wake of the People’s power Movement of the Philippines and the wave of democratization that swept the region in the late 1980s, the Church has spoken clearly on many occasions on behalf of the Filipina care-givers, and supported logistically NGOs promoting solidarity with them. In short, in the complicated equation of welfare regimes and the work of care, while traditional Chinese religions have shaped the demand for this kind of work, Catholicism has played an important role in addressing its worst forms of abuse. This regulatory role has some important implication: correcting the excesses of the corporatist regimes is not the same as asking for its replacement by a more generous one. Such a proposal would be problematic because it could diminish the reliance on Filipina care-givers, whose remittances are necessary for the Philippine economy.

But the Filipinas in Taiwan and Hong Kong have been victims of their success: the factors that have explained why they were more likely to be hired as live-in caregiver there are also the factors that have been used against them. Their superior knowledge of English, relative to their employer in Taiwan has led to the perception that they are arrogant, and as a result, many employers are turning to Indonesian care-givers, who are perceived as more docile. While this logic does not play itself as much in Hong Kong, it also matters there, as the number of Indonesian care-givers has grown there as well in recent years. The early findings from participant-observation suggest that Islam will not play the same role for Indonesian care-givers as Catholicism does for their Filipina counterparts. Although Muslims have their own associations in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, like Catholics do, the religious practice of Muslim women differ from that of Catholic women. While the latter are more likely to congregate in the Sunday mass and take the opportunity to socialise and eventually send remittance and gain help, if required, the former would not necessarily go to mosque to pray. So far, the members of the Muslim communities I have met in Taiwan and Hong Kong do not know of Muslim NGOs that compare in reaching out effort and activism to their Catholic counterparts. No doubt, as the mobilization in favor of the Indonesian worker, Edwina Nowiarty, demonstrated in the Spring of 2015, it is possible that Islamic associations will also play a regulatory role, in concert with the Indonesian state. However, like Catholic associations, this is unlikely to lead to radical demands to change the existing welfare regime.

In relation to this, there are no reasons to believe that universalistic religions such as Christianity and Islam are more likely to promote more inclusive welfare regimes. The current record of countries where these religions represent the faith of the majority is far from conclusive. Moreover, redemptive societies, such as Yiguandao, which have emerged from the Chinese religious traditions, and to some extent Buddhism and Taoism, have also made convincing claims that they can be considered universal as well and not limited to an ethnic group, let alone the family. That being said, it is clear that in Taiwan and Hong Kong, where the potential to develop such activism is possible, Christian associations, and in particular the Catholic Church, stand out as an important line of support for migrant care-givers, in particular but not exclusively, from the Philippines. I know far less about the role of Mosques in supporting migrant workers from
Indonesia and from other countries where many Muslims live. Yet, governments in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, are likely to find that in the shaping of care policies, the leaders of these two religions may become indispensable interlocutors because they know about the plight of their followers who are domestic workers, and will be important in the shaping of their approach to care within the framework of their welfare regimes. The next section moves to the existing efforts made by the governments of the region in that direction.

Religions and care: the policies

The state in Chinese societies, regardless of the political regime, has looked to the family as the basic social unit responsible for elderly care. As we have seen above, such choice results from strategies of economic development that have focused investments on factors of productions such as infrastructure, the training of a skilled workforce through education, and rewards to key social actors supporting the regime. The ideal of the family as a basic unit to provide care reflects an idealized version of life in the countryside, where three generations used to live under the same roof, which is becoming rarer all over East Asia. In post-industrial societies, this approach has become unworkable for households that need to care for parents and children while working outside home to meet basic expenses. This has been a reality for urbanized societies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong for decades, and it is fast becoming the reality for a majority of Chinese as well. Moreover, this approach has never worked for people without descendants, and has become extremely unpractical for families torn apart by parents leaving behind children who will be taken care of by their grand-parents. To maintain this approach to social policy, governments have to overcome the resistance to it that can come from those who are excluded from its benefits, or face difficulties in trying to abide by it. In other words, it is imperative for governments to legitimize their policies and demonstrate that they are the best possible. Religions represent key resources to achieve this goal, but the different governments of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, have approached that from very different perspectives.

In socialist China, the Communist Party ensured that it would wrestle from every religion embedded in social life any form of activity that bear on welfare, the economy, and politics. For the diffused religions that represented the dominant form of religiosity in Chinese society for centuries, that meant outright condemnation as ‘feudal superstitions’ and the endurance of numerous campaigns to extirpate any influence. This approach favored the growth and survival of institutionalised religions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Although the Cultural Revolution sought to eradicate them, this movement represented a short exception, when put in the context of the close to seven decades of the socialist regime. However, this toleration of the religions that had congregation had some serious limitations. They ought to register in state-sponsored associations and they should not engage in other social activities beyond a narrowly defined purely liturgical activity. In Taiwan, there was no such perception of religion as a challenge to the state authority, albeit a clearly expressed preference from the government for organized religions that were deemed more modern and compatible with the goals of the state. In Hong Kong, the limited state intervention in the economy and social policy left a lot of room for religious organizations to deliver social services to the population, in the form of schools and hospitals, as in Taiwan.
As we have seen above, the early choices made by governments, in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong occurred in extremely different contexts: state socialism in China, state-directed capitalism in Taiwan, and laissez-faire capitalism in Hong Kong. China’s state socialism meant that in theory every citizen benefited from a very generous welfare regime from the cradle to the grave. In this context, the social work of religion was considered at best superfluous, at worse an unacceptable source of competition for authority. The state-directed capitalism of Taiwan, like the Japan and German approach in the late nineteenth-century, meant a corporatist welfare state, which considered the delivery of social services by religious institutions a necessary complement to serve the people who could not be served by the state. In Hong Kong, laissez-faire capitalism meant that the government, with a low fiscal base, could only offer the benefit of a liberal residual welfare state to targeted minorities of poor people who were stigmatized, leaving even more space for religious philanthropy to run social services. These different choices had some very important consequences for organized religions and the role they could play in lending legitimacy to state social policies. During the high tide of Maoism, the CPC was against the idea that religion could contribute anything to society, and even the concept of filial piety was criticized as an example of feudal ideology. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that this policy, which culminated with the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and started to be deconstructed in 1978, has been brief when put in historical perspective. Still, it has engendered its own sets of obstacles to the use of religion as a possible source of legitimation for some state policies.

Religious associations in China are getting more often involved in supporting the state in its delivery of social services, but the government makes sure that religious support to its policy is downplayed almost to invisibility. The volunteers from philanthropic associations I have met in large Chinese cities expressed to me one common theme: they indicated that they worked for non-religious associations, even though the association they volunteer or worked for was an affiliate of a temple or created by a prominent cleric. Likewise, the numerous campaigns for civility edification (wenming jianshe) that Xi Jinping has promoted through the country in the last three years, have taken off the important specification that civility was spiritual (jingshen). In other words, the ideological efforts by the CPC seek to make religion invisible in the public sphere. Yet, the CPC also actively seeks to promote the traditional values that compose the cosmogony of popular religions, such as filial piety. In many cases, this value has been put into the service of the very secular belief in nationalism, the country being seen as one big family. Religious believers I have met in China had seemed content with this approach: they affirm that the social services they offer have no religious content and therefore they do not violate any of the regulations which forbid religions from proselytizing outside religious venues.

In the context of compressed modernity, the changes in social policy in China are unfolding extremely rapidly and there are some surprising elements of convergence with Taiwan and Hong Kong. China has repudiated its approach to development based in state-ownership of every factor of production in favor of its own form of state-directed capitalism, similar in many respects to Taiwan, at the price of relinquishing its unique system of the people’s communes and the social services that they offered from child care to retirement. This convergence has limits, however:
China’s adoption of approaches to social policy used in Taiwan and Hong Kong does not include reliance on religious institutions for the delivery of social services in education, health care, and elderly care, like Taiwan and Hong Kong have done for decades. If anything, however, the need for the Chinese government to legitimize its social policies and their shortcomings towards left-behind children and elderly without descendants is at the minimum as acute as in Taiwan and Hong Kong. As discussed above, a key feature shared by the social policies in all three cases is the limited support for elderly care by the state, and the expectation that young adults will look after their parents at home. In societies where traditional values were always sponsored, like Taiwan, this ought to be relatively easy. In societies like China, where the same values had been stigmatized for decades, this was obviously more likely to be a tall order. It was also likely to be complex in Hong Kong, where traditional values were competing with those of the colonial power for decades.

Civic education in Taiwan in the 1960s to 1990s has promoted the concept of filial piety in civic education for decades. This is the object of an ongoing investigation: what were the ideal-types of family life promoted in 1960s to 1990s by civic education manuals used in high schools in Taiwan, and how much they contributed to make almost unescapable and natural in the minds of young Taiwanese citizens the idea that family-based elderly care was the only viable option. These decades of education have shaped expectations about what are the best options among the welfare policies the state wants to offer and they have generated effects that reverberate on these former students as they are about to enter retirement age soon. The gradual process of democratization in Taiwan since the late 1990s has challenged this former approach to civic education, as a vibrant and pluralist civil society came to realize that the ideals promoted by the state did not meet the needs of households with two wage-earners, of elderly people who prefer autonomy or the company of other people in their condition. Struggles to change the civic education textbooks used in middle high schools continue, and represent an important aspect of deeper democratization, as women want to change the promotion of the shackle of domesticity as their only option. But the road ahead to change the complex process that had led household to rely on migrant domestic care-givers instead of state-supported elder care institutions will be difficult: both political parties in Taiwan do not support an expansion of the welfare state, and the electorate does not show an inclination to tax increases that such and expansion would require. Religious organizations like the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation and the Christian churches have invested considerable amounts of resources to run social services such hospitals, schools, and elderly home: will they resist an expansion of the welfare state if they believe this will undermine their influence? It will be very interesting to see to what extent the changes in the textbooks on civic education, by downplaying concepts such as filial piety and traditions such as ancestors’ worship, will affect the preferences of citizens about the best policy options.

Concluding remarks and Research questions

Governments in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, face a serious problem of ageing and they lack the fiscal resources and the political will to develop a more extensive network of elderly homes, a challenge they share with all post-industrial societies. The appeal to care at home and the reliance on the family represents for government a less expensive solution to this problem. For
many households that have not live up to the ideal of ‘three generations’ under the same roof that could help solve this problem, this could be a source of shame, unless they find a way to outsource to migrant workers the work of care. There is a considerable amount of research emerging on the political, economic, and social dimension of the problem, but far less on the cultural factors that drive so many families to accept this state of things as the best possible, and to exclude other solutions as immoral, unethical, or worse. Religions and cosmovisions that articulate views about the afterlife, notions of good and evil, propriety, and harmony, are repertoire sanctioning individual and familial behaviour, with threats of punishment in another life, or damnation in hell, along with social stigma in this life, that states could rely upon to reinforce their policies. The argument proposed above is that religions and cosmovisions can also work to correct the excesses of the reliance on the family, when the latter becomes a source of exploitation and abuse for care-givers. In sum, religious institutions, can act as regulators in the moral economy of care, sometimes competing with each other to establish their credentials as supreme authority. The challenge ahead is to document the very different modalities in which the religious dimension of the moral economy of care of Chinese societies operate.

For each Chinese society it is worth asking to what extent are public morality and ethics inspired by spiritual traditions promoted by the state, and in each case, how the latter proceed? Each context matter and will require methodologies suited to specific conditions. In China, I will have to rely on an examination of the different campaigns for the “construction of spiritual civilisation” (jingshen wenming jianshe) and in particular the emphasis on the “model families”(wenming jiating). To what extent these campaigns promote filial piety? What is the reference, if any, made to ancestor’s worship: is it still superstition, or intangible heritage? In Taiwan, the process will be much more straightforward: I will look at the promotion of filial piety by the primary and high schools textbooks on civic education from the 1960s to the 1990s, and investigate the extent to which this education has achieved its goal by looking into Taiwan’s social surveys for the same period about the extent of the beliefs on retribution to children who are fail to be filial. Finally, in Hong Kong, I will look into by role of the Confucian Academy, before and after 1997, to promote families as care-givers. These research questions build upon previous investigation in these three places, and rely on the specific methodologies of process tracing for each policy. Turning to the religious institutions and the popular beliefs themselves, to what extent they are reinforcing traditional gender roles and ideas about care provisions? How much are religious institutions reinforcing the moral pressure or acting as substitutes to the family or the state as care providers? To what extent does care provision to the elderly, the sick, and poor, contribute to the survival and flourishing of religious groups in contemporary Chinese societies, by giving them an additional source of legitimacy? What are the specific consequences for the different traditions, such as Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity?
Sources


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Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan

Kenta AWAZU
Research Fellow
The Institute of Griefcare, Sophia University, Japan

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates and tries to understand the relation of religion and politics in contemporary Japanese situation through several aspects. At the first, it will introduce politico-religious situation in Japan and Japanese culture. As Japanese character “Matsuri-goko(Politics)” means two things(to govern and festival), from ancient to contemporary, religion has had legitimate function in community and society. How this kind of function has been transformed? Then, this paper will introduce post war situation and recent conservatism trends in Japan. Liberal Democratic Party, especially Shinzo Abe Administration (2012-), is probably good example. It could be characterize Abe administration itself as neo liberalism in terms of economy and conservatism in terms of politics.

Second, this paper tries to analyze the data of both voting rate and number of votes obtained by each party in recent decades. By doing so, focused on religious parties (Komeito/Soka Gakkai, The Happiness Realization Party/Happy Science) and religious coalition(the Association of Shinto Shrines). It will be illuminated how important or less important religious parties are in contemporary Japan. It could be said or not, as Kenneth J. Ruoff pointed out, ‘similarly to the Christian Coalition in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Association of Shinto Shrines has shown itself capable to manufacturing popular support for some of its programs.’ [Ruoff 2001]

Third, tries to calculate social significance and social influence of two major crises in Japanese society: one is Aum Gas Attack and Hanshin earthquake occurred in 1995 and the other is Tohoku Earth Quake and Atomic Error in 2011. On the one hand, it looks voices of historical revisionists and hate speakers are getting stronger as if whole society leaning to the right wing, but the pacifist movements, anti-government movement and counter-hate speech movements are getting stronger on the other.

Fourth, tries to understand the atmosphere of our times. Yoshihide Suga, Chief Cabinet Secretary(2012-), has been answered to media reporters or journalists at press conferences in almost every day. In addition to these conferences are really arranged, insisting obstinately to save appearances, there are lots of evasions and ignoratio elenchi in his speeches as if he is speaking in fake news. As Jean Baudrillard’s sense of hyper-reality is already real now, and we are living in advanced information societies, we need to think about the impact of anti-intellectualism and technologies in ‘the Age of Alt-fact’ or ‘post-truth.’
Religious cleavage in Korea, 2003-2014: conservatization of Protestants

Young Bin Lim (POSTECH)

Abstract:

There is religious cleavage among Korean religious voters. Korean Buddhists tended to support conservative political parties while Korean Catholics and Protestants had relatively liberal political preferences in the 1988 Assembly Election. These patterns continued until the early 2000s. Even in the 2000s, Buddhists were the most conservative group, while Protestants and Catholics were relatively liberal. Thus, it seems that religious cleavage did not change much between the 1980s and 2000s. However, there were some signs of changes among Conservative Protestants. Protestant began to be conservatively politicized starting in the 1990s. In the 1992 Presidential election, candidates’ religious affiliation became important because the conservative party’s Presidential candidate was an elder of a Protestant church. In 2005, conservative Protestants established the Christian Social Responsibility Party and the New Right Union and mobilized conservative Protestants to vote for the conservative party. These two organizations alongside the Christian Council of Korea established by conservative megachurch leaders in 1989 resisted the reform efforts of the liberal government and helped a conservative Presidential candidate win the 2007 Presidential election. Protestants became more conservative in the 2000s because of these political efforts of the conservative party and church leaders. On the other hand, there was no sign of liberalization among Buddhists in the 2000s. Thus, it is expected that the magnitude of religious cleavage between Buddhists and Protestants decreased in the 2000s. In this article, first, I will examine the trends in political preference and religious cleavages among religious groups in Korea. Second, I will examine whether there is change in political preference of religious groups and religious cleavages among religious groups. Especially, I will pay attention to the change of political preference of Protestants and Buddhists.

1. Introduction

Religion plays an important role in elections in many countries (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Manza and Brooks, 1997; Brooks and Manza, 2004; Brooks, 2002). In European countries, many people select political parties according to their religious affiliations. For example, in Britain, Anglicans often support the Conservative party, while Catholics support the Labour party. (Choe, 2003; Botterman and Hooghe, 2012). Religious cleavage has been one of main social cleavages in both Europe and the U.S. (Layman, 1997; Raymond, 2011; Manza and Brooks. 1999; Layman, 2001).

There is also religious cleavage among Korean religious voters. Korean Buddhists tended to support conservative political parties while Korean Catholics and Protestants had relatively liberal political preferences in the 1988 Assembly Election (Choe, 2003: 135; Lee, 2013; Lew and Suh, 1989).
Korean Protestants and Catholics were also less conservative than “no religion” group. These patterns continued until the early 2000s. Even in the 2000s, Buddhists were the most conservative group, while Protestants and Catholics were relatively liberal. Thus, it seems that religious cleavage did not change much between the 1980s and 2000s.

There were some signs of changes among Conservative Protestants. Because the first President was a Protestant, Protestantism and politics has been closely related to each other since the late 1940s in Korea. There were no Protestant Presidents between the 1960s and 1980s. Some Protestants who were classified as liberals resisted military dictators and led democracy movements, while other, evangelical Protestants supported the military governments in the 1970s and 1980s (Lee, 2007; Kim, 2006). The overall political preference of Protestants leaned toward liberal parties in the 1980s (Choe, 2003).

However, Protestant began to be conservatively politicized starting in the 1990s. In the 1992 Presidential election, candidates’ religious affiliation became important because the conservative party’s Presidential candidate was an elder of a Protestant church. So, he was called an “Elder President.” Some conservative Protestants thought it was necessary to establish a Christian political party. The politicization of Protestants was related to the growth of the Protestant population. The percentage of Protestants in Korea increased dramatically between the 1960s and 1980s. In 1995, 19.7% of Korean population was classified as Protestants. In the 1990s, there were many Protestant megachurches whose number of weekly attendants was more than 10,000. Thus, every election, candidates tried to have a close relationship with pastors of megachurches. It made the congregation of megachurches politicized in the 1990s (Lugo, 2007; Kim, 2010; Kim et al., 2009).

Protestants did not have a Protestant President between 1998-2007. The President from the liberal party who was elected in 2002 irritated conservative Protestant leaders by pursuing policies which they saw as harmful to the interests of Christian groups. For example, there were many protests to oppose reforms of private schools. Although private schools include both Christian and non-Christian schools, there were many Christian schools established by missionaries in Korea. For Christians, including both Catholics and Protestants, reform of private schools seems to threaten the autonomy of religious education of Christians and to violate the ownership rights of Christian groups (Kwon, 2006).

In 2005, conservative Protestants established the Christian Social Responsibility Party and the New Right Union and mobilized conservative Protestants to vote for the conservative party. These two organizations alongside the Christian Council of Korea established by conservative megachurch leaders in 1989 resisted the reform efforts of the liberal government and helped a conservative Presidential candidate win the 2007 Presidential election (Cho, 2014; Yoon 2006; Shin, 2012; Noh, 2008).

In the 2007 Presidential election, another Elder President was elected. A major factor in his
success was his use of his religious identity to collect votes from Protestants after he became a mayor of Seoul (Strother, 2017). For example, he suggested that he would consecrate Seoul to God when he attended a Protestant prayer meeting. Although many non-Christians criticized his behavior, it helped him get more Protestants’ support in the election (Kim, 2010).

Thus we can expect that Protestants became more conservative in the 2000s because of these political efforts of the conservative party and church leaders. On the other hand, there was no sign of liberalization among Buddhists in the 2000s. Thus, it is expected that the magnitude of religious cleavage between Buddhists and Protestants decreased in the 2000s. In this article, first, I will examine the trends in political preference and religious cleavages among religious groups in Korea. Second, I will examine whether there is change in political preference of religious groups and religious cleavages among religious groups. Especially, I will pay attention to the change of political preference of Protestants and Buddhists.

2. Methodology and Data

To measure the magnitude of political preference of religious groups, I will calculate the proportion of respondents who support the conservative party. For measurement of religious cleavage, I will use the Alford Index and odds ratios to measure the magnitude of religious cleavage in Korea. The Alford Index is calculated by the difference between the probability of voters supporting the conservative party among Korean Buddhists and the probability of voters supporting the conservative party among Korean Protestants. Thus, the range of the Alford index is between -1 and 1. The Alford Index have been used to measure the magnitude of social cleavage, such as religious cleavage, by many political scientists (Alford 1963; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995).

I will also use odds ratios to measure the magnitude of religious cleavage. I will also use other types of measures, such as the “Thomsen Index,” to measure religious cleavage by using a log-odds ratio. These measurements have advantages because I can control other variables such as gender, age, income, and education (Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999; Lachat, 2007; Evans, Heath, and Payne 1991).

For dependent variables, I used a binary variable for political preference, assigning 1 to conservative supporters and 0 to liberal supporters. The variable was recoded into a binary variable because original question (Currently which political party do you support most?). Because there are more than two political parties every survey year, I recoded party variables into binary variables according to their political orientations. For independent and control variables, I used region dummy variables, household income, employment status, marital status, education, gender, age, and religiosity, which is measured as strength of belief. variables. These variables are used as control variables in calculation of odds ratios or log-odds ratios. But they are also used as independent
variables to analyze what factors are most associated with support for the conservative party among religious groups. I used the religious affiliation variable to calculate the proportion of conservative party support of religious groups and the magnitude of religious cleavages. I summarized these variables in Table 1.

For my data source, I used data from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), which is conducted annually through the Survey Research Center at the Sungkyunkwan University in Korea. It replicates the format of the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (ICPSR, 2015a; Kim et al., 2013).

3. Results

The results show that most religious groups, including those who reported no religion, became more politically conservative in their political preference between 2003-2014. Korean Buddhists are the most politically conservative religious group in Korea, while Catholics and those with no religious affiliation tend to be more liberal than other groups. Korean Protestants were as liberal as Catholics in their 2003 voting patterns, but they became more politically conservative in their voting patterns between 2003 and 2014. Accordingly, the magnitude of religious cleavage between Buddhists and Protestants decreased and the magnitude of religious cleavage between Protestants and those with no religious affiliation increased. The magnitude of other religious cleavages between Buddhists and Catholics, Catholics and the non-religious, and Buddhists and those without religious affiliation remain stable.

Religious cleavages between Buddhists and Protestants showed the same increasing trend after controlling for region, household income, employment status, marital status, education, gender, age, religiosity.

For Protestant and Buddhist voters, age is an influential factor in determining level of support for the conservative party. Living in the West is also important factor in support for the liberal party among Protestants and support for the conservative party among Buddhists.

The proportion of support for the conservative party among Protestants increased in 2005 and 2006. In 2005, marital status was an influential factor along with living in the West and age. Single voters were more likely than married voters to vote for the conservative party in 2005. In 2006, Protestants with lower levels of education and household income were more likely to support the conservative party than more affluent and educated people. It is necessary to use advanced methods, such as using interaction variables, to interpret this inconsistency more concretely. In 2009, 2010, and 2012, employed Protestants were more likely to support the conservative party. Strength of belief influenced support for the conservative party only in 2013.

Among Buddhists, age and living in the West are the most influential factors associated with
supporting the conservative party. Gender is influential in both the 2004 and 2014 election results. The result of 2014 is interesting because Buddhist females were more likely to support the conservative Party, while Protestant males were more likely to support the conservative party in 2014. Highly educated Buddhists were more likely to support the conservative party in 2004, 2005, and 2012. Especially, the strength of belief is influential in support for the conservative party among Buddhists in 2008 and 2009. This seems to be related to the election of a Protestant Elder President in 2007. But caution should be exercised in interpreting that result because the President's party was a conservative party.

<Figure 1> Proportion of Conservative Party Support of Religious Groups in Korea(2003-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Buddhist-Protestant</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>50%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<Figure 2> Trend of Alford Index, 2003-2014 (Political Conservatism among Religious Groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Buddhist-Protestant</th>
<th>Buddhist-Catholic</th>
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<tbody>
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Figure 3: Odds Ratio of supporting Conservative Party between Protestants and Buddhists.
<Figure 4> Log Odds Ratio of supporting Conservative Party between Protestants and Buddhists

<Table 1> Descriptive Statistics (N=17553)

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Political Movements and the Birth of the Japanese New Religious Movement “Seicho-no-ie”

KURITA Hidehiko

Introduction

After World War I, Japan entered a continuous economic crisis. There was an on-going depression, and the unemployment rate and economic inequality were increasing. This crisis led to the spread of socialist and communist movements. The Japanese government banned such activities and arrested many communists, some of who then changed their views and joined right-wing social reform movements. Reformation of the politico-economic regime was a concern for both left and right wing groups. Under these circumstances, Taniguchi Masaharu (1893-1985) started publishing his original magazine named Seichō-no-Ie (生長の家, translated loosely by his present-day successor as “The Home of Infinite Life, Wisdom and Abundance”). His activities grew into the new religious organization Seichō-no-ie, the largest New Thought school in Japan. New Thought was a spiritual movement that developed new ideas on healing different from those of Christianity and science in late nineteenth-century America, inspired by hypnotism and mesmerism. Like American New Thought groups, Seichō-no-ie’s main aim is to give people salvation through spiritual and psychotherapeutic technologies. While established religions and journalists often criticized Seichō-no-ie and called it heresy (邪教, jakyō), Taniguchi's writings attracted in the 1930s members from the middle class, including converts from left wing groups, and, after World War II, also became influential among right-wing and nationalistic political movements.

In other words, his ideas and activities had a strong political aspect. Indeed, starting in the 1930s Taniguchi frequently argued about economic issues and proposed social reform projects. Previous studies have generally focused on Taniguchi's nationalism as well as spiritualist ideas, while paying attention to Seichō-no-ie’s expansion into foreign countries, including Brazil and Taiwan, in the post-war period. However, if we consider that leftists were also interested in Seichō-no-ie in the 1930s, his way of thinking about economics around this time is also important for understanding not only Seichō-no-ie’s postwar development but also the mutual influences between political developments and spiritualist thought in Japan. This paper aims to, while taking the social and historical circumstances of the period into account, clarify Taniguchi's early idea of political economy and consider how it was related to contemporary political movements.

1. Taniguchi Masaharu’s Early Career and the Foundation of Seicho-no-ie

First, I will present a brief sketch of Taniguchi Masaharu and his activities. He was an excellent student in the English literature department of Waseda University. However, due to trouble

with women, he dropped out and passed difficult younger days. During this period, he developed an interest in spiritual healing and religious thought and became an adherent of a new religious group, Ōmoto.

Ōmoto is a Shintō-style religion, but it was often regarded as dangerous, because its teachings included a prophecy that a powerful god which it enshrined was planning to overturn this corrupted world around 1922 and then rebuild a new world directly governed by spiritual rules, in which the Emperor of Japan would be the central spiritual leader. In addition, Ōmoto taught a spirit possession technique of manifesting spiritual entities through one’s own body that was criticized by psychologists and journalists, although it attracted many people (including intellectuals) who were interested in mystical experiences. The Japanese government, in response, cracked down on Ōmoto in 1921. Though Taniguchi was an executive staff member at that time, he parted from Ōmoto after the oppression incident and the failure of the prophecy.

Seeking something he could devote himself to again, he joined the spiritualist group Nihon Shinreigakkai (日本心霊学会) and the commune movement Ittōen (一燈園). However, his poverty was getting serious, and, finally, he took a job as a translator at the advertising department of Vacuum Oil Company, which later became part of ExxonMobil. Nevertheless, his craving for spiritual activities did not stop. While working the company, he published his own spiritual magazine named Seichō-no-ie in 1930. Two years later, he wrote his main work titled Seimei no jissō (meaning Truth of Life), resigned from the company, and bought a printing office with his retirement bonus.

Influenced by the American New Thought movement, his teachings included the ideas that all religions are originally one, everyone is an immortal god-man in the “true world,” the material world is a reflection of our mind, and, therefore, there is neither evil nor illness in nature. Emphasizing the power of words, he insisted that, by reading his writings, people would realize the Truth and become healthy, wealthy, and happy.

2. The Seicho-no-ie Economic League

After the founding of Seichō-no-ie, Taniguchi established the Seichō-no-ie Economic League (生長の家経済連盟). Around this period, the Great Depression was heavily influencing the Japanese economy and unemployment rate was growing significantly. Socialists and communists organized labor and student movements and frequently held strikes. In response, the Japanese government arrested around 1,600 communists in 1928, which is called the March 15 incident.

Taniguchi was also concerned about this social situation. He called for people to share equally in unemployment, that is, for people to reduce working hours and thereby the unemployment rate. He explained that extended unemployment was also “a product of mechanization” and “exploited” by not only the bourgeois but also the proletariat. If a company imposes long working
hours on a worker and the worker has to take sick leave from overwork, another worker takes the job instead. As a result, a worker becomes unemployed and another worker had to overwork. According to Taniguchi, this is caused by avarice for working. Therefore, he said, we have to unite to reduce working hours by ourselves at once. He wanted this to take the form of the Seichō-no-ie Economic League, also known as the Anti-Avarice Association (欲張らない会).

While this seems like a call for strikes, Taniguchi used different rhetoric from communism. However, according to him, rhetoric is very important, because what we think has a strong effect on the actual world. Instead of adopting the Marxist class theory, his rhetoric called upon the bourgeois to unite with the proletariat under the Seichō-no-ie Economic League. He argued that unless employers gave money and leisure to more people they would cut their own throat by decreasing their buying power and increasing dangerous thought that tries to destroy Japan. Therefore, Taniguchi said, “It was such bourgeois that were a snake in our bosom, a treacherous insider of our homeland.” With communism being suppressed by the government and people looking for another solution to the economic depression, Taniguchi’s proposal attracted some, including bourgeois and ex-communists.

3. The Joint-stock Company as Religion

After he established Seichō-no-ie Economic League, he founded a joint-stock company named Kōmyōshisō Fukyūkai (光明思想普及会, “association of spreading bright thought”). The company's main business was the publication of Taniguchi's books. However, he strongly insisted that his joint-stock company was a new religious form that was able to distribute wealth to every stockholder-adherent. He said,

> We have to break apart the wrong idea that one must lose one’s fortune to save the other in our religious activities. […] Seichō-no-ie has the idea that the material is infinite because it is a reflection of the spiritual. Also, it is said that the more you give, the more you get. Therefore, the more of your fortune you give, the more return you receive.  

He criticized donation as an old religious activity and, instead, proposed investment as the new one, which was called “religion of mutual prosperity” (自他倶富の宗教). Taniguchi showed the management plan of his project to subscribers of Seichō-no-ie’s magazine and described his advertising strategy as follows.

> How can we enhance the impact of newspaper advertisements? Firstly, the larger they are, the more effective. Secondly, it is necessary that the content of advertisements be endorsed by

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1 Taniguchi Masaharu “Ware sanchō yori kumo wo namebu (われ山頂より雲を招ぶ),” Seichō-no-ie 5:5, 1934.
authority figures.³

This simple strategy seemed to appeal to amateur investors. He managed to raise funds and placed prominent advertisements in major newspapers. The Truth of Life series sold well. Some purchasers became subscribers of Seichō-no-ie’s magazine, and some subscribers became stockholders of Kōmyōshisō Fukyūkai. Stockholder-aderents actively promoted Seichō-no-ie’s publications out of their own belief and for their own benefit. In short, the more investment money and missionary activity believers gave, the more dividends, rebates, and religious salvation they received. Commercial and religious aspects were closely combined. A person’s salvation itself helped to publicize Seichō-no-ie’s publications because stories of healing experiences were highlighted in magazines and speeches, and one’s devoted activities in missionary or investing often lead to an elevation of one’s status in the organization. In this way, Seichō-no-ie expanded its scale in both financial and missionary aspects.

Taniguchi’s idea regarding the joint-stock company as religion looks like only a justification for his business plan. Indeed, it was often criticized as a “commercial religion” by journalists. However, the belief of “the more you give, the more you get” was consistent all through his own life. In addition, insofar as what one gets something spiritual from Seichō-no-ie, one has a motivation beyond just a business.


From the start of World War II, involved countries turned into wartime economies and were recuperating from economic depression. Japan also strengthened its controlled economy with its total war regime and, as a result, the problem of the high unemployment rate was in the process of being solved. Now, while Japanese government needed to expand production capacity, it was confronted with a supply and labor shortage.

In this context, Taniguchi’s ideas regarding political economy changed. He threw away the Seichō-no-ie Economic League project and strengthened his ideas on “the more you give, the more you get.” He expanded this idea from Seichō-no-ie to whole of Japan. He proposed that the Japanese government print wartime money (軍事紙幣) that could only be used after the war in order to increase workers’ motivation while restraining their consumption. In addition, he said the following.

Economic control is used, but it is done under capitalistic liberalism. However, we cannot accomplish the expansion of production under the fee-for-service system. So I used to propose that, rather than controlling munitions production, the government construct the employees of war industries into a military organization, providing not income growth but honor as military

³ Taniguchi Masaharu “Ware sanchō yori kumo wo namebu (われ山頂より雲を招ぶ),” Seichō-no-ie 5:5, 1934.
personnel, and have them sweep away the idea that they are working under capitalism.\(^4\)

In this statement, his idea regarding the joint-stock company as religion is very apparent. The Japanese government is equivalent to Seichō-no-ie and the employees of war industries are equivalent to its believers. He insisted on the homology between nation state and Seichō-no-ie, stating, “Because, as Hegel said, nation is the ultimate organization, the manifestation of the perfect nation is the manifestation of Jissō (実相, Truth in the context of Seichō-no-ie).”\(^5\)

**Conclusion**

Taniguchi’s ideas were strongly influenced by American New Thought, but I think that his experiences early in life formed his unique ideas. First, from Ōmoto, he acquired an interest in radical reformation and the belief that Japanese Emperor is the center of the world. Secondly, through his own experience of poverty, he realized the importance of political economy. These two factors made him seek not only to relieve people’s minds but also social reform and world reformation based on the ideal of anti-capitalism and a Japanese-Emperor-centered regime. However, his career in an American company taught him the effectiveness of advertisements and capitalistic management. This third factor was a major difference between him and Ōmoto.

In the other words, while taking capitalism in, he sought to transcend it. This challenge was one he shared with contemporary thinkers, including Marxists, which led intellectual people and ex-Marxists to be attracted to Seichō-no-ie. Its economic league was an alternative to the socialist labor movement. Furthermore, his idea about his joint-stock company has common aspects with Marx’s discussion in *Capital* of future associations that socialize capital brought about by public companies in which labor owns capital.

Therefore, Taniguchi had to clearly show how his thought was different from Marxism. For him, this was Japanese Emperor. While Marxists regarded the Soviet Union as the ideal community, Taniguchi considered the Japanese Emperor-centered community the proper alternative. Like communism in the Soviet Union, Seichō-no-ie tried to spread their ideology to the world and supported expansionism of its own nation at the time, all while facing off against the domestic enemies in order to manifest the Jissō (Truth) of Japan. By emphasizing the Emperor, Seichō-no-ie was often thought of as just a right-wing group, but it was rather a kind of national socialist movement that aimed for solidarity through not only nationalism but also spiritual healing and economic policy.

\(^4\) Taniguchi Masaharu, *Gaisei chi no sho* (概世血の書), Kōmyōshisō Fukyūkai, 1940, p. 98
Korean Protestant Christianity in Crisis: History, Predicament, and Loyal Resistance

Seung Min Hong

Department of Communication Studies, University of Iowa

Abstract

In the past decades, South Korean Protestantism has attracted scholars of religion for various reasons including its almost unrivaled numeric growth and vibrancy in East Asia. Recent observations, however, have also noticed its negative perceptions among the general public in Korea, a country in which several religions coexist along with a significant non-religious population. Given the plethora of research on Korean Protestantism, I propose a project that approaches the topic from a slightly different angle that can be an addition to the ongoing research. This essay comes from the introductory chapter from my dissertation, which focuses on religious social actors whom I refer to as “critical insiders” of Korean Protestantism, namely, those who are committed to their Protestant faiths yet are highly critical of the ways in which the Protestant religion is taught, believed, and practiced in South Korea. While the dissertation focuses on the question of how they resist/challenge popular beliefs and dominant institutions – as well as alternative visions they offer – through media, the following chapter provides some basic information on the South Korean context and Korean Protestant critical insider movements.
“In the history of Protestantism, no church has ever been more corrupt than that of South Korea today.”

- Bong-Ho Sohn, Chair Professor of Kosin University -

Unlike the other major religious traditions with significant numbers of adherents in South Korea, most of which have been in the country for more than a millennium, Christianity has been around for only three centuries, with Roman Catholicism and Protestantism being introduced in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. Throughout their short histories in the country, both Catholics and Protestants have played significant roles in education, medicine, and modernization. They also took major parts in liberating the nation from Japanese occupation (1910-1945), though many Protestant leaders later turned out to be collaborators with Japan. Protestantism has also experienced a rapid growth in Korea with a pace that is perhaps unparalleled in other parts of the world. Today, South Korea is particularly known by Christian leaders around the world to be the East Asian center for conservative Evangelical Christianity. In addition to the number of Protestant Christians who make up about 20% of the country’s population, which is remarkable compared to other East Asian countries, South Korea also has some of the largest churches in the world and is the world’s second largest overseas missionary sending country, only next to the United States.

One of the most significant differences between the introduction of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism to Korea is that the later was brought predominantly by American missionaries. Protestantism, also unlike other beliefs – including Catholicism – brought from abroad, has not

1 From an interview with Sohn by Ahn, 2011.
2 A possible exception to this would be the “house churches” or “underground churches” in China, though the fact that these churches are underground indicates that Christianity is far from being established in China. The Philippines is also considered to be a Christian dominant nation, though the population is predominantly Catholic.
3 For a most recent and thorough historical overview of Korean Protestantism in English, see T. Lee, 2010. In the Korean language, an accessible work that thoroughly compares Protestantism’s history in Korea and America can be found in Chang, 2009a and 2009b.
really gone through any major nationwide persecution except during the Japanese occupation. The Korean government never treated Protestantism as a major threat to the nation. Quite to the contrary, the facts that (1) Protestants took major roles in freeing Korea from Japan shortly after the introduction of their religion, and that (2) it was seen as a religion from America, a country that took an incisive role in defeating Japan and bringing liberation to Korea, led many to see Protestant Christianity as a tradition highly associated with liberation and democracy.

After the Korea War (1950-1953), however, associating Protestantism with America took an additional meaning; the post-war Korean peninsula being divided into the North under the Soviet Union and the South under the United States, now being Protestant also meant being anti-communist. The military regime in South Korea (1961-1988), which resulted after the military coup on the 16th of May in 1961, highly reinforced the anti-communist ideology, and influential Protestant leaders, such as megachurch pastors, were expected to cooperate with the government. In return, the government also showed favor to these Protestant groups and institutions. One of the most palpable examples of such collaboration between the military regime and the Protestant institutions was the launching of National Prayer Breakfast, an annual gathering of politicians and Protestant leaders which continues to this day. Protestantism in Korea having been largely conservative from its inception, both politically and theologically, such anti-communist sentiments and cooperating with the government (conservative anti-communist parties to be more precise) are still major characteristics of Korean Protestantism. Nowadays, many Protestants groups – especially megachurches – are known for promoting the election of government officials who are Protestant and politically conservative.

Despite the fact that the above is only intended to be a brief summary, the information given so far alone misses important aspects of both the history and contemporary status of
Protestant Christianity in South Korea. The other side of the big picture that is especially pertinent to the proposed topic of this dissertation concerns the challenges, critiques, and resistance against dominant Korean Protestantism. This can be further broken down into the categories of (a) the sentiments of the general public and (b) voices from within the Protestant religion. To better understand these, one needs to know about the broader religio-cultural context of the South Korean society.

Pluralistic religious atmosphere is not unique to South Korea. The Korean religious marketplace, however, is much more competitive compared to many other national contexts. While multiple religions coexist in various regions all over the world, one or two traditions often boast dominance among the nation’s population. In such cases, the dominant traditions are typically certain branches of Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism, with the exceptions of countries such as India. In South Korea, however, the religious atmosphere can be more competitive in the sense that it is much more oligopolistic. Statistically, roughly half of the population claim to be religious; slightly over 20% are Buddhist, a little less than 20% are Protestant, and about 10% are Catholic (W. Lee, 2010). And, of course, as in other parts the world, there are minority new religious movements (Choi, 2004). In South Korea, then, the religious setting involves both (1) the coexistence of religious and nonreligious populations, both of which make up half of the nation’s population, and (2) the interaction and competition among at least three major institutionalized religions without any one of them overwhelmingly outnumbering the others.

Besides the statistical information, however, another crucial aspect to consider in the Korean religious context involves two less institutionalized religions that are highly influential over the country’s entire culture. Scholars continue to observe that Confucianism and Korean shamanism (mu-sok-sin-ang) remain deeply rooted in all aspects of the Korean society (Choi,
Regardless of the religious institution that one chooses to be part of, Confucianism, as a kind of religious backdrop that pervades all dimensions of life, has always determined the ethical norms of social relations in Korea. Korean shamanism, on the other hand, has always been understood as the “real Korean religion” that defines the whole Korean religiosity, which is applicable beyond individuals who identify themselves as religious. Whenever major religious traditions from overseas traveled to Korea, they have interacted with and become indigenized by the preexisting shamanism. In fact, scholars who study interactions between “imported” religions and local Korean culture observe that even Protestantism has been thoroughly shamanized in Korea (Chang, 2007; Choi, 2011), meaning that actual beliefs and practices often involve those that are shamanistic in origin and incompatible with Protestant Christianity. This is ironic, because Protestants in Korea are known to be most hostile against Korean shamanism. Korean Protestants’ condemnation of mu-sok-sin-ang as “idolatry” and the general public’s perception of Protestants as Western friendly-imperialistic and anti-traditional (Hong, 2016a) speak of Protestantism’s cultural status in the contemporary Korean context. It is not viewed with much favor by the general public.

Despite its fast and successful growth until the recent years, surveys show that Protestant Christianity is the most hated religion among South Koreans (W. Lee, 2010), and it is still perceived as the most “foreign” or “Western” religion among the major traditions believed and practiced in the country (Choi, 2004). The mass media occasionally report on pastors’ moral corruption and conservative Protestant groups’ aggressive rhetoric on other religions and hostile protests against liberal values; characteristics of such protests are similar to those in America,

4 Concrete examples may include attributing worldly misfortunes to demonic causes, belief in the pastor as a medium between God and humans, or belief in increased efficacy of prayers in particular locations such as mountains. While many scholars often refer specifically to the Pentecostal/charismatic denominations in Korea as examples of shamanization, Sung Gun Kim (2011) points out that even the rest of the major denominations in Korea that are not officially associated with Pentecostalism have now become practically charismatized.
which include anti-Islam, anti-LGBT, and pro-capitalism. Also noticed by various media outlets is affluent Protestant organizations’ political partisanship with conservative parties, which is often manifested in megachurch pastors’ Sunday sermons.  

Popular discourses on Protestant Christianity involve derogatory depictions of the church’s exclusive view of divinity and salvation as well as militant street evangelism in the midst of Korea’s pluralistic/oligopolistic religious atmosphere (Park, 2005). In those street evangelisms, with which most citizens of Seoul are familiar, one can often hear the motto *yesu-ch’ŏndang bulsin-chiok* (Jesus-heaven, unbelief-hell), a phrase that is also often appropriated in derogatory statements against Protestants. Such discourses on Protestantism as an everyday annoyance are also occasionally depicted in TV shows and films (Hong, 2016a, pp. 4538-4539). This is not to say, of course, that South Korean citizens’ view of Protestant Christianity is nothing but negative accept for the adherents. Politically conservative parties, for example, continue to recognize large Protestant organizations’ pro-capitalist inclinations and partner with them. It is also true that there are more Protestant non-profit charity organizations in Korea than any other religious traditions (W. Lee, 2010, pp. 222-226). Nevertheless, the negative perceptions of Protestantism is an overarching sentiment in South Korea (W. Lee, 2010), which have been aggravated by growing dissatisfaction with politicians who identify themselves as devout Protestants, the most significant example of which was the former president Lee Myung Bak (2008-2013).

**Voices from within**

The other side of Korean Protestantism’s crisis that is more pertinent to this study, which is yet understudied in scholarship in the English language, comes from the voices of those who identify themselves as Protestants yet are critical of the ways in which the Protestant religion has been

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5 More specific examples involving moral and political incidents will be provided in the following chapters.
taught, believed and practiced in Korea: those whom call critical insiders. In the contemporary context, one of the most notable manifestations of such loyal protesting is the growing number of self-identified Protestants who are leaving the church; that is, not moving to another church but deciding to disassociate themselves with institutionalized Protestant churches altogether while maintaining their faith. Scholars have come to refer to such religious population in Korea as Ka-na-an sŏngt’o, which means “Canaanite saints” (Yang, 2014). This term is wordplay. In the biblical narrative, the land of Canaan is the Promised Land, the Korean transliteration of which is ka-na-an. The Korean rendition, however, is also a reversal of the phrase an-na-ka, which means “I will not go.” Thus, the wordplay implies that those who protest and decide to depart from the established Protestant institutions are the ones truly headed to the Promised Land. Yang (2014) has collected previous sociological literatures that specifically focused on Canaanite Protestants in South Korea and showed that these individuals, though still the minority, are growing rapidly in number. According to statistics gathered by scholars, these Canaanite saints consist of roughly thirteen percent of the entire Protestant population in South Korea (Yang, 2014, pp. 35-36). There were indeed various reasons for leaving church, ranging from political partisanship, moral predicaments of influential Protestant leaders, to dissatisfaction with religious/theological education.6

*History of Organized Critical Insider Movements in Korean Protestantism*

Just as it is so in the history of Christianity in other parts of the world, not to mention other religions, loyal protests against dominant Protestant institutions and authorities in Korea is not exclusive a contemporary phenomenon. Even with its short history in the country compared to the other major religious traditions, Korean Christianity has seen protesters coming from those

6 Again, specifics of these internal critiques will be discussed further in the following chapters.
who profess their Christian faiths. The best known example has been those who advocated *Minjung* theology, which can be translated as “theology of the people.” A Korean equivalent of South America’s liberation theology, *Minjung* theology emerged in the 1970’s as an anti-authoritarian movement that protested against the military regime of that time as well as the established Protestant institutions that collaborated with the government. Just like its predecessor in Latin America, *Minjung* theology highly emphasized the liberating aspect of the Christian gospel, more specifically of those who are powerless and oppressed. Not surprisingly, this branch of Christianity has been constantly in tension with, and suppressed by, the same government that collaborated with major Protestant institutions through means such as the aforementioned National Prayer Breakfast. Albeit a significant theological and social movement in Korea, *Minjung* theology has always been, and continues to be, a tiny minority.7 As activists whose thoughts were indebted to liberation theology, a Catholic movement, *Minjung* theologians have not identified themselves specifically as Protestants but rather employed the broader term Christian. Additionally, lacking theological diversity in a way that is perhaps opposite to what they were opposing (i.e. theologically predominantly liberal whereas the dominant majority Protestants being conservative),8 it continues to be an academically important yet minority voice in South Korea.9

A predecessor movement that is more akin to the Protestant critical insiders of this study actually comes from an earlier period in the Korean history: during the Japanese occupation. This movement has been labeled, initially by its detractors, as *Mu-kyo-hoe-chu-ŭi*, meaning non-church-ism or non-church movement. This movement finds its origin in Japan, which was one

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7 For a substantial introduction to *Minjung* theology, see Kim, 2012.
8 Although they were always the minority, theologically liberal schools of thought did make their way to Korea. See Chang, 2009b, pp. 17-79.
9 Today, The Christian Institute for the Third Era is the leading institution that continues its legacy. Its website can be found at [http://www.minjungtheology.kr/](http://www.minjungtheology.kr/).
of the reasons for drawing criticism from Protestant churches during the time when Korea was under the Japanese rule. A group of Korean Protestant Christians who studied in Japan as students were also trained by the Japanese evangelist Uchimura Kanzō on the Christian bible and Kanzō’s views of the church. Upon their return to Korea, they proclaimed that the established Protestant institutions and authorities were actually keeping the Protestant religion in Korea from being truly faithful to the Christian scripture. Advocating the Protestant confessions of Sola Scriptura and the “universal priesthood”\(^\text{10}\) to the core of their fundamental definitions, they started gatherings of believers (which they saw was the only necessary composition of the church) with no hierarchy or institutionalized practices but only focused on studying the bible and working together to live out the faith in their everyday lives. The three leading individuals of the non-church movement were Kim Kyo Sin, Ham Sŏk Hŏn, and Song Du Yong. Unlike Minjung theology, this earlier movement had more theological diversity. For example, Ham’s theological views are considered today by conservative evangelicals to be too radical, whereas Kim’s teachings are understood mostly to be in accordance with those of the original Reformers (Chang, 2009b, pp. 79-101).\(^\text{11}\)

A key element of the non-church movement was its use of print media. Founded and led by Kim Kyo Sin in 1927, Bible Korea (Sŏngsŏ Chosŏn) was a periodical that served as the media outlet for disseminating their voices across the Korean peninsula. Topics covered by the magazine ranged from exegesis of each book of the bible to discussing current social, political and cultural issues. It also included Kim’s personal diaries and essays about various subjects pertinent to his time. As expected, Bible Korea also included much criticism against popular

\(^{10}\) Also called “priesthood of believers,” this Reformation principle argues against any notion of spiritual superiority of established priesthood or its alleged intermediary function between God and humans. See Grenz, Guretzki, & Nordling, 1999, p. 95.

\(^{11}\) For a full treatment of the non-church movement in Korea and its key figures, see Paek, 2005.
Protestantism and its followers. It was eventually discontinued in 1942, not by the major Protestant institutions of that time but by the colonial Japanese government, for it sensed “dangerous” anti-colonial messages in its pages. After Korea’s liberation from Japan, Kim’s successors gathered the remaining materials of Bible Korea and published them.\(^{12}\)

**Contemporary Critical Insider Movements**

Examining such predecessors of contemporary critical insiders of Korean Protestantism reveals that the perceived crisis of the Protestant religion today in South Korea is also not new. Collaborating with those in power at the expense of social justice, moral corruption, and problematic teachings all had their own predecessors as well. In fact, much of what the contemporary critical insider movements try to counter have its historical roots in them. Nevertheless, things have also changed with Korean Protestant Christianity since the Japanese occupation, the ensuing independence, and the military regime. Now Protestantism in South Korea has become more affluent and powerful than ever before, and its missionary presence can be felt, along with that of the United States, all over the world. Neon crosses, which are typically placed on top of Protestant church buildings in South Korea, are literally everywhere. This context in which the Protestant religion’s political and financial influence, physical presence and visibility in the country are greater than ever before is the setting that the contemporary critical insider movements are situated in. Another crucial society-wide change, however, is the overall media scene in South Korea. In exploring South Korean youth activism and the internet, Kang (2016) echoed previous observations that Contemporary South Korea is “one of the world’s most highly connected societies” (p. 1) that “matured into the social media age well ahead of the

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\(^{12}\) Many of Kim’s writings in Bible Korea can be found online, with English translations of some of them, at [http://www.biblekorea.net](http://www.biblekorea.net).
global curve” (p. 36). This means that, if Kim Kyo Sin continues the non-church movement in South Korea today, he would be able to do much more with *Bible Korea* than trying to produce and disseminate hard copies of the magazine under such a tight budget. Contemporary critical insiders of Korean Protestantism recognize this. The organizations/institutions that I introduce below, their media contents, as well as some of the leading individuals involved in the movements, whom I interviewed during the summer of 2015, are the sources of information that I rely on throughout the following chapters.

*NewsNJoy*

Probably the best known online/mobile news paper among Protestants in South Korea who are concerned of the ways in which their faith traditions are manifested, NewsNJoy is the only Protestant Internet newspaper that focuses specifically on reporting controversies within Protestantism in South Korea. Shortly after it was founded in 2000, this organization also began publishing hard copies of their newspapers in 2001 until 2012. Now all of their contents can be viewed only on the internet,13 and they also created a YouTube channel in 2012 where the viewers can watch videos of their reporters’ coverage. From its inception, NewsNJoy avoided any denominational affiliation, which they saw was a key factor for securing their independence from outside pressure. Currently, there are eight reporters who work full-time for NewsNJoy. In addition to the full-time journalists’ effort to monitor various events and get stories about controversial incidents in Korean churches and Protestant organizations, NewsNJoy also have numerous members who can upload their own reports, opinions, and critiques after going through a review process. When there are conflicting views on major controversies, they also

13 NewsNJoy’s website can be found at [http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/](http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/).
publish op-ed articles with their member correspondents publishing their opinions from differing perspectives.

NewsNJoy explicitly acknowledges on its website that one of their major tasks is to assist in reforming the Protestant churches in Korea by exposing their “dark sides.” There have been numerous topics and incidents covered by their reporters including various scandals of affluent pastors, plagiarizing sermons and books/dissertations by professors at seminaries affiliated with major denominations, and remarks made by Protestant leaders at the podium that include Islamophobic, homophobic, or misogynistic statements. One of the reported controversies that drew harshest reactions was megachurch pastors passing on their churches to their sons. Such cover stories targeted against the most politically influential and financially affluent Protestant institutions often resulted in NewsNJoy being sued for libel or circulating false reports. NewsNJoy, however, won all but one of the court cases (interviewed on July 13, 2015). In addition to exposing what they perceive to be wrongdoings of Protestant institutions, NewsNJoy also cover stories that they wish to present as positive alternatives.

Chungeoram ARMC & Holy Wave Academy

Two critical insider movements can be mentioned together for their similarities. One being founded in 2005 and the other in 2015, Chungeoram ARMC (acronym of Academy, Research, Mission & Movement, Communications) and Holy Wave Academy (Saemulkyŏl akade*mi) put more emphasis on providing proper education for Protestants in Korea. For these two organizations, the intellect is key for appropriate action. The founder of Chungeoram ARMC

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14 Hereditary succession of Protestant churches has been a critical issue in Korea in recent years. Especially in the cases of large churches, which are built and sustained by the congregations’ offerings, there has been much critique about passing on church properties to the head pastors’ sons (who are also pastors) as if the church properties are owned by the family.
(hereafter, Chungeoram) often introduces himself in media outlets as an “evangelical activist” and his ministry as “Christian intellectual movement.” Likewise, Holy Wave Academy’s (hereafter, Holy Wave) website explicitly argues that at the center of the present crisis of South Korean Protestantism is an intellectual problem: the laity is not provided with well rounded education about their own faith traditions, which are necessary resources for critically reflecting upon what they hear at the podium and dominant Protestant media owned by powerful institutions.\(^\text{15}\) The kinds of education and intellectual resources they attempt to disseminate include not only theological information but also various materials from the humanities and social sciences. Both have facilities where they can hold regular lectures with invited speakers and audiences, and many of the lectures are also available on their websites. Some of their contents are provided exclusively on the internet. They both recognize the shortage of resources, or rather the accessibility thereof, to lay Protestants in Korea, and they conduct similar activities to complement each other. The two are not in competition; lecturers invited by Chungeoram and Holy Wave overlap as there are a limited number of Protestant professors and intellectuals willing to actively assist such movements’ cause. One notable element of Holy Wave is that it also runs a publishing company, Holy Wave Plus (Saemulkyŏl p’ŭllŏsŭ),\(^\text{16}\) which publishes books on topics that these academies typically cover. Chungeoram, on the other hand, have regular meetings on Wednesdays specifically for the aforementioned “Canaanite saints.” In fact, Hee Song Yang, the founder and representative of Chungeoram, is the one who collected previous scholarly research on Canaanite saints and wrote a book on the topic (2014). He has also published another book about the overall crisis of Korean Protestant churches, \textit{Tasi}

\(^{15}\) Websites of these two organizations can be found at \url{http://ichungeoram.com/} and \url{http://hwacademy.kr/}.

\(^{16}\) Website: \url{http://hwpbooks.com/}. 

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Yang received an M.A. in biblical interpretation and theology at the London School of Theology.

**Nehemiah Institute for Christian Studies**

In the sense that it provides alternative education, Nehemiah Institute for Christian Studies (hereafter, Nehemiah) is similar to Chungeoram or Holy Wave. What sets Nehemiah apart from other organized critical insider movements is its professionalism. If critical insider organizations are measured with the same method used for higher education facilities, this institute would earn the highest score.

Nehemiah began in 2010 as an alternative seminary for lay Protestants who desire to be equipped with theological knowledge. South Korea having numerous seminaries, one might ask “why does there have to be another one, albeit it claims to be alternative?” Nehemiah’s short answer is that those seminaries in South Korea, which have denominational affiliations and are deeply involved in politics – not only within Korean Protestantism but also with secular politics – are structurally incapable of sharing all the diverse range of information in theological academia, which can potentially equip the laity for challenging Protestant authorities in Korea not from anti-religious perspectives but with theological grounds. As such, the faculties at Nehemiah consist of theologians with impressive educational backgrounds: current or former theology professors with degrees from schools such as Oxford, Yale, or University of Chicago. Some of them were faculties at major seminaries in Korea until they left their tenure positions after exposing corruption at their institutions. Currently, they have seven full-time faculties with several visiting instructors.
While Nehemiah, like the other Protestant academies mentioned above, hold lectures on various topics that are open to the public, another unique factor of Nehemiah is that they also offer theological degrees at the Master’s level to those who complete their formal curricula. Nehemiah is currently not accredited by the Korean Ministry of Education, but it has agreements with several universities in the U.K., including King’s College and the University of Edinburgh, that allow its students for carrying credits earned at Nehemiah over to those schools for further education. Essentially, the institute wants to provide the laity with what the religious authorities – pastors – know and beyond. As such, their more accessible short term materials, such as open lectures, can be viewed on the internet, but the formal curricula must be taken in person at the institute for earning the degrees. The faculties at Nehemiah also give series of lectures outside the institute and write books on theological topics they think the laity should know for critically examining popular teachings at Korean Protestant churches.

Nehemiah’s unique policy with its financial management deserves mention, especially two aspects of it. First, unlike most other educational institutions, Nehemiah does not charge tuition to each student of their degree programs. Instead, the institute relies heavily on donations not only from outside organizations and individuals but also from the students themselves. In other words, those who can afford to “pay” more tuition are encouraged to do so while those in financial difficulties are charged with less or no tuition. Such a voluntary system can sometimes make the institute’s financial circumstances quite challenging, but it has managed to continue so far. Another rather shocking aspect of Nehemiah’s dealings with finance is its completely egalitarian salary system. Monthly salaries for all personnel who work for Nehemiah are the same, whether they are full time faculties, administrators, or hold other management positions.
Other Organizations and Individuals

The above is certainly not an all-inclusive list, as there are smaller and/or less visible organizations engaged in similar activities. Such were also founded for the same purpose of reforming Korean Protestantism, but their media visibility is minimal compared to the ones above that more actively engage in disseminating media contents. One that deserves mention is Protest 2002, which was literally founded in 2002. Though they occasionally upload periodicals and useful reports, statistics and other relevant information on their websites\(^\text{17}\) this organization is more active in implementing gatherings/protests at physical locations against church corruption and holding meetings and seminars to discuss about specific controversies. One unique activity of Protest 2002\(^\text{18}\) is their counseling program that provides counseling services to those who are struggling with various problems in the church, including but not limited to pastors’ scandals, problematic sermons, legal/administrational difficulties, hereditary church and other property problems.

Also not to be forgotten are individuals who are not officially part of these organizations but regularly engage in activities that share the same purpose with organized critical insider movements. Many of such individual agents are academics, many of whom are theologians, and some of them are also pastors. While they work for their employers, which are typically universities and seminaries, they are often the ones who give lectures and talks for events held by organizations like Chungeoram or Holy Wave. NewsNJoy also often seek their opinions on various topics that they cover in their news, and Nehemiah also has some of them as invited/visiting lecturers. Speaking of actors at an individual level, there are also websites and YouTube channels created by such individuals who engage critical insider activities in a smaller


\(^{18}\) This English title is not a literal translation of the organization’s name in Korean, which is *Kyohoe kaehyŏk silch’ŏn yŏntae*, literally meaning “solidarity for putting to action the reformation of the church.”
scale. Some of these YouTube channels sometimes also feature the talks/lectures by leading figures of critical insider movements mentioned above.

All of these organizations and individuals engaging in non-for-profit activities, except for Holy Wave’s publishing company Holy Wave Plus, critical insider movements in South Korea are not in competition with each other. In addition to the fact that they are too small compared to the dominant Protestant institutions, too many of the involved individuals assist more than one movement. The specific characteristics of each movement also make them complementary to one another. For instance, educational organizations have to rely on NewsNJoy to be updated on current issues in Korean Protestantism just as NewsNJoy need theological expert opinions from faculties at Nehemiah.

Appearance in Mainstream Media

Although it is much more on the negative side (or perception) of Protestantism when it is referred to in popular culture (Hong, 2016) or reported in the news media, it is worth mentioning that critical insider perspectives have appeared in mainstream media, albeit the occasions were few. Such coverage usually takes the form of short interviews that are preceded by negative reports on Protestantism in Korea. One of such recent appearances, which was significantly longer compared to typical interviews, was JTBC’s interview with Bong Ho Sohn, former professor of philosophy/theology and a respected elder among critical insiders as one of the earliest critical insider voices in contemporary South Korea. _JTBC Newsroom_, the news show in which Sohn was interviewed, is currently ranked as the most trusted news source among Koreans.

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19 This does not mean that all of their contents are free of charge. Many of Chungeoram and Holy Wave’s public lecture events and advanced online contents, for instance, require certain amount of fees.

20 In fact, many of my interviewees told me that I will see the same names all over the place as I continue my research.
today (Cheon, 2016). In the evening of Christmas in 2014, Sohn was invited to the studio for a fifteen minute long interview with the anchor. During the interview, in which he was asked various questions about the current status of religion in general and Christianity in particular in South Korean society, he expressed his critiques on Korean Protestant institutions with particular emphasis on their financial corruption. He also offered his view, as a Christian philosopher, on the true vision of Christian social ethics.

Hearing Protestant critical insider voices is even rarer in the movie theaters. In 2014, however, the same year that Sohn appeared on the news, theaters released a documentary film that was explicitly Protestant in orientation yet highly critical of Protestant churches in South Korea. Quo Vadis, directed by Jae Hwan Kim, stirred much controversy even before its first release due to the known facts about the film: i.e. it was going to expose various problems of affluent megachurches and critique them. In fact, the film’s release has been postponed for two months due to several Protestant institutions’ attempted measures to deter its screening, including pressuring theater chains to cancel the release (Yoo, 2014). When it was finally released in December of 2014, audiences could only watch the film in a limited number of theaters. One of the punch lines in this documentary film was also quoted by the anchor during the abovementioned interview with Bong Ho Sohn in JTBC Newsroom: “Christianity became an institution in Rome, a culture in Europe, a business in America, and a conglomerate in Korea.”

Supportive Organizations & Institutions

Last mention must go to Protestant institutions, especially media outlets, which support or cooperate with critical insiders in various ways. For Protestants in Korea who are not familiar with the aforementioned movements, perhaps the closest example of Christian organizations

21 The entire interview can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Xmq4M7vk9k.
engaging in critically observing and assessing the Korean society and culture might be the
Christian Ethics Movement, *Kitokkyo yulli silch’ŏn untong*. Often abbreviated as *Ki-yun-sil* in
Korean, Christian Ethics Movement was founded in 1987 by several Protestant scholars
including Bong Ho Sohn, who was interviewed at JTBC Newsroom as mentioned above. The
vision of the Movement was to critically engage the Korean society and culture from a Christian
perspective. As such, the emphasis of their mission was not to propagate the Christian gospel
but to provide ethical commentaries on various realms in Korea, including politics, economics,
and popular culture in a voice that is explicitly religious yet can be appreciated by the general
public. As the years progressed, however, issues that generally concern critical insiders have
also become important parts of Christian Ethics Movement’s agenda. Witnessing corruption at
churches and Protestantism increasingly becoming the object of society-wide criticism, Christian
Ethics Movement also increasingly engaged in the task of critically assessing Protestant
institutions from Christianity’s own standards. In a statement made in 2010, to many
Protestants’ surprise, Bong Ho Sohn said that the Movement’s mission has “failed” (Lee, 2010).
To Sohn, as one of the founders of the Movement, seeing the Korean society not improving at all
in ethical terms and, instead, seeing Protestant churches *needing* to hear prophetic voices instead
of *being* such to the world was an indication that, if there was any tangible/visible goal for them
to achieve, it has turned out the opposite. Christian Ethics Movement still continues to hold
forums, publish periodicals and newsletters concerning social justice and ethical issues
concerning the Korean society, including Protestant churches.

Finally, and most pertinent to critical insider media, there are Protestant broadcasting
companies that sometimes allow/invite voices from critical insiders. Currently in South Korea,
there are two major Protestant broadcasting companies, CTS (Christian Television System) and
CBS (Christian Broadcasting System), both of which are on cable TV. CBS also has a radio station while FEBC (Far East Broadcasting Company), an international Protestant radio network, also has its Korean branch. There are also several smaller IPTV stations, some of which are owned and run by particular denominations or megachurches. Some of the individuals I described above as critical insiders, especially those who are theologians and biblical scholars, have appeared in educational programs on Protestant TV channels. In such occasions, the shows for which they give talks are not identified as ones that focus on critiquing Protestant teachings and practices in Korea. Rather, the shows are introduced as offering general lessons about the bible and Protestant beliefs. Thus, when appearing in such occasions, the theologians who would otherwise be explicit about debunking widely accepted beliefs in Korea would tend to restrain their usual critical language and communicate their messages in a manner more acceptable to the general Protestant audiences. Some of the Protestant TV channels, of course, are more open to critical views than others, and scholars and activists who are rather well known for expounding critical remarks on popular Korean Protestant beliefs are less likely to appear on shows/channels that are more conservative.

Between 2012 and 2015, CBS, the largest and oldest Protestant broadcasting company in South Korea, aired two TV shows that were all about putting together intellectuals, activists, theologians and organizations to assess, critique and re-imagine the Protestant religion in South Korea in the twenty first century. They were all-out critical insider shows, so to speak, that were carried by the largest religious broadcasting system in South Korea. The motives/purpose, contents, performance, and reception of these shows, therefore, are in many ways indicative of

22 Currently there are: GoodTV, CLTV, CMTV, C Channel (owned by Myŏngsŏng church), and CGNTV (owned by Onnuri church).
23 One of my interviewees, a theologian and professor who had experience with such occasions, referred to this as a “camouflaged” strategy.
Korean Protestant critical insider movements. Why would they want platforms via a major Protestant broadcasting network that is largely supported by the dominant institutions when it is the latter that they challenge? Does not the Internet give more freedom and independence for raising their critical voices and reach wider audiences? It is to these questions that I now turn to.

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The Impact of Social Engagement in the New Religions of Taiwan as Observed in I-Kuan Tao.

LEE Su Hyun

National ChengChi University, Graduate Institute of Religious

Abstract

The origin of I-kuan Tao is a Chinese popular religious group "Xiantian Dao". After the sixteenth patriarch Liu Qingxu had formally changed the name to "I-kuan Tao", the group has underwent a religious reformation under the eighteenth patriarch Zhang Tianran in 1930, such as Confucianization, simplification of rituals etc., with aim to make the transmission of teachings easier and enable I-kuan Tao to spread all over China. However, from 1951 to 1987, the government in Taiwan has outlawed I-Kuan Tao. I was only after the Martial Law had been lifted in 1987 that I-kuan Tao could operate openly. It has spread rapidly, and at present, it has presence in 80 countries.

I-kuan Tao in Taiwanese society organizes a variety of large- and small-scale social activities focusing on education, edification, welfare, charity etc. Main activities include, for example, religious ceremonies, Classics recitation from childhood to adulthood, promotion of vegetarianism, and promotion of traditional Chinese culture such as Classics recitation competitions, Chinese orchestra, calligraphy, arts and literature classes etc., and propagation of Confucian thought and practice, care for the disadvantaged members of the society, disaster relief etc.

In my opinion, these kinds of social activities serves several key purposes. 1. Main goal is to attract new believers (daoqin 道親) by means of varied activities, cultivation of religious specialists, and promotion of Confucian thought and importance of vegetarianism. 2. I-kuan Tao not only spreads its teachings, but also takes part in community service to deal with the problems of contemporary society. Social service can lead to self-transformation and help improve lives of the disadvantaged such as impoverished neighbours, and includes animals, plants, and environmental protection. It can cultivate sense of social responsibility and manifest the true essence of religion.

On the example of I-kuan Tao social activism, we can observe how the relationship between religion and society is becoming closer and observe the developments of new religious movements. I will focus my research on the management and distribution of financial resources, specialization of community service, and religiosity in order to gain a better understanding of I-kuan Tao.

Keywords: New Religion, New Religion Movements, Taiwan, I-kuan Tao, Taiwanese society organization, Religion Practice.
一、臺灣現有宗教

臺灣是給予宗教極大自由的國家之一。雖然臺灣地理面積不大，但是在宗教文化表現上相當多元化，並且持續不斷地有宗教發展的新氣象發生。

筆者認為來臺灣已過了多年頭，發現臺灣人對於參加宗教或宗教活動都是習以為常，自然而然地融入日常生活。一般宗教給人感覺都較嚴肅、神聖，與日常生活有點隔閡的感覺，但是在臺灣日常生活裡，很容易看得到宗教的場所，像是一般傳統宗教佛教和道教廟宇、基督教或天主教教會之外，臺灣還有非常多的民間宗教廟宇以及新興宗教大樓（道場或佛堂）。有些宗教沒有一定的宗教建築物，但還是有民眾會持續參與宗教活動。

臺灣面積約3.6萬km²，為世界第38大島嶼，目前人口約2.300萬，人口分布族群主要是由漢族組成，其中，大部分的人為閩南、客家人及外省人，另外除了漢人以外，還有原本就居住在臺灣島嶼上的原住民。通行語言有漢語、臺語、客家語、原住民族語。因此，從人口組成來看就可以看出，臺灣共存著多樣性的民族文化以及語言。

1 1945年之後，中華民國政府遷至臺灣後，跟隨國民政府來到臺灣的中國大陸各省移民人士及後裔。
臺灣的歷史因為受到各式東西殖民文化及宗教影響，相當有特色。在十七世紀以前，臺灣本島上的宗教已經存有臺灣原住民部族信仰、「平埔族」信仰及從中國傳來臺灣的民間信仰。一直到十九世紀，臺灣都處在殖民地時期，臺灣經歷了五個不同政權的殖民統治，在這段殖民統治期間，形成了多樣的宗教發展。像是荷蘭時期基督教、西班牙時期的天主教、明鄭時期漢人的宗教、清代漢人的宗教以及日本帝國統治時期皆有受到來自殖民政權的宗教文化影響。第二世界大戰結束後（一九四九年代），國民黨政權接收臺灣開始實行戒嚴法，也就是威權統治時代。這時候，國民黨政權除了佛教、道教、基督教等之外，對新興宗教勢力的政策是加以壓制及監視。但是在一九八七年解嚴後，人民團體法實施，允許自由宗教結社，新興宗教團體數目在此時便直線上升。一貫道也是在這個時期，達到成長比例上最快發展的時期。許多新興宗教團體不斷地發展，不過在一九九六年時，臺灣媒體上有一些針對新宗教而起的宗教社會事件，讓一般民眾對於新宗教有負面的看法，這時候在臺灣新興宗教被認為是社會亂源的一部分。雖然有這樣的一些突發事件，但還是無法阻擋新興宗教的快速發展，新興宗教的發展帶有一些特質：一、沒有什麼地域性的色彩，二、教主權威集中，三、在家人與出家人界線模糊，四、教義中理論色彩淡薄，五、善於運用媒體等。現今臺灣新興宗教以各式各樣的方式發展中，並且受到政府的認可以及與政府合作活動、設立多樣的宗教教育機構、基金會或者其他團體的社會慈善活動等，又傳播到海外其他國家發展傳教等。

臺灣宗教文化雖極具多元性，卻不脫主流宗教的特色。可以透過如下的臺灣宗教

2 香港的原住民各族都有自己特有的生態環境和生活方式影響，所以每個部族使用的語言、歌舞、服裝、生活習俗及宗教儀式等皆不相同。原住民宗教比較相近於原始宗教、崇拜圖騰等。但是目前，在臺灣不少原住民是信仰基督教或天主教。主要是因為17世紀時，西班牙、荷蘭、漢人陸續來到臺灣，還有19世紀的日本，導致臺灣原住民的生活及宗教文化有所改變，因此受到西方宗教的影響，越來越多人改成信仰基督教、天主教。基督教會入山傳道，對於生活困難的原住民提供飲食、醫療活動等不間斷的幫助。

3 又稱「土著」。在臺灣平野地區的原住民族。

4 丁仁傑，《社會分化與宗教制度變遷——當代臺灣新興宗教現象的社會學考察》，臺北：聯經出版事業公司，2004，頁133-135。
比例分析圖來看到，臺灣的宗教分佈主要是以佛教、道教、民間宗教、基督教、新興宗教為信仰者多寡順序。雖然在臺灣的信仰宗教比例內，新興宗教團體所佔的比例不大，但其實在臺灣當地新興宗教的影響及宗教活動不少。有些新興宗教團體沒有大規模地舉行宗教活動。但筆者認為臺灣宗教團體都會建立基金會或是其他團體之後，不斷地增加舉行社會性的活動、支援社會服務及慈善活動等。

![Largest Religious Groups (Taiwan)](http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/Countries/Country_50_1.asp)
二、臺灣的新興宗教？

一般而言，宗教可以分為兩個宗教概念，一個是「傳統宗教」，另一個是「新興宗教」，不過區別的基準點不一定是時間上早晚的標準，也有來自空間上先來後到的宗教或者傳統宗教的新宗教現象等。

目前，臺灣對於新興宗教的研究還不是很多。在臺灣，新興宗教研究對象主要是以從臺灣本地出現、日本新興宗教或者民間宗教教派出來的新宗教現象研究為主。本研究透過目前關於臺灣新興宗教研究的主要學者觀點來探查臺灣如何定義新興宗教。

董芳苑對新興宗教的區分提出以戰後的臺灣做為時間的基準點，將戰前的宗教團體稱為傳統宗教團體，而在戰後出現的宗教團體稱之為新興宗教團體，並將新興宗教分成三個範疇：1.戰後為迎合臺灣民眾心理需求及寄託，而在本地創立的新教門。2.戰後來自中國大陸及國外的教門和近代宗教。3.戰後發生於傳統宗教的新現象。

瞿海源雖然對新興宗教的定義沒有很明確，但在概念上和董芳苑類似，立足於臺灣的研究。

6 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/taiwan-population/

7 董芳苑，《臺灣新興宗教概觀》，《民間信仰與社會研討會》。臺灣省政府民政廳，1982，頁21-41。
灣地區的宗教發展趨勢，關心1945年後新興的宗教現象，「新興宗教現象」一詞相對於「新興宗教」一詞來說就較為空泛。新興宗教不是新的宗教，而是新的宗教團體，在教義與儀式上進行新的組合與改革，形成了有異於傳統宗教的宗教形式。這些新形式的宗教組織或團體，雖然有的自立為新的宗教，依舊與各種傳統宗教有親密的關係，但與傳統宗教團體互不相容的主要原因在於超出了傳統宗教在操作形式上可以包容的極限，遂自行形成一個新的宗教團體。新興宗教就是新興宗教現象，而具有一個基本特徵：1.全區性、2.悸動性、3.靈驗性、4.傳播性、5.信徒取向性、6.入世性、7.再創性與復振性。

鄭志明則認為需要將新興宗教與傳統宗教新興化這兩個概念區別開來，這兩者分別為不同的宗教團體與宗教現象。另外，他還提出判定新興宗教的四個準則：1.自稱某一神明應劫下凡救世，經由靈媒的傳播，不斷地宣揚其救世的理念，自成一套系統。2.自稱教主是某一神明脫胎下凡，且被信徒視為救世主，相信教主具有某種神秘能力或教法，可以幫助眾生解脫。3.自立一套新的修行方法，宣揚其無比的靈驗與效力，正式地開班授徒，且形成一套宣傳體系、修行工夫與宗教儀式。4自立一套教義詮釋體系，特別強調於宗教中某些神秘的體驗，將其教義重新組合或改革，進而形成新的運動團體。

張家麟則是嘗試以時間、空間、傳統宗教轉化、靈驗與宗教領袖魅力方面來看，試圖構建出一個以臺灣為研究範圍之新興宗教的判定標準。1.時間：指1945年之後出現於臺灣的宗教團體，2.空間：由外地傳入的宗教團體，3.傳統宗教轉化：由傳統宗

8 瞿海源，〈解析新興宗教現象〉，《臺灣新興宗教社會運動》，臺北：巨流圖書公司，1989，頁230。
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教轉化出來的團體，4.靈驗：新興宗教的儀式及教義實踐，應能滿足信徒內心的靈驗需求，5.宗教領袖魅力：教主的領袖魅力與創立新興宗教間具有高度的相關聯性。13

透過這四位學者解釋新興宗教概念之下，可以了解的是在第二世界大戰之後，新興宗教現象出現大的發展，還有傳統宗教從中國大陸傳到臺灣之後，開始變成新宗教的現象。從不同的國家傳到臺灣之後，開始有新興宗教組織或是接收到新的宗教特色。也成了不同的新興宗教在這段時期大量出現的原因之一。

三、一貫道宗教發展史

學界關於「一貫道」的源流有幾個不同的解釋。有一說是一貫道是源於義和團14、從「先天道」所分出的一支改革派15；也有一說是一貫道可能是源自於屬於「東大乘教」或「圓頓教」，而當時這兩個民間宗教則是從「羅教」其中一個支派——「八卦教」演化而來的16；另有二說是從「八卦教」的支派「先天道」演化而來的17；還有源於「金丹道」、「青蓮教」與「八卦教」傳統的說法18。也可能是創於清末「王覺一」19，或是以「路中一」20的或是以「張光璧（或張天然）」在天津創立的為起點等

13 張家麟，〈當代臺灣新興宗教研究趨勢之分析〉，《當代台灣宗教發展》，臺北：蘭臺網路，2009，頁15-16。
14 李世瑜，《現代華北秘密宗教》，第二章，臺北：固亭書屋台一版，1975。
15 林萬傳，《先天大道系統研究》，臺南：靝巨書局，1986。
16 馬四沙、韓秉方，《一貫道的源流與變遷》，《中國民間宗教史》，上海：人民出版社，1992。
17 林榮澤，《一貫道藏》，臺北：一貫義理編輯苑、天書訓文研究中心，2009。共分四部（聖典、史傳、祖師、義理）。
18 佐藤公彥，《清代白蓮教の史的展開》，《續中國民眾反亂の世界》，東京：汲古書院，1983。
19 王見川，《臺灣的齋醮與鸞堂》，臺北：南天書局，1996。
20 林榮澤，《一貫道起源考》，《傳統宗教與新興宗教：2010臺灣宗教學會年會暨學術會議大會手冊》會議論文》，2010，桃園：臺灣宗教學會，頁403-418。
等，眾說紛紜，沒有統一的定論。^{21} 以目前的資料來看因為發展時間和宗教性質都相當接近，所以究竟是誰先誰後，無法斷定。

目前關於一貫道的起源及發展的研究，獲得大部份人認同的說法是，一貫道的淵源起源於黃德輝開創的「先天道」。而傳自王覺一、劉清虛、路中一至張天然、孫素真，則可以說是確立現代一貫道的發展。

一貫道自來以中華文化的傳承與弘揚自任，繼述伏羲聖人以降、至孔孟等先聖的道統精神，並以「敬天地，禮神明，愛國忠事，敦敬崇禮，孝父母，重師尊，信朋友，和鄉鄰，改惡向善，講明五倫八德，闡發五教聖人之奧旨，恪遵四維綱常之古禮，洗心滌慮，僧行修真，恢復本性之自然，啟發良知良能之至善，已立立人，己達達人，挽世界為清平，化人心為良賢，冀世界為大同。」為傳道宗旨。

自1661年第九代祖師黃德輝創立「先天道」，為一貫道基礎。1887年第十五代祖師王覺一以真儒闡揚先天道義，倡導「三極一貫」之說。並自稱其傳道團體為「末後著教」。著有《理數合解》一書傳世。1886年第十六代祖師劉清虛正式將道名定為「一貫道」，第十七代祖師路中一的穏健弘展，著有《彌勒救苦真經》、《布袋真經》、《金公妙典》留傳於世。承繼的是1930年第十八代祖師張天然師尊及孫素真師母的道場大興改革，1947年第十八代祖師張天然過世，而有著《暫定佛規》：記載一貫道信徒平時其中列載道場參詣禮節、早午晚獻香禮節等。「張天然（師尊）」除了確立「一貫道」的儒教化之外，又更進一步地改革禮儀與將傳道儀式簡單化，使「一貫道」更容易傳播。至1947年8月張天然過世的時候，「一貫道」已經傳遍全中國，道務由「孫慧明（師母）」承接。1948年因為中共的取締，許多「一貫道」信徒紛紛避難海外，像是韓國、日本、臺灣、東南亞等。在中共建立政權後，「一貫道」在中國道務陷於停頓。中共將「一貫道的信徒」扣上「被帝國主義者及國民黨所利用的反革命工具」之罪名予與逮捕。所以有的轉入地下利用秘密的地下室聚會，或改稱「中道」來掩護。自1949年後，「一貫道」在中國大陸便很難發展。^{22}


^{22} 中華民國一貫道總會，《一貫道百年大事記》，中華民國一貫道總會，2011。
一直到國共內戰，國民黨政府以失敗告終。中國大陸由解放軍領兵建立了新的共和國政府，一貫道因反共在大陸被鎮壓取締而徹底覆滅，而來到臺灣的一貫道也被國民黨政府認定為邪教，是非法民間教派。一貫道從1951年開始在臺灣被查禁，到1987年禁令解除後，經由臺灣當局明確宣示一貫道是可以公開傳教的教派。因此，一貫道自中國大陸到臺灣、從臺灣到世界各國、穩健地展開出遍佈世界八十個國家以上的一貫道道場。並已在十四個國家成立一貫道總會，且在美國成立世界一貫道總會。目前，在臺灣一貫道是到第十八代祖師之後再沒祖師了。在師尊與師母定下的指導中，中華民國一貫道總會內不同的組線總共有十八個。目前每個組線有不同的發展，各自在不同地區中，積極參與舉辦各式社會活動，活躍成長中。

四、一貫道宗教特色

一貫道教義的概念中，以最主要基本的核心為主，以「無生老母信仰」、「三期末劫」、「三寶」、「扶鸞與三才」、「從三教合一到五教合一」等來看一貫道擁有的宗教特色。

無生老母信仰

一貫道有三教合一的宗教教義思想，所以膜拜的神明也很多，大部分是中國宗教裡的神明，還有五教（佛教、道教、儒教、基督教、回教）裡的聖人，是一個含有多神的宗教。但與此同時，一貫道又具有唯一神的宗教特色。因為在膜拜這麼多的神明中，還分有最高神祇，即以「明明上帝無量清虛至尊至聖三界十方萬靈真宰」為最主要的膜拜對象。一貫道道親稱其為「無生老母」、「老母」、或是「明明上帝」等。

在無生老母信仰的主要觀念中，天地萬物以及人類形成之前，世界原本是一片混沌狀態。後來從這個混沌狀態化出開天闢地的天真古佛，產生了陰陽，孕育萬物和人類。這種原始的混沌狀態是美好的，有主宰力的，因為是萬物和人類的本源，所以稱之為父母或老母。人類離開了老母身邊，降生塵世，迷惑於紅塵假景之中，逐漸失去善良本性，終因罪孽深重，墮入地獄惡趣受苦，回不了老母的身邊。在天上家鄉中的老母卻思念著在塵世中的子女，啼泣悲號不已，終使他親身臨凡或派遣使者下凡，救
世渡劫，喚醒沉迷在紅塵中的世人，共同修道，果積功德，以便回到老母身邊。23

一貫道認為世界萬事萬物都是來自同一個地方，就是無生老母身邊，都是一家人，而且道親都是無生老母的兒女。每個人都需要渡人與修道，特別強調不斷的善行與自己反省等。修道修得好才能回去理天，也就是回到終極歸宿。

三期末劫

一貫道認為自開天以來，共有六萬餘年，已有三期之分；第一期是青陽期，於伏羲時代，燃燈古佛掌天盤，有九劫；二期稱為紅陽期，於文王時代，釋迦牟尼佛掌天盤，有十八劫；第三期則為白陽期，於午未交替，即民國時期，彌勒古佛掌天盤，有八十一劫，將度回九六原人。以至於今，眾原子生生生死，貪戀紅塵假景，迷失本來性靈，既不知從何而來，復不知尋路而歸，愈沈愈迷，愈迷愈壞，世風險詐，已達極點，因而釀成空前之大劫，故曰三期末劫。24

這三個時期中已經過了青陽期和紅陽期，現在已轉入到白陽期，時間約從臺灣民國時代（由路中一祖師開始），一貫道中一祖師亦稱為白陽初祖。而白陽末期，彌勒佛是為世界的救拯者，應運降世來救渡眾。25一貫道認為白陽期是最後世界末劫，所以強調必須內外的修行。最重要的是自己反省之後，克服自己，而普渡眾生，與做善行累積功德。

三寶

一貫道特別重視求道儀式，透過求道儀式之後，點傳師才可以傳授三寶。三寶是

23 宋光宇，《試論「無生老母」宗教信仰的一些特質》，《中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊》Vol.52, Issue3, 1981, (頁559-590), 頁578。

24 慕禹，《一貫道概要》，臺北：中華民國一貫道總會，2002。

25 李紀勳，《宇宙觀、儀式與宗教變遷 - 兼論一貫道興毅南興「道務整合」》，真理大學，宗教學系，碩士論文，2006，頁67。
包括關、印、訣。關於「三寶」簡單的解釋，

第一，「玄關」。又稱「通天竅」，一貫道認為玄關竅乃是人類靈性的根源，是靈性所居住之處，統精氣神，是五官百骸的總主宰，是天人相通的地方，也是靈性生來死去出入的門戶。第二，「合同」，又稱「通天印」或「子亥訣」，能令得道者脫九九八十一劫，也是歸根認母之印記。第三，「口訣」，又稱「通天咒」、「無字真經」或「五字真言」，是一貫道不外傳的秘語。之所以稱「無字真經」，是因為真經不能書寫在紙上，此口訣自古以來仙佛聖神只是口傳心受，以心印心，不立文字，不傳六耳，故不得記於紙上，只許在佛前口傳心受。26

剛加入到一貫道的人，必需要經過求道儀式。透過求道儀式結束之後，就由點傳師27跟新道親傳授「三寶」，在道場可以傳授，在其他地方則不可以輕易提起。傳授到「三寶」即代表有得道。對於道親而言，遇到困難，只要在心裡想一下三寶，即使遇到困難了，依舊可以逢凶化吉。不管父母和親子，都不可以傳授，非道親更是不可以，只能在道場內求道之後，才可以傳授。

扶鸞與三才

一貫道另一個極為特別的宗教特色是扶鸞宣化，扶鸞為當今各民間教團的宗教行為。是一種神人合一的感應行為。現今各民間教團都借扶鸞來傳達神意，來代天宣化。28

一貫道實行扶鸞儀式，透過「三才」扶鸞產生的訓文，當成是一貫道經典教材。已經訓文數量不少，而且在教內開班學習的時候，當成每個講課的教材。

在一貫道之宗教職級裡，「三才」即天才、地才、人才之稱。扶乩者為天才，抄字者為地才，報字者稱為人才。擔任三才者須根基深厚，品性端正，情欲淡泊，主敬

26 陳立人，《論一貫道所傳之「道」》，南華大學，宗教學研究所，2016，碩士論文，頁104-107。
27 點傳師，即傳道師，代表祖師點傳法。
28 鄭志明，《臺灣民間宗教論集》，臺北：臺灣學生書局，1984，頁53。
存誠者，始能任之，天才通常是擇幼童充任。29「三才」是受過訓練的乩手或稱「竅手」，一組三人，一般都是年輕女性，年約十五六歲左右，且長期茹素，平日研讀四書五經更兼一手好書法，每有法會其身體則借給仙佛使用，待仙佛離去之後即甦醒。而在開沙的時候也需三才的配合，所謂開沙則是一個人手扶乩筆讓仙佛要講的話藉著乩筆在沙盤上寫出，另一位則將所見之文字大聲唸出且同時將傻推平，方便繼續書寫，第三人則在旁邊將所聽到的言語快速用毛筆記下，這三人即是「三才」。所以三才在教內扮演著「竅手」與「開沙」這兩種重要的角色。30

透過三才出來的「訓文」是一貫道很有特色的經典，通常在仙佛臨壇的時候，藉著三才的身體寫出或說出對道親的期許之言，其特色是在一整段新聞中再寫上幾個大字，順著筆畫去念又成了小段勉勵文章，也稱為「妙訓」。訓文有兩種，一種是法會訓文，另一種是超拔祖先或氣天先的結緣訓文。

從三教合一到五教合一

三教合一的觀念源自宋明理學，明嘉靖年間林兆倡言三教合一，創立夏教，萬歷十八年憨出大師德清選「三角源流異同論」引起了很大的回響。從此，三角合一之說稱為個各民間教團的主要教義。31一貫道也擁有三教合一的教義觀念之下，有進一步主張五教合一的觀念，在三教裡加了基督教和回教。

在《一貫道疑問解答》裡提到了關於三教合一的解釋說法，「三教原是一理所生，雖分門別戶，言論各有不同，然而究其實際，概屬一理。」32一貫道認為雖然三教的傳法不同，但要都以一為本源，自是由一理而化為三角。一貫道必須三教濟修，行儒
門之禮儀，用道教之功夫，守佛家之規戒。

而且，不僅是三教合一，後來進一步形成了五教合一。儒教：存心養性、執中貫一。道教：修身煉性、抱元守一。佛教：明心見性、萬法號一。基督教：洗心移性、默禱親一。回教：堅心定性、清真返一。五教講的都是一個道理。因為一貫道認為儒教道教佛教基督教回家都來自於一個共同的源頭，其源頭就是無生老母。一貫道說法來講，無生老母是萬事萬物的主宰神。就是一貫道認為皆由五教聖人所闡述的內容來印證一貫道的「道」，就是五教聖人之奧旨。一貫道宗旨強調，「敬天地，禮神明，愛國忠事，敦敬崇禮，孝父母，重師尊，信朋友，和鄉鄰，改惡向善」，主要是以三綱五常四維五倫的東方的倫理道德。因此，一貫道所崇拜的神明是「無生老母」與五教諸神：儒道佛基回教都會敬拜。

五、一貫道的宗教實踐活動

一貫道除了在宗教教理與儀式上鑽研之外，更積極與人群接觸，深耕於當地社會。一貫道主要是透過教育活動、教化工作及慈善活動等非常多樣的實踐活動，讓自己身心、家庭及全社會可以改變更好的生活，以下簡介一貫道所參與的社會實踐活動。

首先是有關於教育事業活動，

1. 1930、40年代在中國各大都市設立了十多所義務小學，為了推廣教育，如在天律、北京、濟南、武進、上海、南京、西安、種慶成都等。

2. 1980年代起，為宏道及發揚中華文化，臺灣各道場在各地普設中文班，以教授當地華裔子弟。

3. 1998年起，提供社區老人及婦女再教育機會，參加老人及婦女分別有200多人及179多人。

慕禹，《一貫道概要》，臺北：中華民國一貫道總會，2002，頁228-230。
再來是含有教化意義的活動，

1. 渡人：強調普渡眾生，積極的傳教一貫道。

2. 辦理道學及才藝班活動：一貫道在各佛堂、道場講述關於一貫道教義、五教經典，比如四書、老莊、禪學、聖經等。而且講習中醫針灸、太極拳、內外丹功、書法、繪畫、戲劇、烹飪等，以弘揚傳統固有文化，培育辦道人才。近年來為了強化人才培訓，設立了學院和書院，比如，崇德學院、一貫書院、忠恕學院、天道學院、純陽學院、崇正學院及在韓國忠南扶餘的一貫道教育院等，提供了道親進修及講師深造的機會。

3. 舉辦國學育樂營及海外中華文化研習樂營：各道場在暑假舉行青年、青少年之育樂營，以培養人格教育、文化內涵。自1983年開始以來，在新加坡、馬來、印尼等當地道場舉辦文化研習營。而在泰國曼谷跟當地的大學、高中學校合辦，講述修身、慈善、道德、環保等客場、而且獲得許多新的信徒。

4. 開設易經研究班

5. 舉辦浄化人心靜坐及園遊會

6. 辦理心中有晴天反煙拒毒活動

7. 辦理活水人心活動，以提倡倫理生活，改善社會新秩序。

8. 舉辦心靈環保園遊會，以響應環保工作，關懷社區文化發展。

9. 辦理國際家庭年系列，以推行儒家思想生活化、社會化、家庭化，以營造幸福美滿家庭、

10. 承辦生命關懷系列活動，以倡導尊重生命，愛護生命。

11. 舉行音樂會，以宏揚禮樂教化。個道場都組織合唱團及國樂團，在道場之

34 慕禹，《一貫道概要》，臺北：中華民國一貫道總會，2002，頁230-239。
唱奏與大都市政府、縣市文化中心以及外國公演，飲譽海內外。

12. 領發獎助學金，以鼓勵青年學子奮進勤學。

13. 辦理繪畫、書法比賽。

14. 出版書籍及期刊，以宏道化俗。

15. 辦理自強運動大會，以強身報國。

16. 開設兒童讀經班，以培育國學、經典道苗。自1994年迄今，各地道場已經有十萬以上學童參加讀經活動。近年來各讀經學會配合各縣市政府辦理讀經會考，績效卓著。而且更有兒童擴及成人、道場多次舉辦大狀元會考，已成為全地區之讀經風氣。

17. 表揚模範母親、父親，倡導三代同堂及舉辦敬老活動，以提倡孝道，強化家庭倫理關係。

18. 舉辦自親自活動，以強化親情倫理。

19. 舉辦論文比賽，以提升道學研究，培育寫作人才。

20. 舉辦成年禮。

21. 辦理儒家思想研習會。

22. 舉辦學術研討會，以提升道場學術水平。

23. 少年觀護所及假釋人士的輔導。

24. 舉辦觀護講座，啟發慈愛善德，以防止青少年再犯罪。

25. 辦理少年輔育院星光夏令營。

26. 設立圖書館，以宏揚社交。

27. 製作弘道及淨化人心節目，以發揚道義，昇華性靈。
另外也有公益慈善活動，從在中國大陸時期一直到現在，一貫道各地的公益慈善活動做得很多，如施粥、施茶、捨藥、助葬、濟貧、救難等等，提供不少臺灣國內外社會福利幫助。35

1. 設立慈善機構，分為育幼院、養老院，收容許多孤苦無依的兒童及孤苦老人。

2. 醫療服務措施，從1985年開始每周提供貧窮民眾免費中西醫醫療服務。

3. 社會福利工作，對於貧民提供冬令救濟、貧病救濟、殘障醫補助、設備之捐助，育幼院、殘障機構、及老人院之慰問，或清掃以及捐助消防器材、救護車等等。另有捐助地方文化器材及地方公共工程，社區環境美化及地方守望相助之協助。也設靈骨塔免費提供貧戶使用。設置義工隊提供公共服務：環保資源回收、淨山、掃街活動、捐血活動。配合社區捐建文化中心、老人會所，以及社區兒童遊樂設施等以嘉惠眾生。在海外也是捐助社會福利工作，以貧民殘障之救助、醫療及育幼院、老人院之濟助服務為主，以及學校獎學金等。每個一貫道道場都捐獻不少錢至難民救助。

4. 急難救助，臺灣各道場聯合捐助臺灣國內國外的災難地區，比如火山爆發、臺風、水災、地震等。需要救助的災難民提供救護物品、災民救助金、食品等，而且很多一貫道信徒當志工服務去災難地域為災民輔導、服務等。

5. 舉辦園遊會、愛心活動，讓溫暖滿人間。為了災民生活困難的鄰居（居民）做募款援助金的活動以及招募義工等一貫道信徒持續參與及吸引許多民眾。

一貫道的許多大小社會實踐活動中，有幾個蘊含宗教實踐的活動。

第一個是透過多樣性的活動引進新的信徒（新道親）。在一貫道很重視「渡人」。這是在一貫道的三期末劫思想下為出發，可以了解到其意涵。現在世界雋轉變化到了白陽期，來到了最大災難的最後世界，以無生老母降下的「天道」救濟世界上人類。

35 慕禹，《一貫道概要》，臺北：中華民國一貫道總會，2002，頁240-257。
一貫道認為，人應先求道，讓自己脫離輪迴之後，才能再將道傳給其他人，拯救世間其他眾人。傳道的內容主要是告訴世人們三寶可以讓他們可以消解生活裡的災難及脫離輪迴等等。在這樣的思想下，一貫道的信徒們每個人都帶有傳道的使命感，為了渡化眾人，很積極地參與傳教活動、社會教化活動、慈善活動等等，身體力行實踐一貫道的宗教教義。 一貫道的修行有分「內功」與「外功」兩方面，透過「內功」可以格致誠正修身之工夫，即克己復禮、清心寡慾，求其放心之工夫。同時透過「外功」行濟人利物之事，要有拯災救世之心，要遵三教聖人之訓，竭力躬行實踐，凡印善書，立佛堂，廣勸化，多開荒，宣揚道義等。內外的心身修道。最重要的是需要自己反省與懺悔，進行慈善實踐改變自己和人類社會等。一貫道有叩首或冥想等修煉方法，但是其實在一般生活裡都可以修成正道，為了修正人倫道德，需要不間斷的善行，不斷地累積功德等等，透過社會慈善實踐過程中得道，都是對一貫道信徒來說，重要的修行方法。

第二個是重視培養人才。一貫道可以算是很有教育系統的新興宗教團體，主要宗教教育有法會、進階班、學院課程等，透過階段的宗教教育從基礎開始到深入的課程，可以培養出未來的一貫道宗教人才。每個課程都有規定的修課對象條件，例如，需要完成清口、前階段課程，通過考試後可以進階學習。而最後階段的課程則是為了培養一貫道講師，講師是一貫道道場的高級人才，是需要教育很多信徒的重要角色。每個課程都有包括五教的經典、老母的訓文等等，不斷的學習之前聖人的教訓，同時參與道場活動和志工活動等有內外的修道。還有學生道團稱為「伙食團」，含有多功能，之所以稱之為伙食團，主要是因為伙食團會帶來家的感覺，除了早期學生因為經濟因素而同組一幢公寓以利生活飲食（素食）之外，1980年代時，臺灣社會上普遍有一股文化尋根熱，一貫道便利用各地的大型公共佛堂，甚至學校伙食團，廣設各國文學研究班，以吸引志研究四書五經和其他國學的青年學生和社會人士參加。伙食團的成員大部分都是在學學生，年紀輕輕卻又要兼顧課業與道場，擔荷學界的命脈，承擔彌勒家業，這一股安定而勃發的力量，不但來自於伙食團具有家的功能，同時又保有

36 例如，一貫道天皇學院，主要培育一貫道弘法傳道、道務經營及經典學術研究與推廣之相關專業人才，主要課程內容是以一貫道教義、五教經典、宗教與文化等學科、融滲德門、學門和行門三項學習。參考：http://www.iktc.edu.tw/
學生氣獨立自主的精神。一貫道重視透過學習五教聖人的教諭、老母訓文等學習人類倫理道德的項目，而且重視透過自己反省、懺悔、為了改變自己不斷的善行等克己復禮和以渡人累積功德、脫離輪回的困難等他們的主要宗教的目的。因此，透過讀經、叩首、唱善歌、佛堂幫辦、渡人、助印善書、救急救難等為一貫道的慈善行為實踐。

第三個是宣傳儒家思想的重要性。一貫道以三教合一、五教合一的各種宗教的精髓融合在一起。在張天然祖師之後，更重視儒家思想，後來明顯地出現以儒為宗的特性。從一貫道的多樣社會實踐活動中看得出來許多教化活動、慈善活動，像是讀經會考、文藝班、國樂團、宣傳各個不同的中國傳統文化等，有許多實際活動的例子。另外父親、母親節活動、親子活動、家長兒童讀經班等不斷地提倡孝道，弘揚家庭倫理的重要性，家庭單位的參與活動頻率越來越頻繁。這樣的一貫道活動的基礎思想都是以中華思想中心出來的，而中華思想的中心思想就是儒家思想，臺灣國內國外廣泛的宣傳實踐活動，以讓更多人了解儒家思想、重視儒家的倫理道德之實踐，這可以說是一貫道活動的主要目的。

第四個是宣傳素食文化。素食對於一貫道來說，含有重要的宗教意義。筆者認為一貫道對入教儀式相當開放，比如說，不管想要入教的人原本是信仰什麼宗教，皆可參加入教儀式（即求道儀式）。參加求道儀式的人非常多，但是他們不一定會定時來一貫道道場參與活動，有的人不願意來道場求道，筆者認為透過宣告吃素的人才可以說是真正有參與活動的信徒。透過清口，來到臺上向老母和其他人宣告我要吃素的宣言，更可以展現出參與一貫道活動的誠意與意志。

素食觀念從佛教的戒律為出發，所以也禁止吃肉，同時也有「三淨肉」的概念：見殺不食、聞殺不食、為我殺不食。還有因果輪回觀：認為吃肉有可能吃到自己親人

37 李慧娟，〈一貫道發一崇德道場學生道團之研究：以台北「學界」伙食團與宣教關係為例〉，玄奘人文社會學院宗教學研究所，碩士論文，2004，頁113。

38 叩首，或稱為「磕頭」，在一貫道的基本禮拜動作，以表達最為誠敬之心。與諸天神靈間「誠心發願」、「感而遂通」、「降衷護佑」、「人一叩為命」、「復命合天」之意。（楊弘任，〈一貫道儀軌：禮門義路、正心修身〉，中國民間宗教的重新認識與傳承研討會，廈門大學國學院、一貫道總會聯合舉辦，福建、武夷山市，2010年10月23-24日。）
轮回成畜牧的肉以及吃肉者会受更大的地狱果报（堕落地狱）、认为食肉断慈悲心、食肉得杀生罪、不食肉的功德、戒杀放生等观念。加上现代素食观念跟环境保护有相当的关系，为了生产肉食，需要耗损更大的自然资源，包括浪费大量的水、饲养牲畜的排泄物、农药及杀虫剂对自然生态的破坏、饲养牲畜造成表土的大量流失等问题不断的出现。另外，素食对于身体健康也有帮助等，不关各方西方，对于提倡吃素的理由越来越多。39

除此之外，素食文化是除了台湾之外，在全世界各地也极为普遍的饮食文化之一，所以一贯道信徒开始开设素食餐厅或是素食事业等有活动经济的素食事业，想要吃素的一般民众也渐渐增加，可以说一贯道是引领素食文化的宗教团体。在海外，主要是在马来西亚和印尼等有很多华人的国家有比较活跃的活动。

六、结论

具有神圣性的宗教与跟象徵世俗性的社会有越来越密切的关系，另外宗教组织的宗教实践也必须要经由社会活动来实现，所以可以说宗教是社会文化的产物之一。每一个阶段的社会、经济、政治及文化往来都极为密切，所以当代宗教团体拥有著当地社会文化的特色。现在的社会不断地改变，越来越快速变化的科技、商业发展等，当代社会的价值观念越来越偏重物质文化，出现了不少难处理的社会问题。但是宗教团体不仅能够给予民众提供信仰的心理要求与精神的安顿，而且透过持续地教化，传播其伦理道德的重要价值及其实践的重要性。宗教团体具有能够建构社会裡个人心理、生活价值观念标准的能力，也就是说在社会裡，宗教的角色是举足轻重的。

一贯道渊源来自中国民间教派先天道，到了西元1930年代第十八第四张天然领导之下，广在中国各地传佈，一直到了西元1948年，传进台湾及世界各地，吸引基层社会民众以及中上层社会人士等入教，一贯道佛堂已遍布全台湾。40但一贯道还是遭到受到查禁与取缔，一贯道的宗教活动便转以秘密活动的方式发展。至西元1987年宣布

39 林荣泽，《台湾民间宗教的持齋戒殺》，台北：兰台，2009，页274-312。
40 郑志明，《台湾宗教组织行政》，台北市：文津，2010，页344。
解嚴後，才與其他幾個宗教團體變成合法化，在臺灣開始有自由的宗教活動，進行公開地宣教和傳播，之前秘密宗教的色彩已不復見。

因為目前的國際社會重視社會保障及人類的福利厚生等，所以非營利性的組織也不斷地增加，可以說宗教團體是非營利組織之一。宗教團體跟著社會改變及受到社會風氣的影響，漸漸開始重視發展多樣社會福利服務的活動。比如說，基督教和佛教等有許多的社會關懷活動，像是教育、慈善、救濟活動、醫療、國際救災等，一貫道也在西元1987年臺灣政府解嚴以後，開始公開傳教及積極參與社會慈善活動項目。目前在臺灣社會裡，一貫道跟地方政府合作的慈善活動和教化事業的內容不少，而且還獲得臺灣政府的獎賞。

一貫道融合了不同宗教核心思想，首先繼承了先天道的宗教思想，所以擁有中國民間的宗教信仰特色，即無生老母信仰、三期末劫等等的思想，並且大量吸收了儒教道教佛教的三教合一思想，甚至到了後來，再加上基督教與回教之後變成五教合一的宗教，誕生了新的宗教思想，也就是現在的一貫道思想。一貫道的宗教思想是在各個不同的宗教系統下融合後發展出一貫道獨特的信仰概念，在這樣的信仰概念裡面，崇拜至高神無生老母，一貫道認為祂是道的化身，是開天闢地的主宰，也是一切生命共同的母源。這樣象徵性母親，不僅孕育宇宙萬有生命，五教聖人也是稟受老母天命在人間示現，傳播福音與真理，意謂各種宗教指稱的宇宙造化主宰，實際上皆為同一本源，只是教義的話語系統不同而已。41一貫道認為世界眾生都是以無生老母的道之下為聯接的，而且目前一貫道稱為的白陽期，就是最亂的世界末劫的時期，所以老母將天道降世以為消解世界災害，而得道後（一貫道稱為求道之後）人類可以脫離生死輪回，讓他們的靈性可以回歸到原來的家鄉，也就是無生老母的旁邊。在這樣的宗教觀念之下，帶來了宗教的使命感。不斷地強調渡人求道、熱烈的傳教可以讓人類的心理解救、善行實踐、建立社會的安樂和平。並有更多的社會關懷及重視社會慈善事業的實踐。

目前一貫道以一貫道總會為中心，總共有十八個組線，各組線有不同道場的宗教

41 鄭志明，《臺灣宗教組織行政》，臺北市：文津，2010，頁346。
活動實踐的例子，但是大部分在上述的一貫道社會活動的例子都有代表的活動。像這樣一貫道的社會活動非常多樣，且持續不斷地實踐大小規模的社會慈善事業。

一貫道一直以來強調社會活動的重要性，一開始是由中國大陸接承而來，一貫道傳到臺灣後，雖然在戒嚴時期，被政府禁止宗教活動，但仍舊快速地成長發展。解嚴後，得到了政府的認可，開始做正式公開的宗教活動，其活動項目變得越來越廣泛。

筆者在觀察一貫道許多大大小小的社會實踐活動中，可以概括其主要社會活動的實踐含有幾個重要目的。1.主要是以透過多樣性的活動可以引進新的信徒(新道親)、不斷的努力培養宗教人才、宣傳儒家思想和素食文化的重要性。2. 一貫道不只是宣傳一貫道的教義而已，還參加社區服務，保持可以隨時學習的狀態，面對當今社會的問題，以幫助別人服務的方式可以改變自己和幫助社會上有困難的人，像是受到生活苦難的鄰居、動物、環保維護等，可以得到個人的社會責任感，也可以實踐真正宗教的精神。

宗教實踐活動參與者大部分是一貫道信徒(稱為道親)，但是漸漸增加加入一般民眾的參與，因為大眾對一貫道社會活動有肯定的印象及評價，同時一起參與活動之後，可以實踐許多更有影響力的社會活動。舉例來說，一貫道信徒透過一貫道舉辦的社會活動之後，可以強化其對一貫道的信仰以及可以重視到修道活動的重要性等，而一般大眾透過一貫道舉辦的法會、讀經會考、才藝班、志工活動等許多活動，可以感受到在日常生活中所需要的知識、教養，還有能夠提高生活品質、累積功德等，感受到宗教存在的意義。

現今的一貫道有濟度眾生超生了死得救的使命，便將此落實在以社會福利的方式來救助人類的災難與禍殃，以自身可以付出的經濟力量來參與救災，傳達了對苦難民衆的憐憫與愛護之情。現在一貫道除了滿足一貫道各個信徒的宗教的需求之外，在臺灣社會及世界各地不斷地提供社會福祉的援助。這樣的活動過程中一貫道可能在臺灣社會、經濟、政治及文化方面漸漸地有社會化的發展，也可能變得更傾向於非營利性的組織團體，從一貫道的活動現象中可以看到，宗教與社會之間的關係越來越密切。

42 鄭志明，《臺灣宗教組織行政》，臺北市：文津，2010，頁361。
也可以從中觀察到新宗教組織的發展現象，筆者將繼續專注在研究資源管理與開發、服務專門性、宗教性的面向，以期能更為完善地去探究一貫道。
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The Measurement of Japanese Religiosity: From the Perspective of “Procedural Equivalence”

YOKOI Momoko
Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

Abstract

In traditional cross-national research on religion, religiosity is measured by religious behavior, such as “religious affiliation” or “church attendance.” These variables have been used in Western countries, where many follow Christianity, and applied in cross-national studies. In the modern globalized world, however, we have serious reservations as to whether these variables accurately measure the religiosity of the Japanese, many of whom believe in multitudinous gods. This paper employs “procedural equivalence” as a criterion for judgment. I explore questions that allow for future international comparative research, and take the “importance of a religious mind” used in the Japanese National Character Survey as a measurement of Japanese religiosity, examining its relationship to social awareness or behaviors. I used a sample of 3,575 Japanese men and women aged 20–64; responses were obtained through an interview survey conducted in 2015 by the Stratification and Social Psychology Project. OLS regression analysis showed that a religious mind has a positive effect on volunteer activities, going to vote in elections, gender role attitude, and life satisfaction. These results are similar to that of previous studies conducted in Western countries. I suggest that the religiosity of the Japanese as measured by the importance of their religious mind performs the same function as Western measures of traditional religious variables. In the future, by testing the importance of a religious mind in other countries including predominately Christian and Muslim nations, and by testing the validity and reliability of religious attitudes, we expect that the effectiveness of this item will be clarified. By doing so, we will ultimately be able to regard Japanese religion and religiosity as a non-particular case in international comparative research.

Introduction

With increasing globalization, many social scientists have developed large social surveys for international comparative research in the past 30 years. For example, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and World Social Survey (WVS) started in the 1980s, and have since been conducted in more than 40 countries. These social surveys are also important for researchers of religious studies. In the field of religious studies, researchers investigated the religiosity and the relationship between religion and behaviors, social awareness, or values of sense by using these data. In Western countries, researchers revealed that religiosity has a positive effect on well-being, volunteer activities, political activities, and moral attitude.

Using two-wave data from the Americans’ Changing Lives panel study, Wilson and Musick found that church attendance and frequency of praying have positive effects on formal volunteer work while controlling socio-economic status and social network variables (Wilson & Musick, 1997). Using EVS
and WVS data, Ruiter and De Graaf concluded that frequent churchgoers are more active in volunteer work (Ruiter & De Graaf 2006).

Driskell et al., analyzing data from Baylor Religion Survey, found that religious beliefs are significantly related to national political participation (Driskell et al. 2008). They found that respondents who pray about “general world concerns” and those who believe that “actively seeking social and economic justice is important in being a good person” are more likely to participate in politics.

Using data from a citywide survey in North Carolina, Woodrum revealed that church membership and type, worship frequency, and religious program listening directly affect moral attitude (Woodrum 1988). He suggests that religious people are more likely to be conservative absolutists. Froese and Bader found, from analyzing ISSP data, that churchgoers and believers in a personal and authoritative God are more likely to be moral absolutists concerning issues of sex and abortion, (Froese & Bader 2008).

In previous studies about well-being, the results of analyses using data from the American General Social Survey showed that church attendance affected well-being positively (Childs 2010; Musick 2000; Ellison et al. 1989).

While there have been several statistical studies about religion and religiosity in western countries, in Japan, however, there are only a few international comparative research studies of religion and religiosity using methods of statistical social sciences. In these studies, the data showed that religion has a positive effect on volunteer activities, and a slight or insignificant effect on well-being (Kaneko 2004; Roemer 2010; Terasawa 2012).

As mentioned above, there are not enough statistical studies between religion and behaviors or social awareness in Japan. One of the reasons is that the traditional question items used in western countries are not appropriate for Japan, because of the specificity of religious circumstances in Japan.

The data in 2008 from the Japanese National Character Survey conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics shows that 27% of the respondents believe in some religion. Similarly, the data in 2005 from an opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun also shows that 22.9% of the respondents are believers. Ishii suggests that only less than 10% of the Japanese are affiliated with some religious organization from the individual survey data (Ishii 2007). The religious affiliation measured by the two-category scale (ex. Yes or No, believer or non-believer) is not recommended in Japan because of the large deviation in the distribution in Japan.

Then, how about the church attendance (or going to religious facilities) measured by the ordinal scale? Indeed, this scale is easier to analyze than the categorical scale; however, I doubt whether church attendance in western countries has the same meaning as going to temples or shrines in Japan. The reason is that church attendance in western countries is viewed as religious affiliation or as participation in a religious program or a social network by congregants, while almost all Japanese
regard going to temples or shrines as traditional and customary behavior similar to visiting a family member’s grave or visiting a shrine on New Year’s Day. These two items are equivalent in translation, but are not equivalent in meaning.

Only less than 30% of the Japanese people believe in some religion. Nevertheless, the data in 2005 from an opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun showed that 79.1% of them visit a family member’s grave and 69.9% visit a shrine on New Year’s Day. It is not that Japanese people are not religious, because although most of the Japanese people have no religion, most of them conventionally make visits to graves or shrines.

This paper aim at attempting to measure the Japanese religiosity including the unconscious and weak religiosity. I employ “procedural equivalence” as a criterion for judgement. This means that certain questions work in the same manner as in Western countries. I explore questions that allow for future international comparative research, and take the “importance of a religious mind (宗教的な心 syūkyōteki na kokoro)” used in the Japanese National Character Survey by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics as a measurement of Japanese religiosity.

Data and Measurement

I use the SSP2015 data to explore the effect of religiosity on behaviors or social awareness. The SSP2015 was conducted in 2015 by the Stratification and Social Psychology Project (SSP Project)¹. The data set is comprised of 3,575 completed responses by participants aged 20-64, using a three-stage stratified random sampling from the Japanese electoral roll and the basic resident registration. The responses were obtained through the face-to-face interview method (Computer Assisted Personal Interview, CAPI).

Independent variables

I use the “importance of a religious mind (宗教的な心 syūkyōteki na kokoro)” as an independent variable. This variable was measured by the following procedures: Interviewers instructed respondents, “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please choose the most applicable one.” And then, the question items and choices were shown below: “A religious mind is important.” “Agree=5, Somewhat agree=4, No opinion either way=3, Somewhat disagree=2, Disagree=1.”

A set of standard demographics were included as control variables: gender (women=1, men=0), age (continuous, in years), education (continuous, in years), marital status (married=1, all else=0), occupational prestige score, employment status (unemployed=1, all else=0), household income (ranges from 0 to 1,000), city size (more than 200,000 residents in town =1, all else=0).

¹ http://ssp.hus.osaka-u.ac.jp/en/
Dependent variables

Dependent variables are 5 domain; volunteer activities, going to vote, cultural activities, life satisfaction and gender role attitude.

The “volunteer activities” variable was measured by the question after the instruction “How often do you engage in the following activities? Please choose the most applicable one.” And then, the question items and choices were shown below: “Participate in volunteer activities or NPO activities.” “Always=5, Often=4, Sometimes=3, Rarely=2, Have never done=1.”

The “going to vote” variable was also measured by the same scale. The question item was “Vote in national or local elections.”

The “cultural activities” variable is a factor score calculated on the basis of factor analysis. The 4 items were entered into an exploratory factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method with promax rotation: “Go to a classical music recitals or concerts (Once a month or more=5, Once or several times a year=4, Once in several years=3, Never in the past 5 to 6 years=2, Have never done=1),”
“Go to museums (ranges from 1 to 5, Once a month or more=5, Have never done=1),” “Read novels or history books (Once a week or more=5, About once a month=4, Once or several times a year=3, Once in several years=2, Never in the past 5 to 6 years=1),” “Go to a library (ranges from 1 to 5, Once a week or more=5, Never in the past 5 to 6 years =1).” One factor had an eigenvalue greater than one, and accounted for 38.5% of the total variance. It is entitled Cultural activities\(^2\).

The “life satisfaction” variable was measured by the question after the instruction “How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your situation?” And then, the question items and choices were shown below: “Your life overall.” “Satisfied=5, Somewhat satisfied=4, No opinion either way=3, Somewhat dissatisfied=2, Dissatisfied=1.”

The “gender role attitude” variable was measured by the question after the instruction “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” And then, the question items and choices were shown below: “Men should be breadwinners and women should stay at home.” “Agree=4, Somewhat agree=3, Somewhat disagree=2, Disagree=1.”

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics values of all variables.

**Results**

I present analysis that summarizes the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions run of the 5 dependent variables regressed on the importance of religious mind and control variables. Table 2 to Table 6 present regression coefficients for the effects of the religious mind variable and control variables on volunteer activities, going to vote, cultural activities, life satisfaction and gender role attitude, respectively.

The distinct finding is that there are statistically significant effects of religious mind on all 5 dependent variables. First, Table 2 shows the determinants of participation in volunteer activities. The beta value (standardized partial regression coefficient) of importance of religious mind is .142, and statistically significant. Compared with the beta values of other control variables, it is higher than the others. This means that the religious mind variable has a large and positive effect on participation in volunteer activities. In short, the people who think religious mind is important are more likely to participate in volunteer activities than those who think it is not important, while controlling with socio-economic status variables.

Secondly, Table 3 shows the determinants of going to vote in national or local elections. The beta value of importance of religious mind is .135, and statistically significant. Compared with the beta values of other control variables, it is the third highest after age and education. This suggests that the people who think religious mind is important are more likely to go to vote in elections than those who think it is not important.

\(^2\) See Appendix.
Next, Table 4 shows the determinants of participation in cultural activities. The beta value of importance of religious mind is .130, and statistically significant. Comparing with the beta values of other control variables, it is the third highest after education and gender. This suggests that the people who think religious mind is important are more likely to participate in cultural activities than those who think it is not important.

Next, Table 5 shows the determinants of life satisfaction. The beta value of importance of religious mind is .082, and statistically significant. Compared with the beta values of other control variables, it is the fifth highest after marital status, income, occupational prestige, and age. This means that the religious mind variable has a positive effect on life satisfaction.

Finally, Table 6 shows the determinants of gender role attitude. The beta value of importance of religious mind is .106, and statistically significant. Compared with the beta values of other control variables, it is the second highest after gender. This suggest that the people who think religious mind is important are more likely to agree with the statement “men should be breadwinners and women should stay at home.”

### Table 2 Determinants of Participation in Volunteer Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient (standardized)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>Years of education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City size (ref. Rural area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance of religious mind</td>
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Adj. $R^2$ .048 ***

N 2601

***: $p<.001$, **: $p<.01$, *: $p<.05$
### Table 3  Determinants of Going to Vote

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<th>Coefficient (standarized)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( b )</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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\( Adj.R^2 \) \( .128 \) **

N \( 2591 \)

***: \( p<.001 \), **: \( p<.01 \), *: \( p<.05 \)

### Table 4  Determinants of Participation in Cultural Activities

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\( Adj.R^2 \) \( .212 \) **

N \( 2600 \)

***: \( p<.001 \), **: \( p<.01 \), *: \( p<.05 \)
### Table 5  Determinants of Life Satisfaction

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<td>.016</td>
<td>.082</td>
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Adj.R²  
N  
2603

***: p<.001, **: p<.01, *: p<.05

### Table 6  Determinants of Gender Role Attitude

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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.033</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of religious mind</td>
<td></td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.080</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adj.R²  
N  
2603

***: p<.001, **: p<.01, *: p<.05
Discussion

The objectives of this chapter are to summarize the results of the analysis, and to provide a possibility of the question item “religious mind.”

My findings from the results of OLS regression analysis are that importance of religious mind has a significant effect on 5 dependent variables about people’s behavior or social awareness. Compared with previous studies conducted in Western countries, this religious variable significantly affects volunteer activities, going to vote, life satisfaction and gender role attitude in Japan as well as in western countries. Furthermore, I made a new finding that the religious variable has effects on cultural activities such as going to museums or reading novels or history books. This relationship has almost never been validated in either Western countries or Japan.

As mentioned above, it was difficult to use the traditional measures of religiosity used in western countries such as religious affiliation or church attendance, because of the specificity of Japanese religiosity. Therefore, according to the use of “the importance of religious mind” variable in this paper, these results are similar to that of previous studies in Western countries. What do I mean by this statement?

I offer the “procedural equivalence (Johnson 1998)” in order to answer this question. Indeed, the “religious mind” is not an accurate translation of “religious affiliation” or “church attendance,” which suggests there is no “interpretive equivalence.” However, the correlation patterns between religiosity and dependent variables have similarity across countries. When certain questions work in the same manner across groups, it has “procedural equivalence.” The religiosity of Japanese as measured by “the importance of religious mind” performs the same function as Western measures of traditional religious variables. I suggest that the “religious mind” variable in Japan has “procedural equivalence” to religious affiliation or church attendance in Western countries.

In the future, by testing “the importance of religious mind” in other countries, including predominately Christian and Muslim nations, and by testing the validity and reliability of the “religious mind,” I expect that the effectiveness of this variable will be clarified. By doing so, I will ultimately be able to regard Japanese religion and religiosity as a non-particular case in international comparative research.

Acknowledgment

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We thank the SSP Project for the permission to use the SSP2015 survey.

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The Institute of Statistical Mathematics 1998 *Kokuminsei vana-ka-koku hikaku.* Idemitsu Shoten. (統計数理研究所『国民性七か国比較』 出光書店)


### Appendix. Factor analysis of cultural activities

<table>
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<th>Activity</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>h²</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
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<td>Go to museums</td>
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<td>.600</td>
<td>2.659</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read novels or history books</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>2.701</td>
<td>1.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to classical music recitals or concerts</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>2.187</td>
<td>1.096</td>
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<tr>
<td>Go to a library</td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>1.271</td>
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</table>

Estimated Communality Percentage 38.547

*Note:* factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method with promax rotation
A Study on "Religious Nones" of the Korean Society

- Is Confucianism in Korean society a religion or a non-religion?

LEE, SUG-HEE
Ph.D. in Religious Studies
Lecturer, Ajou University, Korea

My paper aims to investigate whether Confucianism has religiosity, which specific and peculiar features Confucianism as a religion possesses, and what role its religiosity carries out in the Korean society. Some of sociologists often expressed their deep concern about the secularization of religion, anticipating that religion would ultimately disappear when the notion of rationality was enlarged into the realm of a society by the development of science and reason. However, their theories regarding the secularization were not completely well-received, so they were in fact discarded. And now there is a certain movement aiming to analyze religious phenomena of the secular world from a variety of perspectives. Roughly speaking, religion is very important for a society as well as an individual. When being exclusive, religion as a belief system frequently becomes a main cause or problem that induces social tensions and conflicts. On the other hand, it helps to keep and maintain public order and peace in a society, presenting criteria for a social value system or a behavioral norm and inspiring a moral. The Korean society has a number of dynamic aspects in terms of religion. Also, a variety of religions co-exists in Korea. According to demographic statistics, almost the half of South Koreans has a religion but the rest of them do not have one. In my thought, it is so problematic to have no theoretical frame for elaborating and understanding those “religious none s.” If we do not grasp and map out their belief system, we cannot anticipate whether their potentiality will give a positive or negative influence upon the change of our society. The paper takes a look into the religiosity of Confucianism, basing upon the proposition that the most of South Koreans, with or without a religion, has a belief in Confucianism.
Confucianism as a Kind of Philosophical Counseling: Theory and Practice

By David Wan
Lecturer, General Education Centre, Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract

Ever since the new culture movement, Confucianism as an academic interest no longer dominates the intellectual scene of China as it had for the past two millennia. The modernization of Confucianism has been a great focus of endeavor of many scholars. Nevertheless, the efforts remain theoretical. No much impact has been made outside of the academia. Historian Yu Yingshi considers these discussions empty talk which render Confucianism a “disembodied, wandering soul”

Since the mid 1990’s a small number of scholars began to look into the feasibility of apply Confucianism in counseling with the hope to make the tradition more practical and relevant to the modern world. Yet, these remain theories. No actual case has been reported and reviewed.

In this paper, I will present an interpretation of Confucianism which is applicable in real life counseling context and two cases that I have actually done with the philosophical insights from this interpretation. The purpose is not to demonstrate that such practice is possible and could be very fruitful.
Confucianism as a Kind of Philosophical Counseling: Theory and Practice

(Draft for discussion)

David Wan

Lecturer, Polytechnic University of Hong Kong

Introduction

With the critical challenges posted by the modern culture, the process of Confucianism losing its dominancy in China is rather drastic. It began with the change of examination syllabus (eventually the abolition) of the imperial examination (first done in 1898), and it reached its apex during the new culture movement (mid 1920’s to early 1930’s). In the movement, Confucianism is not only considered powerless in meeting challenges the nation faced at the time, it is denounced as the major cultural hindrance for the country’s modernization process. Since then, while cultural Confucianism might still be deeply affecting China, Confucianism as an academic interest no longer dominates the intellectual scene of China as it had for the past two millenniums.

However, many still believe that Confucianism is a valuable and unique source of intellectual insights. After all, it is a major constituent of a commonly recognized great civilization. If it has satisfactorily answered perennial problems for generations, it must have something to offer to meet the challenges of the modern era. With such belief, even though the relevancy of Confucianism to the modern world might be covert or merely potential, many scholars, both within and outside of China, endeavor to show the relevancy of Confucianism to the modern world ever since the days of the new culture movement.

These intellectual endeavors take many forms and involve various academic
disciplines. Nevertheless, there are two major foci: politics and ethics. Tremendous amount of academic works has been done on the modernization of Confucianism in both of these areas. A lot of these works are the best of their kind. However, they remain theories. None of the discussions regarding how Confucianism could be modernized and implemented as a new political system affected the politics of the real world anywhere. Neither has any of the discussion concerning Confucian ethics been put into practice in any practical and organized way that may impact any society or even individual in the world outside of the academia. In fact, most of these discussions concern with modern interpretations of ancient Confucian texts of various ancient masters. Practice in real life is rarely the concern. Historian Yu Yingshi considers these discussions empty talk which render Confucianism a “disembodied, wandering soul”.

A small number of scholars realize that Confucianism cannot remain purely academic if it were to be rejuvenated and become relevant to the society again. So they look into the feasibility of applying Confucian philosophy on counseling. Number of journal papers and dissertations has been written on this topic. Prof. Cheng Chung-ying’s “From Self-Cultivation to Philosophical Counseling” is probably the first article on the subject matter. In this paper, Prof. Cheng stresses the importance of the achievement of self-cultivation while applying Confucian philosophy in counseling. While understand his concern, I disagree with his presumption on the qualification of a philosophical counselor regarding his achievement on self-cultivation. I will support this claim in the latter part of the present paper.

1 By “ethics” I mean a board range of academic studies which include but not limited to meta-ethics, normative ethics, metaphysics of ethics, and ethical metaphysics.


Several scholars from Taiwan have written on this topic as well. They are Lin An-wu (林安梧), Liu Jian-ji (呂健吉), Huang Li-sen (黃立森), and Su Ying Fen (蘇塤雰). Each of them has expounded upon Confucianism as a form of life changing philosophy and how that is supposed to be applicable in a counseling context. Some of these works are in-depth and inspiring. They have made some cogent arguments that support the feasibility of Confucian philosophical counseling. Nevertheless, none of these works has shown how the philosophical insight from Confucianism is actually applied in a real case and how much efficacy it has. These discussions remain theoretical and academic, and they have very little impact on the general populations. As an attempt to make Confucianism relevant, more is needed. Actual practice and critical evaluations of the practice are necessary.

In the rest of the present paper, I will put forward my understanding of the key concepts of Confucian philosophy that are applicable in a counseling context. Then I will demonstrate how such Confucian philosophy is practical in philosophical counseling by presenting two cases that I have done applying these philosophical insights.

Kongzi on Ren as a base of values of the human existence

“How to remain confident?” “Is there any meaning in life?” “How to maintain a healthy interpersonal relationship?” These are some popular issues that counselors often encounter. Lack of conviction is the major cause to these issues. However, it is especially difficult to have any conviction in the present era where it is predominated by value relativism, pluralism, and nihilism. The grand master of Confucianism,

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4 Lin An-wu, “儒、釋、道心性道德思想與意義治療”, 《道德與文明》2002年第5期，44-49。
6 Huang Li-sen, “淺論孟子學之哲學諮商”, 華梵大學第十一屆「生命實踐學術研討會」論文。
8 I have been a practicing philosophical counselor for 12 years. I was certified by the American Philosophical Practitioners Association in 2005.
Kongzi, lived in an era where traditional values are being questioned with the crumbling socio-political system of Chou Li. A large part of his philosophy is a respond to how one can have any conviction in value.

The following is a concise exposition of Kongzi’s theory on ren which is the key to his understanding of value of life.

The Master said, “If a man is not ren, what can he do with li? If a man is not ren, what can he do with music?” (Analects, 3:3) 

The Master said, “One who is ren settled in ren. The wise profited from ren.” (Analects, 4:2)

The Master said, “The gentleman who is resolute and ren does not seek to live on at the expense of ren, and there are times when he will sacrifice his life to complete ren.” (Analects, 15:9)

From the above quotes, Kongzi believes that without ren the practice of li (禮) and yue (樂) is meaningless. Meanings and values do not come from conforming to any value system no matter how main stream it is. Nevertheless, having ren is the key to a meaningful existence. With ren, one does not have to fill the inner void of one’s life with anything else. This is why renche’s (仁者 one who is ren) life is settled (an 安), and only the true chihche (智者 the wise) would appreciate ren as profit. In other words, ren is necessary and sufficient condition to a meaningful life. Renche realizes such importance of ren and is willing to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of achieving ren.

What is ren? We may grasp the meaning of the term through Kongzi’s answers to his student on this question.

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9 I am using Robert Eno’s internet translation as a base simply because it is generally accurate and convenient. I would use my own translation when I deem his translation not conveying the message intended. I would notify the reader when I do so. Robert Eno trans. The analecTs of Confucius (Version 2.2), 2015, internet resource.

10 My own translation.
1. Zhonggong asked about ren. The Master said, “When you go out your front gate, continue to treat each person as though receiving an honored guest. When directing the actions of subordinates, do so as though officiating at a great ritual sacrifice. Do not do to others what you would not wish done to you. No complaint in office, No complaint at home.” (Analects, 12:2)

2. Zigong said, “If one were to bring broad benefits to the people and be able to aid the multitudes, what would you say about him? Could you call him ren?” The Master said, “Why would you call this a matter of ren? Surely, this would be a sage! Yao and Shun themselves would fall short of this. The ren person is one who, wishing himself to be settled in position, sets up others; wishing himself to have access to the powerful, achieves access for others. To be able to proceed by analogy from what lies nearest by, that may be termed the formula for ren.” (Analects, 6:30)

Kongzi’s answer to Zhonggong’s question on ren basically says that one need to respect others regardless of their social status, be empathetic, and do not blame others for one’s own fortunes. The main idea of the answer seems to be “do not be self-centered, one should concern for others as well.” However, what is interesting about Kongzi’s answer is not this key message but the way he articulate the answer. Kongzi does not give Zhonggong a conceptual answer on ren. Neither does he lay down a set of rules of how to become a person of ren. He put forward several scenarios (going out of the front gate, commanding his subordinates, encountering the undesirables, serving and not serving at the court) and prescribes corresponding attitudes by using specific examples (as receiving honorable guest – deference, as officiating great ritual -- reverence, not treating others in undesirable manners -- empathy, no complaint against others – willing to assume responsibility). The

11 Last two sentences are my translation.
purpose of using examples and not simply laying down the appropriate attitudes as some form of command is obviously to allow Zhonggong to existentially acknowledge, instead of just cognitively grasp, the ideal attitudes through spontaneous moral reactions. To understand ren, Zhonggong has no concept to understand, nor does he have rules to follow. He has situations to react to. Ren is the spontaneous moral responds which has its base on human nature.

Quote 2 convey the same idea even better. Answering Zigong’s question on what count as a renche, Kongzi again put forward two scenarios: wishing himself to be settled in position, sets up others; wishing himself to have access to the powerful, achieves access for others. These again are instances of empathetic behaviors. Again, Kongzi does not just tell Zigong to be empathetic. He put forward situations where Zigong would spontaneously respond with empathy. Then Kongzi states the most important verse regarding ren, “To be able to proceed by analogy from what lies nearest by, that may be termed the formula for ren.” What is that “lies nearest by”? In context, it must be referring to the empathy. Nothing is nearer then one’s spontaneous respond to a particular scenario. It comes from within. It is an instantiation of the manifestation of the moral self. It is qualitatively different from other mental phenomenon such as desire, emotion, or motivation. It appears as a demand that one cannot defy. It is this unique quality that one may take as an analogy to qualitatively comprehends ren.

Reverence, empathy, sense of responsibility, and benevolence are all instances of ren. That is why ren should not be translated and understood as benevolence or mercifulness as some western scholars of earlier generations may. They share the same unique quality aforementioned. Therefore ren could be understood as the undefiable moral demand from one’s moral self. In other words, it is the demand form oneself. It is what one deems to be the most important if one is true to himself.
No value from beyond oneself is comparable. Even societal or economic pressure cannot suppress such demands. Renche is those who conscientiously respond to such moral demands. This is to respond to the most important demand form one’s inner self and thereby actualizes and attains the highest values in one’s life. Therefore, renche is free from any need of confirmation from the world. In fact, Kongzi believes that only renche can be the judge of what is truly valuable and what is not. One who does not need any confirmation is one who is the utmost confident. One who often practices what he himself (not others) deemed to be valuable and meaningful has no issue with the meaning of life. A purposeful, meaningful, and confident existence lays a good foundation for building valuable interpersonal relationship.

So, ren seems to be a promising solution to at least three of the most common issues in counseling. However, is it accessible to the majority or is it something esoteric? Kongzi is quite clear on this issue. He believes that ren is accessible to anyone anytime. He states, “The Master said, Is ren distant? When I wish to be ren, ren arrives.” (Analects, 7:30) Mengzi (another Confucian master who came after Kongzi), even goes as far as saying that ren is human nature therefore it is always in operation. It is always acting in respond to the environment, and generating demands that affect individual all the time. Just that individual may choose to ignore them and act according to the demand of the physical body. Those who so act are called petite man (小人 shiauren), and those who act according to ren are great man (大人 daren). So, it is one’s own choice to become a great man or renche and lead a meaningful life of confidence or a petite man and lead a meaningless life that is determined by corporeal desires.

From the above interpretation of Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s theory of ren, three counseling principles could be drawn:

12 The Master said, “Only the ren person can love others and hate others.” (Analects, 4:3)
1. Draw the client’s attention to the demand of one’s moral self.

2. Explain to the client how responding to one’s moral self is related to leading a confident and meaningful life.

3. Encourage the client to pay attention to and actualize the demand of the moral self.

Two cases

Following are two cases that illustrate how the aforementioned interpretation of Kongzi and Mengzi’s thought could be applied in counseling context. One of them is a case on self-confidence. The other one is a case on the meaning of life.

Case one

Thomas is a registered social worker in Hong Kong who was almost thirty years old when he paid me a visit. He claimed that he had a self-confidence issue which was so serious that his interpersonal relationship was being affected especially with the opposite sex. Since he was a social worker himself, he was familiar with the counseling skills that are being applied in the main stream counseling practices, and he did not find any of these skills helpful in dealing with his case. That is why he came to me for advice.

I: Why do you think you have an issue with self-confidence?

T: I am so very concerned with what other people has to say about me. Very frequently, what others say would make me wonder if I am very incompetent in their eyes. Sometimes, people don’t even have to say anything to make me uneasy. I keep wondering if others are looking down on me. And, every one of these incidents could last for a few days.”

I: Can you give me an example?

T: I am not a degree holder. I only have a higher diploma in social work. On my graduation, I invited all my families to the ceremony. My younger brother noticed that
I was wearing a graduation gown but not a cap. So, he asked me why. I then told him that the cap is for degree holders only and I am only getting a higher diploma. My brother responded by a nod. I have to say his nod is neutral. He could be just acknowledging the fact. He didn’t say anything, but I started to wonder if he is looking down on me! Such feeling of inadequacy haunted me for several days. I just could not get rid of the feeling.”

I: It seems to me that your sense of security base very much on other’s confirmations.”

T: Yes, this is obvious.

I: Then it is not a surprise that you are so sensitive to other people’s comments. Even when other people have not made any comment, you would still want to know what they think about you, right? Your confidence come from others not yourself. No wonder you have so little self-confidence.

T: I understand. That’s why I have been trying to do my best and establish my confidence by my competence.

I: How do you do that?

T: Well, just try to do my best at my job. For instance, when I am at work especially when I am conducting activities with the youth, I am hundred percent engaged. I am so engaged that I could forget about myself. That is the time I don’t really care about what other people think about me. I know I am good at conducting youth programs.”

I: What happen after these activities? Would you be uneasy when people discuss how well or not you conducted those activities?”

T: Hm…not sure. I might be more confident in conducting activities, but when people discuss my performance, I still feel very uneasy.

I: So, that is still using others’ opinion as the base of your self-confidence. As long as one is assuring oneself through measuring oneself against an external scale of value,
one would never acquire real self-confidence. You may use the competence scale
today, but you may all of a sudden realize that people aren’t judging you by your
competence. Even if they are, you would not know how competent is competent
enough, and people’s opinions could change as well. You will never be sure your own
worthiness as long as you are depending upon others’ judgment. So, don’t think that
your achievement would get you the confidence you are looking for. I have met so
many over achievers who have very low self-esteem.
T: So, what do I do?
I: Is there anything that you are so sure that no one else’s opinion would influence
your position?
(After a long pause)
T: Simple calculations, maybe? Like one plus one equal to two, I think nothing other
people say would change my mind on such things.
I: Why are you so sure?
T: Maybe it is so obviously correct?
I: So, your stand on matters that are obviously correct is unshakable?
T: Yes.
I: Even if others call you a fool for that?
T: Of course, I know I am right.
I: Anything else, other than simple math, that you could be so sure?
(Another long pause)
T: Sorry, can’t think of any.
I: If a person pour gasoline on a cat and burn the cat alive right in front of you just for
fun, would you think what he does is fine?
T: No! That is cruel. It is wrong.
I: What if the guy is a degree holder, and he tells you that one has to be well educated
and become sophisticated to appreciate the fun of burning a cat alive. The very fact that you find the act abominable shows that you are just an uneducated fool who could only entertain himself with children cartoon. Would you then think twice about your stand?

T: Gash! Of course not! I would probably get very angry. Such cruelty is just wrong.

I: What if a group of people you look up to say the same thing to you?

T: No! My stand won’t change a bit. They are wrong, not me.

I: Why are you so sure of your judgment?

T: That is blatant cruelty. Such cruelty is wrong. I would feel the wrongness from the bottom of my heart.

I: Impossible to shake?

T: It would be very unlikely unless cogent argument is presented to show me that that is not cruelty. Say, the cat has no feeling or the cat actually enjoys being burned. But, I don’t think these could possibly be true.

I: That is enough. Your judgment does not have to be absolutely true. Your conviction that it is true is the bases of your confidence. Now, what do you think is the base of such conviction?

T: Rationality\(^{13}\)! I think they all make perfect sense. There could be different kinds of reasoning in different categories of things. Mathematics has its reason. Morality has its reason. But as long as I find it rational (he li 合理) from the bottom of my heart, it would be very difficult for me to change my stand.

I: Can we put it this way: Whatever you found rational from the bottom of your heart, be it mathematics, ethics or what else, your stand would be firm and unshakable. This is your inner source of value. If your actions follow such demands from your inner

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\(^{13}\) The term he used is he li (合理). It could be translated as “reason” or “rational”. However, it has a much boarder sense in Chinese. It does not only mean what can be shown true by human rationality. It could also refer to items that make sense intuitively.
self, nothing other people say would make you doubt yourself. Form these; your self-confidence should be based.

T: But I do not know what else I would find rational from the bottom of my heart beside the two categories.

I: That would need a lot of practice. You have to consciously reflect upon your experiences. Use your reason and conscience. Once determined what is right, act upon it and see if you find assurance in real action. Real confidence would then build up.

T: That would not be easy.

I: I have never said that is easy. Even Kongzi spend fifteen years to acquire his basic stand in life at the age of thirty. He spent another 10 years in practice and reflection and finally had no doubt on his conviction in life at the age of forty. In short, self-confidence is the result of deep reflections and practice. It is never achieved through following some external criteria of success.

Thomas agreed with my analysis. He left my office with a sense of direction. He claimed that he knew what to focus on and felt relieved that he does not have to rely on others’ approval to feel good about himself. He did not become a person with high self-confidence just by our meeting. That would take him a life time to achieve. However, his way of dealing with the low self-esteem has been totally changed, and that is a very significant breakthrough for him.

Meaning of life case

Betty came to see me because she found life meaningless and “she does not know what she is doing with her life”. When she came to see me, it was the second semester of her final year at the university. She was about to graduate, and she was supposed to be working on her final year project which she has the slightest intention to work on. She believed that she has chosen the wrong major. She only chose her major because of the unfavorable financial situation of her family at the time. It was
not her own choice. She thought she had wasted three years, and her suffering would become endless if she continues to work in the field of her study after graduation. But if she chooses to work in some other field, her degree was not going to worth much. She wonder if she should spend another three years studying for another major and enter another professional field? If so, what field should she then choose? These were her main issues. Besides, she has no interest in her major and her final year project. She just could not conjure the energy to start working on the project. She did not know what to do. So, she came to see me.

I: If you have no interest in the major and the final year project, what are you interested in?

B: Business administration.

I: Why? What is it in business administration that is so interesting to you?

B: It is practical.

I: Practical?

B: It is easier to find a decent job with a business administration degree.

I: What about your present major? Can’t it help you find a decent job?

B: My major is tourism and hotel management. You could say that it is sort of business study, and it does help to find a decent job. But it is too narrow, and the contents are just so not interesting.

(We spend a little time figuring out what are the major differences between the two major, and we drew the conclusion that they do not have much differences. Just that hotel management provide a much narrower job prospect.)

I: If that is the case, from your point of view, business administration is only going to provide you with more job opportunities. It has nothing that interest your by itself.

B: Hm…really, it doesn’t.

I: My question was “what are you interested in?” Beside the practicality of the subject,
don’t you find anything interesting at all?
B: No. I don’t.
I: Then what have you been doing lately? You are not going to class, and you are not working on your final year project.
B: I haven’t been doing much. Not feel like doing anything.

(After another round of talk, I realized that she did not only find her major not interesting, she found nothing interesting. For her, nothing is really important. This is a typical “syndrome” of an underdeveloped spiritual life. From the Confucian point of view, she needed to rediscover her inner moral self which is always actively making moral demands. Then I asked her whether she has ever felt excited over anything? She uttered some incidents which have to do with her receiving praise or getting blamed. They were not at the same level as the undefiable moral demand form the inner self. I kept on asking. Then she mentioned the experience of piano practice. For a period of time she was very dedicated to piano practice. She was so engaged that nothing else mattered. She said she missed that. Then she mentioned an incident where one of her high school classmate was being blamed for something she did not do by a teacher. She was furious for such injustice.
I: Why do you care so much about this incident? Were you close to that classmate?
B: No, not at all. I don’t know. I guess I just couldn’t stand the gross injustice. That classmate was so mistreated. I could not put this out of my mind for a very long period of time.
I: Because?
B: Just not fair.
I: Do you find the incident interesting?
B: No, not at all! I hope it had never happened.
I: But you were concerned. Sounded like you want to do something for that classmate,
right?

B: Yes, I guess so.

I: It would be meaningful if you could do something, right?

B: Yes! Let justice be done! Ha ha ha…

I: So it seems, whether or not something is meaningful has nothing to do with whether it is interesting.

B: Yes, sometimes meaning consists in whether something is morally correct.

I: Who should be the judge for whether something is morally correct? You or someone else?

B: Of course is me! When I encounter injustice, I would naturally recognize it. Nobody needs to tell me. On the other hand, if I don’t find anything unjust, you cannot just tell me that it is and expect me to change my mind.

I: What would you do if other people tell you to mind your own business and stop being so concerned with what you think is unjust?

B: I would be rather upset. I don’t want to be nosey. I just find what is unjust unjust! I just don’t want these things to happen. I hope I can do something.

I: Can we put it this way: when you find something unjust you would not change your stand no matter what other people say?

B: Unless someone can show me my misunderstanding of the situation. If I have no misunderstanding concerning the subject matters, I believe my stand won’t change because of social pressure.

I then pointed out that this is the undefiable moral demand form her inner self according to Confucianism. In fact, there are many undefiable demands from human nature. It could be creative, artistic, rational and indefinitely more. Her experience of deeply engaged in piano practice could be the artistic demand form the inner self. No one else asked her to practice like that. She just found it important to play the music
well. In her words, “that is doing justice to the music. She began to grasp what I
meant.

At the end of our session, I encouraged her to “listen” to the inner self more
often. I pointed out that human nature is actively acting in respond to the environment
all the time. Its demands are what one most concern as a human. Act according to
these demand means doing what one find most important as being what he is (i.e.
being human). If one can do that, he need not fill the void of his life with interesting
objects or events. In fact, with a healthy and well developed inner self, one is
constantly making things around him relevant.

Three weeks after the session, she send me an email telling me that she still
found her major meaningless, but she is more confident that she could find meaning
in her surroundings. Getting the energy to work on the final year project became less
of a drag.

Conclusion

The purpose of the present paper is not to argue that my interpretation of
Confucianism is the best possible interpretation. Neither is it to show that this
interpretation is effective in helping people in the counseling context. I just want to
illustrate that an understanding of Confucianism (or any Chinese philosophical
traditions) could be applied in a real life situation to help people deal with deep issues
in life. Confining it in academic discussion with no expectation of practice would only
make it irrelevant to the modern world and future generations. No interpretation is
perfect, but a good interpretation could provide important insights and help a lot of
people. And the experiences of practice could provide insights in return to improve
the interpretation. This is in fact how Confucianism has been developing for the past
two and a half millennium. In order to keep Confucianism vibrant and relevant, this
would be the part that the tradition has to retain.
Some scholars have already recognized such importance and theorize about the application of Confucianism in counseling. Yet, real case practice and critical evaluations on these case works are not common. I hope my work could be part of this new initiative.
The Jesus Movement from Rural to Urban: The House Church’s Order Changes and State Control on Northern Jiangsu Zhuo City

从乡村到城市的地方基督教——苏北涿城家庭教会的“次序”变迁与国家效应

Xiao Yunze 肖云泽 东华师范大学

Abstract:

Taking the house churches in Zhuo city as a case study, this paper studies the process from rural to urban. There are two types of church in this city: one is fundamentalist and patriarchal church, and the other is city emerging church. We focus on the orders change and the state governance of the churches; we try to examine two different state effect on the research process. Our study found that the fundamentalist and patriarchal church was continuously dividing from each other, with the local national agents trying to constraint-restrict them, and the church elite acts in a negative response. The city emerging church was the reformers in theology thoughts and the chasers of public orders, with the local national agents trying to communicate-restrict them, the church elite responses in positive actions. The article also tries to show the different state sentiment and social mentality of those two churches in the same urban society by analyzing two religion rights protecting cases, which the fundamentalist church was failed, but the Christian education school of the city church was succeeded. Finally, the paper compares and considers the ordering concepts and the state effects of two churches.
从乡村到城市的地方基督教
——苏北涿城家庭教会的“次序”变迁与国家效应

华东师范大学社会学系 肖云泽
从乡村到城市的地方基督教
——苏北涿城家庭教会的“次序”变迁与国家效应

华东师范大学社会发展学院社会学系 肖云泽

【摘要】本文以苏北涿城家庭教会为个案研究对象，来透视从乡村到城市的社会变迁中，家庭教会“次序”（秩序）的蜕变，以及国家对家庭教会治理，所形成的国家效应。研究发现，作为涿城福音起源的传统基要派、家长制教会处于不断的裂变、衰落当中，国家对这类教会予以强制型控制，宗教精英对之反映出了消极行动策略；从基要派家庭教会分裂出来的城市新兴教会，则在神学思想和教会体制上予以变革，构建公共、开放秩序，国家对这类教会予以沟通型控制，对此，宗教精英以积极的行动策略予以应对。文章还通过朱家教会维权失败和城市教会学校维权成功的案例，来展现双方在城市社会中的不同处境、国家观念和社会心理。最后对两种类型教会的秩序观和国家效应进行反思。

【关键词】次序；家庭教会；乡村教会；城市教会；私人；公共；国家效应

一、引言

在我们看来，基督教进入某一个具体的地方社会（local society），进行在地化的时候会有两个明显的过程：一是由卡里斯马而至教会秩序的生成过程；二是国家效应（state effect）的显出。以基督教进入西方社会为例，恰如 J. B. Russell“钟摆理论”所谓，初代的西方基督教是一个由卡里斯马型的“灵的自由运行（先知）”，而逐渐构成正式的“教会秩序（体制）”的过程，① 在此之中，希伯来的上帝与希腊—罗马的文化传统互相汇流，圣典、教会、神学、传统逐渐孕育成型。②在国家效应方面，虽然从目的论的角度来说基督徒并不是一项具有政治诉求的运动，但是耶稣要求他的追随者（使徒、门徒）只能忠诚于耶稣，对其他要求忠诚的声音说不。与犹太教“分道扬镳”的基督教，③ 面对罗马帝国的国家治理，与国家信仰、国家制度两相遭遇，产生国家效应，形成一系列冲突、逃避、互动或融合的行动策略。而在这一过程中，罗马帝国的政治、社会逐渐授予“耶稣”作为宗教、甚至国家神明的合法性，基督教实现了在地化。

经历了文革的断裂，改革开放之后呈现了“复兴”态势的中国基督教，事实上亦经历了中国地方化过程。不过相较于迅速纳入国家体制，从而呈现一定国家意志、科层制度和同质化色彩的三自教会而言，地方基督教的中国特征，在拥有一定自主性的家庭教会中，表现得更为明显。首先，家庭教会具有一个鲜明的秩序生成过程。家庭教会大致兴起于 1970-80 年代，这些持“非三自”立场的基督徒群体，④ 重新接续倪柝声、宋尚节、王明道等本土基要派传道人的神学资源，几乎在“神迹”、“属灵领袖”等卡理斯玛权威的感

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③ 章雪富、石敏敏著：《早期基督教的演变及多元传统》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，第 280 页。
④ [英]邓雅各：《分道扬镳：基督教与犹太教的分离及其对基督教特性的影响》，杨慧译，香港：道风书社，2015 年。
⑤ 其中有不少家庭教会的领袖经历过三自运动，遭受到严厉之灾，并在 1978 年之后领导了家庭教会，某种程度上也塑造了家庭教会的“非三自”立场和传统。
召下，形成了既有基督教信仰形式，又具有中国传统会社性格的自发性群体聚集。尽管多年间关于家庭教会的纷争、分裂不绝于耳，但是这一长时段之间却有一个有迹可循的秩序生成和变迁过程。

其次，家庭教会亦形成了明显的国家效应。相较于三自教会，更受基要主义浸泡的家庭教会，更恪守与世俗“分别为圣”的原则，他们对于政教分离的执着，甚至是偏执，使其刻意保持与国家政治的距离，并始终对国家要求忠诚的声音，对国家制度进入宗教的安排予以拒绝，某种程度上构成了不服从的传统，6形成了国家效应。因此，家庭教会时常被视为社会不稳定力量加以警惕，其合法性饱受质疑。

但是，当我们将中国家庭教会当作地方基督教进行考量的时候，必须认识到与以城市性、公共性为特征的初代西方基督教不同的是，中国的地方基督教首先是一项农村运动。关于初代西方基督教的城市性，马克斯·韦伯有所论述，他认为初代的西方基督教具有城居性格，城市是基督教传播的核心地域，是宗教敬虔的中心，是理性主义的担纲者，农民则几乎被视为异教徒或较低级的基督徒，相信农民具有敬虔的特殊价值是相当近代的结果7。罗达尼·斯达克亦认为，初代的西方基督教是一项城市运动，他们与城市的陌生人社会当中提供关联机制，并通过慈善服务孕育了一系列公共性特征。而中国的家庭教育则与此相反，他们的宗教行动大多数是农村运动，尤其是河南、安徽、苏北等地的家庭教会都是由农村地区开始复兴的，农民们热切地期盼宗教体验，自认为是这一独一神信仰的担纲者，他们关注私人救赎胜过公共服务。而处于中国城市之中的家庭教会，与其称之为城市基督教，不如以农村基督教审视之。因为在传统的农业中国，除了曾经被作为通商口岸的沿海城市之外，大多数城市从文化、体制到思维方式都打上了深刻的农业文明烙印，他们只不过是以城市连体体当中的“市”或“集”8，抑或农业资源更为集中的中心地区9。这一切都使得作为自组织的中国家庭教会从传统、秩序到神学都打上了深刻的农村烙印，教会成为熟人之间的社会关联机制，教会像一个宗教性大家庭，宗教领袖成为这个类家庭组织的“家长”，宗教实践很容易呈现出乡土的实践逻辑，“家长制”成为家庭教会较为普遍的组织形态。

然而，当下的中国家庭教会却正处于从农村向城市演变的逻辑挑战之中，从而在教会秩序和国家效应上都有了一些内外部的变迁。

首先，全能型国家的改革和对外开放，使家庭教会内外部的联系网络和共享观念都产生了一定的变化。随着老一代传道人的远去，以及家庭教会与海外基督教或普世基督教联络的加强，卡理斯玛权威的合法性渐渐陨落，民主、法理开始成为一部分基督徒群体的共享观念，这使得“家长制”某种程度上丧失了宗教合法性。

其次，随着国家大规模推进“经营城市”运动，城市吸引力大为增强，中国既有的社区关系格局被打破，一系列具有现代城市特征的城市空间被构筑出来，城市现代性开始凸显，社会的陌生化程度不断增加。在这样的空间和社会关联变化当中，有一部分城市家庭教会主动适合城市社会的需要，对内进行民主制改革，对外孕育某种公共性。当然亦有许多家庭教会依然遵循农村教会的运作逻辑，在家长制和民主制之间挣扎，当他们面对陌生

6 袁浩：《中国基督教与不服从的传统：以王明道、唐河教会与守望教会为例》，《道风》第四十四期（2016年春）
7 [德]马克斯·韦伯著：《宗教社会学》，康乐译，桂林：广西师范大学出版社，2011年，第106-108页。
9 费孝通著：《小城镇四记》，北京：新华出版社，1985年，第80-84页。
10 参见 [美]施坚雅主编：《中华帝国晚期的城市》，叶光庭等译，北京：中华书局，2000年，第248页。
人社会时，亦显得有些束手无措。

再者，宗教政策的调整，释放了一定的宗教活动空间，但与此同时，国家管理宗教的方式也产生了变化。由于中国多省域、多层级、多部门的政府治理格局存在，宗教政策被不同尺度地分工、分时执行，不同地域、不同部门的政府机构对家庭教会会采取不同的管理方式。但是由于国家并没有出台针对家庭教会的正式制度，因此，政府部门往往通过非正式制度对之进行管理，同时随着行政管理的法制化，国家也开始通过“非宗教方式进行宗教治理”的方式与家庭教会进行互动。这也使得不同的家庭教会的基督徒会呈现出不同的国家效应，形成不同的行动策略。

为此，已经有一些研究试图把握家庭教会的这些变化，如有学者将家庭教会分为三种类型，将“家庭教会”称为传统家庭教会，将持开放态度的家庭教会称为开放式家庭教会，将城市中的家庭教会称为城市新兴教会。但是就目前所及的文献来看，这些研究尚处于面上的概况调研，其对家庭教会的内在秩序、运作机制、国家效应的内外部变迁上的挖掘显得并不充分。

基于此，我们亦有必要就某地或某个家庭教会的个案来窥见中国地方基督教的进程，我们可以纵向分析基督教由农村运动转换为城市运动的过程中，家庭教会如何走出农村宗教的实践逻辑，如何走出家庭，如何构筑教会秩序，如何处置与国家的互动问题。而实质上，研究中国地方基督教的过程，也是一个“通过宗教来分析社会，通过社会来分析宗教”，甚至是“通过宗教来分析国家，通过国家来分析宗教”的过程。

二、研究方法和田野介绍

2016 年 1 月 21 日至 2 月 3 日，我们前往江苏省北部的涿城市，也就是于建嵘所谓的淮河流域信仰带的家庭教会中作了为期 14 天的田野调查。就调研的出发点来说，我们仅是希望通过各处的走访、参与式观察和深入访谈，掌握当地家庭教会的一些基本情况。然而，我们却在访谈中意外地发现了葡萄园教会（原朱家教会，在行文时候我们通常称这家教会为朱家教会）的一系列故事，从而能够实现我们这篇研究的建构。基于社会学研究的伦理要求，以及对受访人的承诺，我们对调研地点、受访人的姓名和所在教会进行了化名处理。

让我们首先交代大致的调研历程。我们经由温州家庭教会一位朋友的介绍进入田野，先是在 1 月 21 日抵达了位于涿城市郊的葡萄园教会的北乡“肢体”，在 22-25 日之间参加了这个“肢体”的青年团契营会，与青年基督徒一同在零下十几度的寒冬里打地铺，第一次感受到了葡萄园教会所谓的“次序”，也是在这里，我们听到了一些葡萄园教会的故事，也让我们调研的雪球真正滚动了起来。

26 日我们对北乡“肢体”孟庄聚会点的传道人毛彪进行了访谈，27 日我们访问了葡萄园教会大学生团契的同工，应巨林。28 日、29 日我们访问了涿城大通镇的董家教会，张阿姨和她的儿子周以撒，给我们讲了一些涿城家庭教会中那些很很少有人再关心的历史。

30 日我们将调研的重心转移到了涿城市区，访问了一家实行长老会体制的城市新兴教会——以勒教会，王光辉牧师接受了我们的访谈。31 日，我们见到了葡萄园教会的监督牧师朱彼得，他将成为我们这份个案的主角。2 月 1 日，我们住到了葡萄园教会一位年轻传道人，陆臻的家中，听他讲服事的酸甜苦辣。并在他的安排下访问了以琳长老会，赵新德牧

11 于建嵘：《中国基督教家庭教会合法化研究》，《战略与管理》2010 年第 3/4 合期编本。
12 李峰著：《乡村基督教的组织特征及其社会结构性位秩——华南 Y 县 X 镇基督教教会组织研究》，上海：复旦大学出版社，2005 年，第 251 页。
13 中国家庭教会主要存在两大信仰带：淮河流域信仰带和闽浙沿海信仰地带。于建嵘，《中国基督教家庭教会合法化研究》，《战略与管理》2010 年第 3/4 合期编本。
师接待了我们。2月2日，在听了众多关于他的故事之后，我们总算见到了这份研究的另外一位主角，迦密山教会的项天乐牧师。2月3日，我们结束调研，与我们的涿城弟兄们告别。

在这份个案研究中，我们试图以葡萄园教会为主线，以迦密山教会为支点，讲述他们的故事，也试图回答我们提出的那些问题。

三、凡事按着“次序”行：涿城朱家教会的兴起

（一）涿城基督教的起点：基要主义与福音基础

涿城市位于江苏省最北部，一马平川，地势平缓，自古以来是众多战役的主战场。1949年后是江苏省重要的重工业城市和铁路交通枢纽。就传教史来说，美国浸信会、美南长老会、基督复临安息日会等都曾涉足涿城，基督徒聚会处、耶稣家庭等本土宗派也相继传入。但在这些宗派中，传教最有成效的，应当是美南长老会。他们于1897年在涿城建立了第一座礼拜堂，1900年建立了第一所西医医院，1905年创办了第一所教会学校。1910年他们在涿城成立了江北地区长老会，管辖淮北地区几个城市的传教事务。据一份1934至35年的报告显示，长老会当时拥有成人信徒1771人，慕道友1800人。到1947年，已建成教堂及支堂123所，拥有信徒7960人。

可以说，自基督教传入涿城伊始，便为其后续的发展设定了两大起点，某种程度上也型塑了涿城基督教的传统。

一是基要主义、敬虔主义的倾向。1910年，美南长老会在涿城成立了江北区差会（North Jiangsu Mission），成立了四级会议体制。大概由于其辖区经济上的贫穷，文化上的封闭，以及该差会所继承的长老会旧派的保守神学趋向，他们常常被称为“强烈福音派和极端保守派团体”，是在华基要派传教士的主要代表，他们还参与了1920-30年代基要派与自由派的争论。而随后传入的基督徒聚会处、耶稣家庭等宗派，均都未能突破这一神学框架，反而为涿城基督教增添了敬虔主义的色彩。

二是奠定了一定的福音基础。涿城地处苏北，从清末到民国，涿城都是一片经济落后、水患众多、盗跖横行的区域，民众对传教士并不友善，涿城城区“教民冲突”的频发程度并不亚于文化主体性强、经济富庶的苏南地区，并一度成为苏北地区“非基督教运动”的中心城市。但是在兵荒马乱的年代，传教士通过设立医院、开办学校、赈济灾民在当地扎下根来，同时，本地的华人牧师和传道人也被有意识、有系统地培养起来，他们积极参与到教会管理当中，在非基运动之后，创立了两所完全由华人自主的教会中学。1941年太平洋战争爆发，美传教士撤出涿城期间，还联合苏北地区的长老会成立了“苏淮中华基督教会”，1947年成立了“中华基督教江淮大会。随后加入了全国总会。为此，基督教事实上已经在涿城的社区当中扎下根来，并奠定了福音基础。

14 我们之所以将这两个教会列为一个个案，也是因为他们原本属于一个教会，只是因着我们将要讲述的故事发生了分裂。而为了让本篇调研报告更为丰实，在本篇报告当中我们亦使用了2月、8月、11月对涿城家庭教会、三自教会一些宗教领袖和信徒的访谈材料。
15 [美]G. Thompson Brown：《基督教在江苏徐州地区传教简史（1984-1941）》，杨乃庄译，载中国人民政治协商会议江苏省徐州委员会文史委员会编，《徐州文史资料》2010年总第31辑。
16 费振编：《涿城民族宗教志》，涿城市民族宗教事务局，1991年，第158、160页。
17 姚西伊著：《为真道争辩：在华基督教新教传教士基要主义运动（1920-1937）》，香港：宣道出版社，2008年，第101页。
18 高俊：《清末江苏民教冲突的起落》，《安庆师范学院学院报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期；高俊：《江苏非基督教运动始末》，《濮阳职业技术学院学报》2014年第4期。
19 涿城地方志编纂委员会编：《涿城市志》，北京：中华书局，1994年，第2123页。
（二）朱家“放”教会：涿城基要派家庭教会的兴起

与全国其他地区普同的是，1949 年直至 1978 年间的各样政治运动，使涿城基督教产生了分野。1950 年，江淮大会内卓有声望的华人牧师王恒心，在涿城发起了三自革新运动。1959 年市区内各宗派的信徒都被集中到涿城南关堂进行联合礼拜。其余 7 座教堂全部停止宗教活动。但在 1966 年至 1976 年的“文化大革命”期间，宗教活动被禁止，三自及教牧人员受到冲击，教堂被占用，教牧人员全部被驱赶出教堂。这也意味着那些由各宗派传教士建立的教堂和传教体系名存实亡了，但是涿城的福音基础并没有被彻底摧毁。

涿城朱家的儿媳妇王约拿，曾于 1940 年代就读于中国基督教灵修学院，是一名基要派基督徒，1949 年之后回到了涿城在涿城南关堂担任传道人。1966 年之后教堂关门，停止传道人的工作。她的丈夫是一名基督徒聚会处的信徒，这个本土宗派进入涿城后在最高峰时期只有 115 人，1949 年后由于不配合三自运动，被涿城地方政府取缔。1966 年，王约拿重病痊愈之后，感受到了“圣召”，于是在家庭秘密举行礼拜。她的大儿子，一位如今已经 60 岁的牧师，也是涿城一家中学的数学教师的朱彼得告诉我们：“我母亲是贾玉铭牧师的学生，作为一个早已经奉献过的人，受了政治逼迫而停止传道，也因为要养活四个孩子，开了个体眼科诊所。那个时候，三自的牧师长老不知道跑哪里去了，上帝却借着我母亲的病呼召她出来全时间传道。”

随着他们在亲属中进行福音传布，朱家慢慢开始形成了一个家庭教会，涿城的老信徒也渐渐知道，朱家“放”了一个教会。但是不久之后，朱家教会便被公安局查封了，这位女传道人被打成现行反革命，扣上了“打着宗教外衣，进行反革命活动，和共产党争夺下一代”、“香港特务”等帽子，监禁一年。

1977 年 1 月，邓小平第三次上台之后，这位女传道获得了平反。朱彼得在谈到这个平反事件时，颇觉荣光：“当时涿城市都是刑事案件，我母亲是唯一一个宗教案件。公安局专门为我母亲单独发了一份文件，承认是正常宗教活动，不是反革命，现给予平反，恢复名誉。这份文件到现在还挂在我母亲的房间里。”“既然平反文件认为朱家教会是正常的宗教活动，自 1977 年始，朱家便公开进行聚会。苦难对于一个正在成长中的教会或教会领袖，往往能够积敛非预期的宗教资本和声望，以至出现政府越管制越促进受压制宗教发展的景况。”朱家教会获得平反的消息，吸引了涿城和周围县市、乡村的那些信徒们。到 1980 年，朱家的两间屋子已经坐得满满当当，规模近百人。而涿城市三自下属的教会，直到 1980 年才在西关教堂恢复礼拜。”因此，在涿城基要派家庭教会看来，在于耶稣的忠诚方面，家庭教会是远胜三自教会的。

1980 年代，当朱家教会在涿城蓬勃发展的时候，朱家已经开始将他们的福音工作拓展到农村地区。80-90 年代，正是苏北地区基督教飞速发展的时期，而其核心的发展区域便

20 涿城地方志编纂委员会编：《涿城市志》，北京：中华书局，1994 年，第 2123、2135 页。
22 黄殿墀编：《涿城民族宗教志》，涿城市民族宗教事务局，1991 年，第 158、160 页。
23 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160131）。
24 这是朱彼得设立教会时的惯用词汇，“放”字大概也体现了他的主体意识。
25 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160131）。
26 卢云峰，《苦难与宗教增长：管制的非预期后果》，《社会》2010 年第 4 期。
27 涿城地方志编纂委员会编：《涿城市志》，北京：中华书局，2005 年，第 2125 页。
在农村。这其中的信仰现象，大致用罗德尼·斯达克的始发性皈信和继发性皈信可以诠释。始发性皈信来说，当时农村依然处于赤贫和资源匮乏状态，基督教的“神迹奇迹”很容易吸引乡村老者、贫困者、疾病者成为始发性皈信者。涿城大通镇一间家庭教会开始聚会的起因，是1976年一位抱着孩子去聚会的母亲，散会后被大货车卷入车轮底下，却安然无恙。由此，她开始在家中举行聚会，到今天她仍然宣讲当年的“见证”，并依然拥有200多位信徒。

就继发性皈信来说，与农村集体生活的惯习、宗教空间的匮乏有一定关系。一方面公社解体之后，人们却仍然在集体生活的惯习里面。当谈到80年代福音甫一传布的时候，有信徒说：“当时信耶稣教，就是一种惯性，村里面的人看到你去信，我也去信”。一位牧师表示，自己所在的村落更是把大队仓库都改成了礼拜场所。就宗教空间而言，多位受访者表示，文革“破四旧”期间，苏北地区作为老解放区和革命根据地，佛道教庙宇被损毁较为严重。而赤贫的农村地区，显然没有可能进行庙宇建设。同时，政府对于宗教政策显然还处于缓慢的调整状态，其对宗教活动场所布局的严控，令农村的宗教场所设置成为一片空白，基督教自教堂的恢复亦以涿城城区为主，而且开放的空间十分有限，一位在宗教政策恢复时在西关教堂礼拜的信徒说：“刚复兴的时候牧师们就祷告，求神使涿城的教会雨后春笋、遍地林立，那时候我心里想，只有一个教会，都不批，还能遍地林立。”

如此一来，家庭教会的基要性、团体性、身体化的信仰方式便与农村的实际宗教需求产生了适切性，始发性和继发性皈信贯穿发生。而农村拥有的广大物理空间和熟人社会关系，使得城市中无处藏匿的家庭教会可以扩张并生存下来。据一位信徒回忆：“凡是接待家庭都是前排后排弟兄几个，怎么唱他都有搁车子的、施洗的、掰饼的地方，因为农村家族观念，不管他信不信都会支持家人，不会往上报，城里经常有人会汇报，周边的邻居不可能都为着俺们，要是有一个得罪了，就会向政府汇报，说他是非法聚集。”在访谈中，朱彼得亦是不断提到早期那些处于做成周边农村的“门徒”，他们开放家庭，在家中“放”教会，朱彼得和他的同工每逢周末便到农村帮助这些家庭聚会查考圣经、交通、祷告。

我们到达涿城后调研的第一家家庭教会——北乡教会，便是80年代由朱家传的福音。那时候，聚会的要求也极其简单，孟庄的乡村传道人毛彪依然记得那时候教会中的青年、中年人很多：“只要一间屋子，甚至只要一个砖头或塞满稻草的麻袋垫在屁股底下，就可以开始聚会了。大家对于讲道也很渴慕，讲道人讲完一个故事，大家往往要求再讲一个。”

如今，他们已经发展成拥有近60家家庭聚会点、3000多信徒的大教会。在毛彪的家庭聚会点，我们看到他们依然保持90年代作为接待家庭开始聚会时的简陋布局——简单的十字架装饰，一块黑板，几张小板凳和跪垫，便开展日常的聚会。只是出席礼拜的大多

28 有许多研究文章都提到，1978年之后苏北地区的基督教实现了飞速发展，而在农村与苏南地区的普通信仰佛教形成了鲜明的对比。以至于不少官员对江苏省的“南尊佛、北崇基”的宗教分布格局忧心忡忡。

29 江苏省社会科学院课题组：《江苏省农村宗教状况及对策研究》，《江苏省社会主义学院学报》2003年第3期；张华、薛恒：《在社会转型中创新宗教事务管理：江苏农村建设中的宗教和谐关系研究》，《中国宗教》2013年第8期。

30 始发性皈信是指皈信者自己在皈信“过程中起着非常重要的作用，而且通常在变为一个虔诚的追随者之前，他们对一项信仰进行过大量的评估，尽管成员间的社会依附关系会对这一评估的形成起着很关键的作用。”继发性皈信是比较被动的皈信，是对一种信仰的勉强接受，而且通常情况下是始发性皈信为基础的。[美]罗德尼·斯塔克：《基督教的兴起：一个社会学家对历史的再思》，黄剑波译，上海古籍出版社，2005年，第122页。

31 资料来源：涿城董家教会张阿姨访谈记录（20160129）。
32 资料来源：涿城北关礼拜堂张长老访谈记录（20160605）。
33 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会刘阿姨访谈记录（20160602）。
34 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会北乡肢体毛彪访谈记录（20160126）。
成了老年信徒。

![图 3-1 毛彪家的聚会点和房舍平面图](image)

（三）凡事照着“次序”行：初遇朱家教会“次序”


显然，随着教会越“放”越多，朱家教会亦须稳固自己作为教会“家长”的权威，并建立教会“次序”。因此，当我作为一个陌生人初次进入朱家教会北乡“肢体”的时候，接待我们的传道人便首先跟我们声明遵守教会“次序”的重要性。他需要向教会的上级汇报我的来访信息，先是通过聚会点的负责人，而后到达了上一级的同工，继而是“肢体”的领袖首肯了我的访问。甚至一位在涿城的基督徒朋友要来该教会看望我的时候，亦需要致电领袖以获得首肯，但是他最后给出了拒绝这位陌生人涉足教会的答案。

不过，我们也疑惑朱家教会的“家长”何以构建如此严明的权威体系，何以形成如此滴水莫进的教会“次序”，以及何以在如此内敛团体性格中去传播看似开放的基督福音？但首先应该让我们惊奇的是，朱家或许已经不是这个“肢体”的主人，甚至整个朱家教会已经名存实亡了。

四、恩典城市运动：旧“次序”的分裂与被更新的“次序”

（一）旧“次序”的分裂：从“朱家”到“四大家”到“几十家”

34 若一个肢体受苦，所有的肢体就一同受苦；若一个肢体得荣耀，所有的肢体就一同快乐。你们就是基督的身子，并且各自作肢体。《哥林多前书》十二章 12-27 节
35 《圣经·哥林多前书》14 章 40 节。
在涿城的田野调查当中，佛教僧侣经常提及涿城庙宇的破败，他们常常在与“神妈妈”（巫婆）等家户型宗教服务供给者36的竞争中败下阵来，直到近年来在政府的扶持下才稍微改观。由此，我们大抵可以认为，家户型的信仰方式是涿城民间的信仰惯习。某种意义上来说，朱家的家庭教会也是一种家户型基督教，只是与民间的家户型宗教服务供给者不同，他们并不以宗教为生。不过，当教会嵌入到家户之中时，很容易造成教会的不断分裂，尤其在苏北这块具有家户分裂传统的地方社会当中37。据涿城市基督教两会介绍，前在三自登记的信徒有37万，家庭教会信徒与之大致相当。但涿城家庭教会并不同意这一数字，他们认为自己的信众人数远远超过了三自教会，但无人愿意提供一个具体的数字。或许这个数字，对于已经严重分裂的涿城家庭教会来说并不存在。

虽然朱家教会是涿城第一家家庭教会，但自朱家福音传布伊始，朱家教会便始终处在分裂当中。按照朱彼得的说法，是有许多不服管辖的信徒脱离了朱家教会体系。1980-1990年代，涿城家庭教会由朱家一家分裂为远近闻名的“四大家”：

“1991年，我们和李家分开之后，弄得国内国外各地都知道涿城四大家，连公安局都

知道家庭教会四大家，连东方闪电都知道涿城四大家，所以弄得我们觉得很不好意思。”38

直至今日涿城的一些信徒依然记得那些年存在的四大家族——朱家、李家、董家、金家。这四大家自分裂之后便彼此划定势力范围，暗暗角力，以至于教会的“家长”之间互不来往，并要求底下的信徒亦需遵守这一“次序”。

但是涿城家庭教会中尽是不断分裂的故事，四大家的状态并没有维持多久，很快“金家走了异端，李家因为经济问题倒下了，董家的父亲和儿子分开，这些变动，带动了很多教会分散。”39以至于形成“你家可以放教会，我家也可以放教会”的状态，各家教会不断产生分裂，到今天已经到了“分裂成几十家都不止”40的地步。

36 [英]周越：《中国民间宗教服务的家户制度》，《学海》2010年第3期。
37 贺雪峰：《论中国农村的区域差异——村庄社会结构的视角》，《开放时代》，2010年10月。
38 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20161125）。
39 资料来源：涿城董家教会传道人周以撒访谈记录（20160131）。
40 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160131）。
即使在外人看来，四大家中唯一保持完整和正统的朱家教会，内部也处于不断的裂变当中。随着王约拿年纪的增长，她将自己的教会传给了自己的两个儿子。他的大儿子朱彼得自然成为教会的新一代“家长”，并负责牧养王约拿最先开拓的堂点。但十分有趣的是，她的儿子们却将朱家教会分裂了。

1993年，朱彼得的三弟，朱雅各与他的哥哥切割了关系。谈到他的三弟，朱彼得很淡然，并表示，他与我不是在一起的。在一些信徒眼中，朱雅各口才颇佳、为人干练、观念先进，远较他的大哥优秀。在他管理的堂点中，对内进行教会管理改革、开展儿童主日学事工，对外则与涿城其他家庭教会做“合一的工作”，积极呼吁教会参与社区和社会服务，俨然一副家庭教会界青年领袖的模样。不过，2014年这位朱家教会后人，却因为在云南传教的途中突发心脏病“被主接走”了。大概也是因为意外离世，提升了朱雅各在涿城家庭教会中的声望。

（二）被更新的“次序”：迦密山教会的“恩典城市运动”

相较不断分裂的传统家庭教会，现在拥有900名信徒的迦密山教会，已经成为涿城家庭教会的新典范。当我们甫一踏入涿城展开田野调查的时候，便不断有信徒与我们提及迦密山教会的基督教学校、神学教育以及社区服务。但在朱彼得看来，迦密山教会的项天乐牧师实际上也是朱家教会的“门徒”。

项天乐，出身自涿城当地的高干家庭，但这位外表温文尔雅的牧师，青年时受涿城尚武民风影响，参与黑社会，1989年在结束一次拘留经历后，在朱家教会皈信基督教。1990年代，朱家逐渐集中了一批青年信徒，举办了青年查经会，项天乐是其中的翘楚，也是朱彼得所器重的得力干将：“那时候项天乐那一代青年人，非常热心，他们感动得甚至愿意丢掉职业，全时间奉献。那时候海外的仆人经常过来分享，太兴旺了，至少有10-20位青年人，项天乐是其中之一。”项天乐认为，涿城家庭教会所谓的“次序”不过是“家长制”，是一种专制，并且是一种不成文的专制。因为，当年他违反了“次序”之后，甚至不知道违反了哪一条“次序”，也没人告诉他。

1992年，朱家与李家还没有正式分开，但正在暗暗角力。项天乐并不详知其中的端倪，在青年查经会当中，他敬佩李家兄弟的讲道才能，时常与李家兄弟接触。而李家兄弟也早已动了“另立家户”的念头，在他们频繁的互动中，李家兄弟希望项天乐能够离开朱家，进入李家的系统。但依然还是一个“初信弟兄”的项天乐，异想天开地撮合朱家兄弟二人与李家兄弟二人会面，试图令涿城两大家庭教会的“家长”恢复关系，走向教会合一。不过这次合一的努力并不成功，反而造成了事态的扩大化，朱彼得认为项天乐在未获得教会领袖首肯的情况下，私自与李家教会的兄弟接触，违反了教会“次序”，令其要么断绝与李家来往，要么离开朱家教会。事后，项天乐反思道，涿城传统家庭教会所谓的“次序”不过是“家长制”，是一种专制，并且是一种不成文的专制。因为，当年他违反了“次序”之后，甚至不知道违反了哪一条“次序”，也没人告诉他。

1992年春天，项天乐“做了一个痛苦的决定”，带领20人正式离开朱家教会，转而加入了李家，创立了迦密山教会。不过作为兼具生意人和教会负责人的李家兄弟，并没有太多时间管理迦密山教会的牧领事务，他们将主要精力用于四处经商和福音传布、教会联络工作，迦密山教会的事务由项天乐自行处理。为此，在项天乐眼中，作为一个皈信后便在传统家庭教会浸泡之中的信徒，他依然创立了一个在神学思想上是基要主义、敬虔主义，在教会体制上是“家长制”，在聚会场所上是在家庭之中的家庭教会，在这片小天地间，项天乐是这个思想和体制的“家长”。

41 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
42 项天乐认为涿城家庭教会的神学思想呈现一定的混合性特征：救恩观是福音派的，末世论是时代论，敬虔生活是倪柝声小群思想的。
不过，10 年之后，项天乐就从李家的体系当中脱离了。因为李家兄弟在东至连云港，西接河南，北达黄河，南抵长江沿岸的范围内联络成立的“耶稣基督教会”，在 2000 年左右被公安部门发现。其“十大片区”和“八大部门”的大规模组织架构，且涉及台湾资金，被公安部门认定为：“这是一个由台湾基督徒发起的，发展速度很快的非法社团，宗教部门没法作为宗教团体纳入管理，必须进行打击。”

职是之故，在涿城的访谈中，频繁有基督徒提及 2000 年左右涿城家庭教会有“大逼迫”，有亲历者表示近 20 余人被判劳教。事实上项天乐就是“耶稣基督教会”涿城片区的负责人，不过他是幸运的，虽然被判劳教 1 年，但由于身体缘故，被判监外执行。大概这段成为“非法社团”的往事令他有些刻骨铭心，他似乎尽量予以淡化，几次访谈中都没有提及，这也使得迦密山教会有了后续转向改革宗 44 的故事。

2002 年，丧失组织体系的迦密山教会已经拥有 600 名信徒。而在那个时候教会似乎陷入瓶颈，想要突破，却难以突破。而在神学思想上，项天乐也正处于对“救恩”是否确定性的张力之中。对那段日子的困境，项天乐有一个总结性的认知，他将之概括为农村教会问题：“90 年代涿城最兴旺的是农村教会，四大家几乎都在农村，所有的架构都是农村教会的架构，朱家在城市，但他也服事农村，架构也一样。我们虽是新兴城市教会，但我们整个信仰跟农村教会是近似的，我们的信仰、内容、聚会模式、管理模式跟农村教会没什么差别。”

也恰是在 2002 年，在唐崇荣等海外华人牧师的推动下，中国基督教掀起了改革宗热潮。改革宗对于“救恩”确定性的神学教义，对教会体制“有形建造”的强调吸引了项天乐。自此，他便萌发了走出农村教会的束缚，从李家体系彻底脱离，创建一个城市教会的计划，他们教会的“次序”需要被更新。21 世纪初正是涿城市政府“经营城市”的启动期，城市空间正在进行大幅度重组，项天乐似乎不经意间撞见了这场机遇，他的命运不久之后就被改革宗改变了。

在经历了 4 年的改革宗神学思想学习和在教会中的传讲之后，2006 至 2007 年之间，项天乐开始在教会中推动长老会体制的转型。他们在教会中建立会员制，一人一票选举议会，制定教会章程，规定开展长老和执事的选举，施行长老终生制、执事任期制，设立各项事工部门（见附录三）。2007 年，迦密山教会进行长老和执事选举，项天乐被按立为主任牧师。同年，教会在原有 2 个堂点的基础上，再植了 1 个新堂点。而在教会选址上，与涿城其他依然惯于将教会办在家庭中，并遮遮掩掩的家庭教会不同。自那时候起，迦密山教会开始有意识地在城市社区中租赁场所，并计划将堂点向周边所有社区开放。2008 年，面对不断增长的教会事务，项天乐辞去国营单位的公职，全职投入教会服事。

同样是在 2008 年，迦密山教会成立了一所教会学校——铭贤书院。在书院创立之初，他们仅是成立了幼儿园，而随着这些孩童学业的进阶，2013 年他们成立了基督教小学。正是这所基督教小学，事后为他们招惹来了麻烦。

2010 年，迦密山教会信徒增长到了 800 人，虽然依然受传统教会“老人多、妇女多、贫弱多”的结构性因素限制，但教会“白骨精”基督徒 46 明显增多了（见附录四），长老会体制平顺运行，项天乐认为自己已经成功实现了教会突破和转型。2010 年至 2012 年，项天乐在北京、温州等地就读改革宗神学院的经历大概拓展了他的视野和社会网络，让他得

43 资料来源：涿城市宗教局张副局长访谈记录（20160725）。
44 改革宗在信仰、传统、教会体制上主要受到约翰・加尔文的影响，完全接受加尔文归正神学的改革宗，则被称作“加尔文宗”及译作“归正教会”（Reformed Churches）。改革宗的教会通常采用长老制或公理制管理教会。中国很多走改革宗路线的教会通常采用长老制。
45 资料来源：涿密迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
46 由于他们多为白领、骨干、精英组成的，所以又有“白骨精”基督徒之称。参见李向平：《公民基督徒与基督教的中国化问题》，《文化纵横》2014 年第 8 期。
以从涿城和苏鲁豫皖的地域中脱域。正是在这一社会网络当中，项天乐结识了一些北美华人的改革宗精英，他们正以美国纽约救赎主长老会主任牧师——提摩太·凯勒的神学理念为基础，在中国家庭教会中推广“恩典城市运动”。项天乐的城市教会建设工程似乎与这个运动不谋而合，他转而成为其中的积极倡导者和推动者。2014年3月恩典城市大会在香港举行，提摩太·凯勒是此次大会的主讲，项天乐全程参与了此次大会，并作为内地四位城市家庭教会的代表之一，与大会进行了经验交流。这四位代表中便包括以基督徒“公共知识分子”闻名的成都秋雨之福教会的主任牧师——王怡。

项天乐对于“恩典城市运动”的倡导和推动，除了在长老会体制的基础上继续深化建造之外，更在于推动文化使命和对城市社会的参与。项天乐告诉我们，目前教会拥有不到900名信徒，他们正在面临一个亟待突破的新瓶颈。教会正在学习提摩太·凯勒的《福音DNA》课程，着手建立教会孵化器，一方面促进福音的扩张，2016年他们已经植了第三个堂会，沿着涿城地铁线路形成东、南、西、北的堂会布局；另一方面通过聚焦城市、聚焦社区，开展社区服务、义务献血等活动，使教会走入社区，进而由教会影响社会，并整全地塑造信徒信仰和社会生活。他们期待借助“恩典城市运动”可以实现更深层次的更新（其理念见附录五）。

图4-2 迦密山教会正在提供社区服务

正是在迦密山教会“恩典城市运动”的辐射下，涿城一些传统家庭教会的牧者开始向城市教会转型，某种程度上也形成了一个以迦密山教会为中心的“教会圈”，这大概也是项天乐自皈信之初便期盼的“教会合一”。这些教会之间组建了一个联合祷告会，在此基础上开展福音差传、社区服务等工作。应该说，能够以联合祷告会的形式来促成涿城家庭教会间的合一，是来之不易的。据说安徽的颖上团队、厦门家庭教会，甚至海外教会都曾试图推动涿城教会的合一运动，但均是失败告终。究其原因，大概是涿城缺乏一个众望所归的宗教权威。朱彼得显然不是，在一些信徒看来，连亲兄弟都跟他“分家”的人，怎么可能促成教会的合一呢？而迦密山教会的崛起，并能带动教会间合一，正说明这家教会目前在涿城家庭教会中的威望。

在我们走访另外两家家庭教会时，他们都兴高采烈地谈及自己与迦密山教会的紧密关
系。谈及逢年过节各教会为社区贫困户提供的慰问；谈及 2015 年圣诞节前，教会间联合献血，并以“涿城市基督教会献血活动”的标题登上血液中心网站的故事。可是当谈到基督教教育，在一家门脸上还贴着铭贤书院招生广告的教会，牧师却连忙解释说：“这是迦密山教会的书院，跟我们没关系，只是把广告贴在我们这儿而已。” 47从他的反应来看，这所教会学校确实处在不小的麻烦当中……

（三）旧“次序”的溃散：葡萄园教会与“闯入葡萄园的野猪”

相信面对不断分裂的涿城家庭教会，以及迦密山教会这样广开资源、发展势头迅猛的教会，朱彼得不会没有危机感。事实上，朱彼得一直在寻求教会的发展空间。1997 年，赵天恩来到涿城，期望通过神学培训推动涿域“四大家”的合一。不过其他三大家由于政治顾虑退出了神学培训，但急切需要资源的朱彼得不顾政治风险，积极予以了响应。他组织了教会中 20 余位青年传道人，接受了近 2 年的神学班培训，赵天恩委派了多位北美、台湾、香港的华人牧师前来授课。2004 年赵天恩过世，由陈大鹏接手，最后还颁发了毕业证书。这次神学班的培训似乎对朱家教会产生了重大影响。第一、加尔文主义的改革宗神学思想影响了一批中、青年基督徒。第二、教会“国度化”，也即民主选举基础上的片区制管理模式被广泛认同。对于第一点，朱彼得是不能赞同的，他自认为不是一个加尔文主义者，至少不能认同加尔文五要义中的两大点。

但是对于第二个方面，朱彼得认为教会国度化是“合乎圣经的”，而他自己亦是工作忙碌，无暇顾及教会，自认为应该采取分权、授权的管理方式。2000 年，朱家教会内部进行了教会架构的改革，由过去扁平化、一体化的“家长制”管理，改为基于民主选举基础上的片区制管理。不过与其说这次民主制度化改革是“合乎圣经”的，不如说是规范性机制的作用的结果。48尽管近年来中国国家有重新威权化的趋势，但就改革开放的前 20 年而言，国家政治事实上具有民主化改革倾向，对于民间社会来说亦呈现了一个观念机制的转型过程，现代性某种程度上是在向民间下沉，尤其是以“家长制”为特征的传统型支配观念在民间社会开始受到质疑，逐渐丧失了组织的社会合法性。而新教改革以来，不管是奉行会众制还是长老制的西方基督教，就一直是以民主制为基础的。因此，随着海内外基督教的不断交流，民主观念逐渐在青年基督徒之间弥散，至少他们已经产生了对教会民主程序或形式的认同，赵天恩所举办的神学培训班则直接从观念和管理上对教会的民主制进行了集中展示，因此，户制型基督教某种程度上又丧失了宗教合法性。

而在此之前，朱家教会内部对于朱家在教会上的专权已经有不少意见，对“家长制”更是有不少反思，1993 年朱彼得兄弟间的决裂更是引发了信徒之间的议论，朱家教会的年轻传道人陆臻则直接质疑：“连亲兄弟都能分的教会，还是神的教会吗？” 49

职是之故，2000 年的教会民主化改革也就顺理成章了。

当年，朱家教会按照地域划分为三大片区：市区、北乡、西乡，在基层同工中进行投票选举，各选出 12 名同工，建立了各自的同工团队和议事会制度，组成财务、后勤等 12 个专职小组，每一个同工对之进行条块化管理。朱彼得作为教会的总负责人，负责整个教会的运作工作。而朱家教会也走出了家庭聚会模式，市区片区开始租赁写字楼、商业楼进行聚会，北乡、西乡等城郊片区的则尝试盖教堂，在朱彼得看来这样也使教会显得更正规，能吸引更多年轻人。

但是教会的民主制转型却让朱彼得日后如坐针毡，他对这一民主转型有两点牢骚。第一点，他把资金管理权限下放导致了自己无钱可用的后果；

47 资料来源：涿城以琳教会赵新德牧师访谈记录（20160201）。
48 周雪光著：《组织社会学十讲》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2003 年。
49 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会陆臻传道人访谈记录（20160131）。
“我唯一做的就是缺点，我没有让他们把各片的资金抽一部分来集中到大片，因为大片
还会有宣教培训，大片还会有联络，大片还会有工人差传，我当时没有考虑。我当时想得
非常单纯，多少年都在一起的，从小到大在一起的，肯定我一说教会有什么需要，肯定大家
都得支持的，我唯一的一条就是资金全部自己管理，经济上不问，我也想自己廉洁，免
得别人留下诋毁的把柄。但是后来发现出问题了，他们手里有钱，有权之后，你再调就很难
调动了。后来我说，他们基层要培养工人，要开支，而我们大片要调几个全职工人来进行
宣教、培训，调不动。俺开支，俺用，就这个样子。后来决定每年每片交1000块钱来
培训什么的，一开始还够用，后来随着物价不断上涨，20年钱的物价跟现在的物价怎么能
比呢，我们聚一次会就把钱聚完了，做个神学班都做不起来的。因为我们是总负责人，我还
得经常对外联络，经常出差，各种会议、接待，这样的话我一次出差得报销路费、都要对
外公布的，而他们呢都不出去，每一次报销还嫌我花的钱多，他们有的时候同意，给报，
有的时候不同意呢，就显得非常勉强。”

第二点，是他对放权管理和民主制度的不适应，特别是当他提到市区“肢体”议事会
运转的时候，显得满肚子火气：
“我是提倡民主管理，任何事都需要商议。结果我一放不要紧，可能是我放得不太合
适，导致我手里没有任何实权。结果同工会变成了吵架会，天天吵，回回吵。八个人就八
个意见，决策权我没有，太民主了，他们就想干啥干啥。民主议会票数通过，一般来讲应
该就可以大家同心合意一起服侍。但是有些时候，大家的民主意见，并没有领袖看得长
远，而且有些时候领袖的异象无法通过，是会耽误很多事情的。如果再加上领袖还是有缺
点，他就瞧不起你，到处诽谤你。弄得你灰溜溜，不光名声弄坏了，还得干活。光摊上干
活的份儿了，你说这个教会怎么带？最后你稍微批评他一点，他马上搞分裂，我要把这一
帮人拉走。教会的分裂就不断产生。”

50 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20161125）。
51 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160131）。

恰如陆臻所指出的，朱家教会的民主化改革使同工之间的暗地里博弈，变成了公开化的博弈。朱彼得显然对于公开化的博弈很不适应，但是他也明确认知到“搞民主不合适，但随着众会圣灵的成熟、水平的提高，你要搞专制肯定不合适”，他甚至指出，他的同工要搞民主不是因为“厌弃我，而是因为厌弃上帝。”52但与其说朱彼得是教会内部博弈的失败者，不如说是社会系统的作用，导致了朱彼得的行动困境。而朱家教会圣职品级体系的建立进一步造就了他的困境。

中国家庭教会海内外互动的结果除了神学观念的多元，民主观念的输入，亦影响了各教会对圣职品级的态度。这大概亦是规范性机制的另一个侧面，因为就普世基督教来说，不论是罗马天主教、长老教还是浸信会来说，都是奉行圣职品级体系的，奉行无治理制的，往往是门诺会等小宗派，并处于不断的萎缩当中。为此，刚刚开始“开放”的中国家庭教会被迫被纳入“改革”之中。这一点尤其在 2000 年之后体现出来，一时间原本崇尚无治理制度的家庭教会传道人仿佛从睡梦中苏醒了一般，纷纷寻求海内外的宗教资源，按立长老、牧师等圣职品级，涿城教会也处在这样的风潮里面，朱彼得也被无奈地拖入其中：

“我觉得神的教会不在乎名称，不在乎为主做了多少，不太注重这些的。但是周围大小教会都按立了，甚至有一些带会几年的姊妹都按立牧师了，像那个刘岗才信主十几年，做工做了几年就成了主任牧师了，曹冯第也是我们带领了几年的后生，他也按立牧师了。还有的教会的传道人去韩国按立一个牧师回来，带回来了一个牧师证，同工都不知道，莫名其妙成了牧师了。弟兄姊妹左右一看，都是牧师了，我们服事主的资格那么老的，啥都不是，大家就感到不公平。”53

为此，2012 年在教会同工们的要求改革的声音中，朱彼得邀请了温州家庭教会的牧师前来帮助建立了圣职体系。这一选择，大致与改革开放后，温州家庭教会在中国各地不断进行福音传布和教会交流，以及所谓的“中国耶路撒冷”地位是分不开的。而温州家庭教会自 1990 年代进行民主化改革后 54，表面上所呈现的“复兴”却又不失教会“次序”的治理形式，吸引了一部分传道人，尤其是老一代的家庭教会领袖。当时，由朱彼得推荐，全体会众确认，在各个片区各按立了 1 位牧师，2 位长老，1 位教师。朱彼得则被按立为监督牧师，负责监督诸位牧师，他还亲自为教会起了个“葡萄园教会”的名字。不过，朱彼得对于按立圣职品级是有顾虑的：“当时按道理讲，应该先按立我一个，然后再按立他们，他们都是在我后面好几代了，同时按立的话，容易骄傲。”55

当然，后来的事实证明，这些传道人“果然骄傲”了。但是，就问题的实质而言，与其说这和教会体制改革是对朱家教会的民主化转型，不如说这次改革是对朱家教会内部既

52 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
53 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
54 从文革直到 20 世纪 80 年代，温州传统家庭教会按照区域形成了“片区模式”，六大片区自称教会，互相保持独立性，下辖众多聚会点。20 世纪 90 年代之后，教会管理上逐渐摆脱了“家长制”，进行“民主化”改革，在各个片区议事会的基础上，逐渐形成了 11 个片区联合的松散议事机构，称之为“市区总议会”，负责商议教会间的行政事项，圣职按牧，举行联合培训、事工等，每个片区设置“小议会”，管理区内的聚会点。
55 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160131）。
有秩序的确认。进行圣职品级和教会制度改革后的朱家教会，已经不再姓朱了，真正如他们转型后的名字一样，变成众人皆可垂涎的“葡萄园”了，而那些获得教会管辖权的牧师和长老，可能在朱彼得眼中就是那些“上帝葡萄园中的野猪”56。

首先是北乡和西乡片区成了实际意义上的独立教会。在教会民主化转型和建立圣职品级体系之前，处于农村地区的北乡和西乡两个“肢体制止”在许多事项上具有一定的自主支配权，但是在名义上，依然是由朱彼得牧养，在财务上由朱家统一支配。然而，改革之后，拥有牧养权和财务自主能力的北乡和西乡片区就拥有了更大的自主权。也就是说朱彼得这位监督牧师实际上并不能有效监督这两大片区，最多只能监督市区片区。

其次，很快他就发现，自己连市区都监督不了了。2016年1月笔者对朱彼得访问的时期，恰好朱家教会正处于新一次的分裂风波当中。这一次的分裂者是市区片区的主任牧师。据说这位由朱彼得一手提拔的主任牧师，已经与朱彼得“老前辈”闹了半年多，市区片区已经近两个月没有召开工作会议，最近二人矛盾更是升级到了不通电话的地步。而这二位的矛盾在教会内闹得沸沸扬扬，人人皆知，例如：主任牧师为监督牧师牧养的堂点配备了一个100元的话筒，为自己的堂点配备了一个200元的话筒，引得监督牧师大为光火；监督牧师可能只能管得住他老母亲留给他的那个堂点；主任牧师骂监督牧师说，“你们朱家是分裂教会的罪魁祸首”，云云。

面对“钱也调不动，人也调不动，只能处处看别人脸色行事” 的境地。朱彼得质疑了民主制在中国的适用性：“这些人说自己受的教导，就是民主管理，但是等这些人有权之后，就要大家听他的，他就不搞民主了。”实施不了“监督”的朱彼得认为，必须重新强调“次序”，必须规定每一个层级同工的权限，必须把权力收回来。但是到现在还没有收回来……

论公道说，朱家教会可以被称为涿城家庭教会福音起源的。可是现如今，曾经被称为涿城家庭教会起源的朱家教会的“次序”或许真是溃散了。

五、强制型控制与沟通过型控制：国家治理与国家效应

（一）强制型控制与朱彼得的消极行动策略

涿城家庭教会成长的历史几乎与地方政府对他们的管制相伴随，而承担这一工作的通常是国家暴力性质的机关。一位1989年，因妻子患了精神病而信基督教的乡村传道人，对于90年代联防队到他家的教会来“拉走黑板、抬走板凳、不让聚会”，以及大队书记告诉他，“信耶稣是一个丢面子的事情”的“逼迫”记忆依然深刻。

但是如今家庭教会已经获得了一定的活动空间，并且大有纳入国家制度进行管理的趋势，在我对涿城进行调研期间，一部分受访人提及了地方政府将相关调查表格发到家中，让其选择纳入国家管理的方式。朱彼得亦指出：“我的打钩是，接受政府依法管理，不接受三自管理。但是为了防止五进五化进来，我在后面打了括号，注明只要不违反圣经信仰原则。”57 为此，直到今日，基要派家庭教会的基督徒面对国家，亦是有颇多顾虑的，他们的行动方式即受制于国家，又受制于信仰。而在大多时候，他们面对国家治理往往采取即逃避，又依从世俗国家的策略。

朱彼得就表示：“前几年我们老老实实地接受他们逼迫，撵我们就跑，抓我们就蹲，老老
实跟绵羊似的。" 而近年来，随着家庭教会治理归口的日渐清晰化和制度化，朱彼得表示“逼迫”已经少了很多。但是由于中国缺少宗教法，因而主管部门大多为宗教行动者设置一些强制型的规则，至于这些规则具体是什么则需要宗教行动者在双方的互动过程中自己去体悟，或许这些也就是国家的边界。

尽管朱彼得的教会正处在分裂和衰落阶段，并且他在教会中的权威已经日渐下降，但是朱彼得自称是管理部门的重点照顾对象。关于与主管部门的互动经验，朱彼得很清楚国家对于他这一类型教会的治理策略：

“他们就说我以前家里面搞聚会，瞒着他们，而且我被抓到派出所四次，就因为我搞圣诞节聚会，复活节聚会，搞大型活动。他都知道我是个头，一看到我在那儿，就不抓别人了，把别人放跑，就把我留下了。我还上班，当老师呢，弄得我课都捞不着上。我到派出所扣了几次，他就给我照相，列入嫌疑人员，列入监控人员。”

而这一点似乎连普通的信徒都知道：“共产党就是找我们的头嘛，所以头压力很大”。关于与主管部门的互动过程，有两件事让朱彼得津津乐道，也让他大致清楚了主管部门对他设置的边界在哪里。

第一件事是，办不出《港澳通行证》。朱彼得说，一次他计划去香港参加活动，去办理《港澳通行证》，办事人员告诉他，他是国家照顾对象，不准出境。后来，朱彼得找主管部门理论。主管部门告诉他，他能出境，但需要派人跟着他。朱彼得回应道：“好啊，可我也有一条件，我的来回机票，所有费用，你全包。”“说到这里，朱彼得笑得很开心，但是苦笑。

第二件事是，大型活动的干预。朱家教会办的神学班，地点正设在北乡片区。第二届神学班毕业典礼的时候，规模办得比较大，朱彼得把香港的一位神学院院长请来了。不想毕业典礼刚刚开始的时候，主管部门便包围了聚会现场。他们立刻让这位院长隐遁入人群，从后门离开，才未使事件扩大化。“主管部门一看是我，老运动员了，就知道怎么回事了。我说既然是正统信仰，当然要训练工人查圣经了，省得产生异端、邪教，给你们添麻烦。”

这两件事大概是朱彼得与管理部门互动的侧影。而在长期的连续互动中，朱彼得大致明确了主管部门为他设置的活动边界：限制出境，不准联系海外，这是红线；尽量不要搞大型活动，要搞必须上报；朱家教会没落了，主管部门要控制教会的反弹。

朱彼得似乎也明白主管部门希望他能够配合管理工作：“我也知道他们的意思是让我老实交代，一些活动要报给他们批准，到底在哪带会，带多少人，让我把教会的家底子都告诉他们。你想那我能说吗，说了我不是变成犹大了吗？”“或许可以说，对于这些像朱彼得一样，从信仰之初便与国家治理相伴随的家庭教会传道人来说，他们印象中的国家，就是一个充满暴力、不可理喻、近情理的国家，对于这样的国家或“世界的王”，他们始终是保持一定的距离，他们能做的就是将教会秘密化。由此，这种私密化的行动策略与逃避国家治理的策略是相辅相成的，家庭教会越处于私密状态，国家便越会对之进行治理，而越是治理，家庭教会便越会进一步进入私密状态。

参考资料：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
进入21世纪，随着一些知识分子皈信基督教，一些知识型的宗教精英主张家庭教会应当“浮上水面”，“教会应当通过制度性渠道与国家沟通”。朱彼得似乎也接收到了这些信息，不过他并不是主动的行动者，而是被动的行动者。针对主管部门对他的强制型控制，朱彼得认为是一次“官司”事件直接引发的。

长期以来，朱彼得一直试图开展儿童主日学工作。涿城温州商会中有许多基督徒，一位温州家庭教会的企业家在涿城建立了温州人教会。2005年，他邀请擅长做主日学工作的温州人教会来给他们培训，在西乡教会组织了100名信徒参加培训。然而这项计划的执行并不顺利，温州人教会的一位同工告诉我，“我给朱彼得带领的教会讲过一次，还没讲多少就被围住了，吓死了，再也不敢跟他们联系了”。培训被强制驱散，并执行“抄家”：对会场中的VCD、录像机、录音机、电视、书籍资料执行没收。

事后，主管部门跟温州人教会的负责人说，可以跟任何教会来往，就是不能跟朱彼得来往。而这一次朱彼得决定不再做“老实忠实的绵羊”，他已经认识到自己“本来就没有颠覆政权，没有不可见人的事情”，因为在此之前朱彼得曾邀请一位家庭教会培训师来给教会讲法律知识，认为中国已经加入WTO，并正在法治化的进程之中，家庭教会需要学会使用法律的武器。

于是，他聘请了一位北京律师，指责主管部门的执法程序不合法：

“他们没有搜查证，没有亮证件，私闯民宅。我们把宗教局一些明显条文亮出来。

第一，你们抄家没东西，没有开收据，而且说话还骂人，骂骂咧咧的，

不尊重人，干涉我们正常宗教生活，强迫我们停止聚会。”

而这次“官司”也产生了一定效果，主管部门承认他们在执法程序上存在不合法，把没收的物品退回一半，并对案件重新审理，但依然判定培训为“非法聚会”。对此，朱彼得说他通过培训和这次官司显然已经具备了一些法律常识：“因为我没有登记，当然非法嘛，当时我们就说了，你们不给我们登记，不是我们不登记，我们申请了多少次你们不给，非得让我们去三自教堂去。我们说我们信仰不一样，《宪法》第36条说宗教信仰自由，你说得了吗，宗教信仰自由包括选择不同教派的自由，我们就请律师打官司，我们是有话说的，句句咬他们。三自教堂是自由派信仰，我们家庭教会是基要派信仰，宗教信仰自由政策，你们无权要求我们参加三自，你们不是依法治国吗？

诚然，由于法律和政策缘故，这次“官司”没有太明确的结论。不过，自此之后，主管部门给他设定的强制型规则增多了，需要他自己去探索这些规则的边界。而针对不准给他办理《港澳通行证》，不准出境的事项，朱彼得似乎亦应对有道，也就是他们亦需要依靠正式规则进行事务处理：“他不给我办的时候，我就说可以，你们有权，但是请你写出来，为什么不给我出去。你写出来之后，我就上法律起诉你，我一说拿法律起诉他们。他们就都明白我不是肉丸子。”“后来朱彼得的通行证办出来了，但是在通关的时候依然被卡住了。

近年来随着抗争政治（或抗议政治）的兴起，学者提出了一系列抗争理论，其中“依法抗争”的现象被广泛关注。“这些家庭教会的基督徒似乎亦成为“依法抗争”的行动

63 孙明义：《认识中国城市家庭教会》，《举目》2006年总第26期。
64 资料来源：涿城温州人教会传道人访谈记录（20160530）。
65 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
66 资料来源：涿城葡萄园教会朱彼得牧师访谈记录（20160811）。
67 应星：《草根动员与农民群体利益的表达机制——四个个案的比较研究》，《社会学研究》2007年第2期；于建嵘：《当代中国农民的“以法抗争”——关于农民维权活动的一个解释框架》，《文史博览（理论）》2008年第12期；吴长青：《从“策略”到“伦理”对“依法抗争”的批评性讨论》，《社会》2010
者。不过近来这一概念的创作者李连江也声明，他越来越明白自己提出“依法抗争”的问题关怀在于农民的差序政府信任，即政府层级越高，越得到农民信任，项飚所谓的“普通人国家理论”无非也是表达同样的观点。但是，这些传统家庭教会的基督徒似乎通过这种“依法抗争”并没有得到自己想要的权益，而且似乎也没有建构所谓的差序政府信任。朱彼得通过“官司”事件却形成了全面否定的政府信任：

“打官司这条路走不通，在中国打到最后，所有的基督徒律师一个个都被打死，前不久北京有个基督徒律师被判刑了。说他是破坏社会秩序，在这个地方走不通。可能法律在讲究合法的国家管用。大概也是因为我们国家坚持无神论，不信上帝吧，大方向不会变。”

因此，尽管基要派家庭教会的基督徒近年来积极开拓与国家交往的渠道，但是这些接触似乎都是恶性接触，这也使得他们在与国家的互动中产生了一些消极的行动策略。自此，我也可以明白，我初次进入朱家教会北乡片区的时候，他们为何会严格谨守教会的“次序”。而据我们了解，除了上述所提及的神学班事件外，北乡片区还发生过半夜建教堂被邻居举报，举办大学生青年营会被驱散的一系列事件，以至于这些“噤若寒蝉”的教会负责人对任何闯入的陌生人都要刨根究底。

而在政教交往中，朱彼得既然认为法律不可靠，那他是否可以通过一些非正式关系与主管部门交往，以形成双方的良性互动呢，对此朱彼得亦是持宾否态度：

“熟人有，但是我没有去委托他们，因为我觉属灵的事情，始终要依靠上帝，依靠人如同蜘蛛网一样不可靠的。属神的事情，依靠人怎么行呢。耶和华以色列的神，你有神可靠，结果他们找亚述王、叙利亚王、埃及王帮忙，耶和华神马上就拆毁他们，从《圣经》来看，我们得着上帝的时候，只能依靠上帝，还是得回到神面前来认罪悔改……因为我们在这个政治环境比较特殊，国外没有这种情况。在这种情况下我们要建设一个圣洁的国度。”

为此，在朱彼得的观念中，国家是一个邪恶对象，不能施以任何忠诚，基督徒只能忠诚于耶稣。如此一来，大概朱彼得能做的就是尽量隐藏朱家教会的信息，但随着他对教会实际控制权的旁落，以后能让他隐藏的信息应该不多了。2015年，他弟弟朱雅各的追思会，或许是主管部门对朱彼得的最后一次重点关注。一位朱雅各的同工告诉我，朱雅各的追思会，改了三个地方。一开始是在涿城人民舞台，主管部门不同意；后来改在朱家，主管部门担忧出现安全问题；最后只能选择出殡当天在墓地举行。据说，那一天涿城周边所有家庭教会的重要人士，以及朱家在全国“禾场”的领袖都出席了，不计私家轿车，总计租赁大巴车200辆，为了维持现场秩序，购买对讲机1500部。悼念的人群从墓地排到了陵
园外的大路口。一位年轻的传道人还特地提起，出殡前几天都是晴天，唯有出殡那天天下了一天的大雨，之后又都是晴天。

而朱彼得似乎通过这些年家庭教会之间分分合合的事件看清了很多事务，如今他也参与到涿城家庭教会的“联祷会”之中：“最近两年各家也开始恢复交通，以前闹矛盾的，为仇的，为敌的，慢慢受到神的管教。还是看到在一起联合宣教比较好，部分肢体开始建立联合祷告会了。”另一位参与到这个祷告会的家庭教会负责人说：“大家集中起来，力量大一些，胆怯小一些。”

（二）沟通型控制与项天乐的积极行动策略

对于主管部门对涿城家庭教会和迦密山教会的管理，项天乐有一个清醒的认知：“他们对朱牧师盯得比较紧，觉得他的教会有历史，对我可能是觉得我的教会有一定规模，势头比较大。”作为一个常年与主管部门打交道的人，项天乐并不认为这是坏事，按他的话说，可以近距离地感受他们，知道他们想什么。

干部家庭的出身背景，以及国营单位的工作经历，可能对项天乐熟稔主管部门的行政逻辑，具有一定的帮助。在项天乐看来，作为主管部门，必须完成国家委托的任务，其中一项重要职责便是掌握和控制当地有宗教团体的活动，维持地方宗教社会稳定。如何与这些部门相处，便是中国家庭教会“政教关系”的现实处境。因此，有许多地方的家庭教会领袖把主管部门“妖魔化”，以至于一提到主管部门便产生抵触情绪。但是中国目前没有《宗教法》，在宗教政策的执行上，各地具有一定的自主空间，而涿城主管部门的执行尺度相对而言比较温和。

面对一个正在迅速发展的“新势力”，加上项天乐频繁的海外交流，主管部门的总负责人几乎每个月就要与他见一次面，每一次都是喝茶、吃饭，当他出国的时候会为他送行、接风洗尘，态度很客气，某种程度上试图通过沟通来对这一类型的教会进行控制。项天乐后来在涿城家庭教会间的联合祷告会中进行了解之后，他发现大多数教会领袖并没有见过这位总负责人。而在过去，正像现在主管部门对待涿城其他小教会一样，主管部门对他的态度可没有这么客气。如今作为一个具有“一定规模”教会的主任牧师，项天乐对这种待遇的转变深有感触。

正是在这样双方频繁接触的基础上，项天乐对于政教关系的处理显得驾轻就熟。在这些方面他有三项原则。

首先项天乐会让双方的信息通畅。项天乐把每一次与主管部门的非正式会面，当成政教关系的沟通平台。对此他有一条心得，“我越隐藏，他们越不安。你越透明，他们越放心。”从长期交往中，项天乐越来越明白主管部门很专业，信息网络非常发达。因此，与其隐藏，不如通过沟通，建立双方互信。但是，这也并不是意味着，项天乐会把教会的所有情况倾囊而出。

第二点，项天乐会为沟通设限。也就是说，有些情况可以公开化，有些情况则予以保留。与朱彼得的闭口不言不同，对于主管部门关心的教会内部选举、区会会议、内部建造、社会活动、植堂计划等，项天乐会予以公开。他认为这些信息应该让双方知道。而凡是主管部门问及关乎教会核心利益和他人利益的事项，项天乐便会予以规避或拒绝，他认为国家对于公民个人事务的知晓权力是有限度的。

第三，要明晰双方互动的底线，这也是最为重要的原则。在项天乐看来，主管部门的
底线在于涉外事项。尽管主管部门要求项天乐“不要跟外国人接触，闷头搞你们的教会”，但项天乐的教会有在许多方面必须与海外接触，并且项天乐的接触能让主管部门放心。因为，他出国后不论到什么地方，都会把底线坦白清楚，一不接触政客，二不接触西方资金，三不接触民运人士，只接触纯宗教人士。而项天乐交托给主管部门的底线则是，能够公开聚会，不加入三自，不干涉教会教义和内部事务。

在言谈中，项天乐提及了一件双方互动的典型案例。有一年，项天乐要在涿城开全国性的改革宗会议，其运作过程并未公开化，结果主管部门过问了此事。项天乐以为既然如此，这次会议必然无法举办。未曾料想，主管部门告知，会议可以举办，但希望可以让其派员旁听一次。项天乐与同工们了解、商议后。给出的回复是：“让你来半天可以，不然就拉倒!” 最后，会议顺利举行。

相较朱彼得等对主管部门敬而远之的老一代传道人而言，面对主管部门的紧致管理，项天乐似乎呈现一个与前者截然不同的行动策略。用项天乐的话说，“这个国家不再是毛泽东时代的国家”，这个国家是政府层级分化的、是部门利益分隔的、是存在地域管理差异的，这个国家是可以沟通的，是可以协商的，某种程度上也是可以呈现有限性、理性一面的国家。而在忠诚于耶稣与忠诚于国家这看似矛盾的事项上，他也是有尺度地区分，也就是他所谓的“处境化”处理，比如国家安全，可以忠诚于国家，但在教会生活上，他只忠诚于耶稣。就此，他应对国家的行动策略是颇为积极的。

经历过国外生活的项天乐，对于国家也有众多肯定的一面，他赞同上帝赋予国家“赏善罚恶”的权柄，适当的“赏善罚恶”也给基督教发展带来一定益处，比如国家对异端（如东方闪电等）的打击，一定程度上澄清了基督教的发展环境。同时，项天乐对于国家的转型亦有众多期待。他相信国家正在做宗教政策调整，并希望教会能够帮助政府解决社会问题，为和谐社会服务，但是他们会有选择寻找一些值得信靠的教会。特别是，当项天乐将迦密山教会联合其他教会组织献血、提供社区服务的事项告知主管部门的时候，“主管部门非常高兴!”

由于涿城家庭教会的制度归口，朱彼得和项天乐在访谈中所表达的一些政教互动，实际上都是地方主管部门通过非正式关系制度化（即广为接受）的方式进行处置，其有效性在于个体之间的特殊信任，以及对各自行动底线的默认。为此，项天乐可能相比朱彼得更熟稔、适应这一互动方式，他通过这样的日常互动认识了众多主管部门的工作人员，他的教会遇到一些难题的时候还会去找这些工作人员帮忙。而在我调研期间，涿城家庭教会的宗教精英也在讨论国家是否会调整家庭教会的管理归口，项天乐对此甚至有一些担心，“还是不要调整比较好，主管部门比宗教局专业多了，对我们也更熟悉，宗教局的不懂家庭教会。”

但是，相信当取缔铭贤书院事件发生的时候，项天乐肯定不高兴，主管部门可能也不高兴。

（三）取缔铭贤书院事件：我们奉陪到底

2015 年 9 月 1 日，涿城人民政府、教育局、消防队、公安分局、街道办事处以及主管部门联合来到铭贤书院，要将这个学校予以取缔。可能访谈的时间依然处于事件尚未完全终结之际，项天乐对具体日期和涉及部门脱口而出，另一方面也反映了这个事件对项天乐触动之深刻。

这座 2008 年成立了幼儿园，2013 年成立了小学的基督教学校，位于涿城涵水区，一直运转得顺风顺水，截至 2015 年，拥有 90 名学生。而且主管部门也清楚掌握了这所基督

76 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160508）。
教学校的情况。

而在取缔事件甫一发生的时候，项天乐试图通过私人关系去解决问题。但被告知，取缔铭贤书院的决策并不是教育部门的主观行政意愿，而是涵水区区长的指示。据说该区长刚刚从部队转业，对涿城本地的基督教和家庭教会管理事务并不熟悉，只是讶异于“在中国共产党控制的天下居然有这么一间学校”觉得不可思议”。这位区长拒绝了项天乐要求见面的要求。

实际上，项天乐很难通过私人关系解决一个正式的国家宗教治理问题。涿城市宗教局的一位副局长并不清楚这所学校的真实情况，不过他在访谈中指出，当前对于私设聚会点的活动通常通过联合执法进行，并且往往运用非宗教方式进行宗教治理：

“对于比如这次私设聚会点的处置上，不光是宗教局，统战部门、宗教部门、安全部门、规划部门、教育部门、文化部门都要参与，因为，有的场所，涉及到宗教印刷品，这是文化部门，这些场所如果受境外操纵的，有没有建设手续，如果没有建设手续，就依法处置了，建筑规划部门工作。教育部门涉及到老师、学生，肯定会有。这是谁部门的事情，就谁出门做，如果虽然是三间房子，作为非法聚会用，只要是违章建筑处理，要么你停止作为宗教场所使用，要么不然的话我就拆掉了。我们下一步都是综合执法。”

涿城基督教协会会长也称自己被项天乐找过，但是没有见上面。关于对家庭教会的管理上，该会长也指出了国家会运用非宗教方式进行宗教治理：“一般都是有其他原因，他们拿法律条款里面的东西来给你界定。比如‘集会游行法’，如果国家用这个法律来规范你，你也没办法，超过多少人，固定地点，固定时间，你要向公安申报，不申报你就违法。就这一条他就可以搞你，《宗教事务条例》没办法规范他们，管不到他们。因为目前，这么多年真正被处理的，不是因为宗教信仰，因为你找不到依据。”

为此，地方宗教行动者在处理国家关系时，通常使用的非正式沟通机制失效了。不过在行政处罚的最后一个环节，行政部门通知迦密山教会可以依法申请听证。似乎对于迦密山教会来说，只有申请举行听证会这一条路可以走，项天乐准备请律师进行听证。

项天乐应该深深知道他所面对的国家的性格，他正是成长在国家主义横行的年代，而他创立铭贤书院的初衷，就是肃清国家主义在基督徒后代中的主导地位。因此，当他清楚他所挑战的对象的时候，在选择律师上，显然需要十分审慎：一方面，这位律师不能给管理部门留下“制造事端”、“闹事者”的印象，以免造成事态扩大化；另一方面，又要能维护教会学校的办学权益，平息事件；同时，又要熟悉家庭教会的现实处境和维权逻辑，

77 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
78 资料来源：涿城市宗教局张副局长访谈记录（20160725）。
79 资料来源：涿城市基督教协会会长穆耘天访谈记录（20160527）
事后能继续公开聚会。

项天乐开始在各地寻觅合宜的基督徒律师。第一位接触的律师，言辞太激烈，一提共产党和政府，满肚子怨言。尽管这位律师当时已经来到涿城，但还是放弃了聘请。第二位上海律师，手上有案件需要代理，未能成行。最后，选择了一位北京律师，有家庭教会维权经验，项天乐对他的评价是思路清晰，重点是为人很柔和。

事实证明，这个选择至少在目前看来是正确。10月11日，听证会在涵水区教育局举行，持续了两个小时。按照项天乐的说法，“区教育局被辩驳得体无完肤，他们的举证被律师一一驳回，非常狼狈地退场。”

双方辩论的焦点在于，迦密山教会有没有办学的权利，但双方对“办学”的认定却不一样。

涵水区教育局的立场是迦密山教会不具有开办学校的合法性。因为按照《中华人民共和国义务教育法》第二十七条，设立学校及其他教育机构，必须具备：（一）有组织机构和章程；（二）有合格的教师；（三）有符合规定标准的教学场所及设施、设备等；（四）有必备的办学资金和稳定的经费来源。迦密山教会以上各方面并不具备教育局所认可的相关资质，因而不能开办学校，存在违章行为。

对此，迦密山教会承认不具备开办学校的合法性，亦存在违章行为。但是这位律师辩护策略的巧妙之处则在于，他强调迦密山教会所开办的铭贤书院，并不是一所世俗教育学校，而是一所宗教教育学校。这位律师用《宪法》第三十六条的“公民有宗教信仰自由”，以及《中华人民共和国教育》第十八条“宗教学校教育由国务院另行规定”两部上位法来予以驳回。同时，他们以迦密山教会的家庭教会身份和铭贤书院现有的基督教教育体系，举证铭贤书院是一所宗教院校。并且在现实中，国务院对宗教学校教育的政策规定并不存在，也没有法律条文明确规定宗教学校的认定标准。

然而，涵水区教育局并没有回应辩护律师关于宗教教育学校举证，也没有回应相关的政策空白，他们坚持认为铭贤书院是在开办世俗学校。而迦密山教会则坚持，教育局应该管理世俗教育学校，至少应该管理使用国家课程、国家教材的学校，铭贤书院的所有课程都有圣经背景，显然不应当属于教育局的管辖范畴，而应当属于宗教管理范畴。在这方面，项天乐显得理直气壮。

“我不对外招生，我根本不盈利，我关起门来，教我自己的孩子，教会内部的事情，难道我没有权利教自己的孩子？如果你取缔我，你就是干涉公民的信仰权利。如果你干涉我的权利，我就要去控告你。你让我知道，你处理的不是教育问题，是宗教问题。宗教问题，专业的主管部门都要谨慎处理，教育局怎么会懂行呢。我在听证会的最后说，江泽民总书记说宗教无小事，如果你这么处理，你会捅大篓子。”

双方在“办学”认定上的差异，以及教育局对律师关于宗教学校举证、宗教管理问题的回避，使得这场听证会显得像闹剧。“没想到，最后教育局的办事人员说我不管，我只管《义务教育法》二十七条。最后主持人都看不下去了，指着那位办事员说，你不能这么说，这是听证会，要对举证回应，不能情绪化。”项天乐对于这次听证会哭笑不得。

不过，就现行法规而言，实际上《宗教事务管理条例》已经规定：宗教院校的设立须

80 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
81 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
由全国性的宗教团体向国家宗教局，或省一级的宗教团体向所在省的民宗部门提出申请。并有详细的认定标准。然而，或许是涵水区教育局工作人员对宗教法律条文不熟悉，或者是有意回避宗教议题，或者是对执法的敷衍了事，因而只能落得“执法者不懂法”的恶名。

谈及此处，项天乐也直言，家庭教会所创办的教会学校与家庭教会的政策和法律处境是一样的。某种程度上也导致了铭贤书院的法律地位是一个暂时没有答案的问题。对于这一点，恰如项天乐所阐述的那样：

“我坚决服从政府管，让我上三自，不会进入三自，这是我的底线，打死我也不会去。

那难道我不属于人管？我们需要人管，但不需要教育局来管。我们渴望国家来管理我们，我们坚决拥护国家管理我们，我们坚决支持办证，请问到哪里办证？你告诉我怎么去办证。82”

大概也是因为这个没有答案的问题，自听证会结束之后，涵水区对铭贤书院也只能继续保持“睁一只眼闭一只眼”的状态，取缔事件似乎也得不到了了之。项天乐也表示，如果涵水区教育局要维持处罚，迦密山教会也会执行应对行政处分的下一个权利，也即向法院提请行政诉讼，正式打官司。“看起来，他们不愿意走这一步。如果他们要走，我们奉陪到底！”

看起来时下项天乐对这个事件很有把握，但愿将来他对于这个事件依然有把握。

六、讨论与结论：从乡村到城市的地方基督教

在我们看来，苏北涿城家庭教会的“次序”变迁和国家效应是家庭教会的缩影，因为在很多地方我们似乎可以看到类似的例子，只是并不一定能呈现清晰景象。就像我们在文章开头所强调的那样，地方基督教的生成便是一个由卡里斯马而至教会秩序的生成过程，亦是一个产生国家效应的过程，涿城家庭教会便为我们展现了这样的图景。

（一）教会秩序的反思：我们需要什么样的宗教

就乡村趋往城市的意义而言，乡村与城市的变迁过程，不仅是一个地理空间的变容过程，也是实践逻辑的变异过程，更是社会秩序的转换过程。就理想类型意义上的差异来说，乡村和城市应该是两种截然不同的实践逻辑。传统乡村，更趋向于以熟人社会为本位，以家长为核心的内向秩序。而现代城市则是陌生人间的平等交往，以契约为连接纽带的公共秩序。用费孝通的话说，也即差序格局和团体格局的差异。

在当代中国，几乎以“现代化”为信仰的学术思考当中，我们始终对差序格局予以批判，而对团体格局持拥抱态度。在学理分析上，或者在一部分学者看来，基督教能够突破中国的差序格局，甚至费孝通本人也有这种暗示。但是基督教真的能突破差序格局吗？至少这其中的机理需要从田野中寻找答案，并且这其中必然需要经历一个行动者反思、预期转换、社会机制重新组装的过程。

就像本文所阐述的涿城朱家教会兴起的历程一样，中国基督教从乡村开始复兴也意味

82 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
83 刘拥华：《差序格局、公共性与国家建构——费孝通对宗教的认识》，《世界宗教研究》2015 年第 4 期。
基督教并不能立刻改变差序格局，而是嵌入在差序格局当中。虽然我们必须肯定嵌入于差序格局的基督教是中国基督教复兴的重要社会机制，但是作为“拆十字架事件”导火索的一系列违章问题，亦是基督教内部秩序差序格局化的产物，准确地说是差序格局中的私人化产物。此外，当我们思量朱家教会“次序”溃散的时候，在“拆十字架事件”中亦有一个类似的问题，那些在复兴之初承受苦难的基督教会，为何快速走向争斗、分裂、各自为阵，甚至开始比较谁更富丽堂皇、谁十字架更高、谁教堂更大？而后在国家的嘲笑声中，我们不禁要问：为什么我们要忠诚于耶稣，忠诚于国家，还是只忠诚于自己？基督徒到底是构建一个趋向公共的秩序，还是依然试图维持那些终将垂垂老去的旧秩序，更准确地说是私人化的秩序？还是在一个看起来公共，实际上是私人的旧秩序中，怀念旧秩序？

相较于西方公共性衰落的态势，中国的公共性应该还处于刚刚发育的阶段。近年来中国城市社会的公共意识在不断提高，杨凤岗教授所言极是，中国基督教正呈现公共性趋势，在我们所调研的这个案例中，迦密山教会这样从“家族制”的“次序”中蜕变出来的城市教会，正在不断地更新自己的神学思想，对教会进行民主化改革，对外积极推动社会服务，显出一系列公共性特征。似乎中国城市基督教所发生的一切，正如斯达克在《基督教的兴起》中对“八福”的绝妙诠释——充满无家可归者、穷困潦倒者的城市有福了，因为基督教带来了仁慈和希望，充满外来者和陌生人的城市有福了，因为基督教带来了归属感……

但是公共性的城市秩序亦有一定的双重性。在一些票友派信徒看来，城市代表着罪恶，因为《圣经·旧约》中的那些城市正是充满着众多的罪恶。而当下城市教会代表着基督教的方向和未来，某种程度上也正呈现出“城市中心主义”的倾向，与我们相伴4日的涿城北乡“肢体”中的年轻人正在效仿他们心仪的温州人教会，以一系列城市化的装饰、诗歌、游戏、小组学习来训练他们的青年团契。但是正如温州拆十字架事件中的乡村基督徒所指出的那样，没有一座城市教堂在守卫十字架，反而是乡村教堂在守卫十字架。这些守卫十字架、紧抱十字架的乡下信徒，总算以“回到文革中的圣洁、敬虔教会”那种乌托邦想象和实践，来实现了对现代的、理性的、职业的而也是意味着堕落的城市信徒的“属灵”胜利。

同时，我们也不得不承认，作为一个闯入田野的“他者”，我们对涿城城市教会的关注才刚刚开始，抑或我们对他们的了解还不够细致。有很多问题我们也不得不承认：在中国这样的政治社会当中，他们真的能活下去吗？抑或是他们真的公共吗？他们是不是已经是，或者永远不会变成，我们在另一家实施长老会体制的教会中了解到的样子——他们声称自己的教会民主为“民主集中制”，在同工会中对长老和执事进行等额选举，教会会员只需要鼓掌通过即可，教会牧师会上向信徒索要奉献款。最后这些基督的追随者，变得越来越不像基督，就如这个社会的所有组织一样，与光谱另一端的母体越来越类似？

（二）国家效应的反思：我们面对什么样的国家

在宗教管理上，中国国家的管理策略某种程度上是全景敞视主义的，只是在不同时期，对不同对象，运作方式的有所不同而已。中国当代的基督教复兴运动，似乎不断地引起全景敞视机构的警觉，其中尤以改革开放初期，以及近年来的形势较为典型。但是很多时候，基督徒就像王怡一篇被广为传播的文章《基督徒是一个群体性事件》一样，只是看
起来可怕（标题是政治性的），其实质并不可怕（内容是宗教性的）87。然而，正是这些似
是而非的观念，产生了难以名状的国家效应。

事实上，改革开放后，国家对家庭教会的治理，某种程度上也造成了家庭教会的内敛
化，甚至可以说是秘密社会化——他们将对国家的恐惧，延伸为对陌生人的恐惧，将对陌
生人的恐惧转化为对国家的恐惧。因此，我们在涿城的田野调查，也显得艰难，我们与一
些教会领袖的谈话时常会被怀疑为是否会提交给国家。但是，就大多数被国家治理的家庭
教会来说，他们仅是像王明道所说的那样“我们是为了信仰”，而后来也有众多的研究表
明，这个非政治的王明道，也确实是虔诚地为了信仰，或者说也仅是一个“信耶稣”的私
人而已。即使我们案例中的那个“老运动员”朱彼得，他更多时候也仅是忠诚于耶稣，而
无其他忠诚。这也使得太多无谓的治理会使得基督徒在表面上“顺服掌权者”，但是实质上会
将国家视为“世界的王”。为此，他时常消极地应对国家的一系列治理。

而像迦密山教会一样的城市教会兴起之后，他们能够在对国家的整体不服从中，潜藏
着某种局部服从，在局部服从当中，亦蕴含着些许的不服从。这大概是因为他们在忠诚于
耶稣之中，也能忠诚于耶稣所认可的价值，而这些价值某种程度上也是现代社会所承认的
价值，也是中国国家能够与之实现重叠共识的价值。因此，即使在国家治理之中，他们亦
能够有效地处置好忠诚于耶稣，与忠诚于国家的距离，从而能够形成一系列积极的行动策
略。

诚然，涿城城市家庭教会与地方政府的关系，似乎正处于相对和谐的阶段。如项天乐
所说，“政府既想让教会成为可以利用的资源，帮他们解决社会问题，但又很谨慎，有选择
性地找一些教会。”88一些基督教会或许正在被视为“和谐社会”建设的一股力量。似乎这
样的阶段，地方政治与家庭教会其乐融融的关系，温州家庭教会也经历过，曹南来在《建
设中国的耶路撒冷》中有颇多描述89。然而，这种关系很快便衰落下去了。

就事实而言，多层级的中国国家有很多面向，有些时候国家有私人化的面向，需要通
过非正式的机制去沟通，有些时候国家的公共化的面向，可以通过正式法制的渠道去交
涉。对于基督教会来说，国家不同面向的展露，亦取决于宗教与国家的交往方式。浙江温
州过去那种“和谐”政教关系的衰落，某种程度上也是一种私人化的政教关系的衰落。相
较而言，我们更愿意称颂迦密山教会那样的，在对处境充分考量的基础上，基于对国家清
晰认知的基础上，设限的、契约的、法治的交往方式，这种交往方式某种程度上也促成了
他维权行动的阶段性成功。

当然也有可能是迦密山教会所面对的对手实在太过糟糕而已。

87 王怡：《基督徒是一个群体性事件》，《杏花》2010 年秋季号。
88 资料来源：涿城迦密山教会项天乐牧师访谈记录（20160202）。
89 曹南来：《建设中国的耶路撒冷：基督教与城市现代变迁》，香港：香港大学出版社，2013年。
附录一、作者简介


曾在浙江省、江苏省进行宗教社会学田野调查，涉及宗教用地、基督教家庭教会、宗教慈善等。现已公开发表学术期刊论文4篇，具体为：

1. 《信仰方式与土地规则——以A省土地专项整治行动中的基督教为例》（《道风：基督教文化评论》2017年春季号，A&HCI，独立作者）；
2. 《制度变迁与传统再造——兼论当代西南民族民间信仰的复兴或重组》（《世界宗教文化》2016年第4期，CSSCI，第一作者）；
3. 《新教伦理还是财神伦理——兼论温州基督徒的财富观》（《浙江学刊》2015年第3期，CSSCI，第一作者）；
4. 《碎片化的信仰——论民族民间信仰中的“文化化”建构》（《西北民族大学学报》2014年第6期，CSSCI扩展版，独立作者）。

通讯地址：华东师范大学社会发展学院社会学系

电话：+8618317018117

电邮：clozeshaw@gmail.com
附录二、访谈人物对象

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<td>高中</td>
<td>主任牧师</td>
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<td>学生</td>
<td>葡萄园教会学生团契</td>
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附录三、朱家教会与迦密山教会结构对比图

朱家教会：“灯台”在“黑暗”国家中连接为“光明”的“肢体”
附录四、迦密山教会的会友结构

迦密山教会2015年度会友职业统计

迦密山教会2015年度性别统计

迦密山教会2015年度会友学历统计
附录五、“恩典城市运动”的理念——光明教会让城市变光明
When the "state"appropriates"society" — The public representation of Christianity and the Remaking of the Miao
Kong Deji

Abstract:
As the presentation of the Miao culture, a Christian Church was inaugurated officially on May 1, 2007, in the “Miao village” of the Yunnan Ethnic Theme Park, which is a tourist attraction showcasing the cultural characteristics of the ethnic minorities. The paper tries to explain why a Christian church could be possibly established in the public space of an atheist state, and why Christianity could be employed to represent the Miao, an ethnic minority whose Christian members amount to a very small proportion. In doing so, the paper analyzes the sophisticated state-society interactions by investigating the processes of the establishment of the church, and the experience of a hymn band which join in a series of singing competitions. I argue that the Christian church that may attract tourists are neither a state authorized religious site, nor is it an underground church that tries to escape from the state regulation. Instead, it constitutes a “third type” that a simple “state-society” dichotomy cannot explain. Finally, the case help us to understand the reality of Chinese religion, which transcends the state-church assumption.

Keywords:Miao Christianity legitimation folkways village appropriation choir
当 “国家” 盗用 “社会” ——基督教的公共表达与苗族再造

孔德继

摘要：2007 年 5 月 1 日，在以展现各少数民族文化为特色的旅游景点 “云南民族村” 里，新建的 “苗族寨” 基督教堂正式运行。本文试图解释为什么无神论国家的公共空间中基督教堂能够建成运行，以及占苗族人口比较少的基督教信仰何以成为苗族文化的代表。本文通过教堂建设和诗班参赛经历的过程考察，呈现一个与民族精英 “盗用” 国家符号相反的 “国家” 盗用 “社会” 的案例，以此分析 “国家” 与 “民间” 互动关系的复杂性。民族村的苗族教堂作为一个旅游点可以吸引游客信教，但它既非国家认可的 “宗教场所”，也不是试图逃脱国家的管束的聚会点，从而形成了一个 “国家—社会” 框架无法解释的 “第三类”。这一案例有助于我们理解中国宗教的现实图景，超越目前二元政教关系的预设。

关键词：苗族 基督教 合法化 民族村 盗用 诗班

导论

2006 年，云南省昆明市的旅游景点 “云南民族村” 的 “苗族寨” 开始建盖一座基督教堂。2007 年 5 月 1 日，这个以基督教堂为主体的 “苗族寨” 与其它一些园区内扩建的村寨一并投入运行。将习惯中被认为是外来文化的基督教看作少数民族的特色，新建一座教堂在旅游景点作为旅游产品进行展示，这在中国却并不多见。

回望百年，中华民国和中华人民共和国都坚持政教分离原则，尤其共产党执政 60 余年来始终坚持无神论的意识形态，改革开放以前曾对各种宗教进行过强力打击，改革开放以来对宗教的管理和控制也比较严格。不过各种宗教并没有因为强力打击而消失。改革开放后，信教人数的高增长也没有因为严格的管控而放缓脚步。基督教信仰的存在和基督教堂建设无
论在汉族地区，还是地处边陲的少数民族村社，都不算特别稀奇的事情。


作为宗教活动场所的教堂是信仰载体之一，也是很多教会纳入政府宗教管理体系、取得合法审批手续的前提。本文聚焦的案例，教堂在城市最重要的旅游景点中的合法出现，超出了学界目前解释政教关系的一般经验，作为无神论为主流意识形态的国家何以允许这样的事情发生？本文首先确认这不是一个偶然现象，并且是个少数基督教代表整体苗族的文化误读。然后通过详细考察苗族村基督教堂的建设缘起和历程，分析了苗族基督教诗班通过参与体制内的文艺比赛，从而促使苗族的基督教信仰被更多公众知晓及公共领域脱敏，并最终重构了公众和部分人群印象中基督教与苗族的密切关系。

在这个过程中，基督教诗班既被地方政府征召利用，同时也参与主流意识形态和政治仪式的实践。除了人们观念中通常代表“国家”的政府公务人员和代表“社会”的基督徒之间的互动频繁之外，还有非宗教管理部门的政治精英、苗族精英、非基督徒非苗族的学术精英，基于各自目的和诉求共同实践，最终导致了一个比较意外的结果。

在旅游景点和文艺创作中，通过重新包装再现与现实的少数民族不一样的形象是很普遍的现象，杜磊（Gladney, 2007）曾对一些艺术作品和北京的旅游景点“民族园”中少数民族形象的“再呈现”进行了详细的考察和分析。杜磊认为，中国是世界上民族主义工程的成功典范，中国不仅建构了世界上最大的民族——汉族，而且建构了一个由56个民族支撑的新中国国家政体。在他的论述中似乎隐含着，对民族文化多元化的强化，同时意味着对目前一体格局的消解。本文案例没有与杜磊商榷的意思，但客观上呈现了一个民族正在构建的过程，以及“一体格局”目前的复杂状态。
一、文化的呈现与现实

（一）文化呈现：民族村苗族教堂的建立和运行

“云南民族村”位于云南省昆明市南部的滇池之滨，1992年2月18日开园，是国家AAAA级旅游景区、国家民委民族文化基地，CIOFF中国委员会民间传统文化基地和国家民委全国首批民族工作联系点之一。是外地游客游览昆明的“必到”景点之一。民族村内逐批建设和开放了20余个少数民族同名“村寨”，用于展现其民族文化和生活原貌，给游客提供参与式的民族风情体验。

图1 本文案例所在地示意图

2007年5月1日，这个以基督教堂为主体的“苗族寨”与其他园区内增建的“村寨”

1 国际民间艺术节组织理事会（International Council of Organizations of Folklore Festivals and Folk Arts）
一并投入运行。目测苗族村占地大约 2-3 亩，除了教堂占地近四分之一外，其余主要是一个空场。大概 2010 年左右，户外增设了一个“吹箭”的游戏项目。苗族村基督教堂初期接近普通的教堂，特点是四面都有门，为了便于游客的进入，三面的门都是开着的。

2009 年笔者到访这座教堂时，陆英华^{2} 穿着苗族的服装坐在教堂中间的长椅上，专职与游客交流信仰问题。2015 年笔者再次到访这座教堂时，教堂内的空间部分已经被建为商铺，陆英华在室外经营吹箭的游戏。陆英华 2007 年入职前在云南省神学院进修，进修期间有民族村的工作人员来云南省神学院招聘。最终陆英华与民族村签订了劳务合同，来到了民族村工作。因为教堂产权属于民族村所在的旅游公司，并非宗教活动场所，所以陆英华的主要身份是旅游从业者，而非牧师。

基督教建堂虽由民族村官方主导，但动力并不完全是经济因素。据了解，时任民族村总经理的严冰，母亲就信仰基督教，民族村文展部的艺术总监于滔（曾任昆明市文化馆馆长）也从小就受到过宗教文化的熏陶，苗族村建教堂主要是这两个人操刀的，家庭和个人背景可能是影响决策的重要因素。尽管民族村总经理和文展部艺术总监的基督教背景看似主导了官方的意志，但这并不意味着事情不再遇到阻力。

因为大多数苗族是不信仰基督教的，在以教堂为主体的苗族村投入运营后，云南省苗学会曾对苗族村建盖基督教堂表示抗议，并上访至云南省委和省政府。鉴于此，2007 年 9 月的一个周日，时任云南省委书记的白恩培“微服私访”民族村，中午在苗族村基督教堂内聆听了祷告。据当时在场的陆英华转述，白恩培当时表达了“基督教能够净化人的心灵”的感受，算是默许了苗族村基督教堂的建设。标志着基督教堂在云南民族村的合法地位得以确立。

笔者 2009 年 8 月调查时，教堂每周末大概有 50-100 名民族村里的工作人员由陆英华带领在堂内礼拜，他们中有信主历史较长的傈僳族、拉祜族、独龙族的员工，也有水族等苗族寨教堂建立之后才皈依的“弟兄姊妹”。苗族村教堂建立之前，民族村内工作的各民族基督徒平日到附近村庄的教堂做礼拜。苗族村教堂运行后，民族村内的少数民族信徒解决了过信仰生活的难题。

无论建盖教堂的初衷如何，苗族村基督教堂承担了至少四个功能：民族村内各寨基

^{2} 依研究惯例，此处及后面所提非高级公务人员均为化名。
督徒员工的礼拜场所：作为旅游产品的文化展演平台；公开场合宣传“福音”：少数民
族信仰“外来”基督教的正当性的确认——基督教成为了中国少数民族不断更新的传统
和特色的一部分。

（二）文化实情：苗族同胞信仰基督教比例不高

一般游客来到民族村参观了苗族教堂，恐怕大致会有这样的印象：苗族受基督教影响很
大，苗族信仰基督教的人很多，基督教是苗族文化非常重要的一部分，苗族是云南受基督教
影响最大的民族等等。但综合了解了贵州、湖南和云南的苗族，以及云南省各少数民族的信
仰情况，就会发现以上印象并不成立，与现实有较大偏差。

中国境内苗族中，基督徒不足苗族总人口的十分之一。据 2000 年第五次人口普查统计，
全国共有苗族 894016 人，主要分布于西南和中南的七个省（含自治区）。其中贵州省苗族
人口最多，共有 4299,951 人，差不多占全国苗族总人口的一半；湖南省 1921,495 人，居第
二位；云南省苗族人口数量虽然全国第三位，约 1043,535 人，大约相当于全国苗族的九分
之一。贵州和湖南两省苗族信仰基督教的较少，主要信仰本土的传统宗教。2000 年第五次
人口普查的数据中，苗族人口达到中国苗族总人口的 1%以上的“县市区”有 26 个，总数约
占中国苗族总人口的 50%，主要集中在贵州和湖南省，基督教在这些县市的影响普遍很有限。
贵州凯里、湖南沅陵等地区有一些苗族群众皈依了基督教，但基督徒在当地苗族中的比重不
大。

云南省的苗族人口主要分布于文山州（422,991 人）、红河州（274,147 人）和昭通市
（155,766 人）三地。前两个地区苗族人口占全省苗族总人口的 66.8%，但这两个地区苗族
的绝大多数却不信仰基督教。据云南省宗教事务局 2003 年的数据，文山州各民族基督徒总
数仅为 930 人。受基督教影响大的苗族聚居区域分布在滇东北、滇黔川边地区（主要包括云
南昭通、贵州毕节和四川泸州）和包括楚雄和昆明地区在内的滇中北地区。但这两个区域苗
族人口不多，基本没有一个人口超过国内苗族总人口 1%的大县。后文将提到的以唱诗闻名
的昆明市富民县由于的苗族人口太少，甚至很难在苗族人口统计的数据中显示。

一百余年来，基督教在云南少数民族的宣教和发展从规模上比较成功，对文化和生活各
方面的影响也颇为深远。关于基督教在云南省各民族中的分布情况，尚无权威统计数据。但
可以通过一些文献窥探各民族受基督教影响的概貌。
《云南省志·宗教志》（云南人民出版社：1995.9, 226-228）介绍了基督教初传云南时影响较大的六个地区。分别为滇东北苗族地区；滇北苗族、彝族地区；滇西北傈僳族、怒族地区；滇西景颇族地区；滇西南拉祜族、佤族地区；滇南哈尼族地区（江城、墨江）。可见在云南省，受基督教影响大的民族不止苗族。

据2016年云南省基督教“两会”的数据，云南省苗族基督徒约有10万人，占总人口的8%。省内信仰基督教的少数民族分别为傈僳族、彝族、苗族、佤族、拉祜族、怒族等，在基督徒比例上，苗族小于傈僳族和彝族；在基督徒比例上，苗族小于傈僳族、景颇族、怒族、佤族。（云南省基督教“两会”，2016）

综上，无论是《云南省志·卷六十六·宗教志》写作的布局上、还是2016年云南省基督教“两会”统计数据的相对规模和实际增长速度上，苗族都只是云南受基督教影响较深的民族之一。基督教在苗族中的传播主要是大花苗支系，在省内其他苗族支系中并非普及。

民族村苗族寨建堂是极具象征意义，更新着人们头脑中的各族形象的文化版图。倘若不将苗族村建堂看作一个偶然事件，承认民族村苗族寨建堂事件的象征含义，问题就出现了：一个占苗族10%人口的局部文化，何以成为苗族重要的标志性文化？苗族与基督教，一个似乎被夸大甚至被严重曲解的事实仅仅是偶然的误解吗？事实上，这种误解时常出现，并不偶然。

（三）误读与基督教标识苗族

以基督教标识苗族有着较为长久的文本生产过程。例如30余年前一本由几位民族学专家共同编辑的《宗教与民族研究资料选辑》辑录了当年宗教和民族研究领域的部分研究成果。全书所辑的几十篇文章包括马克思主义宗教理论、中国的宗教法规、关于宗教问题的重要讲话及各宗教调研等专题，只有两篇的内容主要讲基督教，而这两篇恰恰都取材于苗族基督教信仰。一篇是原文由韦启光发表于《贵州社会科学》1981年第4期上的《黔滇川边区苗族信仰基督教试析》，另一篇是庞宗尧发表于《宗教》1982年第1期的《关于云南“小石桥”问题的考察报告》。两文都是讲的善良苦难的苗族同胞，最终毅然选择了基督教的故事。前一个是川滇黔边的苗族，后一个是云南楚雄州武定县的苗族。可以说，苗族基督教在本书中的分量之重无以复加，足以给读者基督教与中国苗族有强关联性的暗示。

表1 中国少数民族宗教信仰情况简表
另外，全书的最后附有一张《中国少数民族宗教信仰情况简表》，苗族位列 16 个信仰基督教的少数民族之首。该表有一个不准确的错误，除苗族之外，所有信仰基督教的族名后面都加了“部分”二字，并且加注“部分”的这 15 个民族，基本出现在其他宗教范畴之内，如佤族和傈僳族。但基督教的栏“苗族”后面却没有加“部分”二字，同时“苗族”也没有出现在“原始宗教”的部分。可见，编者认为苗族是普遍信仰基督教的。

类似案例 30 年来其实不时出现，如韩军学（2000）所著《基督教与云南少数民族》一书中，该书首章为“信仰基督教的云南少数民族”，涉及 10 个民族，“苗族”首当其冲成为了第一节，整章 117 页中，20 页是写苗族的。

学者尚且犯过这样的错误，20 年后的“民族村”在苗族寨建了基督教堂就不显得那么奇怪了。综上，民族村苗族寨建堂虽然与苗族基督徒群体的发展规模不相称，但反映了一些学者意识中的宗教和民族的版图。我们至此可以发现，民族村苗族寨建堂不是偶然现象，应该对此“巧合”的误读进行解释。

文化和民族问题相连，经常涉及到自尊心，于是下里巴人和琐碎的东西通常会被忽略，系统性的，反应大众价值观中较高层次和系统性的元素愈加得到重视。苗胞中少数的基督教文化也是受益于这样的运行逻辑而不断被索引、放大并循环生产。

近代著名作家沈从文从多次在文学作品中表达他的苗族血统，他的孙女沈红对文化“圣地”石门坎这一“西南苗族最高文化区”教育问题曾进行过系统研究。并对石门坎的教育和卫生成就的总结：“创制苗文，结束了苗族无母语文字的历史；创办乌蒙山区第一所苗民

3 处贵州省威宁县。曾因基督教的传入在中华民国时期取得了空前的发展，极大地促进了当地民族的文明化进程，并取得了卓越的文化成就。
小学；建威宁县第一所中学；培养出苗族历史上第一位博士；在中国首倡和实践双语教学；
开中国近代男女同校先河；倡导民间体育运动；创建乌蒙山区第一个西医医院；乌蒙山区第
一个接种牛痘疫苗预防天花的地方；创办中国最早的麻风病院；建立中国第一所苗民医
院……”（沈红，2006）

近代苗族崛起的历史，也是苗族基督徒发迹的历史。由于基督教循道公会在川滇黔边区
的苗族中影响巨大，形成了苗族文化历史上的一个巅峰。于是苗族基督徒的故事也成为非基
督徒苗胞不易抛弃的民族故事。

在苗族基督徒的成就常被津津乐道之外，苗族基督徒精英的文化贡献除了基督教相关知
识的梳理外，还包括基督教传入之前苗族文化和历史的书写。杨汉先（1913 年 10 月出生于
贵州威宁县，1919 年进入威宁石门坎光华小学就读；1938 年毕业于华西协和大学。1950 年
出任贵州省民族事务委员会副主任兼贵州民族学院院长。被称为教育家和社会活动家，也是
国内外有较大学术影响的苗族学者。曾撰写了《苗族述略》（1937）、《大花苗移人乌撤传
说考》（1941）、《威宁花苗歌乐杂谈》（1942）、《大花苗歌谣种类》（1942）、《大花
苗名称来源》（1942）、《大花苗的氏族》（1943）、《黔西苗族调查报告》（1948）、《贵
州省威宁县苗族古史传说》（1982）、《基督教循道公会在威宁苗族地区传教始末》、《基
督教在滇黔川交境一带苗族地区史略》等几十篇论文和书稿。（张慧真，2009:138-145）

杨汉先作为学者梳理了苗族的历史，促进了苗族内部的认同；作为教育家和社会活动家，
身居文教界和政界高位，提升了苗族的形象；作为基督徒，梳理了本地基督教的历史，强
化了基督教的正当性，以及苗族—基督教关系密切的社会学印象；作为苗族非基督徒和苗族基
督徒共享的精英同胞，弥合了二者之间的隔阂感。

比杨汉先年长十岁的苗族教育家朱焕章，903 年生于贵州威宁县。1929 年入华西大学预
科部学习；1931 年升入华西大学教育系深造。大学期间，组织编写《滇黔苗民夜读课本》；
1935 年大学本科毕业时得到蒋介石的赏识，留他在成都绥靖公署工作，但朱焕章毅然回贵
州威宁石门坎从事苗族教育。1939 年到云南昭通明城中学任教教导主任。1943 年创办西南边
疆私立石门坎初级中学，并任校长。1946 年 10 月 27 日当选首位全国大会代表，并到南京
参加国大会议。1954 年奉调贵州省教育厅任职，因受肃反运动中影响，1955 年 12 月 11 日
离家出走，四月后被发现自缢。(张慧真，2009:132)

在石门坎地区之外，其他苗族聚居区也同样有基督徒的传奇故事涌现。

1998年7月9日，英女王宣布了20世纪世界十大基督教殉道者，包括波兰神父圣国柏、因信仰被父母杀死的南非原住民少女梅思修拉、乌干达圣公会大主教鲁温、俄国的圣伊丽莎白、美国黑人民权领袖牧师马丁•路德•金等，他们的雕像被雕在伦敦威敏斯特大教堂的西门上。在这被纪念的十位殉道者中，唯一的中国人就是云南苗族的牧师王志明。

王志明出生于中国云南省武定县，1940年起任滇北地区内地会洒普山总堂传道员，1948年按立为洒普山总堂牧师成为当地教会领袖。1951年，外国传教士被驱逐出中国，王志明继续负责当地教会。面对风起云涌的政治运动，他虽然忠于国家，但拒绝参加当地的批斗地主和反对外国人的活动。1969年，包括王志明在内的当地21名基督教领袖因反对信徒参加“三忠于”活动被逮捕并被判处死刑。1973年12月29日，66岁的王志明在当地万人批斗会上被枪决。5


当人们读到这些书，无论专业与否，都容易陷入到“苗族受到基督教很大影响”，甚至“基督教影响了苗族的方方面面”这一认识陷阱当中，滚雪球式循环往复的的知识制造是形成人们印象的决定因素。6尽管宣传从来都不是学术研究的主题词，但在本文探讨的“误读与重构”的问题上，都在刷新人们对苗族和苗族基督教的印象，并最终塑造着苗族和基督教

5 维基百科－王志明 http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E5%BF%97%E6%98%8E

6 如果没有特殊的生活和研究经历，如一般非基督教背景的苗族社区的社区走出的苗民或者少数民族传统文化研究的资深专家，从外界尤其文献了解苗族，很容易有基督教是苗族主要信仰的误区。上述作者们在读彼此的著作的时候，未免没有一种相互的误导和心理暗示在发挥作用。
的公共形象，以及基督教与苗族的关联。在贵阳市人民政府门户网站的“苗族的宗教信仰”页中也提到，“外国传教使团或者传教士们在苗族地区开设了许多的中小学校、医疗机构、甚至实施了一些经济发展项目，对于苗族社会的进步、政治地位的改善起到了不可磨灭的作用。”

在“苗族=基督教”这个等式中，不仅海外基督教力量循道公会、内地会，苗族基督徒杨汉先和苗族非基督徒沈红等起了重要作用。贵州日报文艺部主任记者杨大德，学者东人达、秦和平、陈晓毅等非苗族、非基督徒等都参与了以苗族与基督教为主题的书写。民族、宗教、学术和传媒都积极参与了“苗族=基督教”这个氛围的营造。在这个过程中国家和宗教对立的因素是有限的，利益诉求微弱。

二、苗族诗班成名史

精英构建民族的历史是通常的建构路径。在改革开放以前的苗族基督教历史中，都有一部分“国家—社会”的对抗史，民国时期朱焕章对抗杨森主政贵州省时的民族同化政策，共产党建政后工作组企图发动群众揭发朱焕章时，苗族同胞又普遍对抗调查。王志明的故事更是国家与信仰冲突的典型。而本节主要介绍改革开放年代，苗族基督教会唱诗班参加歌咏比赛，并与主流体制密切互动，互相借用的过程，探讨代表少数人的基督教何以在民族村中成为苗族文化的代表符号的问题。

（一）作为艺术资源的唱诗

近年来，云南一个新兴的旅游项目是到苗族或傈僳族聚居的村寨参观教堂，听当地少数民族教会的诗班演唱世界名曲和赞美诗。该旅游项目得到游客青睐除了诗班歌唱水平不错外，更重要的还可能是诗班演唱的众多“国际范儿” 的世界名曲，造成的外来“洋教”形象与公众对内地欠发达地区少数民族落后形象在人们心中形成的刻板印象之间的反差。

前文提到的云南民族村教堂工作人员陆英华对教堂选在民族村苗族寨建的首要解释是：“民族村各种建设的一个重要的标准是要反映各民族的文化（特色），宗教是文化最重要的部分之一，基督教信仰也是广大苗族同胞的重要部分，包括苗族诗班合唱，水平之高也是广为所知的……” 正像陆英华所说，民族村的经营决策者决定在民族村建立教堂，也会适当

7 http://scp.gygov.gov.cn/gygov/1443129927946731520/20051215/91645.html
考虑要符合民族的文化特色。而当时基督教作为苗族的一项文化特色，实际上也得到了大众的知晓和认可。

唱诗班是教会的日常配置，通过群体性的演唱宗教歌曲表达信仰是教会礼拜仪式的一部分。与基督教在中国大地生根发芽同步的，还有党政力量，尤其组织文化对宗教的影响。组织的动员和宣传方式表现为文艺汇演、歌咏比赛等。而这些精神层面的技艺，通常也不是普通农村擅长的领域。当歌咏比赛，文艺汇演在云南省被组织起来时，一些地方官员发现了基督教会诗班这一文艺资源。为了完成组织安排的宣传和竞技任务，苗族诗班成为了很多地方“征召”的对象，不过这一时期合唱团的基督教诗班背景是被隐藏的。

2005年，时任云南省楚雄彝族自治州政协主席的杨文彪，将该州禄丰、武定、元谋三县的240多名苗族基督教会诗班人员组织起来。当年7月29日，楚雄彝族自治州一年一度的彝族传统节日“火把节”期间，杨文彪带领他组织起来苗族诗班合唱团举办了一场以“祥和之夜”为主题的大型演唱会，并成为是次“火把节”的亮点。这次“祥和之夜”演唱会由“和谐中华、祥和社会、欢乐生活、真诚祝福”四个乐章组成，演唱曲目有《爱我中华》、《哈利路亚》、《友谊地久天长》、《欢乐颂》等中外名曲和苗族民间歌曲。当地官方报道认为，此次演唱会“充分体现了彝州各民族的大团结、大融合，使整个火把节活动高潮迭起、异彩纷呈。”（云南楚雄州民委, 2005）

2005年是中国人民抗日战争胜利60周年，也是中华人民共和国国歌曲作者、云南省玉溪市人聂耳逝世70周年。9月14日，由云南省委宣传部、省文化厅、省文联、昆明市委、市政府联合举办的首届昆明“聂耳杯”合唱节上，由杨文彪率领的苗族“山民合唱团”——也就是“祥和之夜”演唱会表演的这支队伍，在有省内外120支合唱队参加的比赛中夺得了最佳合唱奖的第一名。

在这次比赛上，参赛和得奖的苗族合唱团共有四支。包括同获一等奖的昆明市五华区厂口乡苗族合唱团、更早成名的昆明市富民县小水井苗族合唱团，凭借《毕业歌》获得了二等奖的昆明市禄劝县苗族合唱团。

这些来自乡土社区的合唱团几乎都是苗族，这些苗族也无一例外都是基督徒。在主流意识形态及政策制定中，对基督教文化表达长期存在抑制性政策。于是由教会诗班组成的合唱团尽管通过参与比赛获了奖，但在最初几年，合唱团的基督教学背景是被遮蔽的，被包装为“山民合唱团”：
放下手里的锄头，将牛羊赶进圈里，掸掉身上的泥土，聚拢在一起，清清嗓子，引吭高歌……他们都唱得那样好，许多人无论如何也想不到演唱者竟是一批来自云南偏僻山区的苗族农民……

楚雄州苗族山民演唱团正式成立于2005年7月。演唱团演员200人，男女各100人，全部是来自于楚雄州山区的苗族青壮年农民。楚雄州政协主席杨成彪在下乡考察时发现了这些农民歌唱家，州政协策划组建了这支苗族山民合唱团。

没有名家指点，就以书本、光盘为师，大家相互切磋，共同提高。很多人虽然文化水平较低，但对音乐却有一种特殊的悟性。自小以来的音乐熏陶，伴随全身心真情的歌唱，使他们逐步修练成了较高的音乐素养。他们不但全都能视简谱即唱，而且有相当一部分成员能看懂五线谱。经过长期不懈的学习，他们终于成功地拿下了一部又一部中外名曲，走出大山，登上了大雅之堂！（任维东，2005）

在这次报道中，“山民合唱团”的成功的秘诀被描述为农民的“悟性”，成就被冠以“为彝州争光”的旗号，受的训练是“州政协的精心组织”，唱的歌曲是世界名曲和爱国歌曲、革命歌曲。（楚雄政协，2005）

尽管比赛期间有些人了解这些合唱团来自基督教会的诗班，但有关这次比赛的报道以及对苗族合唱团的公开的赞许中，完全看不出合唱团的基督教背景。隐藏合唱团的基督教身份的实践看上去像是“国家”对“社会”的压制，但并不尽然。

杨文彪当年是州政协主席，对民间信仰有兴趣，退休后筹资建立了该州一个以“福”为主题的旅游景点“福塔”——实则也是一个介于佛教和民间信仰之间的庙宇。福塔旁边的殿内殿外，供奉了与各地佛教寺庙区分不大的神灵群体。是杨最初将楚雄州文化馆工作人员发现的基督教诗班组织起来表演和参赛，并申请了40万经费用于排练和购置服装。

另外，民族村的管理者策动建堂，都说明代表“国家”的官方力量的成分和动机的复杂性。
同时，这些苗族诗班参赛也是参与国家宣传机器运转中的一个环节，除了个别基督教歌曲，他们在比赛中还演唱了《义勇军进行曲》、《歌唱祖国》、《保卫黄河》、《卖报歌》、《祖国颂》等革命和主旋律歌曲。于是，教会诗班的行为难以被简单还原成“社会”，正是因为合唱团唱了革命性质的主旋律歌曲，形式上契合了国家的口味，苗族教会才有了更广阔的空间表达信仰的机会。但更值得注意的是，“国家—社会”两者的互动远远超过“抵抗”模式。将楚雄的苗族唱诗班装点成“彝州”品牌“山民合唱团”，就是有意的误读，它说明地方政府有意无意地隐藏基督教和苗族两种身份对“彝州”这一文化资本可能造成的侵蚀。这种“包装”，不能不说是一种“盗用”（appropriation）。这种盗用的特点是“国家”盗用“社会”，与传统上民族精英盗用国家符号说法不同。

诗班案例呈现了“国家—社会”之间更复杂的关系，互相利用，互相成全，互无恶意。

（二）基督教身份的浮现

前文提到“山民合唱团”获奖后身份被隐藏。与楚雄的“山民合唱团”齐名甚至名气更大的，还有来自昆明地区富民县小水井村的“农民合唱团”。2008年，他们代表云南省参加了当年的CCTV主办的青年歌手大奖赛团体赛。通过诗班参赛和苗语演唱主旋律歌曲，教会、苗族都参与了国家意识形态大厦的建构，并得到了作家余秋雨、作曲家徐沛东等的赞赏（黄笑宇，2008）。这样的参与过程也是受到体制歧视的外来宗教取得了官方体系接纳的主流模式，取得了宗教团体在公共空间展示的资格。

2005年，“聂耳杯”比赛上各苗族诗班合唱团虽然成绩卓著但基督徒的身份还是被隐藏的，但诗班文化资本的积累过程是实在的。2008年青歌赛之后，小水井苗族合唱团更加出名，诗班的演唱不仅成为了媒体竞相挖掘的新闻资源，也成为了地方政府可资利用的旅游资源。在青歌赛之后的新闻报道中，基督教诗班的身份也逐渐被公开化：

小水井村是大营镇束刻村委会的一个自然村……85%的成年人信仰基督教，在

唱诗班基础上发展起来的苗族农民合唱团，以原生态四声部独具特色的演唱风格享

誉海外，被国内外专家评委们誉为天籁之音。（贾薇、赵伟、袁野等， 2009）

唱诗班起初通过参赛曲目的精心挑选和主旋律化的歌唱，消弭了执政习惯与宗教之间的
高张力。因比赛成功并且带来的经济效益，强化了信仰歌唱的正当性，并借改革年代经济发展的天然合法性逐渐摆脱了制度和文化上对宗教的抑制，并最终实现了信仰的公共表达。这说明信仰的表达可以借社会中的文化、政治和经济等各种需求实现。在统治阶级的意识形态中，宗教既是政治消灭的对象，也可以是政治利用的资源。反之，政治既是宗教面临的威胁，也可以是宗教发展的平台。

表2 富民县小水井合唱团参赛和演出经历 2003-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年份</th>
<th>月份</th>
<th>演出活动</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003年10月</td>
<td>首届中国西部合唱艺术节“美丽彩云南”族群杯大赛</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004年4月10日</td>
<td>中央电视台“同一首歌·走进云南”大型演唱会</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005年9月</td>
<td>首届云南聂耳音乐周暨昆明“聂耳杯”合唱比赛</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006年1月</td>
<td>与俄罗斯国家爱乐乐团在昆明、曲靖同台演出</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006年12月</td>
<td>与俄罗斯芭蕾舞团在云南艺术剧院同台演出</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007年5月1日</td>
<td>2007昆明国际旅游节开幕式演出</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007年5月20日</td>
<td>全国第七届残运会闭幕式演出</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007年6月</td>
<td>昆明市非物质文化遗产传承人命名仪式暨民族民间歌舞乐晚会演出</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007年10月14日</td>
<td>广东省中山市举办的全国首届社会主义新农村合唱大赛</td>
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<td>2007年11月</td>
<td>参加首届中国福保乡村文化艺术节演出</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008年3月</td>
<td>中央电视台隆力奇杯第十三届青年歌手电视大奖赛的舞台</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008年4月</td>
<td>昆明市第十三届农民运动会开幕式演出</td>
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资料来源：作者根据赵殿桦(2008)作品整理

苗族诗班公开化的过程说明了，政治和宗教遵循各自的运行逻辑，互相之间可密切合作，彼此成全，并行不悖。西部大开发、新农村建设、文化下乡、乡村旅游、非物质文化遗产等国家政策，这些既需要苗族基督教诗班的参与以充实其内涵，同时也是苗族基督教可以利用的平台资源。而且云南基督教的发展未必导致对地方宗教管理部门绩效评价的负面影响，相反，云南省和云南省的一些地区，常常会作为多民族多宗教混居地区和谐共处的典范，须总结经验供外省参考。从这个意义上说，宗教有序发展，也经常成为地方行政管理部门和研究机构的资源（张桥贵，2016）。
笃信传统信仰并竭力宣传“彝州”的楚雄州前政协主席杨文彪、现场聆听小水井青歌赛表演并积极点评的中国文联副主席丹增和著名作家余秋雨等，以及以市场为准绳的官办开发商（民族村领导），每一个偶然因素都是苗族基督教诗班演艺事业实践过程中的重要力量。

三、总结

教堂建立在民族村进一步说明了“国家—社会”二分的复杂性，乃至“国家—社会”二分的无效性。民族村的苗族教堂作为一个旅游点可以吸引游客信教，既非国家认可的“宗教场所”，也不是试图逃脱国家的管束的聚会点，从而形成了一个“国家—社会”框架无法解释的“第三类”。显然，对这一现象的解释，不能套用国家—社会的二分法，简单地将地方政府等同于“国家”，也不能将非政府行为还原成“社会”。两者的互动远远超过“抵抗”模式，存在大量的妥协、争议，以及有意的误读、“合谋”。

将苗族基督徒的唱诗班装点成“彝州”品牌，就是有意的误读，它说明地方政府有意无意地隐藏基督教和苗族两种身份对“彝州”这一文化资本可能造成的侵蚀。这种“包装”，不能不说是一种“盗用”（appropriation）。这种盗用的特点是“国家”盗用“社会”，与传统上民族精英盗用国家符号（梁永佳，2013；N Tapp，2002）说法不同。
“用基督教标记苗族”的话语，其生产不管多么复杂、多么热闹，绝大多数人都是被排斥这一生产过程之外的。其推论是：那种将话语生产内部力量分成“国家”与“社会”的做法，真正忽视了所谓“社会”，所谓沉默的大多数，因为他们没有一个表述渠道和表述手段，甚至没有获得准确信息的方式。有关石门坎、王志明等例子提供了解释力。原本信教人口比例不多、信教人数绝对值并不高的苗族，却与“基督教”这个符号紧紧地联系在一起。“国家—社会”框架的解释，通常会强调基督教精英在这种营造过程中的作用。在参与苗族基督教知识制造的学者中，我们很难说后两者为“社会”，但它们参与了这一过程。

作为政治精英和经济精英，不可能关心苗族“万物有灵”等的具体内容，而只能对媒体和文字有选择地人云亦云。因此我们只能说：各种力量经过复杂的互动，共同形成了与实情相去甚远的、用“基督教”标记苗族的话语。这是一个各色精英合谋又争议的过程。我们或许数不清楚有哪些“能动”的主体参与了话语的形成，但可以肯定的是，在基督教标记苗族的过程中，普通苗族成员的声音却非常少。Louisa Schein（1997）曾提出了内部东方主义（“Internal Orientalism”）这一概念，其初衷就是要描述这一复杂的“民族特色”话语的形成过程。她这一说法要比简单的“国家—社会”（或偷换的“支配—反抗”、“中央—地方”）精巧，其主旨在于揭示一个道理：一种话语一旦形成，会有一种让赞成者和反对者都无法逃脱的力量。

用“基督教”描述“苗族”，就是这样一个让各方无力排斥、无意愿排斥的话语。但问题比Schein说的还复杂：那些对苗族基督教没有兴趣的苗族和非苗族，不仅无力参与这一话语生产过程，甚至无从知道这一话语的“误导性”。他们被表述为统计数字，他们或许是去“民族村”的游客，他们也可能是电视机前的观众。

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The Online Religious Communities Under Restriction in a WeChat Age

— From Public Account to Mega-Group

微信时代监控下的网络宗教社群—从微信公众号到超大群

刘焱 Yan Liu

摘要：尽管宗教自媒体和其它在线非制度化社区并未被定义为灰色宗教市场的—部分，但是他们的快速增长却能在宗教三色市场分析框架中得到解释。笔者通过对微信公众号、微信群和微信个人对话的内容分析发现：微信技术提升了宗教资源的可视性、可进入性和可获取性，使政府难以在多个互联网平台互通时阻止信息交换。宗教性公共账户的封号、重建和发展揭示了政府管制下基督教社区的活力。宗教灰市在个人、公共账户和超大群中的发展，孕育着在线信仰社区规模性发展的可能性。

Abstract: Although religious we-media and non-institutionalized online communities are not defined as part of the grey religious market, their rapid development supports the triple-market religious model (Yang, 2006). The author collected and analyzed the contents from WeChat public accounts, groups, and individual conversations. It is found that mobile technologies make the religious resources more visible, accessible and available. When multiple Internet platforms are linked together, it is difficult for the government to block information exchange completely. The shutdown, reestablishment, and development of religious public accounts reveal the vitality of Christian communities under government’s restriction. The WeChat mega-group provokes new forms of knowledge transmission among group members. In the WeChat age, individuals, public accounts and mega-groups form a large network; the religious “gray market” is developing among them day by day. Although these online communities are ambiguous in their cultural and religious identities, the interactivity between them cradles the future scalability and reproducibility of huge Internet communities of faith.
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Introduction

In the past three years, China has witnessed a nationwide crackdown on Christianity. When Chinese President Xi took power in 2012, the Chinese government adopted different measures to put religious organizations under government control. The Zhejiang provincial government demolished many churches and tore down around 2000 crosses. In 2015, the Zhejiang government issued a trial regulation of religious building to ensure the government’s control over the decoration of religious spaces. In Sep. 2016, the central government released a “Draft of Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs.” Things forbidden by the Revised regulation include: providing religious services online; organizing citizens to attend religious training, conferences and activities overseas; religious activities in unapproved sites, etc. On Sept 9th, 2016, Chinese Supreme People ‘s Court, Supreme People’ s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Collection, Extraction, Examination and Judgment of Electronic Data in Criminal Cases.” This document claims that information of mobile text, email, online social groups and other network application services can be extracted as evidence in the court trial. Both
of the two regulations came to effect in October 2016. Under these regulations, the religious freedom of Chinese people is significantly limited.

It seems that a “religious winter” is coming again, raising questions about the future of Christianity in China (Mansfield, 2016.9.30). Some leaders of house churches worry that there could be a new round of repression against Christian house churches in China (Carney, 2016.10.8). Will government restriction work to keep Christianity in the private sphere? What role will social media play under these circumstances?

According to the triple-market religious model (Yang, 2006), suppressive regulation may provoke the growth of gray market. A gray religious market refers to “all religious and spiritual organizations, practitioners, believers, and religious activities” (p. 97).

The author argues that with the development of Internet technologies, the religious gray market in China is expanding quickly in diverse forms and contents. The complexity of the religious phenomena of Internet community makes it harder for the government to define legal and illegal religious activities. The deprivation of thought and speech freedom will provoke greater mass demand for political freedom and religious freedom. Thus, a new era of religious flourishing may be coexisting with the “religious winter.” Here are some of the reasons:

First, new Internet technologies and cell phones will enable the religious resources to become more visible, accessible and available through mobile phones;
thus, the Christian faith is growing from a personal religion to a more public religion on the mobile media platform.

Second, when more information is blocked on the WeChat public account or web links, people will transfer the text information into pictures, PDF documents, and even voice or video messages, the same content will still be circulating among WeChat friends or friend circles. Even if the information disappears from the WeChat platform, it will usually be released and broadcast to other platforms before the Internet police can block or delete them. The crackdown of some public accounts and blockage of different voices will reveal to the public the facts of deprived information freedom. The more information deleted or blocked from the mobile sources; the more curious people will be. WeChat users still can see the title of the deleted articles from the mobile, and they can still search the title and access those articles online if they have a computer. This makes the information blockage difficult.

Third, a variety of functions of the WeChat platform provoke new forms of knowledge transmission and creation. Social groups are using the WeChat platform to broadcast news and lectures. The forming of mega-groups on the WeChat platform reinforces fast broadcasting of common ideas and culture awareness among group members. Supported by the government as a tool of economic and technologic development, WeChat is becoming a great platform for the exchange of political thoughts and cultural views. Tied up with countless economic and political interests, it will be impossible for the government to stop this huge vessel of information by blocking the whole WeChat platform. With the accumulation of knowledge, capital,
and human relationships on the WeChat platform, WeChat will inevitably bring about profound change in Chinese society.

Finally, the mobile platform will enable followers of different religions from around the world to form communities with similar values and allow them to work together for the same cause and shared agenda. The WeChat platform will play an even greater role in shaping the Chinese people’s awareness of human rights and facilitate the development of a civil society with social groups of common values and beliefs.

**Data & Methodology**

The research in this paper include information from WeChat research reports, Christian WeChat public accounts, WeChat mega-groups, groups, and individual WeChat conversations. The information collected from the Christian WeChat public account includes the general background, mission statement, and the titles and content of articles released in public accounts. The inter-communication data of the released WeChat articles and readers was studied as well.

Based on the observation of the mega-group activities on the WeChat platform for six month, the author extracted the characteristics and the forming mechanism of knowledge chain of the mega-group.

**1. The Advantages of the WeChat Platform**

**A. Easy Accessibility**

Free services, easy accessibility, and the multimedia information transmission function are the top three reasons for the user to choose WeChat (Kuang, 2016).
WeChat has become one of the most popular mobile apps in the world since Tencent company released it in 2011. About 80% to 90% of the mobile users in Mainland China use WeChat or QQ mobile apps (CINIC, 2016, p.1). By August 2016, WeChat had a total user population of 700 million around the world (Peter Weber, 2016), with about one tenth of them being outside Mainland China (IIPR, 2016, p.1). According to the 2015 social application user behavior annual report (CINIC, 2016) by the Chinese Internet Network Information Center, the WeChat public account, similar to a blog function on WeChat platform, has become one of the main WeChat services; about 80% of the users will click and read the web page released from their “Friend Circle” links on WeChat. Around 60% of the users will use WeChat for more than an hour per day, and 75% of the users will use it over half hour per day.

B. Lower Threshold for We-Media

Compared with the traditional publishers and presses in Mainland China, the WeChat platform gives more freedom to Chinese people regarding the promotion of news and ideas, even though it is under heavy governmental Internet restriction and surveillance. The news released from journals, newspapers, and traditional publishers must go through several levels of censorship. However, news and ideas on the WeChat platform are usually released and broadcasted to other platforms before the Internet police can block or delete them.

The threshold for the news release has been minimized on the WeChat platform. To apply for a personal WeChat public account, you need only your true name, personal identification number, bank account, and mobile number. To apply for an
organizational account, one needs only the name of the organization, the code of the institution, the identification number, and the mobile number of the person who manages the account. The WeChat number is connected to the manager’s bank account and the public bank account of the organization.

When applying for a WeChat public account, the applicant can apply for a subscription account, service account or enterprise account to meet different ends. The subscription account supports the release of a single message every day and is most widely adopted by individual and group media applicants. The service account is designed for enterprises and companies to provide service inquiries, and it will allow the account owner to release four messages – usually commercial- every month. The enterprise account is mainly used for internal communications of companies and social groups.

C. Forging a Strong-tie Organic System

According to the CINI report (2015), people’s motivations for using WeChat include “to promote the interaction and emotional bond between friends” (80.3%), “to learn about the hottest news” (50.2%), “to get useful knowledge for my life and work” (49.1%), and “to learn about things in which I am interested” (45.8%). Compared with the other two social media platforms, Weibo and Momo, the users of WeChat form a stronger tie in the virtual community (p.38-39).

The information exchanged among users on WeChat enjoys a higher level of privacy and security. Wang and Gu (2016) explain how the technical design of WeChat enables “the free flow of information within the context of heavy Internet
policing and surveillance in the People’s Republic of China” (p. 23). They consider that the three functions unique to WeChat app - Moments, Friends’ Circle, and Share To– ensure the privacy and security of information dissemination of the platform. With those functions, the “free dissemination of information and public involvement through social media” (p. 23) is also ensured. Thus, the technology, design, and social context can interact to promote the possibility of social innovation.

Kuang (2016) compared the characteristics, functions and perceived accessibility and trustworthiness of WeChat and some other media like Weibo, newspapers, broadcasts, and TV in China. He found that the credibility of WeChat is the highest among all. Compared with weak-tie media platform Weibo, the strong-tie social media WeChat platform promotes trustworthiness of the information through person-to-person transmission and provides a platform for people to share their opinions to a wider audience. The hold-to-talk voice messaging, instant video talks, one-to-many text and voice messaging, photo/video sharing functions greatly cater to the users’ needs, and enrich the forms of information released from the WeChat platform.

2. The WeChat Religious Public Accounts

A. Large in Quantity and Variety

According to the social application user behavior annual report (CINI, 2015), the WeChat public account has become one of the main WeChat services. Around 58% of the WeChat users will read from a WeChat public account (p. 28-29). In 2015, the number of WeChat public accounts exceeded 10 million, and 11.2% of the accounts
belong to the government at different levels and NGOs (IIPR, 2016, p.4, p34). The number of government WeChat public accounts exceeded 83,000 in August 2015 (IIPR, 2016, p.47). Although none of the reports mentions religious public accounts, it cannot be denied that a significant amount of religious public accounts are active on the WeChat platform. These reports neglected the religious accounts partly because the number of the religious public accounts is comparatively lower than that of the mainstream and recreational WeChat public accounts. The government’s strict control over religious activity in public is another reason.

There are individual public accounts like “Wang Yi's Microphone” and “Christ Today.” There are WeChat public account belonging to certain group of people, such as fellowships, churches or religious organizations like “IJingjie” and “Living Rock.” There are WeChat public accounts attached to Christian news websites like “Christian Times” and “Behold”. There are also WeChat public accounts attached to government recognized Christian journals and electronic journals like “Tian Feng.” Besides those well-know public accounts, there are many religious WeChat public accounts with different social backgrounds that are created everyday.

**B. High Quality and Interactivity**

Compared with other types of public accounts, the religious public accounts may be smaller in number. However, they attract a great number of readers, and their readers are increasing day by day. The religious public accounts with high popularity usually win their readers through high quality and effective interactivity. Most of the religious public accounts keep the comment and praise function open to readers. The
readers can often see the comments of other readers at the end of an article and leave their own comments there. Different public accounts serve different groups of people. For example, “OC Behold” and “OC Overseas Campus” aim to serve the young Christians and students, and their WeChat public accounts are attached to Christian news websites. With growing numbers of followers, the rising of many Christian public accounts opens the possibility for new networks.

Jingjie was China's first non-profit WeChat public account focusing on faith, which was started in February 2013. The editorial is a group of media professionals of faith with deep concern for public issues. It aims to meet the people’s needs of soul and spirit and to restore the element of faith in news events and figures. A spiritual power to open up to a higher existence, the intelligence of rational analysis, and emotional intelligence of interacting with people are the three key elements of the public account.

The author collected the data from the WeChat public account “IJingjie” at the very beginning of December 2016. In the 30 days of November 2016, “IJingjie” released 27 articles. Some of the articles are combined with a small video of a Bible story on top of their pages. The average click rate of the 27 articles is 19,742 times per article; the average praise rate is 217 times per article, and the average comments are 29 pieces per article. With a click of the “reward” key at the end of the article, readers can also make a small financial donation to the original articles. The donation could be of any amount between one to 256 Yuan, and each original article received an average of 117 donations.
By December 5th, the article “America’s future does not depend on the president— the Christian voice of ‘Revive us’ ” (Nov. 7th) won the highest click rate of 63,652 among the 27 articles released in November. An article talking about how the Christian faith helped to bring back a family — “Our Marriage Resurrected After the 9th Year of the Divorce”— won the click rate of 47,533 (Nov. 18th). In the third place is an article about a Chinese badminton Olympic champion Lin Dan’s recent scandal: “Can People Stick to the Bottom Line on Their Own? — On Lin Dan’s Derailment During His Wife’s Pregnancy” (Nov. 21st). From the following table of the top three and monthly average click rate of articles on Ijingjie, we see that the interaction between readers and the writers is very active. Some of the comments of readers won hundreds of praises.

Table 1: Top Three and Monthly Average Click Rates of Articles on Ijingjie

(Counted by Times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Click Rate Per Article</th>
<th>Praise per Article</th>
<th>Comments Per Article</th>
<th>Donations Per Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 1 Article</td>
<td>63,652</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 2 Article</td>
<td>57,052</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 3 Article</td>
<td>47,533</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Average</td>
<td>19,742</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Wang Yi’s Microphone” is a WeChat public account named by the owner’s real name. By early October, the average click rate of the 15 pieces of articles he released in Sept. 2016 was about 5,800 times per article, and the average praise rate
per article was 90 times. By December 5th, the article “Surplus Grace” (Nov.24th) won the highest click rate of 18,379 among the 15 articles released in November. The article “How can Christians Identify Heresies” won the click rate of 16,166 (Nov.1st). In the third place is the article “Will Revolution Happen in China Again?” (Nov.15th)
The average click rate of the 15 articles released in November is 7,631 times per article, and the average praise rate and comments per article are 125 and 25 respectively. We see from the record of these two months that the click rate of Wangyi’s article is increasing.

Table 2: Top Three and Monthly Average Click Rates of Articles on Wangyi’s Microphone (Counted by Times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Click Rate Per Article</th>
<th>Praise per Article</th>
<th>Comments Per Article</th>
<th>Donations Per Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 1 Article</strong></td>
<td>18,379</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Not displayed on the article page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 2 Article</strong></td>
<td>16,166</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 3 Article</strong></td>
<td>14,372</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monthly Average</strong></td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zhao Yi (2014) analyzed the integration mode of traditional paper media and the WeChat platform with the example of the Yangzi Evening WeChat public account. He concluded that the public account is characterized by its mode of “high quality resources + key words + navigation information push...Offline activities + online micro-interaction...Sub-screen reading interface + text + picture + voice,” and a combination of flexible and interactive information exchange. Bai (2015) proves that
among the well-educated social group, the information quality is far more important than the recreation level in attracting more users (p. 49-55). The data from the aforementioned religious public accounts also support Zhao and Bai’s conclusion.

**C. Clear Religious Identity and Mission**

Most of the Christian WeChat public accounts carry very clear identification symbols and standpoints. Pictures of the cross, the Holy Bible, light and Jesus are always adopted as the background of an article. The most common types of articles include personal faith testimony, spiritual practice, everyday Bible verses, hymns, and sermons. The terms and concepts of Christianity are frequently used in the articles. The world and people’s lives are interpreted through the lens of the Holy Bible. Articles on family, education, marriage and career are always popular with the readers.

Take the Wechat public account “Christian Times” as an example, it calls itself a network Gospel ministry, and its mission is to spread the Gospel. It also claims to be trans-denominational and will not be affiliated with any group or church organization. Its mission is to become a platform or a bridge between the churches, society, the governments and the believers, and to build the kingdom of God. The WeChat account of “Christian Times” is linked to the website of the “Christian Times” with columns on the church, service, theology, society, family, life, and business. “Christian Times” presents rich and profound content to meet the needs of Christians’ spiritual lives.
According to the statement of the “Christian Times,” content is the soul of a website, the content of a Christian website shall be taken from the Church and used in the Church. “For the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart” (Hebrews 4:12).

As its mission statement goes, “Christian Times” records the history of the various churches under the leadership of God; it records the acts of Christians and their institutions in all spheres of society to witness the grace of God. In Sept. 2016, the WeChat public account “Christian Times” released a total of 182 articles, with five to seven articles every day on average. On every day’s content table, there are reflections on current religious issues, faith testimonies, Christian hymns or poems, some gospel messages, sermons, or Bible stories. “Christian Times” does not only release the articles of personal faith testimonies. Within this month, it released seven articles about the life of preachers in rural and urban areas, twelve articles on church services and church management, and three articles about religious services across national borders.

D. Quick Response to Social Issues

Most of the Christian WeChat Public Accounts respond to social issues in different ways. Articles on hot topics will attract more readers, however, articles on some political issue may lead to a blockage of articles or even the shutdown of the WeChat public account. The faith communities supporting the public accounts are
usually vague in their legal identity: some of them belong to the traditional "gray market." Even if they belong to the government supported “red market,” they cannot ensure that every word released on the public account is not on the government’s forbidden list.

To set up a new WeChat public account is the common practice of those who encountered a shutdown. “IJingjie” was recovered after a 20-day shutdown of the “Jingjie” by an official WeChat administrator. “Wang Yi's Microphone” was set up after the public account of Wang Yi's church, the “Autumn Rain WeChat Journal” had been shut down.

On September 22nd, “Wang Yi’s Microphone” released an article named “24 Citizens’ Proposal for the Interpretation of Articles 36, 89 of the Constitution”. It argues that the “Regulation” violates the constitution, and that the opinion collection process of the “Regulation” should be terminated immediately. When you click on the link to the article page, you will go to an empty page saying, “This content can not be viewed, other user’s complained that it violates relevant laws, regulations or policies.” However, if you are interested in this article, you can enter the name of this article in a search engine on the computer, and you will still find the article on various websites.

“Christian Times” released an article “The Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council promulgated a public notice on the revised draft of the Regulations on Religious Affairs (draft for approval)” in Sept. 8th, 2016. By early October, its click rate reached over 9,300 times. On Sept 9th, 2016, “Christian Times” released an
article named “What are the differences between the revised draft Religious Affairs Ordinance (Draft) and the 2004 Regulations on Religious Affairs?” This article did not make any comment on the difference but compared in details the clauses in the two versions of regulations. On Sept. 24th, “Christian Times” released an article “The draft of the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs (draft) — Views and Analysis of Some Religious Scholars and Pastors of House Churches.” This article gave both positive and negative comments on the “Regulation,” and questioned the ambiguity, reasonability and feasibility of the “Regulation.”

Another faith-based WeChat public account, “Cedar Leadership,” was started by scholar Zhaoxiao, a typical “Red market” Christian. He released two articles by Feng Xuewei - the general director of the former State Council Legislative Affairs Office - on October 10th and November 15th respectively. The titles of the articles are: “Several Principles of Establishing Religious Affairs Legislation by Drawing on the Historical Development of Religious Freedom,” and “Comments and Suggestions on the Draft of Revised Regulations on the Religious Affairs.” Compared with the article blocked in Wang Yi’s Microphone, these two articles expressed a similar stand. They expressed an opinion contradictory to the mainline media, and advocate religious freedom with professional legislative analysis and historical facts.

From the above example, we see that different WeChat public accounts seem to be labeled red, black or gray by the government. The voice from the “gray market” religious leaders and the mass needs to strive to be heard, and their articles could be blocked or deleted by the WeChat administrator any time. In comparison, the voices
from people with higher social status enjoy higher tolerance from the government, and they can talk about some sensitive issues that others cannot.

3. The Mega-group: a Comprehensive Platform

3.1 The Forming of Mega-group

A church with more than 2000 attendees is usually called a mega church (Baird, 2006). A WeChat mega-group, however, can reach a level of about 10,000-20,000 members and even more. We know that Tencent Technology – the designer of the WeChat – set a 500 members limit to the number of people in a WeChat group, and the person who joins in a group with over 100 people is required to go through the real-name verification and to have his/her personal bank account linked to his/her WeChat account.

How can a group reach the level of tens of thousands people? Let us examine the forming process of the mega-group. A WeChat group can easily be established through the invitation function of the WeChat app. The host needs first to choose a person from his contacts and begin the conversation mode; then he can keep on inviting people to join this conversation until the number of people in this group reaches 500. A host can keep creating new WeChat groups only if others would like to accept his invitation to join. Thus, a host can create unlimited numbers of groups.
with 500 people. Therefore, a host can have tens of thousands of people in his groups.

Graph 1: The Space Relationship Within a Mega-group

3.2 The Mechanism of the Knowledge Chain

You may ask how the host connects the groups together? What is the mechanism for the forming of mega-group? The technologies offered by the WeChat platform and some information technology enterprises give the answer. The WeChat app enables individuals to send point-to-point and point-to-group information in the form of a voice message, video, picture or text. The host of the mega-group can use some broadcasting equipment or software to send a message in any of these forms to all the groups at the same time. The information the host sends out will be automatically received and stored on the receiver’s mobile. People who receive the message can read or listen to the message any time. In this sense, the WeChat app enables a mobile to become a movable information storage device.

The receiver of the message can respond to the host’s message with negligence, silence, comments, questions and relevant information in the WeChat group or private conversation. The host can further interact with many members of different groups in a WeChat group or private conversation, and he can share the conversations further
with all the other groups. A host will usually share the discussion on the most frequently asked questions and hot topics to all his groups. Thus, a hot topic can get hundreds of people involved in the discussion and generate new knowledge. After several rounds of discussion and debate, some common understanding and value can be reached under the host within the WeChat mega-group.

Graph 2: The Multi-period Knowledge -Value Forming Mechanism of the Mega-Group

H: Host; G: Groups; M: Members; I: Information;
CKV: Common Knowledge & Value

3.3 The Characteristics of the Mega Group

A Charismatic leader, cultural value, technical support and stable profitability mechanism are the most important components to support the mega-group. To understand these core elements, we take one of the WeChat mega-groups as an example. We call this Mega-group “Thoughts” in the paper.

A. Clear Mission

This mega-group consists of 40 sub-groups and about a dozen correlated groups. The subgroups are enlarged by the invitation function at random, and the correlated groups mainly focus on some specific field like history, culture, international politics, economics and finance, market analysis, new industry analysis, and investment. The
The mega-group has a very clear statement of mission and culture characteristics. In the group introduction, it says:

We are the Chinese descendants from around the world. We are using the same language and sharing the same heritage of Chinese culture. Through the Internet, we get together across the oceans. We learn the facts of Chinese history and culture here, and we explore the future path of Chinese civilization. The Internet brings us together; it enables us to exchange ideas and enlighten us with a broader cultural rationality. The persistent collision of thoughts here will surely bring about personal enlightenment and insight and awaken our consciousness and self-confidence. Once this consensus is formed, and the power of the social groups is cultivated, this nation will surely present a grand new ideological enlightenment. Before this, we need to learn to think, with the essence of human civilization, and to guide the future change with an inner conscience.

This introduction of the mega-group encourages people with open-minds to work together with people of similar ideas and to make change of the current system.

**B. Clear Vision**

This mega-group has a clear vision for future development. It plans to develop a large or medium-sized Internet community with unique culture values. To form a scale effect, the expected participants shall reach two million to five million people. In the first stage of the group development, it focused on the cultivation of a study
group on the WeChat platform, and it will gradually expand the services to tourism, family and marriage, immigration and studying abroad, business logistics, and promotion of new products. To create an online community with both social and economic values, the host is planning to set up media platform both inside and outside Mainland China with steady financial support.

C. Content-oriented Study

Within the past two years, this mega-group has invited some well-known scholars, experts and pastors at home and abroad to give lectures on the WeChat platform. Each lecture is simultaneously broadcasted to all the subgroups of the mega-groups, and there are three lectures broadcasted every week on average. These lectures give systematic analysis to the hot topics of politics, economy, and culture in the world and China.

Under the initiative of group members, this WeChat community started a series of book reading activities. Some classic books are recited and recorded, and the voice messages of the books were broadcasted to the mega-group. The most welcomed books among the group members include: Two Treaties of Government, The Spirit of Law, The Wealth of Nations, Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Declaration of Independence, the Road to Serfdom, the Principles of Economics, Investment theory, and Social Science and Statistical Analysis.

The host of the mega-group concludes in his speech that the lectures and book reading activities stimulated individuals’ innovation and thinking. Whether adults or
students, their way of thinking, knowledge structure, and openness to new ideas are significantly improved.

**D. Charismatic Leader**

The host of this mega-group is a Christian and an experienced macroeconomic expert with the doctoral degree in economics. He will release his comments on some current affairs, macroeconomic situations, cultural, and religious topics on a daily or weekly basis. Most often, his message will first be broadcasted to the mega-group in the form of a voice message; the voice message will then be transformed into a text message and shared within the sub-groups of the mega-group.

The host established a good relationship with scholars, activists, merchants and freelance writers at home and abroad. He will break the ice for every invited lecturer and introduce the lecturer to the audiences in the sub-groups. He will comment on every lecture, analyze different opinions and theoretical traditions, and make claims that can hardly be heard from the mainstream media. He advocates common sense, democracy, civil society and freedom, and he criticizes the totalitarian government and the distorted official history bitterly. Therefore, the impression he gives to the members in the mega-group is knowledgeable, righteous, and conscientious.

**E. Sustained Financial Support**

To support the broadcast of information in different forms, the mega-group will release donation notices to every sub-group and encourage people in the group to donate their pocket money. Although some people will donate small number of money from time to time and some people never donate, all of them are equally
welcomed. They will paste the name list of those who donated money on the group space almost every week. The donations usually range from 5 to 3000 Yuan. According to the donor's request, the names on the list will sometimes appear as anonymous.

The mega-group also adopted a membership system. The annual membership fee is 50,000 Yuan or more for honorary members; 2,800 Yuan or more for senior members; 1,000 Yuan for ordinary members; 220 Yuan for access to lectures and book readings. Honorary members will be invited to participate in high-level community gatherings of experts and elites and to join the community counselor committee. The host offers to senior members and ordinary members comprehensive analysis of political, economic and financial situations, as well as new industry and investment around the globe.

F. Small Team and Various Broadcasting Technologies

At the present, a very small team is supporting the whole project. The core members contacting the whole WeChat group are two persons: the host and the manager. The original contents created by the team are the host’s comments on various topics in the form of voice message and texts, and the manager’s oral reading of some classic books. The manager will periodically send texts to each WeChat group member to ask for everyone’s personal comments and intention of donation.

The fast development of WeChat technology, rich functions of various soft wares, and other online platform compatible to the WeChat are the key elements to support the small team management mode of the mega-group. Qianliao, WeChat Information
Exporter, and the Himalaya FM are some of the most frequently used voice services in the mega-group.

In addition to the regular broadcasting of voice messages in the mega-group, the platform “Qianliao”- literally means a thousand talks– is frequently used in the WeChat mega-group. The Manager will release the information to the mega-group about the exact title, time and lecturer of a lecture on the “QianLiao” platform, if the group member was interested in the topic, he could pay a small sum of money, usually ranging from 5 to 50 Yuan to listen the lecture. What the listener needs to do is to scan the two-dimensional code of the lecture offered in the mega-group, and the scanning will automatically link him to the pay page and enable him to complete the payment on the mobile. Then, the listener can wait to the designated live broadcasting time to listen to the lecture and communicate with the lecturer directly through “Qianliao” during the live time, or he could choose to listen to the lecture anytime after the live broadcast.

To the lecturer, it is also very convenient to use the “Qianliao” platform. He just needs to download a “Qianliao” app into his mobile, and then he can record his voice message with it. He can promote the lecture by sharing it to different groups, and receive payment with his mobile. With this app, anyone has something to say can actually use it as a personal radio station to share a message; with this technology, different values and ideas will walk closely into peoples life and help shape new thoughts. It is almost impossible for the prior audits of the government to work on this private broadcast station.
The first broadcast of a lecture in the mega group is always in the form of voice fragments. It is restricted by the WeChat service function - a single piece of voice message shall not exceed sixty seconds. Therefore, a 60-minute lecture will need to be sent in 60 pieces at least to each receiver. Although the WeChat app will enable many pieces of information to be played automatically without pause, the process of playing could be interrupted by other apps or functions in the mobile. Due to a time delay of sending and receiving messages, a lecture could be in disorder when it arrives at different mobiles. Some listeners could find that the earlier message comes later, and it is hard to reconnect the disordered lectures together. To solve this problem, the host and the manager will turn the fragmented voice message into a whole piece of mp3 audio message. There is software named “WeChat Voice Exporter” to help with turning pieces of voice message into a whole. The whole piece of voice message is usually sent again to the mega-group for the convenience of those who are not be able to hear the fragmented messages. The message could also be stored in a web disk for the group members to download; it could be stored on Himalayan FM platform for the listener to listen anytime.

The Himalaya FM is one of China's largest online voice-sharing platforms. By the end of 2015, its users had reached 200 million. The mission declaration of Himalayan is “Enable me to listen to what I want to listen, and enable me to speck what I want to speak, at anytime and any place”. Himalayan tries hard to meet the users demand and devotes itself to unremitting innovation.

4. An Interactive Culture and Value Platform
4.1 Ambiguity: Is the Mega-group Cultural or Religious?

Interestingly, with a clear vision to explore the correct development direction of national culture, the lecture topics of the mega-group will inevitably go to the comparison of different religions and their influence on Chinese culture. The lectures covering religious topics in the mega-group include: “The Relationship Between Western Civilization and Christian Culture;” “Will Christian Culture Bring us Democracy?” “The Conversation of Confucius Analects and The Holy Bible;” “The Life Philosophy of Laozi;” “Laozi’s Realm of Life: Return Good for Evil;” and “The ‘Democratic’ Thoughts of Laozi.” Some of the lecturers clearly express their identity as a Christian, and some of them express strongly their love of tradition Chinese culture. The lectures always arouse heated discussion among the group members in the sub-groups. Their questions after the lecture will be forwarded to the lecturer immediately, and the lecturer will usually answer their questions on the spot in the form of a voice message or text message. Their discussion will be simulcasted to all the sub-groups.

Among the books promoted and read in the mega-group, there are some books that focus on traditional values like *The Canon of the Way* and *The Analects of Confucius*. The Holy Bible is the most frequently discussed book in the mega-group.

Besides, there is a correlated WeChat group named “Knowing Jesus” in the mega-group with about 100 members. The lectures and book-reading activities of the mega-group are also promoted here in this correlated group. The links and content shared here are mostly from religious public accounts. The members here will also
share the videos and voice messages of their church.

4.2 Interactivity: Questioning and Answering

The mega-group is a very active online community. The host and group manager will introduce lecturers, sending voice message of current issue comments, or voice message of classical books almost everyday. Faith, justice, culture, consciences and human rights are the most frequently used words in the lectures and conversations. The frequently asked and discussed questions also include: Do Chinese people need faith? What is faith? Can Christian culture save China? Can we find confidence in our traditional culture?

Discussions after the reading activities are always heated in the mega-group. After the group manager read Locke’s *Two Treaties of the Government* to the mega-group, one of the group member left a message in a sub-group space, saying:

“I am very surprised to see that Locke mentioned about the Holy Bible and Adam so many times in his book. I just cannot understand why he talked about Adam and God so often in a book on government. I am very curious about the Bible, and I feel the urgent needs to read the Bible and to figure out what Locke is talking about.” A group member responded to him on WeChat immediately, “I strongly support your decision to read the Holy Bible, you will never regret it!”

Almost every time anybody asked questions about the Holy Bible and Christianity, there would be someone in the group to respond to the questions. From the way and the language used in the answers, it is not difficult to identify that there are some Christians in the mega-groups. Some of them even using Bible terms to
name their WeChat account, for example, “the way, the truth and the life,” “Serve the Kingdom of Lord,” and “Emanuel.” Some of them are in Mainland China, and some of them are overseas Chinese. A brother from the United States even shared the pictures of worshiping scenes in his church to support his claim that the fundamentalist Christian Church is pious and meek.

Sometimes, debates among the group members are heated. Some of them are truthful followers of traditional Chinese culture. They consider that Christianity is a very dangerous religion that could drive Chinese people into betraying their tradition. They post some article links and conversation records refuting the Christians and their bad behavior. In contrast, the Christians are patient in introducing Christian culture and church. They are taking every opportunity on the WeChat platform to link the current topics to the Christian culture and try to transmit the message of the Gospel to other group members. Once a Christian leaves a message about the Gospel on the WeChat group chat space, some other Christians will stand out to supplement the ideas with more information.

4.3 Individuals, Public Accounts, and Groups

On the WeChat platform, individual users, public accounts, groups, and mega-groups form some incredibly complex webs and sub-webs. Information from individuals, public accounts and groups are transmitted quickly over space and time. In a mega group, concepts and ideas are discussed, evaluated, sublated, accepted or renewed. The comparative isolated social groups are thus reconnected and reorganized.
If we consider the articles criticizing the new religious regulation on WeChat public accounts to be an open calling for religious freedom, then, the releasing of messages from the religious WeChat public accounts, and the discussion over religious topics among individuals, groups and the mega-groups on WeChat platform could be considered as the practice of religious freedom. WeChat technologies enable the transmission of knowledge to happen under any circumstances, and the transmission of Gospel is no longer confined in specific time, space, or group. WeChat platform links people around the world together and enables them to work together for similar values and pursuits.

During the opinion collection period of the revised draft of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, Chinese Christians around the world received a 6,689-word letter via WeChat, email, or other point-to-point social media. The title of the letter is: “To Cry out Aloud for the Freedom of Faith–A Fasting Prayer of 21-days.” The letter is composed of twenty-one parts, including the detailed contents of prayer for each day in the 21-day prayer program.

It invites Chinese Christians from around the world to pray for the churches rights of religious gathering at home and in legal property, the church’s rights to have their properties and religious personnel, the church’s rights of evangelizing overseas. The letter encourages Christians to pray for the legalization of theology schools in China, the church’s service at community level, the common see of the Christians, the forming of lawyer groups to stand up for the church, the unity of the church, and the courage of the church leaders, Christians and students in theology schools. The letter
also encourages Christians to pray for the justice and peace of the state leaders, the State Council, the Deputy of the people’s congress, the religious bureaus, the neighborhood committee, the national security police, and the property owners of gathering places. Finally, the letter invites the Christians to pray for the authority and kingdom of the Lord. Although the regulation was approved according to Chinese government’s plan, the adversity put Christians of house churches around the world in the same boat and urged them to work together. With the help of modern information technology, Chinese Christians are contacting each other and working together for the same agenda.

Yan (2016) argues that if we view media as a subsystem of the society, any change within the subsystem will influence other subsystems in the society, and thus provoke the adjustment of social structure. Media is no more than some “instrumental existence,” and it even develops into an “organic existence” as people’s source of information and spiritual life (p.142), which have become an indispensible part of peoples’ lives. On the WeChat platform, the information releaser and receiver are of equal positions; the content-driven ties replaced the identity-driven ties leading information awareness. People with similar value perspectives and preferences will be able to contact each other through comments on the articles released on WeChat public accounts, “Friend Circle” links, and group conversations; This establishes more intimate ties with people on the WeChat platform.

4.4 Reproducibility: the Restriction and Reshuffling
Deeply rooted in the system of social economy, different elements contribute to the organic integration of the WeChat ecosystem (IIPR, p.14). The suppression of certain spheres of the WeChat ecosystem might cause a series of reactions from different social groups. According to Yang (2006),

Heavy regulation cannot effectively reduce religion. It can only complicate the religious market by pushing religious organizations and believers into the black and gray markets. Under heavy regulation, the gray market is not only huge, but it is also volatile, providing a fertile ground for NRMs. For regulators and regulation enforcers, the gray market means an unmanageable state of religious affairs (p.117).

With the deletion and blockage of WeChat articles and information, government’s restrictions on people’s basic human rights — the rights of free thoughts, faith, speech and gathering — are more visible to the public than ever before. It exposes the WeChat users to the fact that the control over dissidents is happening all the time in people’s daily lives. These practices attracted more attention and provoked a higher sense of human rights among the mass.

On November 29th, many WeChat groups like Thought Salon, Walking in the Rain and Hardship, Road to Constitutionalism, Consensus, and Toward the Republic, were shut down for their engagement in the discussion of freedom and democracy. Many famous scholars’ WeChat accounts lost the function of releasing messages, and some WeChat lecture groups were also closed. One of the sub-groups of the WeChat
mega-group and one of the mega-group manager’s personal WeChat accounts were shut down.

The reason for this government action is due to many website’s discussion over the death of Castro and the comparison of Cuba’s social institution with that of China (Qiao, 2016). As a response, the WeChat account Walking in the Rain and Hardship released a notice to their group members. The notice informed them that a new group with a new name will be created, and the group members can withdraw from the original one and invite more friends to join the new group.

Wang Jiangsong (Qiao, 2016) considers that the Words cannot be completely controlled unless the authorities cut off the Internet:

[The WeChat group] can be rebuilt or even multiplied. The original host can withdraw from a group, and everyone else in that group can be the new host. Everyone can build new groups and gather the original group of people together and continue to do with what they have been doing before. Therefore, the Internet society poses a challenge to the traditional political system: the coercive regulation behavior does not work, unless you cut off the whole Internet.”

Chen Yongmiao (Qiao, 2016) argues that the control over public speech has always been restricted in China. From BBS, blogs, WeiBo (Micro blog) to WeChat, the government’s control on media increased with the upgrade of information technologies. With each new round of upgraded product, more and more people are joining in the democratic movement. The common practice is that many host of WeChat group have established more groups for the storage of contacts in case of a
sudden block. The shut down, reestablishment and flourishing of some WeChat religious public accounts, and the closing and expanding of some WeChat groups have proved this. Together they depict a great picture of future online civil society and usher the forming of practical civil society.

The concept of “global civil society” is assumed to be of a society with equal human rights, social vitality, culture pluralism, and political democracy. The notion of “civil society” is “associated with voluntarism - citizens coming together voluntarily to carry on this or that collective agenda” (Berger, 2005).

According to Gunitsky (2015), China’s WeChat are rapidly becoming “both a source of active citizen participation and a tool for non-democratic governments” (p.44). Under the authoritarian government, China seems to drift away from the global trend of democracy. However, WeChat has reshuffled the ecological order of the media society (Yan, 2016). It influences people’s way of expression and action and gradually changes people’s cognition of the self, of the others, and of the social environment. The interactive comment function offered by the WeChat platform connects the acquainted society with unknown people and opens a channel linking to other public web platforms. Individual discourse can enter public platform through “forward” and “share” functions. Thus, the acquaintance-oriented interactive evaluation system develops into a stranger-oriented public evaluation system, which fosters the user’s self-cognition system with various value standards. In the WeChat ecological system, a variety of media technology, social and political forces will be treated equally. The competition among them, and the mutation, evolution, and
symbiosis phenomena of them will further promote the development of WeChat application.

**Conclusion**

The easy accessibility of WeChat functions and services has created a great opportunity for social change and cultural renewal for Chinese people. The shutdown, rebuilding, and development of religious public accounts reveal the vitality of Christian communities under government’s restriction. The forming and expanding of WeChat mega groups forges a great potential of culture, thoughts, values, and faith reformation. In the WeChat age, individual, public accounts and mega-groups form a large network; the religious “gray market” is developing among them and is renewed day by day. Although they are ambiguous in their cultural and religious identity, the interactivity among them cradles the future scalability of a huge Internet community of faith. Under heavy restriction of the government, the reproducibility of a faith community and online civil society has ushered the idea of human rights and democracy into the Chinese society. However, it is not clear if these ideas will change the current political order due to authoritarian circumstances.

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A Dilemma between God’s Will and Governing Authorities: the Fertility Desires and behaviors of Chinese Christians——Based on the Case of Church G

WANG Ling

Abstract: Taking Church G as a sample, this article aims to describe the predicament some Chinese Christians are facing with. People in this church is struggling sorely in a dilemma: on the one hand, God orders people to “be fruitful and increase in number, fill the earth”; on the other hand, Chinese government insists on Birth Control Policy strictly. As a result, members in church G have obviously higher fertility desires than average level of Beijing citizens. Whereas, their actual fertility rate is markedly lower than that.

After the universal two-child policy was carried out on January 1, 2016, fertility activities in church G was greatly changed. Fertility rates are distinctly improved. This kind of change may alter the total number and age structure of Chinese Christians. At the same time, pro-life ministry sprouts in church G, together with other churches, which may reduce abortions in Chinese Christians. It also may be good news to Chinese people who are trapped in the long lasting abortion tide.

Key words: Christians, Fertility desires, Birth control policy, Abortion
一、绪论

在影响生育意愿和生育行为的诸多因素中，宗教作为一个重要因素，正在引起越来越多研究者的关注。而在其中，由于存在一个特殊因素——持续时间长达40年的严厉的独生子女政策，宗教对生育意愿和生育行为的影响更加复杂和特别，因而更值得研究。

文献检索发现，对中国基督徒生育意愿和生育行为的研究目前在中国宗教社会学中基本处于空白，极少有论文聚焦到基督徒的生育意愿，更不用说受更多现实因素影响的生育行为了。

美国学者对宗教与生育的研究显示，宗教对生育有着显著的影响（Sarah R.Hayford,S.Philip Morgan2008）。Kevin McQuillan（2004）在比较不同信仰群体的生育情况之后得出结论，宗教信仰在以下三种条件被满足时对生育产生重要影响：宗教信仰必须具有与生育行为有关的行为准则；宗教团体必须有能力推动其会众遵守这些准则；宗教信仰成为个人认同的突出方面，也就是说，对于更加虔诚的个体，宗教对生育的影响就更明显。

在这个理论框架下考察中国基督徒的生育意愿和生育行为，会得出什么样的结论呢？本文尝试在北京市家庭教会G的个案研究基础上，对此问题进行探索。

通过对G教会的长期观察，与部分会众的访谈、多次主题座谈和通过微信进行的问卷调查，笔者发现，G教会存在一种异常现象：会众的生育意愿明显高于全国平均水平，其生育率却明显低于全国平均水平。这就带来一连串的问题：为什么会出现这种生育意愿与生育行为的异常悖离？在严厉的独生子女政策下，基督徒个体的生育行为受到什么样的影响？除了这些问题外，还有一个新的变化值得关注——2016年1月1日，中国废除了独生子女政策，实施两孩政策。中国基督徒对这一政策调整的反应是怎样？与其他群体有什么不同？这种不同将会如何反映在他们的生育行为上？

本文将通过解剖G教会这只麻雀的方式，尝试对上述问题作出回答。论文的第二部分通过数据和图表，具体阐述G教会存在的生育意愿与生育行为异常悖离现象；第三部分通过G教会会众的访谈和调查，分析造成这种异常悖离的原因；第四部分则是讨论G教会会众堕胎的话题，包括教会带领人和会众对堕胎的认知、会众堕胎和超生的案例以及信仰支持下的反堕胎行动的兴起。文章的最后一部分就个案研究内容提出结论和讨论。

二、异常的悖离——从生育意愿到生育行为

1. G教会基本概况

G教会是一家位于北京市东三环的家庭教会，107名固定参加敬拜者（不包括儿童）中有86名为受洗在册的会众，其他为会众尚未受洗的直系亲属。本次研究主要针对这86名会众。从性别结构看，G教会以女性为主，占比为68.6%：

从年龄结构看，中青年为绝对主体，70后、80后占总人数的68.9%。

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<tr>
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<th>50后及以前</th>
<th>60后</th>
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<tr>
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<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
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表1：G教会会众年龄结构

G教会目前的管理模式是由牧师R及其丈夫和另外两对夫妻组成六人同工会，对教会进行集体管理。重大事情都由同工会商定。R是同工会的核心。教会内部又分成八个小组，各小组设有小组长，不定期举行小组聚会。除周日敬拜外，一周里还有周三晚上的门徒培训、周五晚上的祷告会和周日下午的福音预工班。整体而言，教会内部各会众之间的联系相对比较松散，超过50%的会众只参加周日敬拜。

从神学观点上，G教会属于相对保守传统的福音派。教会跟外界的联系相对较少，周日的讲道大部分由本教会的牧师和同工承担。

2. 异常的悖离——更高的生育意愿，更低的生育率

通过访谈和调查，笔者发现，在G教会会众内部，存在着一种生育意愿和生育行为的异常悖离。

所谓生育意愿，指的是人们对于生育问题的看法、态度和倾向，具体包括生育目的、生育数量、生育性别和生育时间（顾宝昌2011）。生育意愿落实到具体的生育行为上，会因为各种抑制因素而打折扣。原美国人口学会会长Morgan提出，由于进度效应、不孕效应、竞争效应的影响，实际的生育水平会明显低于生育意愿。

国内外人口学者的研究显示，在发达国家和发展中国家中，都存在生育意愿和生育行为不同程度的悖离（Alicia Adsera 2006；杨菊华2008）。但是，G教会会众所表现出来的悖离异常显著——其生育意愿明显高于全国平均水平，而生育水平却明显低于全国平均水平。

先看生育意愿。根据对G教会28位年龄从27岁到53岁（出生于1963-1989年间）会众的调查，他们的理想子女数为2.37个。而根据中国社会科学院出版的《社会蓝皮书：2016年中国社会形势分析与预测》，中国华北地区民众的理想子女数为1.94。北京市卫计委在2014年7月8日启动实施单独两孩政策的公开新闻发布中披露，北京育龄妇女的生育意愿仅为1.3。这样算来，G教会会众的理想子女数比华北地区平均水平高出0.43个，比北京市高出1.07个。

再看生育行为。现存子女数是人口学上一个用来衡量生育率水平的重要指标，指的是夫妻双方现有存活子女数加计算，包括婚生子女、非婚生子女、养子女、有抚养关系的继子女。根据统计，G教会中60后人群的平均现存子女数为1个，70后为1.06个。（由于晚婚晚育等因素影响，G教会80后会众的平均现存子女数仅为0.18个，不在此项研究的比较之列。）

而根据 2010 年北京大学中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS2010），2010 年中国 30 岁女性平均现存子女为 1.5 个，更高年龄段的现存子女数量呈增加态势，54 岁年龄段的现存子女数为 2 个。7 很明显，G 教会 60 后和 70 后的现存子女数都大大低于同年龄段的平均水平。

另一组数据也可以证实 G 教会会众实际生育水平与平均水平的差距。根据中国社会科学院人口与劳动经济研究所研究员王广州的测算，北京市常住人口超生的比例为 20%。而在 G 教会在 20 对夫妻（注：指夫妻都是 G 教会在册的会众，夫妻双方只有一方信主的不在此列中）中，只有一对超生了一个孩子，占比仅为 5%。

3，全面两孩政策实施后 G 教会反应异常热烈

2016 年 1 月 1 日，中国正式实施全面两孩政策，提出“一对夫妻可生育两个孩子”。和政府预想的不同，全面两孩政策实施一年多，民众的反应总体比较冷淡。根据全国妇联 2016 年的调查，有 53.3%的受访家庭不想生育第二个孩子，在城市，这一比例超过 60%。腾讯新闻十万人调查的结果也显示，计划生二孩的仅占 31.4%。

从 2016 年全面两孩一周年的实际出生人口数量看，民众对二孩的反应的确并不热烈。根据国家统计局公布的数据，2016 年全国共出生 1786 万人，比 2015 年增加 131 万，远低于此前卫计委的预估。人口学者姚美雄发表文章，判断全面两孩政策已经遇冷 8。

然而，G 教会会众对全面两孩政策的反应异常热烈。21 位已经生育了一个孩子的育龄妇女（49 岁以下），截止到 2017 年 2 月底，已经有 6 位生了第二个孩子，1 位在孕，另有 3 位在备孕中，1 位在犹豫，明确表示不要二孩的 10 位，不要二孩的原因分别是年龄过大的（有 9 位超过 40 岁），6 位在 45 岁左右，她们表示如果政策早放开几年很可能再生）、身体状况不佳和经济压力太大等。这样算来，这 21 位育龄妇女计划生二孩的比例为 47.6%，在政策实施第一年生产和怀孕的高达 33.3%。G 教会会众对全面两孩政策的积极反应印证了这一群体明显高出全国平均水平的生育意愿。

G 教会同工 L 对教会的人丁兴旺表示兴奋。

“过去全教会一年平均也生不了一个孩子，现在一下子有六七个，还都是二胎，真热闹。”

上文几组数据共同勾画了 G 教会会众在生育意愿和生育行为上的异常悖离：其生育意愿明显高出其他人群，尤其是与北京市育龄妇女 1.3 的生育意愿相比，高出 82.3%。另一方面，其 60 后、70 后会众的实际生育水平却明显低于平均水平（80 后由于晚婚晚育原因未纳入统计对比）。

这一异常悖离现象的背后是一连串疑问：G 教会的会众为什么会拥有比其他人群显著高的生育意愿？又是哪些原因导致他们的实际生育水平显著低于平均水平？这种生育意愿和生育行为之间的异常悖离的根源是什么？全面两孩政策实施之后，G 教会会众为什么会出现如此热烈的反应？哪些因素在决定他们生育行为时在起作用？

下文将尝试对这些疑问做出解答。

7 王广州（2014）：中国老年人亲子数量与结构计算机仿真分析, 中国人口科学, 第 34 卷, 第(3) 期, 2-16.
8 姚美雄（2017）：把全面鼓励生育定为新基本国策很有必要 中国改革论坛 2017 年 2 月 28 日
三、上帝意旨与政府强权的悖离

通过对 G 教会近 40 位会众的访谈和调查，笔者发现，无论是明显高出平均水平的生育意愿还是明显低于平均水平的生育行为，宗教信仰都是一个不可忽视的影响因素。概括地说，由于基督信仰的影响，G 教会会众拥有显著高于平均水平的生育意愿；同样是由于宗教信仰的缘故，G 教会会众有更大的动力和压力制约自己的生育行为，以使自己的生育行为符合国家法律规定，其生育率因此明显低于平均水平。

1. 迥异的生育观和生育意愿

访谈中发现，G 教会会众的生育观跟大众有所不同，这直接影响到其生育意愿。生育观是人们在一定的社会、经济、文化背景下对生育的看法和评价。在中国，由于长达四十年的独生子女政策和“人口是负担”的大量宣传，中国人的生育观从整体上已经被改变。传统“多子多福”、“养儿防老”等观念已经基本破除，少生优生已经成为主流的生育观。9

笔者在对北京部分育龄群众的访谈中发现，在 80 后、90 后中，“传宗接代”意识已经非常淡漠，青年一代更加重视个人享受和个人价值实现，养儿育女被视作一项耗时间耗金钱的辛苦活。

但对于 G 教会会众来说，80%以上的受访者表达了“儿女是耶和华所赐的产业”、“生养众多是神的祝福”等观点。正在酝酿要第二个孩子的会众 D 这样表达宗教信仰对她生育观的影响：“如果我不信主，可能我不会想再要一个孩子，确实多一个孩子要花费大量精力，很辛苦，经济压力也大，真是给自己找麻烦。我的朋友也觉得，你有那些钱和精力，还不如自己多买点漂亮衣服，多出去旅游，好好享受生活。但是我觉得，孩子是上帝赏赐给我的产业，他是无价的，我为他付出多大辛苦都值得。”

会众 F 认为，孩子的价值远胜过金钱和别的好处。

我认为孩子是神的祝福，圣经里面神给亚伯拉罕的应许就是后裔，像海边沙一样数不尽的后裔，不是金钱，不是别的什么好处，是后裔。这说明孩子在神眼里看是非常宝贵的。”

基于圣经的生育观，直接影响到 G 教会会众的生育意愿，具体表现在生育目的和生育数量上。

会众 H 的理想子女数是三个，她表示她从来没有考虑过为了养老多生孩子：

我看到新闻里面说穆斯林的生育率很高，人数增加很多，就很担忧，我们现

9 王培安 国务院新闻办全面两孩政策实施新闻发布会 2015 年 11 月 10 日
在生育率这么低，人数就增加得慢啊。有时候我听外面的牧师讲道鼓励年轻基督徒多生几个，扩张神的国度，我就热血沸腾，可惜就是二胎放得太晚，我年龄有点大了，不知道还能不能生出来。

同工 L 同样看到了生育对信仰版图的影响。L 只有一个孩子。作为已过育龄期的 60 后，她已经放弃再生一个孩子。

基督徒应该多生一些，这也是符合神心意的。《创世纪》里也说的很清楚，你们要生养众多，遍满全地。咱们不生的话，地都被穆斯林占满了。

除了宗教因素外，G 教会会众愿意多生的原因还包括一个孩子太孤单、本人喜欢大家庭等。根据 2016 年初腾讯新闻进行的十万人网络调查，想生二孩的前三位原因分别是：有利于孩子健康成长，减轻子女养老压力，减少成为失独家庭的风险。两者对比可以发现，宗教信仰是 G 教会会众生育意愿的影响是显著的。

从生育意愿到生育行为，存在着文化、经济、就业等多方面的影响因素。在中国还有一个特殊因素，那就是生育政策。在 2016 年全面两孩政策实施之前的中国，独生子女政策是一条普通民众难以逾越的高压线，也是影响 G 教会会众较高生育意愿实现的重要因素。

2. 计划生育红线

中国举世闻名的独生子女政策开始于 1970 年代，并逐步在全国范围内展开。根据 1980 年 9 月 25 日《中共中央关于控制我国人口增长率问题致全体共产党员、共青团员的公开信》，计划生育的初衷是为了“控制人口过快增长”以及“促进社会主义四个现代化的实现”。

尽管在上述公开信和此后的《中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法》中都明确“提倡一对夫妻生育一个孩子”，中国政府对外宣传也强调民众是自愿实行计划生育，但是实际上，计划生育却是以强制的手段在全国推行。这是因为，由于独生子女政策与群众的生育意愿相悖，在实施过程遭遇了群众不同形式的抵抗。为确保顺利推行，中国政府采取了一系列强制手段。

这些强制手段包括：
① 在各级政府和相关部门及单位实行计划生育一票否决制。
所谓一票否决，也就是说，不管其他工作做得如何，只要是计划生育相关指标没有完成，就对其相关负责人处以取消评优甚至是降职、免职的处罚。这一制度成为各级政府和相关部门及单位高度重视计划生育工作、严抓共管的重要动力。
② 对违规超生者征收社会抚养费。
社会抚养费的征收依据是超生者违规多生了孩子，因而多占用资源，需要缴纳一笔费用以弥补额外的占用，其征收标准由各省自行规定，一般是当地上一年平均年收入的数倍甚至十倍之多，有的还要与当事人的收入水平挂钩。2014 年，著名导演张艺谋因为超生缴纳了 748 万元的社会抚养费，被称作中国社会抚养费第一大单，并引发了社会关于“超生罚款不公平，富人有钱可以任意超生”
的争论。
客观上看，高达数万甚至数十万元的社会抚养费对中低收入家庭来说是一笔巨款，因此在一定程度上遏制了部分家庭多生孩子的意愿。
③开除工作和开除党籍。
除了缴纳社会抚养费之外，超生者还有可能受到开除工作和开除党籍的处罚。尤其是在政府机关、事业单位、国有企业，“双开”是一个比罚款更让普通人难以承受的处罚。
④不给超生孩子上户口。
如果不能足额缴纳社会抚养费，当地派出所就会拒绝给超生孩子上户口，使得孩子成为一个没有身份、不能享受相关福利甚至被剥夺受教育权利的“黑户”。
根据国家发改委宏观经济研究院副研究员万海远 2015 年所做的调查，中国大约有 1300 万黑户，其中 50.8% 是因为 “超生不能上户口”。
此外，根据媒体报道，计划生育的强制手段还包括强制堕胎（如 2012 年陕西妇女冯建梅怀孕七个月被强制堕胎事件），亲属连坐上学习班，牵牛扒房抬粮等。上述这些强制措施以及官方媒体宣传造成的全社会对超生行为的负面评价，共同成为遏制民众生育意愿的因素。
G 教会会众作为生活在北京的普通民众的一份子，跟其他人群一样，受到上述遏制因素的影响。但这并不能解释 G 教会会众的实际生育率为何会低于平均水平。也就是说，G 教会会众由于宗教信仰的影响，拥有比平均水平更高的生育意愿。按照逻辑推理，由于同样受到计划生育政策的遏制，其实际生育水平至少应该与平均水平相当，但实际上，其实际生育水平却明显低于平均水平。这背后还有什么其他因素在起作用呢？

3，顺服掌权者的教导和认知
访谈中发现，在遏制生育意愿的因素中，除了生育政策不允许、时间精力不足、身体状况不允许、经济状况不允许等共同因素外，G 教会会众比普通民众多了一项宗教信仰的影响。
多名会众表示，既然国家规定不能超生，基督徒就要带头遵守生育政策。
会众 C 反对超生的态度尤其鲜明：
作为基督徒，你要顺服掌权者，国家不让生，你当然就不能生。但是如果你有很强烈的愿望要生，或者意外怀孕了，你就生下来，然后接受后果，接受处罚。如果会众都违反计划生育超生，也是不好的见证。
会众 K 认为，基督徒首先是社会人，应该无条件地服从政府的法律政策。独生子女政策既然形成，也有上帝的允许。基督徒当然要顺服掌权者。
会众 L 也曾经持类似观点，现在她对教会超生很少的现状表示遗憾。
我以前对计划生育没有感觉，政府让生一个就生一个呗，没多想。现在想想这个政策不对，违背神的心意。别的教会人家有生两个、三个的，我们教会都是听话的良民，几乎没有超生的。都是因为我们教会的教导，要顺服掌权
“顺服掌权者”出于《圣经》。《罗马书》第 13 章 1 至 2 节指出，“在上有权柄的，人人当顺服他，因为没有权柄不是出于神的。凡掌权的都是神所命的。所以抗拒掌权的就是抗拒神的命。”

据受访会众介绍，G 教会在平时的讲道中比较注重传讲“顺服掌权者”的信息，鼓励会众以大局为重，顺服掌权者，为基督做好的见证。

这一教导直接影响到了 G 教会会众的生育行为。他们主动压制自己的生育意愿，甚至在意外怀孕发生时，采取堕胎的方式解决问题，避免发生超生行为。正因为这个原因，G 教会会众虽然生育意愿高达 2.37，远远高于北京市育龄妇女 1.3 的生育意愿，但其最终的生育行为却反而明显低于平均水平。

对 G 教会会众的访谈和调查显示，在他们显著高的生育意愿和显著低的生育行为之间存在的异常悖离，其实是基督教“生养众多”的教义和政府独生子女政策的悖离。本来这双方会产生一种互相消减的力量，可能会使会众的生育行为出现不同的表现。但是由于 G 教会“顺服掌权者”的教导，使得天平偏向政府一方，结果最终表现为会众异常低的生育行为。

对比 Kevin McQuillan（2004）关于宗教影响生育的三条件理论，可以发现，在 G 教会，尽管第一个条件被满足，即基督教在生育问题有明确的教义，但是由于第二个条件没有被满足，即教会没有使用能力和手段推动其会众遵守这些规则，而是相反——通过宣讲顺服掌权者来压制会众较高的生育意愿，这就导致基督信仰没能发挥其原本在提升生育率上的正面作用，反而起到了反作用。

至于第三个条件，更加虔诚的个体，宗教对生育的影响就更明显，在下文的个案中将会进行讨论。

四，圣地黑影—G 教会中的堕胎

在全面两孩政策实施之前，对于已经有一个孩子的 G 教会会众来说，非常惧怕发生意外怀孕。这将使他们处在一个两难境地——留下这个胎儿就意味着会违规超生，会发生不顺服掌权者的行为；而堕胎，对于基督徒来说，也不是一个容易的选择。

访谈和调查发现，多名意外怀孕的会众在教会负责人知情的情况下选择了堕胎。至少在这些堕胎案例中，在上帝旨意和政府威权的悖离中，G 教会会众选择的天平再次偏向掌权者一方。

1. 堕胎泛滥

在讨论 G 教会内的堕胎现象之前，先来看一下中国的堕胎现实。实行了四十多年的计划生育，除了加剧人口结构的少子老龄化外，还助推了堕胎在全国范围的泛滥。根据卫计委历年的《中国卫生统计年鉴》，自 1971 年以来，仅国家卫生计生管理部门统计在册的人工流产就接近四亿例。如果加上未被统计在册的人工流产和数量庞大的药物流产，总的堕胎数量更加惊人。

2. G 教会内部的堕胎案例

根据调查，在 G 教会内部，2008 年至 2010 年三年间，至少发生了三起堕胎事件，而且都是在当事人跟教会负责人讨论过之后发生的。
个案 1:
2008 年，会众 M 意外怀孕。他们已有一个孩子。对于要不要留下这个孩子，夫妻俩有些犹豫。当时既有对 M 身体状况和家庭经济状况的担忧，又有超生会触犯“顺服掌权者”的惧怕。纠结之中，夫妻俩找到当时的教会带领人 N。M 回忆起当时的情景:

“她问我的第一句是，‘你们有生育指标吗?’ 我说没有。后来我说，如果这是神给我的苦杯，那我就喝了吧。我的意思是说，虽然我很怕再多一个孩子，会多很多辛苦和压力，但是如果是神给我的，我愿意受这个苦。但是她说，你怎么知道这是神给你的苦杯呢？是你们自己避孕失败造成的。耶稣当年在客西马尼园祷告，祂说的那个苦杯是指着十字架说的，是为了神的国，你们这个不是。我听她这样说就特别难过。最后她问我，现在孩子多大了?
我说四五十天吧。她说，那你要尽快了。她这样说，我就明白我该怎么做了。
提及此事，丈夫 F 很后悔。
那个时候我俩信主时间不长，很单纯，教会带领人的话差不多相当于神的话，我们就听了。他们的意思很清楚，不能违反政府规定，基督徒不能带头违反国家政策。现在我真后悔，如果时光倒流，打死我都得要，谁的意见我都不会听的。”

个案 2:
2010 年，会众 P 意外怀孕。她一直很想要二孩，只是由于政策限制，没敢行动。不信主的丈夫明确表示反对再生，要求 P 去堕胎，理由是在北京养两个孩子压力太大，而且国家政策不允许多生。他所在的是一家国有企业，超生的话很可能会被开除。
纠结之中，P 找到了教会带领人 N。

“当时她问我，是意外怀孕吗？我说是的，完全是意外。她说，你们怎么这么不小心？我感觉她就是在指责我没有尽到避孕的责任，我觉得很委屈。后来 R（教会另一位牧师）对我说生孩子也不是一个人的事，两个人意见要一致。那个时候除了顺服掌权者，我心里还有一个压力就是要顺服丈夫。这两座大山，把我彻底压垮了。”
个案 3：
2010 年，会众 Q 的妻子在带节育环的情况下意外怀上第二个孩子。由于担心带环受孕会影响到胎儿健康，Q 咨询 R 的意见。
“我记得她没有明确表态要不要堕胎，她当时说，生命的问题，要交托在神那里。但是我的信心不够，没有完全交托给神，我担心这个孩子不健康，我承受不了，所以就去堕胎了。”

对比这三个案例，可以发现，尽管情况各异，当事人都是在面临纠结和犹豫的状态下去寻求教会带领人的意见，最终的结果也都是堕胎。显然，教会负责人的态度对他们最终选择堕胎有重要影响。而教会唯一的一对超生夫妻，在遭遇意外怀孕后做了截然不同的选择。

3，G 教会的特例——唯一的超生者
2015 年，会众 S 的妻子意外怀孕。S 没有告知教会，自己做了生下这个孩子的决定。
“我们经济条件不好，养一个就很辛苦了，根本没想要老二。发现意外怀孕，我老婆当时就急哭了。我说无论如何也要生下来，尊重这个生命，而且要跟第一个孩子一样，平等地对待她。我没有跟教会说这事，我只是按照神的意思做，我也不想别人的任何说法伤害我老婆。按照法律，这个孩子不该生；按照圣经，必须生。虽然不合法，但是符合天条。人的法律和神的律法，依照大和小的原则执行，肯定小的服从大的。”

对比前三个堕胎案例和 S 的超生案例，尽管在同一个教会中，面对的是同样的教会带领人，当事人最终的选择跟自身对堕胎的认知和对教义的领会有关。当然，不能从堕胎这件事上得出 S 比别的会众更加虔诚的结论，但至少，在对堕胎这件事具体的事上，S 的态度更加符合基督教义，也更加虔诚。

这组案例也进一步证实了 Kevin McQuillan（2004）关于宗教影响生育的三条件理论。在头两个条件相同的背景下（同样的基督教义、同样的教会团体），由于个体的虔诚程度不同，宗教信仰对其生育行为产生的影响是不同的。在这组案例中，前三位会众选择了堕胎，而 S 选择了留下孩子，他和妻子也因此成为 G 教会唯一的超生者。

4，基督徒对堕胎的认知
对于堕胎问题，尽管基督教不同教派的观点并不完全统一，但已经有基本一致的态度，包括胎儿是按照上帝的形象被造的人，堕胎就是谋害人的生命。在《圣经》中也有多处经文肯定胎儿的价值。比如诗篇 139 篇 13 节，“我的肺腑是你所造的。我在母腹中，你已覆庇我。”

但是，访谈和调查发现，在 G 教会，不光是会众，同工和教会带领人对堕
胎的认知也非常模糊和有限。

教会带领人 R 在 2015 年底受访时表示，三个月之内的胎儿算不算生命，在基督教内部还存在争议。2016 年 2 月再次受访时，她表示，如果夫妻双方都是基督徒，在发生意外怀孕时还是要生下来，因为这是一个生命。

多位会众称，在 G 教会的主日讲道和其他形式的教会聚会中，从来没有涉及到堕胎的问题。堕胎案例 1 的当事人、会众 F 愧悔自己之前对堕胎问题的无知。

那几年没有认识到胎儿也是人，觉得他只是细胞，不算什么生命，对他没有感觉。后来，又学习了一些知识，看了一些书，尤其是看到我单位领导从美国教会带回来一个小胚胎，小小的，软软的，看到之后很难受。

根据笔者对北京市其他几个家庭教会和三自教会的调查，类似在堕胎问题上认知模糊不同程度地存在。有的牧师虽然也认为堕胎是不符合基督教义的，但是当会众意外怀孕有可能会违法计划生育时，常常会默许甚至纵容会众堕胎。至于在周日崇拜和聚会中不提与堕胎相关的信息是正常的。除了成都秋雨之福教会 2016 年发出反堕胎的立场宣言之外，大多教会对中国泛滥的堕胎现象保持沉默。

5，反堕胎事工在 G教会兴起

与中国教会在堕胎问题上的沉默和对会众教导的缺位相比，美国教会态度鲜明地表达了反堕胎的立场。在对会众进行反堕胎教导的同时，通过开办孕妇救助事工，以减少堕胎发生。美国 passionlife 机构负责人 John Ensor 介绍，美国约有近 3000 家由教会主办的孕妇救助站，免费为孕期危机中的孕妇提供服务。这些救助站在减少堕胎方面发挥了重要的作用。根据美国人口调查局的数据，1991 年，美国总人口为 2.53 亿，堕胎总量为 160 万。2015 年美国总人口为 3.2 亿，堕胎总量为 80 万。John Ensor 认为，在总人口持续增加的情况下，美国堕胎数量在 25 年间减少 50%，教会主导的孕妇救助事工功不可没。

值得注意的是，目前在 G 教会以及国内其他教会，已经出现了反堕胎事工的萌芽。在 G 教会，有过堕胎经历的会众组成了反堕胎小组，向教会其他会众传递反堕胎信息，并与其他教会联合，共同帮助在孕期危机中的母亲。

据笔者了解，除了北京之外，在陕西、四川、安徽、贵州等地的教会也开始出现反堕胎事工。

五、结论和讨论
通过对 G 教会会众生育意愿和生育行为的研究，大致可以得出以下结论：

1，基督信仰对 G教会会众的生育意愿有明显的正向影响。

两个论据可以证实这一结论：首先是会众在访谈中的对信仰影响自己生育意愿的肯定，80%的会众认为自己的生育意愿受到信仰影响。其次是调查得出 G 教会会众的理想子女数为 2.37 个，显著高于北京市育龄女性的 1.3 个。两者处于同样的文化、社会、经济环境和生育政策下，宗教信仰是其最显著的差异。

这一结论跟中国综合社会调查 CGSS2010 年中关于信仰与生育意愿的调查结果相符。根据华东政法大学李峰对上述调查进行的分析，宗教教义对个体的生育意愿有着直接的独立影响。信教者的意愿生育数要高于非信教者：基督宗教的信徒生育意愿要高于中国传统宗教信仰者。11

2，受顺服掌权者教义影响，G 教会会众对政府的生育限制政策更加敏感，更倾

11 李锋的这一结论尚未发表，预计将于 2017 年三四月份发表。
向于自我约束，对政府采取配合的态度。

这直接体现在教会生育意愿和生育行为的异常背离上——尽管教会会众受宗教信仰影响，生育意愿显著高于社会平均水平，但是其实际的生育水平却显著低于社会平均水平。对夫妻中仅有一对超生，显著低于北京市常住人口中20%的超生比例。

对生育政策的敏感还体现在全面两孩政策放开之后，教会会众迅速做出回应。政策实施仅一年零两个月，教会有一个孩子的21名育龄女性中，已有6名已经生下二孩。生二孩比例远远超出社会平均水平。这表明，生育政策调整后，教会会众被压制的生育意愿得到释放，生育水平显著提高。

3. 在宗教信仰影响生育的过程中，教会的教导有着重要的影响力。

如果教会积极主动宣讲关于生育的基督教义，鼓励会众多生育，就会对会众生育水平产生正向影响。否则，像教会这样既不宣讲相关教义，又不支持会众超生，反而强调要顺服掌权者，带头遵守生育政策，就会对会众生育行为产生负向影响。教会内部的三个堕胎案例表明，教会的教导、带领人的态度对于部分会众的生育行为产生直接的影响。

4. 基督信仰对生育的影响跟个体对基督教相关教义的领会和坚持有关，跟个体的虔诚度有关。

对于越虔诚、坚定遵守教义的个体来说，基督信仰就越容易对生育行为产生正向影响。教会内部三个堕胎案例和一个超生案例的对比，证实了这一点。除了上述结论外，还有一些问题值得进一步讨论。

首先，作为个案，教会显著高于社会平均水平的生育意愿来说，在其他教会是否存在类似情况？在低生育意愿已经成为社会现实的背景下，中青年会众，尤其是作为生育主力军的80后、90后会众，也会跟教会会众一样拥有较高的生育意愿吗？

此外，教会显著低于社会平均水平的生育行为是否具有代表性？根据笔者的调查，尽管在部分三自教会存在跟教会类似的避谈堕胎、带领人默许堕胎等现象，但是也有不少教会，牧师和会众都更乐于按照基督教义而不是政府生育政策来选择自己的生育行为。在北京不少教会，会众生育两三个孩子是比较普遍的显现，有的教会牧师自己就生了两个孩子。所以，教会生育意愿和生育行为的代表性，值得进一步研究。

其次，影响生育意愿的因素教多，除了宗教信仰外，还包括社会经济变量以及男孩偏好价值观等世俗因素。在基督徒的生育意愿中，这些因素分别在多大程度上起作用，还需进一步调查和分析。

其三，考虑到基督徒相对较高的生育意愿，全面两孩政策放开后，基督徒群体的生育水平有可能出现高于社会平均水平的提升。反堕胎事工的开展和基督徒不能堕胎这一观念的传播，也将会在一定程度上提升基督徒的生育水平。基督徒家庭孩子数量的增加将会如何通过信仰的代际传递影响到中国基督徒的总体数量和年龄结构，这也是一个值得关注的研究课题。
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The Cross nearby the Mountain God
-A Case Study of Christian Community in village L of Kansu-Tibetan Border, China

Yan Xueqin

[Center for Studies of Modernization of Ethnic Minority Groups of Xinjiang, Xinjiang Normal University, 830017]

Abstract: Through case studies, this paper deeply described research of the Christian groups in village L of Kansu-Tibetan Border, we did in-depth analysis on the formula of the Christian community features, the network, the daily and ritual exchanges, the conflict, the collaboration and identity dilemma. The case shows the experiences and problems of the small Christian community encountered, and shows the practical path how different religions react in the gray religious market.

Keywords: Kansu-Tibetan Border, Christian Community, Multi-Culture

山神堆旁的十字架
——甘肃汉藏边界地区 L 村基督徒群体研究

严学勤 1

【新疆师范大学民族学与社会学学院，830017】

摘要: 本文通过个案研究，通过对 L 村基督徒群体的深描式研究，对汉藏边界地带 L 村基督徒群体特征、网络、日常与仪式交往、冲突，协作及身份困境做了深入分析。L 村的个案给我们呈现了丰富的多元文化背景下基督教小群体生活的经验和面临的问题，同时对多元宗教共存背景下灰色市场中的宗教互动机制问题，关系问题提出了非常好的实践路径。

关键词：甘肃汉藏边界，基督徒群体，多元文化

1作者简介：严学勤（1982-），男，汉族，甘肃金昌人，新疆师范大学民族学与社会学学院讲师，博士，主要从事民族社会学研究。
引子

从甘肃兰州出发向南，顺着兰临高速，穿过永靖、广河、和政，马上就进入了甘南藏族自治州夏河县地界。从夏河一路向西南则会到达甘南藏族自治州的首府合作。这里会有两条路线：从合作继续往南，则会经过碌曲、若尔盖直接通往四川地界，到达松潘、茂县、汶川、四川阿坝藏族羌族自治州，直通成都；而从合作沿公路向东南，则会到达临潭、卓尼，再往东南会到岷县，进入甘肃陇南境内。这块面积几百公里的范围，却是中国境内民族、宗教文化多样性最为丰富的地区之一。这里既是汉藏回等多民族“大杂居、小聚居”生活的传统区域，也是多宗教汇集发展繁荣的区域，不同民族、宗教在这里共存交汇，形成了独特的地域特色。

从地域上，这里被费孝通先生称为“陇西走廊”，也是美国人类学者、出生在这片区域的埃克瓦尔（Robert B Ekwall）笔下所称的“甘肃汉藏边界”。费老对于陇西走廊区域的特色归纳为“成分复杂，犬牙交错”，准确的描述了陇西走廊的复杂的民族构成和宗教特色。早在民国时期，1939年，中国学者顾颉刚与王树民等人从兰州出发，一路南下途经临洮、渭源、陇西、漳县、岷县、临潭、卓尼、达隆、临潭旧城、黑错、夏河、临夏、永靖、和政、定宁（今甘肃广河县）等地，后形成《甘青闻见记》一书，用游记形式对诸地的地政、政治、历史、民族、教育、宗教、风土人情、物产等进行了详细的记载。其中，对于西北的宗教民族问题见解独到：“盖甘肃居民汉、回、藏三方势均力敌，种族宗教既殊，加以交通不便，不明外间情形，不知天地之大，心思恒多窄隘，遂致日以寻仇为事……在如此杯弓蛇影之心理下，无日不作相斫之酝酿，酝酿既久，遭逢一发泄之机会即生大乱矣。西北所以三十年一乱，其故在此，此不可讳疾而忌医也……”顾颉刚先生同样对该地汉藏回复杂的民族宗教关系印象深刻，同时认为民族宗教问题是影响西北社会稳定的重要原因。民国时期，还有如李安宅、谷苞等人类学、民族学研究先驱来到这里，并留下了宝贵的相关著述。

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5 见李安宅对于拉卜楞地区的研究，谷苞对于卓尼番区的研究等。
2011年的夏天，我沿着前辈们的考察足迹，乘车一路从兰州出发，路过穆斯林聚居的临夏回族自治州，穿过甘南合作、夏河，到达临潭旧城，再换乘小公交走过不同的村庄，一直走到卓尼地界。在路上，我依然能和20世纪前期的民族学研究先驱们一样感受到这个地域多样复杂的民族和宗教特色。进入临潭县城，更可以看到清真寺与龙神庙相对而建，西道堂和基督堂比邻而居的独特情景，这样的情景是在别的城市是很难看到的。在田野考察中，当我沿着洮河，在河边的藏族村落和多民族杂居村落访谈时，我发现了另一种景象：洮河岸边的L和D村是基督教为主的村落，L村是基督新教在甘南最早的传播点，而河对岸则是藏族为主的村落，在旁边的山顶上，矗立着象征着藏族信仰的山神堆。我开始惊讶于这样如此近距离的文化差异。在这样迥异的文化背景和差异下，基督教作为一种外来文化，信仰基督教的群体有着怎样的特点和生活？他们如何与周围不同信仰的群体互动？带着这样的问题，我对该地L村的基督教群体进行了为期三个月的田野考察。

一、甘肃汉藏边界的基督教——历史与现实

基督教在甘肃南部汉藏边界地区的传播始于19世纪90年代。19世纪中后1期的甘肃，正处于清朝没落的统治晚期，民生凋蔽而且交通极为不便，甘肃南部地区多山，既无铁路，又无舟楫，历史上造就的移民环境与多民族，使得甘肃的文化语言背景异常复杂。同时，人口的稀少和贫困、文化水平低下，都使得甘肃成为封闭偏远的荒芜之地，传教士到甘肃要经历的艰难可想而知。据《中华归主——中国基督教事业统计（1901-1920）》中记载："1877年1月内地会之伊斯顿（G. F. Easton）、帕克（G. Parker）二先生进入本省（甘肃）为宣教事业之开端，二人历尽艰辛到达兰州。"在此创业时期内（1877—1900），宣教师遍游全省各重要地区并随处分发六种语言之经书，足迹远至新疆之宁远...1891年（清光绪十七年），宣道会派美国传教士克省悟（W. M. Christie）、席如珍（后更名W. Simpson）、德文华（Torsten. Halldorf）、吕成章（W. N. Ruhl）到临潭（洮州）传教并在洮州南新城创建甘南宣道会”。据《临潭县志》介绍，当时的临潭旧城名绅周肇南将自己的房屋用作礼拜堂，在旧城成立了中国基督教宣道会华西部委办。由斐文光任总负责，后因克省悟传教成绩显著，提升为委办长，管辖岷县、陇西、临洮、临夏及临潭、卓尼的传教活动，并在旧城购地买房，
于 1894 年修建了教堂。1910 年信教人数达 50 余人。而本文所研究的 L 村就是基督教最早发展区域之一。

1912 年 5 月，美籍传教士席如珍（后更名 W. Simpson）与克省悟（W. M. Christie）发生分歧。1913 年席如珍被克省悟撤职回国。之后加入了美国基督教神召会，后于 1917 年取名新普逊（W. Simpson）（意重新将福音传给世人之意），携其长婿杰姆森、次婿陈维德及眷属共 4 人重返临潭，与乡绅周肇南共同在卓尼阳坝村成立了洮州境内第一个“自立神召会”，亦称福音园。这个称呼即使在现在还在当地基督徒的口中沿用。周肇南成为首任神召会牧师。同年，周肇南向神召会奉献了家产内的阳坝滩，又将自己庄园内修建的 5 间瓦房捐献作为礼拜堂。神召会自此有了固定礼拜场所。神召会在岷县成立了总会，新普逊任总监督，周肇南任副总督，后岷县神召会改为西北神召会。西北神召会总会先后在临潭新城、卓尼、黑错（合作）、夏河、郎木寺、迭部、舟曲、武都、文县、宕昌、西和、礼县、兰州、天水、甘谷、武山、漳县、陇西、渭源、临洮、榆中、通渭、定西、临夏等 30 多个县成立神召会支会。教务活动一直扩展到宁夏银川、四川江油、河南新乡、山东青岛、青海西宁、同仁、湟源、保安、贵德以及沈阳、广州、上海等各地。

在神召会发展迅速的同时，原有的宣道会也没有停下脚步。1927 年大革命时期，苟希天等人成立“中华基督教宣道会”，苟希天为会长。1933 年，美国教会又派英国人莫天佑来甘肃，召开筹委会，成立“华西部中国基督教宣道会”，委任苟希天为部长，委员 6 人。会后在各地分头成立“中国基督教宣道会”，并开办“短期圣经研究班”、“灵修院”，由苟希天任校长。

宣道会中先后有英美传教士 20 余人，分布在临洮、临夏、黑错（合作）、夏河、郎木寺、迭部、舟曲、武都、文县、宕昌、西和、礼县、兰州、天水、甘谷、武山、漳县、陇西、渭源、临洮、榆中、通渭、定西、临夏等 30 多个县成立神召会支会。教徒共 1040 人（内陕西 180 人）。在藏区尝试使用藏语进行传教，采用藏文圣经。有意思的是，在新普逊重返甘南的过程中，原来信仰宣道会的当地知名乡绅周肇南起了重要作用，他不仅奉献了阳坝作为新的神召会的发展基地，而且率先垂范，在神召会的发展中起到了非常大的引领作用。而与阳坝比邻的 L 村，则一直是宣道会的基地，在该地，至今仍有 2 块外籍传教士的墓碑存在。

1934 年，受全国性的基督教自立运动的影响，在宣道会中从事传教的本地人开始拒绝接受外国传教经费和津贴，提出“不受约束，自由传教”的主张，并

7《临潭县志》，P800-801.
选出本地执事，公开与外国教会分庭抗衡。1948 年后，临潭县境内的宣道会、神召会所有外籍传教士离开临潭，教会财产由当地基督教会接管。在田野调查中，在录巴寺村教会得到的一张泛黄的老照片记录了 1949 年岷县神召会欢送新普逊回国的照片（见图 1-1）。在图中可以看出居中的有外籍传教士三人，居中年轻者为新普逊（W. Simpson）。而旁边老者手拿的琴非常有特色，可能是宣教时常用的乐器。

图 1-1 1949 年岷县神召会送别新普逊回国

新中国成立后，洮州地域的基督教陆续卷入新中国的各种集体运动中，并有着曲折的命运。1958 年，基督教宗教活动被取缔。改革开放后，基督教在甘南的农区逐步恢复。据《甘南州志》介绍，截止 1990 年底，甘南地区开放基督教堂 3 处，活动点 9 处，自设活动点 26 处。共有神职人员 100 人，其中牧师 3 人，教师 1 人，长老 25 人，执事 71 人。有基督教徒 3763 人，主要分布在临潭、卓尼、舟曲、夏河、迭部等县。其中，开放的基督教堂和聚会点主要分布在临潭县境内。据 1997 年出版的《临潭县志》记载，临潭全县有基督教教堂 3 处，活动点 6 个，基督教信教群众 500 多户，2000 余人，分布在城关、新城、羊永、术布、石门、扁都、冶力关、三岔等乡镇的村社。全县有教牧人员 31 人，其中牧师 1 人，教师 1 人，长老执事 29 人。在笔者 2012 年的调研得到的临潭县民族宗教局的数据显示为全县共 3 所基督教堂，分别为城关教堂（旧城），业路教堂，新城教堂，聚会点 7 处，分别为扁都、陈旗、三岔、新堡、冶力关、术布和石门。从调查可以发现，笔者调研的 L 村尽管有着非常丰富的基督教历史传统，现实也有不少基督徒存在，但并不是一个政府公开批准的活动点。笔者就此问题询问过当地教会，回答原因是 L 村隶属卓尼县，是以藏族为主的县。

8 甘南藏族自治州地方史志编篡委员会编，《甘南州志》，民族出版社，1999 年，P1732。
9 同上，见《临潭县志》，P800。
目前，基督教开放政策仅限于临潭，未涉及卓尼，因此，卓尼的基督教目前呈地下发展状态。

二、L村的地理、民族宗教与基督徒群体

1. L村的地理与民族

L村位于甘肃南部临潭县和卓尼交界区域，位于黄土高原与青藏高原及四川盆地的结合地带、秦岭、横断山脉、巴颜喀拉山脉构成的三角地带。从历史来讲，该地位于中原地带和藏区的接合地带，古称洮州。清光绪年间编纂的《洮州厅志》记载：“洮州本番戎地，中古以前远不可知，自秦汉以迄元明废置无常，洪武初置卫守之，专以防番自海首犯两川而番人遂内附马迨”。[10] 其地处“西控番戎，东蔽湟陇”、“南接生番，北抵石岭”之要冲，“汉唐以来边备要地”，“进藏门户”，[11] 具有非常重要的军事和战略价值。从地理地貌来讲，临潭到卓尼自然地理基础和环境特征兼有青藏高原东北边缘和黄土高原西部两大地区的特点，地形类别复杂多样，洮河上游（高石崖山岔山南）为河源草原区；中游（高石崖山岔至海甸峡）为土山山岭林区和黄土丘阜区，这些地区历史上草场辽阔，森林密茂，地面覆盖度高，水源涵养条件好，为流域产水提供了有利条件；下游（海甸峡以北）属黄土丘陵沟壑区，约占流域面积的27%，沟谷纵横，植被稀少，黄土裸露，水土流失严重，是流域泥沙的主要来源区。洮河流域及其支流形成的冲积型的小型谷地也成为洮州地域主要的耕地区。L村就位于洮河流域中游，周围多高山峡谷和小型冲积平地。

从人口和民族角度来讲，临潭、卓尼古代即为汉、羌、戎、吐谷浑、吐蕃多民族聚居杂居之地，迁徙游牧，疆界游移。又加之宗教、部落间管理上错综复杂的纽带联系，疆界朦胧，变化无常。从民族现状分布来看，这块土地上分布着汉、藏、回、蒙古、土家等多民族，民族成分非常多元。其中，汉、藏、回是该地人口最多的民族。

2. 主要宗教分布

（1）洮州区域的宗教分布

历史上的政权变更、族群迁徙和各文化传对洮州地域的多宗教文化的形成有着重要影响。而洮州地域多样的地貌特征则给各种文化的生存和繁衍提供了基

本的资源保证，对于习惯牧业的藏族，洮州地域地区有着丰富的草场、草山和森林资源，藏传佛寺也大部分建立在小型的藏族人口集中地。对汉族而言，历史上多年的屯垦也造就了大量适合汉族耕种的土壤，这种川地的广泛分布成为汉族在该地发展农耕文化的基础，汉族在此扎根后逐渐移植和发展出自身的信仰体系。对回族来说，回族亦农亦商，在临潭地区的集中分布一方面可以像汉族一样以农耕，另一方面，临潭的较为中心的区域地理位置使得回族可以以临潭为据点，一方面就地开设店铺等，参与集市，另一方面也适合以临潭为基地，开拓周围藏区的贸易。回族清真寺大部分集中分布在临潭旧城就说明了这点。

从分类来讲，洮州地域影响力较大的宗教形式可以简单划分为以下几种：

汉族民间信仰。在洮州地域有历史悠久目前仍保持规模的龙神信仰，此外，还存在数量不少的其它民间信仰，如二郎神、金花娘娘等。

藏传佛教。在洮州地域影响深远的卓尼禅定寺，历史上鼎盛时期号称有 108 属寺，历史悠久，其解放前实施政教合一制度，与卓尼土司一起，对当地社会有着重要影响。

伊斯兰教。在临潭地区有着多样的伊斯兰教门宦系统，有独具特色的西道堂，很多在中国伊斯兰教历史上有过重要影响的门宦都和临潭区域有关。

基督教。作为一种外来文化，基督教于 20 世纪晚期传入该地区，并落地生根，成为异文化的代表，在当地目前仍存在一些信教的家族和传承。

除此之外，洮州地域还存在汉传佛教、苯教等信仰形式，其中，汉传佛教在临潭旧城有一座新建寺庙慈云寺，苯教在卓尼的车巴沟深处有部分分布，但基于各宗教在洮州地域的分布范围及影响力，因此仅选取了四个具有典型性的宗教类型进行典型性研究。

从密西根宗教地理信息系统得到洮州地域（临潭、卓尼地区）的宗教基础数据，并将其输入 ARCGIS 地理分析系统，得到洮州地域宗教的总体分布图（图 3.1）：
从图中可以看出洮州地域大致的宗教空间分布状况，可以看出：伊斯兰教集中分布在临潭地区，佛教大部分分布在卓尼县，基督教审批的点都在临潭区域。从地理位置来看，卓尼地域对临潭县域呈半包围态势，而这也构成了独特的文化地理格局。

（2）洮州地域周边的宗教分布

得到洮州地域的宗教分布情况还远远不够，下面我们将会逐步来分解洮州地域所处的地域圈层，进一步分析不同地理圈层下宗教的空间分布情况，力图从中间寻找洮州这种宗教多样性具有的典型性与特殊性意义。

由于密西根大学的宗教地理数据库基于行政区划建立，因此第一步我们将分析作为较大的区域：甘南藏族自治州的宗教分布情况。我们从密西根宗教地理数据库分离出甘南藏族自治州的宗教数据，其中包含的宗教点数据如下：共 70 个佛教点、45 个伊斯兰教点、1 个道教点和 3 个基督教点的数据（见表 3.1）。

表 2-1 甘南藏族自治州多宗教分县统计

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>地域</th>
<th>道教</th>
<th>佛教</th>
<th>伊斯兰教</th>
<th>基督教</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>合作市</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>卓尼县</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>临潭县</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 根据密西根宗教地理信息系统数据库数据统计。
迭部县 0 0 0 0
舟曲县 0 21 0 0
碌曲县 0 3 0 0
玛曲县 0 12 0 0
夏河县 0 1 1 0
合计 1 70 45 3

将这部分数据输入 ARCGIS 地理信息分析系统，得到其宗教空间分布图（图 3.2）。

由图可以看出，佛教在甘南地区分布较为密集的区域为合作、卓尼和舟曲、玛曲，迭部、碌曲、夏河、临潭的分布密度较低，但夏河、碌曲都有作为地区中心的佛教寺院存在，夏河有拉卜楞寺，碌曲有郎木寺；伊斯兰教集中分布在临潭及其周边区域，合作有零星分布；基督教的三个审批活动点均在临潭；道教仅在合作有一个场所点。

图 2-2 甘南宗教分布图（分县）2014 年
（资料来源：图 3.1 根据密西根宗教地理数据库 2004 数据结合现实数据绘制而成。）

这样的空间分布图使得我们对洮州地域的周边区域——甘南藏族自治州的整体宗教分布状况有了基本认识。作为一个富有藏族特色的民族自治地方，藏传佛教占据了大部分的地理范围，而伊斯兰教、基督教的分布非常集中，道教更是非常稀少。

3. L 村的信仰结构
走进 L 村，目前的 L 村依山而建，位于山脚公路旁边。原来的旧村子在半山腰上，大部分为土木结构，2008 年汶川地震后，部分房屋成了危房，政府通过补助水泥和砖，加上农户自己补贴部分的方式，在山下另辟新址修建了目前看到的新村。2013 年村子一共 48 户人家，共有汉族 34 户，藏族 11 户。该村子与附近的 Y 村、D 村共同构成一个大的行政村，村委会所在地为 Y 村。

从姓氏结构来看，L 村的姓氏以来家、陈家、胡家三家为主。其中来家 9 户；陈家 11 户；胡家全为藏族，11 户；王家 4 户；闫家 6 户；余家 3 户；郎家 1 户。而考察几家姓氏的来源，通过访谈发现，来家祖先来自于卓尼的来家湾，陈家及几家杂姓家的祖先来自于临潭的汉族内迁，大部分由逃荒而来。而中间也有族际通婚的过程，如访谈对象来长者的曾祖母就是来自卡车沟的藏族。胡家全是藏族，祖先也由卡车沟迁来。

录巴寺村的信仰结构基本以基督教和藏传佛教为主，基督教在该村占了明显的多数。其中，全家信仰基督教的有 20 家，部分信仰基督教的有 5 家，信仰藏传佛教的 11 家，信仰汉族民间信仰或不信教的有 9 家。

4. 基督教群体的特征与组织模式

在田野调查中，笔者分析了 L 村基督徒的群体构成特色，发现基督教信仰群体具有非常明显的家族式特征。其中，来家、陈家、闫家是信仰基督教的主体，来家则是整个家族全信仰基督教，主要的教会事宜也由来家操持。从历史来看，来家并不是历史上在该地最早接受基督教宣道会信仰的传统家族，但信仰基督教也有三代人之久。来家在 L 村的教务领导权力主要来自于家族人口众多，而且有几名肯“奉献”的中坚力量，其中，笔者最多接触的基督教长老就是来自于来家。

笔者在田野调查过程中，与基督徒一起生活，聚会，不仅参加了本村和邻村的一些聚会，而且随基督教长老一起，赴较远的其他村落参加了几次聚会活动，其中，发现了该地基督教较为特殊的传播模式，可以归纳为“点——大家”组织模式。在讨论中国基督教的本土化发展过程中，以堂带点是常被提及的主要模式，即基督教通过大的堂点来发展聚会点，并对聚会点进行管理的模式。但在笔者调查的区域，由于 L 村事实上并不具备合法的聚会点身份，只是由于其特殊的历史和家族背景，形成了事实上的聚会点。在 L 村的聚会点，也并没有明显的十字架标志。在当地的宗教管理中，政府官员也曾来 L 村聚会点视察，由于该地的实际状况，政府没有批准的先例，而该地信仰基督教又是一种既成事实。因此，对其的管理采用了一种较为灵活的方式，即需要不违背三个要求：“有大型活动需要
报备，有外来传教士需要报备，不跨区传教”。在不违背这三个要求的情况下，
政府部门事实上默认了该地基督教的存在和发展。

L村与周围的Y村、D村构成了一个小小的信仰基督教为主的聚落，其中Y
村和L村都有固定的聚会场所，分别能容纳五六十人聚会。笔者调查的7-8月中，
很多年轻人出外打工，因此聚会的时候并没有多少人，来的都是留在村子里的一
些资深信徒，好多都上了年纪。而日常的聚会则分大聚会、节日聚会和小聚会，
大聚会是指每周日的礼拜，小聚会则局限于十余人的查经聚会，除了农忙时期，
平常每晚都有。节日聚会则主要是圣诞节。

笔者在访谈中，得到了L村教会常联系的基督徒的分布情况。有意思的是，
在介绍基督教的分布状况时，基督教的长老使用的是家户的概念，也就是说，信
仰是以家户为单位的，在临潭、卓尼地区都有分布。L村教会已经成为一个没有
合法身份，但在该地基督教发展中举足轻重的信仰基地。在基督教在L村的传播
过程中，主要的聚会点通过核心的布道人员，集中到某个家户开展培灵聚会成了
主要的发展和组织模式。这种模式的发展主要源于当地较为复杂的交通环境，大
部分地区都有丘陵和山阻隔，很多地区不通公交车，在这样的情况下，到大的聚
会点或者教堂参加一次聚会就成了较为奢侈的事情。而由基督教长老组织的这种
上门服务，不仅带来了宗教知识，而且聚集了周围的信徒，大家一起唱赞美诗，
交流心得，祈祷，是另一种很重要的信仰生活形式。

三．基督徒与邻居的日常与仪式性交往

在L村，虽然有着多元的信仰结构，但村里整体的气氛还是较为融洽的，彼
此关系也处理的很好。突出体现在以下几个方面：一是农忙时候的互相帮工，这
点在L及周边村落里都很普遍；第二是婚丧、盖房等仪式上的礼物往来；第三是
日常的互相交往，如互相串门等方面，并不因为不同信仰而有所隔阂。相对来讲，
信仰基督教的村民在交往中体现出了与信仰其它宗教不同的“更抱团”的特性，
彼此以“兄弟姊妹”相称，这种基督教的本土化称谓无疑拉近了原来没有亲缘关
系的人之间的距离。而同宗教之间的交往也远远高于不同信仰的。在访谈中，一
位基督徒就这样说道：“农忙或者婚丧事我们都没有什么计较的，信仰是心理的，
不是外在的，和外人比起来，同信仰的弟兄姊妹肯定要更亲些。”（访谈记录，
LYC）

为了分析这种特殊的交往关系，阎云翔在《礼物的流动》一书中对东北下岬
村礼单的分析给了笔者很多启示。与很多的西北农村地区一样，在L村，保存礼
单是一个约定俗成的习惯，礼单在这里不仅记录了婚丧事、盖房子等礼节性往来
的经济账，也暗示着你应该在对方的仪式性活动上应该给予多少“回礼”。在阎云翔的分析框架基础上，笔者做了部分改变，即在分析礼金额数、亲属分类等基本变量基础上，根据洮州地域多宗教、多民族的特性，以及本研究的需要，加入了以下几个变量：信仰分类、民族分类、职业分类及地区分类。

笔者搜集了共六份礼单，涵盖不同的婚礼、丧事、盖房等，从中选取了来长老家 2008 年盖房后请人的礼单。这份礼单具有相当的代表性，首先作为基督教的长老，其交往范围往往比一般村民要广泛，可以从一个侧面分析基督教与其它不同宗教的人的交往范围。另一方面，这份礼单保存较为完整，时间也不是很长，当事人能够清晰的记起每个人的职业、信仰及相关信息，人数适中（56 位客人），能够完成笔者最初的设想。笔者将这份礼单重新整理分析，最后输入 SPSS 统计分析软件，最后得到以下分析结果。

选择首先我们分析礼金额数，从下表可以看出，礼金额数最大为 380 元，最少为 20 元，平均 65.8 元。从礼单里发现，金额最大的来自于来长老认识的一位浙江籍电站工作人员，因此这种礼金额度在当地来说都是罕见的大数目，不具有典型性。

表 3-1 礼金额数统计

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>最小值</th>
<th>最大值</th>
<th>均值</th>
<th>标准差</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>礼金额数</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>69.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

从礼金分类来说，可以看出最高的为 50-60 元档，占近 4 成；其次为 20 元档，约占 1/4；100 元档约占 1/5；200 元档约占 10%；200 元以上比例很小。

图 3-1 礼单礼金分类
从亲属分类来看，客人中比例最高的为邻居，约占 1/4，其次为主内弟兄，占近 1/5，外甥（外甥女）占 16.1%，姑舅哥（弟）占 12.5%；侄儿 12.5%；其余为直系亲属。可以看出，邻居和主内弟兄的比例大于其余亲戚，尤其是主内弟兄，其与主人没有亲缘关系，但能够在客人中占如此高的比例，可以看出基督教教内信徒社会交往的广泛和密切性。

表 3-2 礼单亲属分类

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>亲属</th>
<th>频数</th>
<th>比率（%）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>（堂）兄弟</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>舅舅（阿舅）</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>姑舅哥（弟）</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>姨夫</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>外甥（外甥女）</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>侄儿</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>普通朋友</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>主内弟兄</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>邻居</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

从客人的民族分类来看，汉族占其中的 71.43%，藏族占到了 28.57%，可以凸显出其交往圈子的民族以汉族为主，藏族为辅，而来的藏族主要以邻居为主。

图 3-2 礼单客人民族分类

从客人的信仰分类来看，信仰基督教占到了 66.07%，占大部分。信仰汉族民间信仰占到了 17.86%，信仰藏传佛教占到了 16.07%。从比例来看信仰藏传佛教和信仰汉族民间信仰的人数在客人比例里相近。
从职业分类来看，个体（私营）占 32.14%，打工占 25%，事业单位、公务员占 25%，务农占 16.07%，牧民比例最小，仅占 1.79%。从笔者了解的具体从事职业来看，个体私营以跑出租、开铺子等为主；外出打工则以农闲时去周围或者内蒙打工为主，从事建筑行业、挖掘机等；事业单位、公务员基本为直系亲属；务农以邻居为主；牧民仅一名，是来自车巴沟的朋友。从职业分类来看，能看出其交往圈子职业的多样性，个体（私营）、打工的比例超过了传统的务农，据访谈得知，七八年前大部分人还是务农，可见当地主要经济收入来源构成已发生了重大改变。

最后，笔者分析了不同亲属类别送的礼金多少。在西北农村，一般意义上讲礼金的多少体现了和主人家的亲疏远近程度以及经济能力。在这份礼单中，可以
看出直系亲属的搭礼大部分在 100 元以上，有 2 个是 200 元，与西北一般情况相符；姑表亲中大部分的搭礼也在 100 元以上，仅有一位是 20 元；14 个邻居中，12 个的搭礼均在 20 元，2 个在 30-40 元；外甥（外甥女）的搭礼有 6 人在 50-60 元档，其与较为分散；2 个姨夫的搭礼均在 100 元档；6 个侄儿的搭礼统一在 50-60 元档；11 位“主内弟兄”的搭礼有 9 位在 50-60 元档，另 2 人分别在 20 元档和 30-40 元档。可以看出没有亲缘关系的“主内弟兄”的搭礼基本与关系为侄儿、外甥（外甥女）的搭礼程度类似，低于直系亲属。这也能看出“主内弟兄”通过日常的宗教内仪式交往，已经建构起了较为深厚的人情关系特征。

通过礼单分析，我们能够对仪式情境下基督徒与周围民众的跨文化交往做基本了解，从中发现，基督徒与周围不同信仰的民众还是保持着较为密切的关系。特殊的是，人际交往中，主内弟兄作为一种新的群体身份被提及，而且给其带来了新的社会资源。从群体比例来看，主内弟兄成了除邻居之外参与仪式最多的群体，就礼金而言，绝大部分的礼金在礼金分布中处于中等，也能够看出主内弟兄在基督徒社会交往中的重要地位。

四、冲突、合作与身份困境

1. 冲突

在日常生活中，由于基督教文化的“异质性”特征，其信仰一神，排斥其他信仰的特性，使得基督教信徒在生活中也往往遇到一些与信仰其它宗教的群众的抵触现象，这点在许多基督教研究者的研究中屡有提及。在抵触和冲突方面，较为典型的例子有以下 3 个：

个案 1：放羊的故事

“八几年的时候那时候家家都养羊，我们基督徒的羊放到山上去，藏民的就说草山是他们的，不让放呢，村子里藏民的也不让羊和我们的羊往一起走。”（访谈记录，ZJK）

在这个个案的叙述中，基督徒与藏民一样有着放牧的需求，但在放牧过程中，由于信仰的不同，藏民认为草山是属于自己村落的，因此出现矛盾。

个案 2：D 村聚会点修建的失败

在田野调查中，笔者问到了 L 村聚会点修建的过程。L 村依据其“福音苑”的地位，以及 L 村信主家族较多，实力较强，所以在建聚会点以及后来的宗教活动中慢慢得到了周围村落居民的默认。而临近的 D 村的聚会点修建过程，则被扼杀到了萌芽中。约在 2008 年左右，D 村的基督教信徒开始张罗着在村里修一间
房子作为固定的礼拜场所，但就是这个看似没什么影响的活动，遭到了村里以藏族村长为首的反对，后来在村里藏族家族的抵制下，教堂的修建工作不了了之。笔者在田野调查中访谈了这个藏族村长的侄子，他的回答比较有典型性：

“前今年在我们这个地方要盖基督教的教堂，但是没盖成，原因是从历史上我们这个地方回民没有教堂，也没有基督教的教堂，所以就不让盖。如果旧社会是有的话，就让盖，旧社会里没有，新社会里就不让盖。甘南藏族自治州，卓尼县还是藏族自治县，所以就不让盖。这是七八年前的事情了，去年在卓尼先要盖，卓尼下面还是有藏族汉族，也是不让盖，都拆掉了。历史上没，所以不让你盖。他们信他们的，但是就是不能盖教堂。你信宗教信仰一家一家的随便信啥，也没人说啥”。（访谈记录，ZHJ）

被访者眼中经纬分明的“历史传统”观念对笔者的触动很深，当地的民众在心底已经对这个地方的主要宗教和归属事实上是有很深的认同的，也就是说，他们只接受这个地方有历史传统的宗教的发展和传承，对于外来宗教的这种“越界”宣教行为则不能接受。这点在藏区的很多地方都很看到端倪，比如甘南藏区的一些藏族聚居区域，就曾因为清真寺的修建而产生群体性事件和冲突，这点无疑能反映出多民族多宗教地区这种独特的“文化领地”观念。

个案3：祭山神摊派的矛盾

L村、D村、Y村周边都有较为浓厚的藏族信仰传统，其中，每年八月的“祭山神”是当地的传统活动。由于L村、Y村基督徒占较多比例，藏族比例不高，所以在祭山神活动中，摊派并没有牵扯到L村和Y村。而在D村，由于基督徒占少数，这样的问题就凸显出来。2011年，D村要举办一个大型的祭山神活动，要向每家按人头收取20元的费用，在收取摊派的过程中，遭受到了村中几户基督徒的抵制。在这种情况下，村庄的额拉（即组织仪式活动的长者）要求村庄成员今后不参加对方的红白喜事帮工作为惩罚。

事情后来还是以基督徒没交摊派费用为结束，为解决D村基督徒红白喜事帮工的问题，L村和Y村的基督徒主动承担了D村基督徒红白喜事的帮工。

以上三个个案，能够基本反映出L村及其周边基督徒在生活和仪式中由于其信仰而遇到的冲突问题，值得注意的是，一是个案2中体现出的文化领地问题值得注意，这也成为基督教在该地进行传播扩张的重要阻碍因素之一，二是个案3中，基督徒通过内部互助来弥补由于冲突造成的外部关系网络破裂造成的损伤问题。反映出了基督教在本土化传播过程中特殊的资源互补机制。

2. 特殊事件中的群体合作
在田野调查过程中，一位基督教的长老还给我们讲了 L 电站修建过程中的群体性事件的一个案例，中间体现出的这种跨文化的村落合作引起了我们的兴趣。

2008-2009 年期间，在 L 村附近的洮河上由浙江籍投资商投资修建一座电站，本来是一件有利于地方经济发展的好事，但在电站建设过程中，与周围的几个村子都起了矛盾。当地人这样讲述电站和村庄的矛盾：

“修电站和我们村子里的矛盾大了, 在这面打洞子的时候我们的植被破坏的严重，打的洞子里出来的石头都把河床占没了。在洞里放炮的时候，炸的厉害，在村子里炮一放房子都动。修电站原来公家的设计的土不是倒在河床上而是有确定的地方。现在他们为了省钱，都到在河床上，把洮河的河床占用的厉害，万一有洪水的话，我们村子里就是个麻烦事情。电站污染很严重，现在都没鱼了。对水的污染很大。”（访谈记录：LJT）

根据访谈和后续追问发现，电站和村庄主要的矛盾冲突点有以下几个：一是电站修建对于村民传统生计的影响，原来村民可以去山上挖石头，拉石渣挣钱或者自用，现在电站不让用了；二是电站对于生态的破坏，修电站后，阳坝等几个村子原来打的井都抽不出水来了，电站修建通水洞挖出的石渣乱放，对植被、水质还有树木都造成了不好的影响，产生的垃圾等问题也影响着周围村民的生活；三是电站建设对于周围村民的耕地补偿产生的利益纠纷，村民不满意为什么给下面的 LZ 村每亩地 13 万的补助，对于 L 村却只有 2 万。然而，由于修建电站由于 L 电站属于招商引资项目，按他的话讲就是浙江老板把上上下下都买通了，所以电站修好后造成问题后并没有多少人理会村民的反对声音。在这种背景下，几个村子开始联合起来和电站管理者抗争，中间还发生了诸如群体械斗这样的事件。在这种事件中，基督徒并没有和其他信仰的村民表现出有什么不同，而是和村民站在一起打群架。而打群架的结果是村民有 6 名受伤，电站方有 8 名受伤，电站最后在政府协调下赔了 18 万了事。

有意思的是，在“电站维权”事件中，几个村落并没有因为信仰不同或者是信仰抵触而不合作，恰恰是在这样的情况下，几个村落开始合作一起向电站方“讨个说法”，甚至集中起来和电站方发生冲突。按基督教长老的解释，“生存都生存不了了，还在乎那么多干啥。”在共同的生存环境受到威胁时，信仰上的分歧暂时被放到了后面，采取合作，群体性抗争成了不同信仰群体的共同选择。

3. 身份困境

由于身处汉藏边界，藏传佛教及山神信仰的影响巨大，受当地特殊的文化习俗等因素影响，L 村的基督徒尽管有着向藏民传教的想法，但在实际过程中往往
很难实施，在自身发展过程中，也面临着由于自身因素、现代化变迁等因素造成的身份困境。

在笔者的田野调查中，在 L 村周边的 LLG 村遇到了一位藏族退休干部，当问到周围的基督教有无向周边传教问题时，他说这个经常遇到，但他明显不接受对方的传教，他给出的理由是：

“在各民族的宗教也没说头，你信你的，我信我的，各方面就是贼不要做，心善，多做善事，恶的事情不要干，谁都这么说的，他们的（信基督教传教的）还是这样说着。回民们也是这样说的...我的朋友很多，基督教的有，回族的也有。我们到回民家去的时候烟也抽着，他们来我们家里的时候，我们做点素净的，大肉不做，用具上也要注意，尽量往清真里做。我们到他们家里面啥都行，只要他们不做狗肉和驴肉不给的话，我们也成着”。（访谈记录，ZHJ）

在这里，被访者讲述了一种根植于地方多元文化的本土性的宗教观，他认为不同宗教在这里本质上是一样的，都是教人向善，因此信什么都差不多，宗教没有高低之分。在处理不同宗教的关系的时候，被访者（藏族）举了一个他和回族交往的关系的例子，认为互相的尊重，尤其是对于对方饮食习惯的尊重，是相互和谐关系的核心要素。此外，对于基督教传教者对于自身宗教优越性的强调，被访者给笔者讲了一个很有趣的故事，信基督教的人给他传教，他很生气，然后用 Y 村基督徒发生的“乱伦”事件来反驳传教者，最终让传教者铩羽而归。从另一个角度来看，这点也反映出了基督教在当地面临的伦理和身份困境，不同宗教均是嵌入在当地社会的肌理中的，在各族群众中有着共通的信息传播网络，在这样的社会情境下，一些“污点”会被基层信息网络当成“八卦消息”传播甚广。彼此之间的没有“秘密”让基督教传教者对于其他民族群众很难构建自身的“卡里斯马”型宗教权威。

在笔者的田野调查过程中，笔者还参与了一位资深基督徒儿子的婚礼，他儿子和媳妇也是本地的基督徒，但我当时很奇怪为什么在典礼中并没有基督教的元素，后来在和来长老的攀谈中才知道，这个小伙子和他妻子是做礼拜的时候认识，后来两人相约出去打工，后来就同居在了一起，结果后来女方怀孕了才结的婚。教会的长老认为这样似乎有悖于基督教的“守贞洁”的教义，所以原定的要由当地牧师给典礼祝福，后来也取消了。但大部分的本地基督徒和教会长老都参加了这次婚礼，长老们在宴会中似乎也与本地人完全打成了一片，很多也喝起了酒，而在平时和他们的攀谈中，酒是作为禁忌不能饮用的。笔者还参加了年轻人在婚礼前夜的聚会，一帮年轻人有藏族有汉族，有基督徒有藏传佛教信徒，居然还有
一个曾经在知知寺当过喇嘛的藏族，一帮年轻人喝酒猜拳玩的非常融洽。当我在酒桌上问起他们的不同宗教时，一个藏族小伙打断了我，这样说道：“我们酒桌上就是喝酒么，不管啥民族，啥宗教，在这里就是个喝么。”这样的回答得到了酒桌上其他人的广泛认同。笔者在婚礼过程的访谈中，D 村村长侄子（藏族）的回答很有典型性，他认为宗教都差不多，都是“让人以行善为主，不要做贼不要骗人，不要杀人放火”。这点同样反映出了当地较为朴素的一种宗教观，即在这种朴素的宗教观下，不同宗教是可以和谐共处的，也就能够理解为什么信仰不同宗教的人能够参加基督徒的婚礼，而且能够打成一片。基督徒在这里则面临尴尬，一方面教义的要求使他们在日常生活中都尽量禁酒，但另一方面在仪式中，不喝酒成了一种非常不合群的“不礼貌行为”。在集体欢腾的仪式情境下，地方性的仪式传统与规则战胜了日常的禁酒规训，而在回归日常环境后，禁忌的习惯又恢复正常。

在田野调查中，L 村的基督徒还告诉了我他去藏区传教的故事：

“我在车巴沟有不少藏族朋友，很多都是我当年收羊肚（一种蘑菇）的时候认识的。有一年夏天事情不多，我到车巴沟玩，想的顺便给传个福音呢，结果去了就是个喝（喝酒），半夜偷着骑得摩托车就跑回来了...（笑）...那个喝酒法着不住”。（访谈记录，LQA）

这个故事更明显的反映了基督徒的身份困境问题，在当地，汉族、藏族甚至是回族都有喜欢喝酒的传统，喝酒成为一种地方性的交往仪式和规则，如果不喝酒则无法进行深入的人际交往。基督徒由于禁酒，所以在当地的人际交往中往往有自身的伦理困境。在这种情境下，一些基督徒则通过选择情境，来确定自身是否喝酒来适应地方交往规则。即便如此，被访的基督徒在访谈过程中，总表现出由于喝酒而自责的情绪。

五、灰色市场中的张力与宗教共存之道

在以上部分，我们通过对于汉藏边界一个村落基督教群体的历史与现状，以及面临的身份张力与困境的叙述，能够基本描绘出生存在多元文化地方社会中的基督徒众生相。杨凤岗教授在分析中国的宗教生存环境时，认为“加强宗教管制只能是导致宗教市场的复杂化，即出现三个宗教市场：合法的红市，非法的黑市，以及既不合法也不非法或既合法又非法的灰市。只要宗教组织在数量和活动上受到政府限制，黑市就必然会出现；只要红市受到限制和黑市受到镇压，灰市就必然会出现；宗教管制越严，宗教灰市越大”。（杨凤岗，2006）在我们研究的汉
藏边界区域，当地的基督教因为特殊原因目前仍未获得合法身份，可以说处于杨教授所说的灰色市场区域，但其生存机制，则体现出了灰色市场的另一种宗教相处之道，这种宗教相处之道超过了简单的合法与非法的区分，而是与地方性规则、历史传统等紧密绑定在一起。

首先，洮州地域的四种主要宗教信仰系统中，不同宗教信仰长期共存在同一区域，在历史演化和互动过程中，形成了彼此的边界关系。这种边界有时候呈现为地理的、村落的区分，有时候呈现为精神信仰的区分。历史上经过数百年的变迁中，洮州地域形成了这种多宗教信仰共存糅合的区域发展体系，即以藏传佛教寺和神山信仰结合的藏传佛教信仰体系；以龙神信仰为典型的汉族民间信仰体系；以教派和门宦为特征的伊斯兰信仰体系；作为异文化传播并生根发展的基督教信仰体系。

第二，从历史传统来看，多种宗教在历史变迁中划定了一定的“领地范围”，这种范围既是一种“地理区隔”，也是“文化和伦理区隔”。这种交织“区隔”的历史记忆影响到宗教之间的关系与互动，“越界”的行为往往会引发一定的冲突。而多宗教杂居“共存”的区域，则不同宗教都必须保持对于“伦理底线”和“历史记忆”的尊重，也就是说尽量不要跨界传播，不要挑战宗教底线如基本的饮食习惯等，还要对部分地域社会共通的习惯加以容忍，比如喝酒、应酬和抽烟等，尽管这些行为某些方面也与教义相悖。

第三，从现实来看，各宗教主要影响的村落仅在信仰形态上有主要区别，在日常交往领域互动仍然较为频繁。此外，在遇到特定的重要事件，不同群体会暂时放弃宗教差异形成短暂的利益联盟。

洮州地域L村的个案给我们呈现了丰富的多元文化背景下基督教小群体生活的经验和面临的问题，同时对多元宗教共存背景下灰色市场中的宗教互动机制问题、关系问题提出了非常好的实践经验。此外，L村的个案对于进一步理解中国情境下的多宗教共存社会，多宗教在小地域社会的共存关系维持机制将提供重要的借鉴。

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Modernized Individuals in Imaginary Communities: An Anthropological Study of Artist Churches in Songzhuang, Beijing

HU Mengyin

Abstract:
The study of metropolitans in China has been a popular topic in the studies of China's remarkable urbanization process for the last decade. Among them, the new types of Christian churches have been studied substantially in sociology of religion or anthropology of religion. One of these new types of Christian churches is “Rural Churches in the Urban Area.” There are reasons to believe both the structure and the internal constituent of these churches have been evolved as well. This article studies churches composed of artists, based on a case in east suburb of Beijing. Do these churches still reserve the characteristics of “rural church”? Or have they already been modernized in the urbanization of this suburb area? This article aims to explain how different imaginations of communities have become the keys for the individuals who have been modernized to cope with the pressure from the capital, metropolitan and modernity itself.
“都市里的乡村教会”并非罕见的现象，而随着中国大陆城市化进程的进一步发展，以及城市新移民群体的扩大和演化，特别是在北京、上海、广州等大都市，无论是“乡村教会”本身的形态，还是内部人员的组成，也都已经随之发生变化。一方面，这些由城市外部进入到城市内部的群体，已经是第二代，或者第三代农民工，并且他们已经从务工者转变成为了城市的定居者，他们面对的首要问题是生存空间的挤压，而并非与城市生活的融为一体。并且这种挤压是现代性语境下一种普遍的生活压力，而不是针对特定群体的排斥。另一方面，社会分工程度的加深，或者说劳动的高度异化使得在城市中生活的个体被划归进由职业所标定的类别，但又无法形成某种普遍的，或者说统一的具有归属感的共同体。这些变化使得对于城市中的教会的考察进入到一些特殊的“职人教会”身上，而北京市通州区宋庄地区的艺术家教会便是这样一种“职人教会”。

从教会的草创者、后面的带领者以及教会成员都是从事艺术工作、主要是绘画艺术，并且聚居在宋庄这样一个新兴的艺术产业园区的艺术家。并且这些教会成员本身对于“艺术家”这样一种职业属性非常强调。这些大大小小的教会基本上已经形成了某种“共同体”。但一个显著的特点在于，这些艺术家教会被某种共享的、一致性的原则所维系。这种一致性是其中每个个体都达到意见统一的局面，而这种一致性一旦因为某些事件而被打破，教会也会随之分裂。于是，一方面宋庄地区如同北京的其他地区一样在过去的二十年内经历了信仰的复兴和快速壮大，但另一方面，无论是外来教会还是本地原生教会都无法形成更大的规模，反而陷入一种周而复始的壮大-分裂怪圈，每每筑成高塔，却又瞬间崩塌入沙。这也就形成了现在宋庄地区大大小小的教会林立的局面。

当更深一步地去观察宋庄地区的艺术家教会时，就需再次开始关于“都市里的乡村教会”的讨论。这些教会中的一些试图在重建一种“传统村落”，并且在某种程度上是对宋庄这样一个“画家村”的形成过程的模仿。事实上，任何深入的讨论都必须注意到宋庄这样一个“画家村”的形成过程的模仿。事实上，任何深入的讨论都必须注意到宋庄这个新的艺术产业园区的前世今生。这些艺术家教会的成员本身也都是宋庄这个“画家村”的成员，也经历着资本对于其生存空间的挤压，或者说原先这样一个“城中村”的瓦解崩塌。虽然不能简单地把这些艺术家教会视为某种转移或者替代，但是它们确实为其成员应对这种挤压提供支援和帮助。可以说这些教会的存在将散落在城市缝隙里的“沙”不断地汇聚，并且重筑高台。如果要将这些艺术家教会的形态勾勒得更加清晰一些，那么必然要回到这些教会所处的社会语境之中，去理解时代里的“个”和“共同体”。这也是将“都市里的乡村教会”这一讨论延续下去的缘由。

本文是基于这样一种前提而进行的人类学考察，通过田野调查中的访谈资料，试图展现当下宋庄地区的基督徒艺术家作为已经现代化的个体和参与作为共同体的教会之间的张力。特别是通过两所教会的不同实践的个案，即一是鼓励其中成员成为更加完全的个体（full-developed individual），另一是强调一种教会内部的高度一致性（homogeneous community），来理解这种个体和共同体。这里所用到的共同体以及关于这种共同体的想象，指的是查尔斯·泰勒在《现代社会想象》一书中描述的种关于社会的想象如何从精英阶层中产生，进而被整个社会所接受，成为某种理所当然古已有之的概念。在本文涉及的两个教会之中，两位教会的领袖对于整个教会形态，乃至

1 黄剑波：《都市里的乡村教会——中国城市化与民工基督教》，香港：道风书社，2012.
关于教会这样一种共同体应该的状态的理解有很大的影响，甚至起到了决定性的作用。进一步的，讨论这种个体和共同体之间的张力，也可以解释宋庄地区教会林立但规模都较小，并且经常出现分裂的现象。更重要的是，这两种教会的实践，也为我们去理解在现代社会和资本的挤压之下的个人的生存状态，以及它们本身应该被视为对于这样一种挤压的反抗，即将“共同体”视为足以对抗“社会”的存在，但是“共同体”与“个体”之间的张力却也一直存在。

一、画家村里的十字架

今天的宋庄有很多名头，比如“原创艺术集聚区”，中国的“苏荷区”，“文化工厂”等等，但是最通俗的称呼还是“画家村”。事实上，今天的宋庄，聚集了大约 6000 名画家，而如果算上流动人口，这个数字则可能达到 1 万。与此同时，还有大量的美术院校学生、视觉和行为艺术家、诗人、作家以及音乐家不断向宋庄聚拢。这使得广义上的艺术家在宋庄可能达到 2 万之众。如此庞大的规模，已经远远不是“村”所能够代指的了。宋庄本身就是一个拥有 47 个行政村以及 10 万户籍人口的镇子，属于北京市通州区，北部与顺义区相邻，而西部则与朝阳区相邻。而“画家村”的中心原来就是宋庄镇的小堡村，现在随着小堡村原先的土地被几大美术馆以及艺术街区占领，大量的画家也转移到小堡村周边的地区。宋庄镇政府一直以来也致力于文化产业的建设，小堡村也是在这一过程中成为宋庄艺术的地标。但是，这样一个“画家村”的形成并非政府一手导致，而是和最早进驻宋庄的黄永玉、栗宪庭、方力钧等人有关。而“画家村”的称呼，也是来自于其前身——圆明园画家村。

以栗宪庭为代表的最早的宋庄画家大多是和圆明园的画家群体有直接的关联。当迫于政府的压力，圆明园的画家村衰败且濒于破灭的时候，相当一部分人转移到了宋庄。宋庄当时的房屋土地价格低廉、乡村生活气息浓厚，因而成了“避世”的好去处。房价便宜且空间广阔，同时又远离城市中心，交通不便，这样的宋庄确实符合“归田园居”式的要求。但是当栗宪庭、黄永玉等大家纷纷进驻宋庄之后，慕名而来者络绎不绝，很自然地，一个以小堡村为中心的新的“画家村”逐渐形成。


孔建华：北京宋庄原创艺术集聚区发展再研究，《北京社会科学》，2008 年 2 期，22 页。
在这一方针之下，小堡村乃至宋庄镇的发展是显而易见的。各大美术馆、画廊、工作室拔地而起。越来越多的艺术大家进驻，虽然可能只是开设一个画廊或者工作室。同时也有越来越多的国际合作展览，每年举办的“宋庄文化艺术节”的艺术品交易额可能破亿。文化搭台，经济唱戏在“中国·宋庄”的打造过程中似乎完美地体现了出来。但是，在文化经济产业大力拉动了当地的经济增长，当地村民的腰包越来越鼓的同时，作为文化产业生产者的艺术家们却依然和“贫困”联系在一起。在宋庄的艺术家中，能够靠艺术作品维持基本生计的不到10%，而目前宋庄，特别是小堡村地区一位艺术家一年基本开支是6万元。也就是说，宋庄大半的艺术家无法仅仅依赖卖作品来保证自身的温饱。事实上，宋庄几个基督教会中，吃不上饭需要依靠家里或者其他教会成员接济的人很常见，而事实上教会也为他们的日常生活能够进行下去提供了相当有力的保障。

基督教传入宋庄地区，具体来说是这些艺术家群体中间，是2000年左右。传教活动在1998年左右就已经开始，当时主要进行传教以及最早开始聚会的几位基督徒都是先前已经归信。基督徒艺术家A声称自己是宋庄第一位基督徒，而他是在2000年的11月归信的。而A在归信之后立刻就和聚会的基督徒一起进行传教的活动，并且在之后的一年里相当热心。最早的聚会由五、六名基督徒组成，基本都是画家。这中间除了A以外，每个人接受福音的途径和过程都不相同，是在到了宋庄之后，才在一起进行聚会。A说，最早的聚会点就在他的家中。A的经历很大程度上反映出了宋庄地区教会的发展历程。目前宋庄地区的大部分带领人都是出身于A最早聚会的教会，以及在他们早期的传教过程中接触到信仰并且归信的。另一位画家B表示“最早就是这些人在一起聚会，后来又带了很多进来。现在原来的教会以及不在了，但是这些人自己也都办了新的教会。”宋庄地区在21世纪初的宣教活动在最初的几年当中并没有带来基督徒人数的显著增长，当地也没有出现教会数目的大量增长，但是最初的教会规模明显扩大了，从最早的不到10个人，发展到后来将近50人，并且也逐步有了周间的小组和团契。可以说这批最早的基督徒就是宋庄地区基督信仰的种子。

对于当时聚会的这些基督徒来说，一个基本的共识就是对于传教活动的迫切。他们不但在日常的聚会、交往中向自己的艺术家朋友们传讲基督教，以及说服家人归信，更是有人前往河南接受培训，以便回到宋庄可以更好地进行传教。到了2006年，宋庄地区已经有了六、七间教会。其中一两间是后来一对做画材生意的姐妹在带领，剩下的教会中都有最初宋庄聚会的成员。原先聚会的C和D现在都是一间教会的带领导人。在他们的描述中，宋庄基督教会从2006年以后的增长，和“外来教会”有很大关系。

从2006年开始，宋庄的基督徒人数有了明显的增长，一方面是教会的规模在不断变大，另一方面教会的数目也迅速增多。除了当地的三自教会以外，宋庄镇的非三自教会已经有几十个之多。而C认为已经有上百个大大小小的教会分散在宋庄镇，人数多的在二三十人，少的只有几个人。虽然C和D都是最早聚会的成员，但是今天宋庄镇的教会他们熟悉的也不多。他们认为，这样一种局面的出现，和“外来教会”的不断进入有关。

3 林京路：中国宋庄画家村调研与发展报告，《文艺理论与批评》，2013年3期，75页。
4 林京路：中国宋庄画家村调研与发展报告，《文艺理论与批评》，2013年3期，73页。
5 这一点是不是肯定很难考证，但是他是最早进行聚会的那些基督徒在宋庄发展的第一个基督徒是比较确定的。
C 和 D 口中的“外来教会”组成其实很复杂。有一部分是北京其他区的教会，有一些是河南、内蒙等省市来的，还有的则是从韩国过来宣教的人。在宋庄越来越扩大的外来人群中，很多不再是“画家村”中的“北漂”一族，而是北京一些高校，尤其是相关艺术专业的学生，以及一些文化创意产业的员工。伴随着宋庄文化产业的发展，他们也来到这里定居和工作。这些人中有一部分原先在学校、单位附近的教会聚会，当他们到达宋庄之后，或者参加宋庄本地的教会，或者就是自己重新组织聚会，乃至于后来发展成团契。

另一种情况则是其他教会派到宋庄建立教会的同工，D 说他知道的一个比较大的教会（50 人左右）就是从朝阳区的一间教会过来的姊妹带领的。相比于北京市内的其他教会，外省市特别是河南和内蒙的教会在宋庄也有相当大规模的传教活动。C 的教会在 2011 年就曾经和一间河南背景的教会发生过“抢羊”的冲突。而韩国的教会也曾经向宋庄派出过传教士，给与了很大的资金支持。其间不但组织各种大型的活动来吸引信众，更是会用赠送礼物以及提供资金援助的方式劝说人来教会。一开始确实吸引了很多信，一位曾经参加过韩国教会的基督徒表示，当初教会生活很热闹，经常有活动，遇到圣诞节更是有演出。但是后来人多了也就觉得没什么了。事实上，在韩国教会宣教的两年的时间里，教会的规模从一开始的将近 100 人不断减小，到最后寥寥无几。因此，这批韩国宣教士最后又离开了宋庄。

不应该割裂开来看宋庄的基督教增长，2001-2010 年这十年中，无论是北京还是中国大陆，基督教都呈现出一种复兴且快速增长的态势。在这个大背景之下，宋庄的基督教增长并没有什么独特性。整体的复兴态势也能说明北京其他地区教会与外省市教会在宋庄的频繁活动事出有因。但是宋庄的基督教增长中，一个与众不同的特点在于大型教会几乎不存在而是数量极多的小型教会。宋庄地区人数最多的是三自教会查经堂，大约有一百多人参加；在非三自教会中，50 人左右的规模已经是比较大的教会，而一般都在十几到二十几人之间。也就是说，宋庄的基督教增长，不但体现在基督人数的增长上，而且基督教会的数量增长也很显著，但是极少出现大型教会。

在 D 的解释中，宋庄的人口流动性高是造成这样一种局面的主要原因。他说除了宋庄的常驻艺术家其实并不多，但是会有大量的人不断涌入，寻找一些机会。他们往往在宋庄待几个月，看看能不能卖出去画。往往没有机会他们就会离开去别的地方。D 表示就他自己拉过不少人进教会，往往是花了三个月终于带进教会，没过多久人就离开宋庄了。而他们的信仰也就没有了下文。D 的教会的成员基本都是长住在宋庄的人，并且其中艺术家只占三分之一，剩下主要是附近文化公司的职员。但是就笔者参与的几次主日崇拜而言，每次人数都将近三十，并且其中大量是画家，也有诗人和音乐家。但是几次的人都不一样。D 说，很多朋友就是来宋庄附近顺便过来参加一下，他这里更像是一个迎来送往的客栈而不是主内的家。

而对于这种现象，C 给出了不一样的解释。C 认为“外来教会”不断地进入导致了本地的教会不断分裂，最终造成了宋庄教会林立的局面，甚至是一条巷子里有三四个教会的情况。在 C 的叙述中，他认为“外来教会”并不理解宋庄本地的情况，以及这些基督徒艺术家的特性。虽然他们一直试图将人从本地教会中拉走，但是由于这种不理解导致大部分基督徒艺术家不会待在“外来教会”之中。但是这种拉人或多或少会给本地教会中的弟兄姊妹带来一些不同的想法或者做法，而这种不同

6 比如 C 的教会，稳定聚会是 22 人；D 的教会稳定聚会是 16 人。
必然会在教会内部引起矛盾。正如早期的聚会一样，现在本地的教会仍然没有合适的同工队伍，同时也没有形成某种组织观念，一言不合教会就分裂了。因此，每次有“外来教会”进来，教会都会经过一次分裂。

二、周而复始的分裂怪圈

教会分裂的阴影似乎从基督教信仰进入宋庄之初就一直萦绕周围。最早的一批基督徒的聚会，即A所在的聚会，便是在一场大的分裂之中收场，而这场分裂的导火索恰恰是A。早期聚会的内容基本就是周日的敬拜以及周间的小组查经，并没有人可以进行牧养。A在归信第一年中对于传教的热情过去之后，遇到了越来越多的疑惑。这些疑惑原先聚会的基督徒们并不能进行解答，其中的一些只是要求A去按照圣经上所记的“行”。A对这样一种回应并不满意，继而退出了聚会。A的退出酝酿出更大的一场争执，几乎所有成员都被卷入对A的行为的讨论之中，这场争执的后果就是聚会分成两拨，不再复合。

在随后的日子里，类似的分裂并不少见。事实上，这次分裂几乎成了一种模板，即由个体的不同意见引发群体的意见分歧，进而直接导致人员的重新聚集。在基督教进入宋庄之初，基督徒艺术家群体的一些特性就显露出来。一是这些基督徒艺术家大多非常注重自身个体。这一方面体现在个人观点的表达往往非常强烈，另一方面也是体现在对于个体的理解达成往往有着非常高的期待。另一个基督徒艺术家群体展现出来的特性是组织性非常松散。对于他们来说，聚会和离开并不是非常大的问题。A的例子中，一个群体在一起聚会一年多的时间中，也一直没有发展出明确的团契领袖。甚至于，这样的聚会是否真的形成了某种团契也是存疑的。因此当出现了一些明确而尖锐的矛盾时，聚会立刻就变成了意见统一的人的抱团，分裂也是顷刻之间的事。

在C和D的叙述中，以及上文提到的A的例子上，我们不难发现，“分裂”是宋庄地区的教会面临的一个非常尴尬的局面。似乎是“合久必分”的定律一般，从最初的聚会，到今天的教会林立，这样一个趋势一直存在。A的例子中，当聚会中某种默认的共识不存在了之后，教会是各自抱团，进而更小的群体中寻求一致。而C也说当教会当中的一些人接受着不一样的思想或者做法，进而对原先教会的看法产生不认同的时候，分裂就再所难免。C自身的教会也经历了多次分裂，其中一次分裂是因为当时教会中的一些人接触到另外一间教会的传道，觉得那种讲道方式更好，因此希望C也能那样进行。当C并没有这么做的时候，他们就转而去了另一间教会。而作为最初聚会的D，他对于当初的分裂非常无奈：“吵架吵着吵着就分了”。那么基本上可以看出，当教会内部出现矛盾时，或者说当某种一致或者共识被打破时，教会成员会选择重新再更小的群体内结成团体，而不是由一方做出妥协。这里或许可以注意到一点，同常见的基督徒因为种种的原因，不愿意待在一个教会中，而选择换教会，或者根本不再去教会不同；宋庄的教会矛盾一但出现，一定会成为一个公共的事件，几乎所有成员都会对这一事件有自己的看法，并且依据不同的看法重新抱团。因此，宋庄教会的分裂往往是一批人的“出走”。

因此，当我们开始讨论宋庄教会的这种周而复始的分裂怪圈时，需要考虑的就不仅仅是作为基督徒艺术家的个体所展现出来的特性，并且也不仅仅是“组织性差”就可以得出的解释，这两者只是为什么在宋庄的基督徒艺术家中矛盾会如此凸显的原因。那么教会这样一种分裂态势的原因，很可能是因为这些基督徒艺术家所寻求的一致性或者团结。虽然宋庄的教会外表上非常类似于一种卡里
斯玛式的教会，比如最初聚会的几名基督徒现在都是教会的带领人，在教会这样一个背景之下，带领人个人的魅力可能更加具有感召力等等。但实际上，这样一种常常分裂的态势恰恰说明了在宋庄教会的内部，对于认同的强调。当其中的一个成员对于带领人的做法提出质疑时，并不仅仅是个体的冲突，而代表着原本教会所代表的某种认同被打破。这种认同很难说就是“基督徒”的认同或者“基督教”的认同，但是毫无疑问是基于全体教会成员的一致意见的，也就是限于教会这个范畴的。

这种认同难以界定，是因为在实际的教会中它就是无法被细化或者明说的。在笔者所接触到的各种例子中间，这种认同有的时候是基于对于艺术创作的理解上的，比如“基督徒的艺术应该用来表现社么”，还有的时候则更加物质，比如“这件画室应不应该卖”。事实上，教会成员似乎并不会去仔细思考彼此的认同是什么，只有在具体的场景下、具体的问题面前，这种认同才会浮现。

真正有意思的是，当原先的认同被打破之后，宋庄的基督徒艺术家急切地寻找一种新的认同。在这里，似乎“求同存异”的情况很少存在。当一个矛盾公开化之后，教会成员的分离几乎是立刻出现的。也就是说，当一个矛盾在教会被提出来之后，当一种共识被打破之后，不仅仅是提出的成员和带领人需要重新寻找某种一致性，而是教会的所有成员都需要找到这样一种一致性。因此，这样一种对认同的迫切需求，不仅仅是某一个成员具有，而是宋庄的基督徒艺术家都具有一种状态。

在本章开始部分，对于A的例子的分析中显示，宋庄的基督徒艺术家，一方面对于个体非常注重，无论是个体的表达还是合理性的追寻；另一方面组织性又十分地松散，无论是在带领人的问题上还是教会本身的完整性上都没有特别的强调。进而在这一章中，宋庄的基督徒艺术家们并非是绝对的个人主义者，也并非对教会毫无概念，而是对一种绝对的一致性和群体内的认同有强烈需求。这种对于教会完整性的“疏忽”，正是由于对于一致的绝对强调。当出现不同的意见时，比起进行沟通从而双方妥协以保证教会的完整，宋庄的基督徒艺术家们大多选择退回到一个更小规模的团体中保持这样一种一致。当然需要意识到，这样一种一致性并非某种空洞的、主义式的标语。几乎在每次分裂中，双方的成员都对于自身的立场有现实的考虑。因此这种认同的寻求并非出于形式上的思辨，而是其中每个成员对于身处处境的现实考虑。有了宋庄的基督徒艺术家们对认同和一致性的强调这一认识，再去理解在基督教传入宋庄这十几年的发展中出现的教会不断分裂，小型教会林立的局面就不难发现其内在的逻辑。

正如上文中所说的宋庄教会处于这样一种分裂的怪圈当中，很重要的原因在于对于个体的基督徒艺术家而言，追求“一致性认同”显得至关重要，因而他们不愿意维持教会的形态从而互相妥协。在近几年中，教会则在宋庄成为一种类似于中国传统乡村社会的“自然村落”，用已有的社会关系网络维持教会的稳定，并且通过强化教会层面的“村落认同”以及教会内部成员的多元化来代替和转移基督徒艺术家个体的“一致性认同”的追求。但是这两者的后果，前者是教会不断陷入壮大-分裂的怪圈，而后者则限定了依托于熟人关系网络的教会的规模，特别是其对于新成员的谨慎态度更是影响着教会的发展。因此，宋庄教会在某种程度上集中地体现了在现代都市之中，想象的村落与其中散落的个体之间的张力。

三、都市中的村落与个体

从上世纪九十年代以来，宋庄就一直不断涌入画家、画材商人、雕塑家等等。2004年宋庄的文化造镇方针确定，2005年开始每年举办宋庄文化艺术节，吸引海内外的艺术资本进宋庄。而越来
越多的文化创意产业，不仅仅是画廊和美术馆，也开始进入宋庄，在小堡村的艺术广场上形成了一个“艺术村落”。从绝对的人口数据来看，宋庄逐年吸引的进入人数在递增，以至于这样一个“艺术村”和原先的“画家村”一样，具有实实在在的“村民”，而并非仅仅是艺术建筑群。但是，正是在这样一个“艺术村”逐渐成型的过程中，对于已经进驻宋庄的艺术家们来说，宋庄却逐渐失去了原先“自由”这一属性⑦，当巨额的资本进入宋庄并且逐渐在艺术品市场上形成了一种垄断的时候，宋庄对于原先的“草根”画家来说，已经不再开放，而变得封闭起来。正如数据显示的那样，今天的宋庄，90%的画家依然被逐渐排挤出艺术品市场，也就意味着逐渐被排挤出这个新的“艺术村”。

在宋庄的基督教会中的艺术家们，大多都属于这90%的部分。事实上，越来越多的基督徒艺术家也正在从小堡村这个中心往周边的其他村转移，教会由于大多是在带领人或者教会成员的家中举行敬拜，因而也就一起转往周边的村落。而在这些教会身上，也体现着一种封闭性。在其对成员的接纳，对教会的强调以及对外来教会”的拒斥方面，这种封闭性似乎可以与传统的中国汉人村落形成一种类比，某种意义上来说，这些教会也在宋庄，延续了“画家村”这样一种奇特的“自然村”状态。

从圆明园时代就形成的“画家村”以一种特别的方式延续了城市中的中国传统文化村落。和今天拥有实体的艺术建筑群的宋庄“艺术村”不同，当时蜗居在圆明园附近的“画家村”并没有形成一种地理空间上的乡村重构，而是完全依赖人与人之间的关系，形成了一种有“村长”有“士绅”也有普通村民的社会。并且同传统的中国社会中的村落一样，同代表“国家”的中央政权（皇权）进行着博弈和斗争。对于圆明园的“画家村”来说，是一种更为直接的对抗，当然结果也是以村落的失败告终。但对于来到宋庄以后的“画家村”来说，则是选择了与政府进行沟通和合作，这时候的栗宪庭等人如同村落中的“士绅”一般，与地方政府进行沟通。在这个特殊的“自然村”中，艺术家之间的私人关系代替了传统的血缘和地缘关系，因而很难形成一种具体的村落边界，或者认同的来源。同时这些类比中的“士绅”也不具有传统乡村社会中的士绅的政治权力与合法性，事实上，随着宋庄的发展，原先的“画家村”中的大多数已经被排斥在新的“艺术村”之外，而这些“士绅”本身对于地方政府的影响力也微乎其微。但是这样一种传统的乡村社会并没有因此消失，而是转入了周边的村落，分聚成大大小小的团体，延续着这样一种假象中的“共同体”，基督教会便是其中的一种。

与其他的艺术家“共同体”不一样的是，虽然宋庄村的基督教会越来越体现出依据成员的私人关系进行发展的特点，但是却提供了原先的“画家村”所没有的认同感来源，以及有了清晰而明确的边界。这种状态下的基督教会是封闭的，与周边，甚至是其他的教会隔离开来。D对笔者表示，他所带领的教会吸收的成员彼此之间都是有很强的私人关系，而且都是他亲自考察考核过的“可靠”的基督徒。D说这两年陆陆续续有人来找他，想到他们教会聚会，但是大部分都被他婉拒，有一些介绍到其他教会，而很多刚刚到达宋庄的画家慕道友，被他介绍去三自会的查经堂参加聚会。即使对于愿意接纳的慕道友，也需要在教会参与一年左右的团契生活，才可能在教会决志受洗。而对于在别的教会受洗的基督徒，D说基本不考虑接纳。

这样的一番表述显得极为有趣。在基督教最初发展的时候，本地的教会对于传教是非常地重视，即使在经历了最初的分裂之后，传教工作也没有停滞下来，而是分头建立了新的教会，吸纳基督徒艺术家。在这样一个大背景之下，才会有C对于“外来教会”“抢羊”的抱怨。但对于现在的D的教会而言，吸收新的成员变成了一件慎重又慎重的事情。而在C的教会，虽然C一再表示非常欢迎有慕道友和已经受洗的基督徒到他那里聚会，但是实际上这种欢迎聚会是利用主日崇拜的机会发展出
一个用于社交的公共空间。这类的现象在 D 的教会也有体现，即“迎来送往”的主日崇拜聚会提供了一个教会成员与其他基督徒艺术家的社交平台，但是在吸纳新的成员方面却极为谨慎。

这样一种状态如果类比到中国传统社会中的村落就会发现极为有趣的相似性，对于外人的排斥极为明显，但是不妨碍周期性的公共活动。村落之间可能联合进行一些节日性的祭祀，而此时村庄是开放的，甚至是欢迎外人的到访。但是在这种周期性的典礼之外，日常生活中的村落呈现出一种保守的状态。外人成为“村民”是很困难的，即使通过婚姻等途径入住村庄，但是其“外人”的身份时隔多年依然会被提起。而对于宋庄的基督教会来说，除非通过在教会的“受洗”这一“重生”过程，不然很难取得某种成员身份的合法性。

这种对于接纳新成员的谨慎态度来源于对于新成员与已有的群体没有关联或者关联太弱的担忧。在中国传统的乡村社会中，“外人”之所以成为难以接纳的对象，一个很重要的原因是他与他所处的社会没有或者只有很弱的社会关系。对于村民来说，他不能通过已有的血缘、地缘关系对这个“外人”进行定位，而这个人是依循着这一定位，才能展开自己的生活实践。而对于脱离的原有的社会关系网络，进入一个新的社会的人来说，他是无法被定位的，而他的生活实践的基础是非常不稳固的。这类人在社会中自然地成为某种不安定的因子，这个社会中的成员能感觉到这种不安定的隐忧，并且在某些特殊的场合之下集中爆发出来。一个“外人”进入当地社会的重要途径就是通过婚姻取得当地的社会关系网络中的地位，虽然他仍然处在社会关系网的边缘。这一情况随着他在当地社会的居住，以及后代的繁衍而逐渐改善，他的身上也不仅仅是单一的社会关系，而逐渐有了更多的链条，也逐渐往社会关系网的内部移动。同样的情况也发生在宋庄的基督教会。流动性很强的新成员，在别的教会已经受洗的基督徒，对于教会内部的成员来说都是很难建立起稳定社会关系的对象。这种新成员的加入往往会在教会内部引发不安和担忧，并且在教会内部出现矛盾时（可能与新成员有关也可能无关）成为被归因的对象。事实上，C 把自己所在的教会的几次分裂都归结于“外来教会”对教会本身成员造成的影响也是在这样的一种逻辑之下得出的。虽然这些“外来教会”的成员没有直接进入教会，但是他们的出现和活动依然破坏了原先教会内部的社会关系网络，并且在矛盾出现的时候直接导致了原先社会关系网络的崩塌，教会出现分裂。

在努力维持这样一种类似于中国传统乡村社会关系网络的同时，宋庄的教会也越来越强调“教会”这样一个概念。可以看出，这样一种强调，同上文所述其对于教会新成员的谨慎态度一样，都来源于对教会可能出现的分裂的担忧。这种强调，一方面是在不断加强教会内部成员的认同感。这种认同感并非在前文讨论的基督徒艺术家对于某种共同体内部的一致性的追求，而是一种类似于传统中国社会中的村落认同。这是一种有着明确的边界，同时依附于社会关系网络中的认同。相对于前者来说，这种认同更多地是提供一种归属感，而非对个体的强调，并非对某种个体的表达或者合理性追求的支撑。事实上，教会的领袖们正在试图通过这样一种“村落认同”来取代原先基督徒艺术家们追求绝对一致性的那种“认同”。正是由于这样一种“村落认同”依附于更加实际的社会关系网络，因而在教会出现矛盾的时候，有更大的可能性可以维持教会的完整。或者说，虽然这种“村落认同”强调也是通过圣经文本的形式出现，但是其实际的操作却是通过一种很强有利的社会关系网络完成的。因此即使当这样一种“村落认同”出现危机，社会关系网络依旧在发挥作用，而使得教会不至于立刻出现分崩离析的局面。对于原先的追求一致性的认同而言，几乎不依赖于任何的社会关系网。
络，而只是个人对自身处境的考量，因而出现分歧之时，几乎没有任何的力量可以维持原先教会的形态。

虽然从本质上来说，这两种认同的出发点并不一样，“村落认同”提供的是一种群体的归属感，而“一致性认同”则是对个体表达与合理性的追求。但是在教会进行替代工作的实际操作过程中却并没有出现特别大的障碍。一方面是“自然村”式的教会对于很多成员来说非常熟悉，因此接受度很高。另一方面则是教会成员的多元化使得“一致性”的追求越来越难以达成，很多基督徒艺术家也不再试图在教会内部达成这样一种一致性认同。D的教会是一个很明显的例子。与早期的基督徒艺术家的聚会大多由画家组成不一样，D的教会中比较稳定的成员很多并非艺术家，而是相关的艺术产业的成员。有文化传媒公司的成员，有手工饰品店的员工，也有歌手和服装店老板。除了D本身以外，教会内只有三个传统意义上的画家。在C的教会，虽然人员还是以艺术家为主，但是很多也是雕塑家、音乐家，画家的比例只有一半不到。这样一种组成使得教会成员认为在教会内部形成一种一致性认同是不切实际的，因此在C和D的表述中，这两年教会内部的矛盾内容已经发生了很大的变化。从早期很多涉及个人观点的冲突变成了对于教会牧养、教会建设上的不同意见，比如C的教会就一直在讨论是否要有一个委身本教会的牧师的问题。可以看到，在这样一种情况下，教会内部出现的矛盾也已经转移到了教会的相关领域。从这个意义上来说，教会内部的“村落认同”已然取代了原先对于“一致性认同”的追求，并且反过来成为教会这样一个“自然村”继续维持的来源。

在宋庄基督教会中的大部分成员都是整个宋庄地区中那90%的一部分，在温饱线上挣扎。在日益明显的极端的两极分化之下，在成员逐渐退出小堡村的中心而形成一种明显的地理区隔的时候，宋庄的基督教会也不得不直面基督徒艺术家在当地安身立命的问题。在生活的巨大压力之下，教会并不是一个可以让基督徒暂时抛却烦恼的世外桃源。相反，在教会内部，无论是带领者还是成员都时刻感受到这样一种深切的压力。这样一种压力被他们不断地整合进基督教的信仰之中，因而在教会内部，信仰和实践往往是最常提及的话题。这种压力的来源，不仅仅是贫困，同时还有很多关于艺术作品的表达，以及艺术家渴望的认可方面的问题。小堡村拔地而起的艺术广场对于当地的艺术家来说，是一块展现资本主义力量的标志。基督徒艺术家们同样也每天面对着这样一块标志，他们一方面鄙夷一味追求卖画的商业倾向，一面又深切地感受着资本的力量。这种夹缝中的基督徒艺术家们处于一种焦虑的状态，这种焦虑来源于他们所处的悬空位置，因此他们渴望在信仰的领域寻找到一种确定感。这种确定感，就是上文提及的两种认同，对于一致性的认同解决个体表达和合法性上的焦虑，而教会内部的“村落认同”则解决在日常生活中的焦虑。

宋庄的教会给成员带来生活上的援助和支持是毋庸置疑的。C的教会每月的支出表上都会有援助弟兄姊妹的支出款项。同时教会将主日崇拜积极建设成为一种公共社交平台也给其成员带来了实际的好处。无论是作品送出去参加展览，还是和业界进行结交，教会可以说是一个非常重要的途径。同时在日常生活中，教会这个“传统村落”也使得其成员得到了相当大的支持。这种“乡里乡亲”的构筑使得基督徒艺术家在严酷的现实处境之下获得了一种稳定感。由此，教会提供的认同感来源于基督徒的身份被他们视为一种类似于“先赋性”的关系。或者说，他们虽然在保持着教会的“封闭”，但是在教会之外，他们依然形成了关于“基督徒”的认同感。这种认同感用于应对其他的基督徒以及非基督徒。对于他们来说，教会提供的“村落认同”与自身对于“基督徒”身份的认同并非同一种层面上的东西。一方面由于村落并不是真正意义上的“自然村”。它可以在类比的构想之中承担传统中国乡村的属性，但是却并不能包含其成员的日常生活。因此，“基督徒”的认同是在日常生活的层面上出现
的，它杂糅着“村落认同”和“一致性认同”的一些特点，在“基督徒”这一身份上，宋庄的基督徒艺术家们不但附带着某种先赋性的关系预设（同为基督徒的亲近及与非基督徒的疏离），同时还预设了对于自身“个体”的期望（比如我所表达的基督教艺术应当得到其他基督徒艺术家的认可和回应）。但是在实际中，这种“基督徒”身份带来的预设，同理想型的“基督徒”与“基督教”一样难觅踪迹。C 对于基督徒企业家的抱怨就直接体现了这一点。

在教会的主日崇拜后的社交活动中，C 一直很想吸引一些基督徒的企业家参与进来。对于 C 来说，他认为基督徒企业家同其他企业家一样有收藏艺术品的爱好，那么基督徒艺术家所创作的作品应该比其他艺术家的作品更能吸引他们才对。但是事实上，很多基督徒企业家对基督徒艺术家们的创作并不偏好，而更加喜欢一些知名艺术家的作品。2014 年四月，笔者就参与了一次这样展览，参展的除了 C 自身的画作，以及教会成员的作品以外，还有其他地方的一些基督徒艺术家特意送作品过来。展览就在 C 所在的教会举行，但是在现场笔者遇到的基督徒企业家并不多，而很多都是文化公司和画廊的人。在场的艺术家 I 告诉笔者，这种状况非常普遍，这些基督徒艺术家的作品和目前宋庄艺术市场上的作品相比并没有什么特殊性，也没有找到一类特定的消费者群体。C 表示自己接触到的基督徒企业家们对于属灵题材的创作并没有表现出特别的兴趣。对此 C 很失望，甚至有一些不满，觉得基督徒企业家不应该去追捧那些“世俗”的东西。同时他也焦虑于是不是包括自己在内的基督徒艺术家们的创作依然不够“属灵”，没有办法把基督的生命通过作品表现和传达出来。

与此可以形成某种对比的是，D 表示自己经常能够有机会去一些韩国教会举办的画展，在那些画展之上，基督徒艺术家的作品很受欢迎。因此在宋庄的基督徒画家群体之中，去韩国参加画展也越来越普遍。这些画展并不是每年定期举行，但是基本集中在每年的夏季与冬季。从 2010 年以后，去韩国参加画展就变得逐步普遍起来。与此同时，这些基督徒画家仍然需要将自己的作品送去很多非基督教主旨的展览，但卖出去的几率并不高。A 表示韩国基督教的兴盛发展一个缩影就是这些基督教主旨的画展上，画作等艺术品的成交比率非常高。韩国的基督徒们非常乐意购买这些基督教题材的作品。而国内，特别是宋庄这样一个大规模的艺术品交易空间里依然没有形成类似的局面。

从 C 的想法中不难发现这样一种“基督徒”身份的认同和预期，即那些基督徒的企业家无论是出于弟兄姊妹的关系还是出于对于属灵生命的追求都应该更加偏好于基督徒艺术家的作品，而不是“世俗”的艺术名家的作品。在这里可以看出，“基督徒”的身份，“属灵”和“世俗”的二分被宋庄的基督徒艺术家们运用在日常生活之中，来划分自身的位置。这一点与他们所处的被资本排斥在外的境况息息相关。并不是否认属灵团体的存在，而是对于宋庄的基督徒艺术家而言，之前他们被动地被排斥且归类（无论是在地理上还是业界）。改变这一状态的一个办法就是重新划归自己的社会类别，“基督徒”与“非基督徒”便是一这样一种重新分类。并且在这个类别之中，他们和基督徒企业家同属一类，因此原先非常强烈的资本对他们的排斥在这个类别中不复存在。但是这种类别划分是基于他们对于“基督徒”这一身份的预设，在实际中往往出现不符合的情况（比如基督徒企业家依然在斥巨资买名家作品，但是对于基督徒艺术家的作品不愿意购买，或者给价远低于他们的预期）。但是这种情况之下，宋庄的基督徒艺术家们并不愿意放弃这一对自身重新归类的努力，因此他们开始为这样一种现实与预期的“偏差”寻求解释，就是自身的作品相对于“世俗”的作品来说“属灵”程度仍然不够，因此不能吸引基督徒企业家的注意。这一解释是可以接受的，因而宋庄的基督徒艺术家开始对自身的创作进行反思，开始对于“属灵”的反思。但是这一反思的过程并非轻而易举，究竟什么样的作品才是基督徒艺术家的作品，这一问题无论是宋庄教会的领导者还是成员都在苦苦思索。
四、结论：时代里的“沙”和“塔”

在理解宋庄教会的问题上，必须考虑到宋庄这样一个“文化产业镇”自身的发展轨迹。宋庄的基督徒艺术家同时也是聚居在宋庄的艺术家。他们中的大部分与贫困为伍，在宋庄处于巨大的生存压力之下。这种生存压力来自于生存地理空间以及艺术市场的双重挤压。除了小堡村的艺术建筑群不断扩大，这些基督徒艺术家还处于北京这座特大都市的挤压之中。宋庄教会中的这些成员，是基督徒，是艺术家，也是“北漂”。同时这种生存压力对于他们来说并不陌生。他们中的很多人的艺术之路都一直处于这样一种压力之下。

而在经历了将近十年的壮大-分裂怪圈挣扎之后，宋庄教会出现了一些新的变化。这些教会可以类比于中国传统乡村社会，也可以被视作宋庄的“艺术家村”，乃至于更早的圆明园“画家村”这样一种在城市中重构的“自然村”。如同中国传统的乡村社会一样，这些教会通过建立起紧密的社会关系网络来维持自身形态的完整。不同于个人出发的“一致性认同”，在这些“自然村”教会之中强调的是一种群体（教会）出发的“村落认同”。这种“村落认同”依附在社会关系网络之上，成为可以替代“一致性认同”的选项。如同依靠地缘、血缘关系网络构建起的中国传统社会的乡村一样，这些教会通过成员之间密切的社会关系网络构建起“教会”这个概念。同时，通过“村落认同”带来的归属感和确定性来弥补“一致性认同”隐而不显之后，个体合理化过程停滞所带来的焦虑感。并且，这种归属感和确定性能够比单纯的个体合理化进程更好地应对以小堡村为中心的文化产业资本对于原先的宋庄艺术家进行驱逐排挤这一局面。在那时，这些类似于“自然村”的教会形成一种社会组织，来解决其成员作为个体无法应对这种生存压力以及资本主义的排斥的问题。作为一种有明确边界，有强烈内部联系的社会组织，相较于个人有更强的抗风险能力。而基督徒艺术家也深切地感受到这一点。

但与此同时，仍应该看到，这样一种想象的村落仿佛比现实的宋庄更加真实，仿作一座真切的高塔，可以在其中抵御资本的冲击和城市空间的压迫。但是即使再强调群体性的村落认同的同时，个体并未真正的消弭其中，而是转移成了对于“基督徒”的想象。对于什么是基督徒，自己是什么样的基督徒的理解恰恰是个体对于一致性认同的延伸。换言之，个体并未因为归属于某个群体而发生实质上的变化。所谓“高塔”，细看之下依旧是粒粒沙尘。教会所构建的“传统村落”，只是概念层面的类比和模拟，而并不能真正转变已经个体化的个人，同时也无法将这种想象的社会关系网络投射回现实生活之中。可以说，这样一种在都市里重构乡村的教会实践，越来越成为一种符号化的象征性的展演，而不是共同体的建构。那么，在这样一个时代之下，个体的“沙”是否可能真正筑成共同体的“高塔”？这个问题将比理解城市里一个传统村落样式的教会更加值得深思。

C 和 D 的教会是在这其中两个最突出和典型的案例。C 在访谈的最后和笔者说下一步就是要建设专业的牧养队伍，更加重视智识性的信仰牧养。同时也坚持教会的开放和多元，欢迎各种人前来聚会，给与其中的成员高度的自由和个人空间。同时另一方面，专业的牧养队伍也就意味着分工的明确，各类同工的职责和权限都将得到明确的规定，具体的细节化的教会章程也在起草之中。对于 C 来说，教会只有成为每个人都接受或者认同的一种存在才有可能成为“共同体”。而 D 的教会在其带领之下越来越成为一种典型的“城市村落”，其中的成员组成固定，流动性低，彼此之间关系紧密。同时领导队伍权责复合，没有明确的界限，有事情是互相商量着决定。同时在内部要求高度的统一，并且认为这样的“共同体”才是教会应该存在的形态。这两种选择之间无所谓对错或者优劣，
但是却能为我们展现出关于“共同体”这一概念的理解本身就存在着非常大的差异。而这种差异本身可能是源于对“现代社会”的不同理解。

回到宋庄艺术家教会，无论是作为“职人教会”，还是“乡村教会”，都不是一个新鲜的概念。但是宋庄艺术家教会产生的过程本身又是一系列特殊事件和背景之下的个案。那么如果宋庄是如此特殊的一个存在，本文的意义又在哪里？

宋庄是特殊的，它形成的前因后果，机缘巧合都并非其他地方可以一一对应的模板。同时，基督教在宋庄的艺术家中间传播，过程中也出现了各种夸张甚至是戏剧性的事件。但是回到本文所关心的议题上来，宋庄是大大小小发生在城市化与金融资本涤荡中的乡镇的缩影。而宋庄的艺术家们也是夹在这种城市与乡村，富贵与贫困之中的中国一代人的缩影。这些人对于艺术乃至信仰的热情背后，是对于国家、社会、历史的思索、愤懑、哀伤乃至绝望。同样，在基督教在宋庄的传播过程当中，时代的变化清晰可见。更为关键的是，在这些基督徒艺术家身上，在这些基督徒艺术家组成的教会身上，我们可以一窥信仰与实践，个体与群体之间的张力。为理解中国社会，理解基督徒，理解中国社会中的基督教提供一面镜子。

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Religion in the Global East: Challenges and Opportunities for the Social Scientific Study of Religion

Fenggang Yang

In contrast to the political and economic concept of the “Global South,” I propose the social and cultural concept of the “Global East.” Socially, the Global East has developed or fast-developing countries rather than underdeveloped or slowly developing countries. Culturally, these societies share the traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and various forms of folk religions. The Global East also includes ethnic communities of East Asians in other countries around the world that are closely connected with East Asia and playing important roles in East Asian developments.

Religion in the Global East presents theoretical and methodological challenges for the social scientific study of religion. First, the religion-state relations in the Global East have been very different from Europe and Americas. Religious monopoly has been rare throughout the history. Multiple religions have coexisted most of the time. Second, at the micro level, religious identity has not traditionally been exclusive or salient. A majority of people have been open to beliefs and practices of multiple religions. Third, modernization has led to secularization movements in the Global East, but secularization theories fail to explain most of the religious changes in modern times, which include revivals of Confucianism and Buddhism, persistence of folk religions, and the rise of Christianity in some but not all of the Global East countries and communities.

Religion in the Global East also presents great opportunities for the social scientific study of religion in the globalizing world. First, if we can develop good measures of religiosity in the Global East, it should help substantially improve the measurement of religiosity around the globe. Second, cross-referencing and comparative studies of religions in the Global East is likely shed light on many theoretical issues in the general social science of religion. Third, a better, scholarly understanding of the religion-state relations in the Global East may help to present meaningful alternatives to the existing models of modern religion-state relations.
The Restoration and Reinvention of Tradition - Buddhist Temples in Contemporary Urban Gentrified Shanghai

Author: Weishan Huang
Affiliation: Assistant Professor, Cultural and Religious Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Email: Weishan@cuhk.edu.hk

Abstract: This paper will examine the process of urban temple revival since the 1980s by focusing on the example of the temple expansion of the Han Buddhist Temples and their interaction with state-planned urbanization since the 1980s when it was returned to religious use after being severely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. The successful restoration of Buddhist temples in city proper have led to a new legend of which Buddhism can be a prompt enticement for neighborhood gentrification in the debates of urban planning. Drawing from the findings in renewal of Jing’an Temple and other 6 temples in three diverse sites in Shanghai, this qualitative study provides analysis of temple’s developmental strategies to deal with secular policies and to benefit urban revitalization at district levels.
Understanding Human Rights in the Context of Buddhism
Ellen Y. Zhang
Hong Kong Baptist University

Abstract

In political realm, the concept of human rights sets limits to more powerful collectives and institutions such as state, society, and religion. Concurrently, the concept of rights intends to set up an egalitarian model in society to replace a hereditary one accepted by various cultural traditions in the past. Yet the tricky part in contemporary politico-philosophical discussions is what constitutes “rights” or “human rights” since both ethicists and legalists employ the same term yet very often use it with different connotations. Can the concept of rights competently deal with the complexity of social issues we are facing today? Should human rights be the new lingua franca of ethics and legal principles for public good and human well-being? Do human responsibilities and human rights supersede each other or complement each other? Would too much emphasis on rights compromise what is perceived as “good”? In this paper, I shall use Buddhism as an example to explicate what kind of human rights Buddhism would accept and what kind of human rights Buddhism may find problematic. In addition, I shall take a look of the human rights problems in contemporary China and explore what the role of Buddhist communities can play to improve the common good and the human rights condition in China.

1. Introduction

The concept of human rights, with its unique cultural matrix of socio-political and intellectual developments in the Enlightenment of the West, has been a highly disputed one in contemporary ethical discourse. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter UDHR, 1948) and its subsequent human rights conventions aim to make “the rights of every individual” a legally binding agreement that can go beyond cultural boundaries and religious or ideological differences. The concept of human rights entails three key words, that is, dignity, rights, and freedoms, all of which point to a fundamental idea that each individual, as a free agent or a self-determined person, should be protected via recognition of his/her dignity and rights. In other words, the respect of human dignity and the protection of human rights define the minimum of what is necessary in order to safeguard the freedom of individual agency and freedom of self-determination. In political realm, the concept of human rights sets limits to more powerful collectives and institutions such as state, society, and religion. Concurrently, the concept of rights intends to set up an egalitarian model in society to replace a hereditary one accepted by various cultural traditions in the past. Yet the tricky part in contemporary politico-philosophical discussions is what constitutes “rights” or “human rights” since both ethicists and legalists employ the same term yet very often use it
with different connotations. Can the concept of rights competently deal with the complexity of social issues we are facing today? Should human rights be the new *lingua franca* of ethics and legal principles for public good and human well-being? Do human responsibilities and human rights supersede each other or complement each other? Would too much emphasis on rights compromise what is perceived as “good”?

In *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, Michael Ignatieff speaks of human rights as a means not only to protect individuals but also to affirm what he calls “moral individualism” (Ignatieff 2001: 66). Since the notion of “individuals” here refers to every person regardless of his/her race, color, sex, religion, birth, etc. these human rights are viewed as valid for everyone equally and universally. The UDHR intends to use the general concept of human rights to underline the importance of biodiversity and its conservation as a common concern of humankind with its language of expansiveness and inclusivity. Since the intention here is to use a general principle to cover potential diversities in ethical controversies across nations and cultures, this principle must be easily accepted and applicable. The question under the debate is how one can justify the claim to universal validity of human dignity and rights indicated in the UDHR as a global ethics in a post-modern age whereby a consensus on anything transcendent and universal seems difficult if not impossible across different cultures, religions, and ideologies. In this paper, I shall use Buddhism as an example to explicate what kind of human rights Buddhism would accept and what kind of human rights Buddhism may find problematic. In addition, I shall take a look of the human rights problems in contemporary China and explore what the role of Buddhist communities can play to improve the common good and the human rights condition in China.

2. Human Dignity and Human Rights

Human dignity and human rights are usually mentioned side by side. The concept of human dignity seems less controversial at the first glance. Yet the problem is that it is very difficult to justify one particular understanding of human dignity in the contemporary pluralistic world through a rational formulation without defining the term. In the Western tradition, the ontological basis of human dignity in the sense that each person is “unique and unrepeatable” is argued either philosophically or theologically. The idea of human dignity also comes from the idea of “natural right” and the belief of “universal moral law” rooted in the “justice of God” in Judeo-Christian tradition. Nevertheless, the concept of human dignity, particularly the notion of “intrinsic dignity” as we often suggest today, is a product of the historical evolution of modern thought.

No doubt, rights-talk is not historically Buddhist, yet Buddhism would accept the modern notion of “dignity” as a general principle, since the Buddhist idea (in Māhayāna in particular) that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature provides a basis for the respect of
the individual’s inherent dignity. But at the same time, Buddhists may see both human dignity and human rights having an “anthropocentric implication” (i.e. humans vs. non-humans) that might be problematic in some cases. In his essay “Buddhism and the Idea of Human Rights: Resonances and Dissonances,” Perry Schmidt-Leukel has observed that “in Buddhism human beings do not occupy an absolutely privileged position but are seen against the doctrine of rebirth as being continuous with all ‘sentient beings,’ that is, with all forms of existence in which rebirth can take place” (Schmidt-Leukel 2006: 39). This explains why many Buddhist scholars insist on supplementing the concept of “animal rights” whenever they are engaged in rights talk. However, a non-anthropocentric position may compromise the absolute rights of human beings. For example, should we use animals for medical experimentations? Obviously, the practice of medical experimentations on animals is in conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of not doing any harm to animals.

Another problem facing Buddhism is the notion of a “self-embedded individualism” entailed in the very concept of human rights. The Buddhists would see that too much emphasis on rights compromises what is perceived as “good.” One of the central tenets of Buddhism is that there is no self ontologically. That is to say, there is no substantial or fixed self that underlies a person’s experience, and thus an individual is nothing but a sequence of causally linked psychological and physical events and processes. If Buddhism denies the essential nature of individual or self, then the idea of an essential/unalienable nature of individual dignity and rights would be questionable unless the Buddhist takes the issue from a broader perspective.

Damien Keown, one of the leading scholars of Buddhist studies, contends that for Buddhists “human beings live in relationship with one another is not a moral argument about how they ought to behave” since classical Buddhism is largely devoid of a systematic philosophy of human rights, or any form of normative ethics perceived in the West (Keown 2005: 30). Although Buddhism is an intellectually dynamic tradition, says, Keown, it is “lightweight” in moral and political philosophy in a modern sense. For Keown, normative ethics is prescriptive telling people how things ought to be, and it is always questionable whether “ethical theories” in the West — deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics — are appropriate lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought like Buddhism or to approach non-Western ethical concept like human rights. Nevertheless, it does not mean that we cannot talk about Buddhist moral teachings and their theoretical implications to the rights issue in a normative way, as long as we acknowledge the limitation of such approach. Hence Keown asserts that there are some elements in the Buddhist tradition that can be looked at from a vantage point of the modern idea of rights. For example, the right to life can be understood from the Buddhist precept not to kill, and that the right to private property can be seen from the precept not to steal (Keown 1995: 31–33). In addition, Keown argues that the Buddhist concept of duties and virtues of a king (Dharma) anticipates the modern notion

It is true that ethical discussions, including moral precepts in Buddhism, are often conducted in practical terms (i.e. concerning the application of precepts) rather than in a pure theoretical manner. Yet Buddhist-inspired moral teachings have elements that can be employed and extended when we bring Buddhism into the conversation with contemporary ethical discourse. For example, although the language of rights is absent in Buddhism, it seems to me that certain components in Buddhism are synchronistic with what is called “negative rights” from its broader perspective. Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918), the American legal theorist calls this kind of rights as “privileges” or “liberty rights.” According to Hohfeld, $A$ has a privilege to $x$ if and only if $A$ has no duty not to $x$. For instance, a person’s right to life and property exists independently of someone’s actions. Concerning bio-medical ethics, it has been widely accepted as a general moral principle requiring that doctors perform or refrain from performing particular actions which will harm the patient. In his article “Human Rights and Compassion: Towards a Unified Moral Framework,” Buddhist philosopher Jay L. Garfield makes an argument that “rights” are asserted when they are violated or threatened, and thus they are fundamentally protective and negative in character (Garfield 1995:1-14). In view of protecting human life and freedom, Buddhists would have no problem accepting the concept of human rights. In other words, human rights are necessary because they reflect certain moral standards of how humans should be treated, and how a violation of such standards should be condemned.

When talking about the Buddhist concept of dharma, Keown attempts to suggest that rights and duties are mutually interdependent. From legal and moral perspectives today, a duty-based or duty-dependent right is sometimes called “positive right” or “claim right.” A claim right is a right which entails responsibilities, duties, or obligations on another person as a duty bearer for the right-holder. That is to say, $A$ has a claim that $Bx$ if and only if $B$ has a duty to $A$ to $x$. In political and moral philosophy, a distinction between negative and positive rights is often employed by some normative theorists, especially those with a libertarian bent. The right-holder of a negative right focuses on permission and non-interference whereas the right-holder of a positive right is entitled to provision of some good or service: A right against assault and harm is a classic example of a negative right, and a right to welfare assistance or Medicaid systems is viewed as a positive right. The language of rights, particularly the language of claim rights, suggests a person’s “entitlement” that needs to be treated justly which, in turn, implies a corresponsive obligation by someone else in order to make that entitlement actualized. Along this line of thinking, the UN’s Declaration embraces both negative and positive rights.

1 For this issue, also see the book *Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights: Dissonances and Resonances* by Carmen Meinert and Hans-Bernd Zöllner (eds.). Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag, 2010.
I concur with Keown that in the Buddhist tradition duty and right are mutually dependent. This argument is also consistent with the Buddhist notion of interconnectedness of everything both ontologically and ethically. However, it should be noted that if we examine what constitutes rights closely, we will see that even though some rights presume duties and obligations, it does not mean all duties and obligations can be translated back into rights. This is particularly true from a modern (Western) liberal point of view. On this point, Craig Ihara has made a good point, saying that “while it is true that from every right a corresponding duty can be deduced, the converse does not hold, that is, one cannot deduce from every duty the claim to a corresponding right (Ihara 1998: 45). I am quite intrigued by Ihara’s points of view when he claims that it is important to draw a line between cooperative activities and the kind of moral property which constitutes a right. The debate on human rights, Ihara argues, would be better served if it could be shown that “rights talk” in Buddhism is a “skillful means” (upāya) towards the elimination of suffering rather than something that is fixed and essential as unalienable rights, or functions as a universally shared framework for addressing all social problems, including bioethical problems. To put it differently, the Buddhist doctrine of interconnectedness is responsibility-oriented rather than individual-, right-based.

Historically speaking, from the very beginning cases in terms of human research/experimentation such as Nuremberg Trials and US vs. Brandt are meant to address the question of how to protect a human life from the atrocities committed by physicians and scientists in the name of the interest of the state, or the purported interests of medical and scientific progress. From the perspective of Buddhism, this is not simply an issue of human rights, but an issue concerning a physician’s responsibility to protect the life of each individual patient in clinical practice because of the interconnectedness of all sentient beings. Yet on the flip side, does society have a duty that goes beyond individual interests to explore the fundamental importance of a population’s health and well-being? It seems that Buddhism would reject a universally shared principle on this issue.

Here, we run into a long-standing debate between rights and duties/responsibilities. Buddhism, like most other Asian traditions, tends to focus on duties rather than rights. Duty is connected to the idea of compassion. In other words, instead of speaking of the rights of the right-holder, Buddhism prefers to talk about the duty-giver whose “good” action is not merely a result of a legal and compulsory requirement but a “voluntary” (“volitional” in a Buddhist term) action. The word “compassion” (karunā) in Buddhism is usually understood as “active sympathy” or a “willingness to bear the pain and sorrow of others.” In Māhayāna Buddhism, compassion, along with enlightened wisdom (prajña), is the key moral character to be cultivated on the bodhisattva (i.e. Buddha-in-making) path. Chinese Buddhism translates the Sanskrit word karunā as bei (悲) which means “sympathy”, “empathy”, or “pity.” This word is also connected to another word, “loving kindness” (Pali, mettā; Chinese,
ci (慈), being understood in English as “compassion.” The ethics of compassion indicates that everyone in the world is interrelated. Unlike the Confucian tradition in which the notion of loving kindness (ren (仁) is characterized by familial distinctions (i.e. a graded love or care), compassion in Buddhism emphasizes a shared human experience, particularly the experience of human vulnerability. The Buddhist monastic order (sangha) as a social institution has a long tradition of treating and taking care of the sick regardless of his/her sex, religion, and social class.

Since Buddhism speaks of a shared human experience, the issue that may bother Buddhists regarding the language of rights is the concept of individualism, or to be more exactly, the atomic notion of individualism (in Charles Taylor’s term) embedded in the very idea of human rights. Although people talk about collective rights, that is, the rights of a particular group or community (such as children’s rights, women’s rights and gay rights), the idea of human rights, whether positive or negative, is based on free-standing individuals and individual autonomy. When speaking of rights against the Buddhist doctrine of compassion, Garfield makes an important distinction between liberalism in which the spirit of human rights is formulated vis-à-vis compassion as the guiding principle of Buddhism. Central to liberalism, Garfield states, is “the protection of the private,” and central to that protection is “the protection of individuals from obligations to undertake any particular attitudes or visions of the good life” (Garfield 1995:1-14). Quite obviously, Garfield interprets “negative rights” in a more “negative” manner by suggesting that right is a means to avoid obligations one has for others. He then further points out that “to begin from compassion is to begin by taking the good of others as one’s own motive for action” (Garfield 1995:1-14). Garfield’s critique of the individual-oriented approach to rights supports his argument for fellowship implied in the Buddhist ethics of compassion. For Garfield and many other Buddhist scholars, compassion or obligation to other fellow men/women should be the primary moral language, while the concept of rights functions as a protective mechanism to safeguard human life and freedom. It seems to me that Garfield’s argument for compassion is quite similar to that made by communitarians in the West such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael J. Sandel. For them, the drawback of rights-talk lies in not only its overemphasis on preferences and choices of someone who is “antecedently individuated”, but also in its potential undermining of one of the fundamental issues in moral philosophy. That is, “what is right” (a pun here) has replaced “what is good” which provides a strong foundation for good society and the flourishing of human beings.

Buddhism implies similar arguments. For Buddhists, the language of rights indicates the primacy of a self-embedded individualism that is antithetical to Buddhist moral teachings. Ihara, for instance, contends that “…invoking rights has the inevitable effect of emphasizing individuals and their status, thereby strengthening the illusion of self. While Buddhism has a holistic view of life, the rights perspective is essentially atomistic” (Ihara 1998: 51). To
respond to this problem, an online symposium in 1995 entitled “Buddhism and Human Rights” sponsored by the *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* issued “Declaration of Interdependence” as a supplemental document to UN’s Declaration of Human Rights, in which one reads,

> Those who have the good fortune to have a “rare and precious human rebirth,” with all its potential for awareness, sensitivity, and freedom, have a duty to not abuse the rights of others to partake of the possibilities of moral and spiritual flourishing offered by human existence. Such flourishing is only possible when certain conditions relating to physical existence and social freedom are maintained. Human beings, furthermore, have an obligation to treat other forms of life with the respect commensurate to their natures (Harvey 2000: 121).

The citation shows two distinctive moral frameworks maintained by Buddhists: (1) it puts rights—if the language of rights has to be employed—into the assumption of interconnectedness; and (2) it adds the rights of other life forms, that is, non-human forms into the category of rights. The former stipulates an intrinsic relation between rights and duties while the latter focuses on an eco-centric position emphasized by Buddhism. From the Buddhist doctrine of (inter)dependent-origination, duty for oneself and duty for others do not necessarily contradict each other, as the Buddhist scripture puts it, “Protecting oneself, one protects others; protecting others, one protects oneself” (*Samyutta-Nikaya* 47, 19). The point here is not to say that there is absolutely no conflict (or moral dilemma) between protecting oneself and protecting others; instead it attempts to emphasize social responsibilities albeit the value of individualism.

From another perspective, I do not think the doctrine of (inter)dependent-origination can discount the importance of the idea of individual rights; instead, it can be used to articulate the importance of respecting each individual. In the Chinese tradition, this idea is particularly expressed through what is known as the “negative golden rule,” i.e. not imposing on others what you yourself do not like. In the Confucian teaching we have a well-known saying that “One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated” (*己所不欲, 勿施於人 Analects 5, 11). The same idea can be found in Buddhism as well: “For a state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must be so to him also; and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another?” (*Samyutta-Nikaya*). I do not think that liberals in the West would have any problem with the statement here. Peter Harvey, for instance, defends that Buddhists would accept the basic idea of rights although the radical idea of self is at odd with the Buddhist concept of no-self. In his book *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics*, Harvey admits the fact that “Buddhists are sometimes unhappy using the language of ‘rights’ as they may associate it with people ‘demanding their rights in an aggressive, self-centered way, and may question whether talk of ‘inalienable
rights’ implies some unchanging, essential Self that ‘has’ these, which is out of accord with Buddhism’ teaching on the nature of selfhood” (Harvey 2000: 119). Yet this does not lead to the conclusion that Buddhism would reject the concept of human rights, particularly the rights “of other people” categorically. What Harvey seems to emphasize is that the critique of atomic individualism should not deny other moral implications suggested by human rights. To be more exactly, Buddhism would fully accept the negative rights and welcome certain aspects of positive rights with qualifications.

Probably, most people would agree that in a well-functioning community or society, individual rights and social responsibilities are well attended to rather than one negating the other. But very often the concept of human rights is emphasized more often because of the existence of all sorts of violation of human dignity, rights, and freedom in the world, including in healthcare systems. Take the healthcare situation in China, for example, it is a common practice for hospitals to forge an informed consent in order to get the blood sample from a patient or a particular ethnic group in the name of life science and social good. Most doctors I have interviewed in recent years would defend such kind of practice, believing that they did so out of social responsibility and the common good. Thus in China we need to fight for more individual rights; while in a society like the US where unrestrained greed and self-interest have pushed individualism too far, we need to talk more about care, compassion, interconnectedness, and the common good.

3. Human Freedom

How do we interpret the notions of “freedom” of individual agency and freedom of self-determination implied in the UDHR? According to liberalism, the good society is viewed as “a collection of self-interested individuals, free to choose their own life projects, bound together by agreement to respect the rights of others in the pursuit of these projects” (Theobald and Dinkelman 1995:14). As such, freedom to choose is based on recognition of each individual’s self-interest; society is built on mutual consensus.

To follow this contractarian line of thinking, the notions of individual agency and the freedom of self-determination in bioethics are usually linked with the principle of autonomy, informed consent, right to choose, etc. The word “autonomy” comes from the Greek autos-nomos meaning “self-rule” or “self-determination.” Such modern concept of freedom may not exist in Buddhism. Freedom as absence of coercion is not emphasized by Buddhism either. Nevertheless, the idea of choice and consent in medicine can be found in the Buddhist tradition. For example, according to early Buddhist monastic codes, the patient’s personal choice is respected. That is to say, the intention of the patient is given a serious consideration in the decision-making process. Freedom of self-determination is equally important for Buddhism in the contemporary situations such as euthanasia and organ transplantation.
However, if the patient lacks knowledge concerning what is occurring, whether due to extreme physical pain or mental disruption, he or she will not be considered morally responsible for making medical decisions. As for truth-telling vis-à-vis confidentiality in medical practice, the Buddhist notion of “right speech” requires wisdom on the part of a physician to know what kind of medical information should be disclosed to the patient and his/her family members.

That being said, we should not expect a radical notion of freedom in Buddhism. Despite that most Buddhist scholars and Buddhist followers claim that Buddhism is a religion of freedom, we know they are talking about different kind of freedom, a freedom best labeled as “spiritual freedom” rather than freedom of choice in a modern socio-political sense. Very often, freedom in Buddhism pertains to an intrapersonal rather than an interpersonal relationship. In the case of freedom with reference to interpersonal relationship, a social relationship is considered “free” if all parties in that relationship can exercise their equal and reciprocal rights without coercive interference by others. In the case of freedom in Buddhism, it focuses more on releasing oneself from the bonds of *samsāra* caused by desires, or at best, aims at the possibility of existential transformation of one’s mind so that he/she is capable of being engaged with his/her living ambience in a spontaneous way so as to de-limit boarders, boundaries, and limitations of all kinds. Personal wisdom, instead of personal rights therefore, is the main theme of Buddhist discourse on freedom.

So the question of freedom-from-cum-freedom-to in Buddhism is closely associated with its attempt to be free or liberated from dis-ease (*dukkha*) derived from the emotive attachment that leads to an individual’s existential anxiety in coping with impermanence and changes. Attachment sometimes refers to *alāya*, a particular form of consciousness that “tends to get solidified into concepts of incorruptible and ultimately real objects every time it occurs.” This tendency is also applied to occasions of sense experience (Kalupahana1992: 191). *Alāya* consciousness functions in two ways: (1) internally it appears as the constituents of a self; and (2) externally it becomes the consciousness of the object as “the other.” Vasubandhu, the Buddhist philosopher of the School of Consciousness-Only or Yogācāra (*weishi* 唯識宗) speaks of freedom attained by an *arhat* (*aluohan* 阿羅漢) in terms of dissipation of *alāya*, i.e., the mental and emotional attachment. According to Vasubandhu, all ideas have mind (*mano*) as a pre-condition, and the mind as a special faculty is different from other faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) in that it tends to substantiate and conceptualize things/objects it has experienced, which eventually leads to attachment, not only to a metaphysical object but also to a metaphysical self. Non-attachment, in this sense, means a freedom from a metaphysical essence, and more importantly, from a metaphysical self that perceives mind as independent and incorruptible. As one can tell, the Buddhist
notion of human freedom is not grounded “free choice” *per se*; rather, it is a kind of “spiritual freedom.”

One of the major critiques of Buddhism is connected to the Buddhist notion of karma which is viewed very often as a form of “determinism” that denies a freedom of choice. For Buddhists, however, karma refers to “action and reaction” which includes three kinds of action, that is, the physical, the mental, and the verbal. Buddhists use the term karma specifically referring to volition or choice, that is, the intention or motivation behind a mental formation and action. This intention can also be understood the “act of will” in that an individual person is responsible for his/her actions and the consequences of those actions. According to Buddhism, it is the volitional will behind the action that determines the karmic consequences. Volition, in turn, is shaped and reshaped by acts of attention, which influence perceptions and determine the views from those perceptions. Keown rightly points out that in Buddhism individuals have free will and their destiny is “the function of their choice” known as karma. Because one can attend to the results of one’s intentions, there is an internal feedback loop allowing one to learn and control. Because attention can ask questions, it can monitor that feedback to determine how best to put it to use. From this perspective, I think Buddhism cares more on the content of the choice than a procedural act that shows one has the right to choose.

Accordingly, “free choice” raises the question as to how far the choice which one seems to exercise in his/her conduct and actions is actually a free choice or only a “causal necessity” in the sense that what is conceived as “free will” or “choice” is nothing but a mere matter of habit, or of likes and dislikes engendered by heredity and environment, over which one has little control. Therefore, volition as contrasted to natural causality points to logical or extensional causality because it is involved in a rational process through which logical inference may occur. But if causality is volition, it could be much more complicated than a mechanical relationship in forms of natural causality represented by uniformities and regularities, for the required and necessary conditions are also “conditioned,” either immediate or far-reaching, by the specific relationship between the agent and his/her consciousness/will. As a choice-model of ethical conduct, karma indicates a prescriptive as well as a normative dimension. That is to say, “A ought to do x in order to achieve y,” or “X is the right thing to do.” Therefore, when a person understands that karma is based on volition, he/she will see enormous responsibilities and has to become conscious of the intentions that precede his/her actions. Thus, Buddhists insist that taking personal responsibilities is crucial for moral life.

But the question of free choice remains. If someone is conditioned, or dependent-arising, how can he/she be totally free (for a hope-for result), or be extricated from causal chains of determination? A “logical determinist” would question how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined or conditioned somehow in
the present. This skeptical view implies that conditionality and freedom are mutually exclusive. But for Buddhists, the doctrine of interconnectedness shows that the conditionality is always a process of infinite conditioning and being infinitely conditioned, as causality itself is devoid of self-nature, and the same thing applies to freedom as well. The present as such is never a “clean slate” since it has partially shaped by influences from the past and the immediate results of present actions. Therefore, the implications of karma involve the notion that predestination and free will exist simultaneously.

The compatibility of causality and volition suggests that freedom for Buddhism does not mean being absolutely free from anything whatsoever; instead, the choice is free because it is conditioned. To be more specific, Buddhism accepts “freedom of choice” in the sense that a person can think, reflect upon things, emotions, etc., and act upon according to his/her judgment, yet all these are done within a cluster of “lived” (not mechanical) conditions, as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws. Meanwhile, the Buddhist doctrine of centrality (the middle way) in reference to non-attachment also aims at avoiding the two extreme views of freedom and fatalism. Thus the Buddhists accept the notion of self-determination yet put more weights on self-responsibilities instead of rights.

4. The Role of Buddhism in Contemporary China

As we know, the Chinese government has been criticized for years by the West for its violation of some fundamental human rights principles outlined in the UDHR, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion, although the Chinese constitution admits those basic rights. Other areas of concerns include issues such as death penalty, one-child policy (which was abolished a couple of years ago), the invasion of personal property rights, and the censorship of internet, all of which shows the lack of legal recognition of human rights. Very often, the Chinese government defends its practice by arguing that the Western concept of human rights are inapplicable in the Chinese context and that the basic duty of the government is to provide economic security (shengcun quan 生存權) or national security (guojia anquan 国家安全) to its people. As such, the basic goal of the government should be social stability, harmony, and economic development. The major human rights watch groups in the West, however, have rejected this position as an excuse of China’s abysmal human rights records in the past. Nevertheless, the criticism from the West is dismissed by the government as a gesture of interference to China’s internal affairs and Western cultural hegemony.
Then, how should Buddhist communities respond to such situation? In 2016, Yang Siqi published an article in the Time magazine entitled “Life in Purgatory: Buddhism Is Growing in China, But Remains in Legal Limbo” in which he claims that “China’s religious revival, born of the failings of both communism and capitalism to provide adequate meaning in Chinese lives, has been well-documented. While Chinese have flocked to Confucian temples and Christian churches, the biggest beneficiary is Buddhism.” Despite the Communist Party’s generally welcoming attitude toward Buddhism, especially shown in the current administration, Buddhism is in no position to influence the political situation, not mentioning to criticize the government on its violation of human rights. Many see Buddhism, as most other religions in China, has been “harmonized.” Given that China is still, officially, an atheist country, the Buddhist influence is quite limited. The idea of Buddhist freedom is, to a large extent, confined to the spiritual level instead of the political or the rights-based conception of freedom emphasized in the contemporary West.

On the other hand, we see the impact of market economy on the Buddhist communities in China today. Many temples become the site of tourist attractions and the means of money making rather than religious pilgrimage or the spiritual place of self-cultivation. The problems can be seen from two dimensions: the external and the internal. The former is linked to the governmental infringe (especially from the local and low-ranking officials) upon the rights and interests of the monastery, and the latter is associated with the internal corruption within some of the Buddhist organizations themselves (Miller 2006: 90-94). Some monks perform rituals as a way of making money instead of seeing it as an opportunity to help people understand Buddhist teachings. Yet it by no means suggests that Buddhism cannot go back to its original religious ideals (such as ideals of charity and compassion embodied by the bodhisattva practice) and change social ills caused by all kinds of greediness in the world. In recent years socially engaged Buddhism in other parts of Asia have extended over a wide arena, including political movements, social welfare promotion, environmental protection; and even the issue of human rights. The Buddhist social participation (by both clergymen and laypersons) can benefit society significantly like what the Tzu Chi Buddhist Compassion Foundation (慈濟會) does in Taiwan and mainland China today. In his article, “What’s Buddhist about Socially Engaged Buddhism” David R. Loy, a well-known Buddhist scholar, speaks of the non-duality of the personal and the social in Buddhist teachings. He contends that socially engaged (or humanistic) Buddhism attempts to go beyond quietism and personal spirituality, and is “perpetually engaged in a dynamic process of reflecting, interpreting, and transforming the socio-political and cultural situations in which they are embedded.”

3 Quoted from David Loy - Reproduction interdite (February/March 2004).
As for the Buddhist view on human rights, Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer argues that despite the attraction of the bodhisattva ideal in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a place to situate human rights, Buddhist discourses against the existence of autonomous ego-centered individuals make a Western conception of human rights nearly incompatible with Chinese Buddhism (Meinert and Zöllner 2001). Yet, I do not think that the Chinese Buddhist communities should deny the basic notion of human rights since the concept of human rights can be used as a protective mechanism to prevent people from any forms of coercion of the state power given the current situation in China. It is true that Buddhism tends to emphasize more on collectivity, solidarity and harmony (the word “harmony” has a special meaning in the Chinese context), it does not mean that Buddhism should collude with state institutions of repression and control by keeping silent on human rights abuses.

5. Conclusion

This paper focuses the attention on some key theoretical issues concerning human rights in light of Buddhism and its implications for Buddhism in China today. How should the concept of human rights be translated to a non-Western religion such as Buddhism and to the local level such as in Chinese society? How can we compromise between rights and responsibilities, or individualism and collectivism? All there are complicated questions. Very often, we hear scholars claiming that human responsibilities and human rights should not supersede but complement each other. But from political and judicial perspective, this is quite a vague statement as it does not offer a clear picture of what constitutes “responsibilities” and what constitutes “rights.” Liberals, libertarians, and communitarians keep fighting because of their different definitions regarding the parameters of responsibilities and rights both morally and legally. For Buddhists the gap can be even bigger since Buddhism does not have the rights-based conception of freedom. One of the crucial differences lies in the fact that Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy did not emerge either as a social philosophy, or as a social religion (in comparison to Christianity). In fact, Buddhism is quite individualistic (in a different sense though), aiming at individual emancipation and enlightenment via attaining a personal moral and spiritual transformation.

In sum, both rights-talk and duties-talk are important in the ethical discourse, yet neither should be confined to an ideological cage. Differently put, when the society tilts toward one side, the other must be shored up. Accordingly, Buddhism should play a more active role to promote human rights protection in China.

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The Syncretic Nature of Master Shengyan's Ch'an Teaching

NG, Yau-nang William (Ph. D., U. Toronto)
Associate Professor and Associate Head,
Hong Kong Baptist University
Email: mtcarmel63@gmail.com

Abstract:

Master Shengyan is one of the representative Ch’an masters of contemporary Humanistic Buddhism in Taiwan. In 1989, the Master founded the organization Dharma Drum Mountain (Fagu Shan) to promote Buddhist teaching. In 2005, he established the School of Dharma Drum, which Master Shengyan himself identified as a new lineage of the Chinese Ch’an Buddhism. Since the Master identified his teaching as Chinese Ch’an, his teaching should represent a continuation of Chinese Ch’an teaching. However, it should also demonstrate innovation since it is a new lineage. This paper seeks to study the nature of Sheng Yen’s Ch’an teaching so as to demonstrate the new elements in his teaching. Through an investigation of his autobiography and other accounts of his life, this paper argues that the Master’s Ch’an teaching is not merely a simple renovation of traditional Chinese Ch’an teaching, but also a syncretic teaching that the Master elegantly developed. It shows that the Master attempted to enrich the Chinese Ch’an teaching through interacting with the new environment and adopting ideas and practices from other traditions even though the Master identified his teaching as Chinese Ch'an.
Demand of Faith, Institutional Constraints and the Niches Choice of a China New City Christian Group

ZHANG Zhipeng

Abstract:
For nearly 30 years, more and more Chinese people have converted to various religious groups. Although the scale of original religious organizations grows continually, at the same time, more believers choose to set up or add new religious groups. As a result, the number of registered and unregistered religious organizations in China is increasing. It is difficult to explain the conversion phenomenon of China only from the micro, the central and the macro-institutional level respectively. In fact, the three level factors affect the conversion behavior at the same time and they have interaction mechanism in the conversion process. Specifically, this paper argues that in the existing macro system of China's political and economic, the people's rights are limited or damaged, leading to the growth of individual belief demand. However, when individuals with different needs enter a religious organization, the religious organization is promoted to select a specific niches. Once the religious organization's niche is determined, some of the believers who do not approve of the inches will leave for another new group. To test this hypothesis, the author investigated a Christian church in Nanjing, Jiangsu province. In this church, there are many university teacher believers; education levels of the church members are relatively higher. The church does not have full-time pastor; the daily affairs are mainly taken care of by church co-workers. The rise of the church is primarily to meet the growing demand of faith; this belief demand is largely resulted from the rights limited by the current institution environment. The church's niches are mainly formed by the interaction of church co-workers and believers gradually. The church also faces a variety of challenges that need to resolve step by step.
一、皈信需求、宗教团体与社会制度

在中国的许多大都市中，有多种多样的新兴宗教群体，这些宗教群体主要是由信仰基督教的信徒组成，也有不少是由信仰佛教的信徒组成。这些群体经过多年的发展，不仅有了稳定的聚会场所，也有了核心的群体成员，而且成员还在不断增加。这些宗教群体的共同特点是：大都是近10年来出现在城市中；没有固定的神职人员；没有登记为宗教活动场所；没有得到官方的承认。

解释越来越多的中国人皈信宗教的现象需要借助宗教皈信理论。然而，皈信是一个复杂现象，没有一个单一的理论模型或方法可以解释。目前，宗教社会科学研究者分别从微观、中观和宏观三个层面加以解释。而且从20世纪90年代以来，这三个层面的研究都有了重大的转变。在微观层面上，皈信从剥夺假说转向个人联结和人际网络；在中观层面上，对皈信的解释强调了堂会、仪式和身份认同的作用；在宏观层面上，则提出了社会和文化境况的重要性。这三个层面的分析并不是矛盾的，相反，三者之间能够相互补充。

各层面的皈信理论同样可以应用于中国的宗教皈信现象。同时结合中国的实际情况，可以进一步拓展这些理论解释。例如，杨凤岗在解释大规模的中国移民在美国皈信福音派基督教的现象时，提出了社会和文化境况的重要性。他发现在影响中国移民皈信的最重要因素是巨大的社会和文化变迁，这一变迁是在强制现代化过程中发生的，其中充满了战争、社会动乱、政治风暴和传统文化系统的倒塌。与此同时，研究者也从微观、中观和宏观各层面对中国各宗教皈信的现象进行了分析，这些研究让我们能够更为全面深入地理解宗教皈信的原因。

不过，一个完整的宗教皈信理论应该能够深入揭示微观个体、中观组织和宏观制度之间的互动机制。事实上，我们需要一个能够解释人们寻找信仰、皈信宗教、改教、放弃宗教全过程的理论。显然，建构这一理论就需要观察和分析皈信者个体与宗教团体之间的互动，以及宗教团体与制度环境间的互动。更为复杂地过程则包括了皈信者个体希望能够从宗教团体中获得期望中的信仰需求；宗教团体能否提供这样的信仰服务则取决于制度环境是否允许。不同的需求、供给和制度条件会演变出多种多样的宗教发展模式。例如，一种可能是在制度环境宽松的情况下，皈信者从宗教团体中获得了所期望的信仰服务，教会得到公开发展。另一种可能则是在严格的制度环境下，皈信者无法从宗教团体中获得期望的服务，则会离开宗教团体，或者去建立新的宗教团体，或者是推动着原有的宗教团体向着更高张力的方向发展，甚至最终成为原有宗教及政府眼中的“邪教”。基于上述观察和思考，笔者试图通过对一个城市基督教会的案例分析，来展现个人皈信需求与教会区位(niches)选择、政府管理政策之间复杂的互动机制。

在笔者生活的江苏南京市存在着数以百计的新兴宗教群体，在日常生活中很容易遇到。本文所
选取的是一家名为“JM 教会”4的基督教群体。与该群体成员的最早接触大约是在 2014 年秋季。当时，笔者参加了在 DN 大学的一个读书会。认识了该读书会的几个主要成员，后来得知他们也是 JM 教会的主要成员。笔者此后在与 DN 大学的 X 老师交流过程中，得知他的基督徒身份，当时他介绍说所在的教会有许多大学老师，在这样一个高学历的学者群体中，要找到合适的讲道人很不容易。由此，引起了笔者的研究兴趣，希望能够深入了解该教会的运行情况。此后，笔者陆续认识了一些在该教会参加聚会的朋友，做了一些简要的访谈。有了这些条件，笔者决定对该教会做一个系统的个案研究，从中了解事实，解答问题。

从 2015 年 12 月份以来，笔者几乎每周都去参加该教会的聚会，进行较为深入的观察和访谈。随着对该教会了解的深入，我所关注的问题日益集中在以下几个方面：这个宗教群体是怎样发展而来的？一个没有专职牧师的教会是如何自我治理的？他们的独特区位是如何形成的？此外，由于这个教会还是处于一个成长之中，他们是如何解决面临的各种挑战以及未来走向如何，也是我希望了解和判断的问题。为解答这些疑惑，笔者采取了观察、访谈、财务开支资料分析、讲道的文本分析等多种研究方法，逐步了解到这个群体的发展过程，获得了初步的答案。

二、皈信者推动着的教会成长

JM 教会在南京市中心的一座写字楼内。该地点距离地铁、公交站台都很近，交通便利。乘电梯到了所在的楼层，推开虚掩的门进去就是 JM 教会。准确地说是一个两室一厅的房间，进门正对着是厅，左侧是两个房间，两个房间较小，平时是做主日学校用的，也作为同工开会的地方。一个房间内放置着一些《圣经》和相关的基督教书籍；另外一个房间里主要是孩子学习所用的白板等物品。在大门一侧的左边是一个厨房，厨房最里面有一个卫生间，在大门和厨房中间的墙面上方悬挂着一个镜框，里面用毛笔字写着大大的两个字“JM”并有日期和书写者的落款。

厅比较大，约有 40 平方米，一进门就看到厅里放着 7 排椅子，中间和左边留出过道，左右各 4 把，共约 50 多张椅子。门口右边有一个磁性白板，上面贴着“敬拜侍奉安排表”和“收支明细表”、“水电费缴纳单”。再向前，右边墙上挂着两个带框的展板，一个上面写着“十诫”的内容，另一个上面写着“使徒信经”5的内容。在右边椅子的尽头是一台电脑桌，电脑的前面就是讲道的讲桌，上面有话筒。讲桌与窗户之间仅有两个人宽的距离。一个投影幕布悬挂在窗户正中，放下时会遮蔽住大部分窗户。在窗户左边的墙上，贴着一个较大的木质十字架，在左角的空调上面还竖立着一个较小的十字架。在空调与第一排椅子之间，摆放的是一台电子钢琴（该钢琴只有会弹奏的司琴来时才发挥作用，大部分的唱歌伴奏用的还是吉他，偶尔也有带手鼓的学生来伴奏）。左边两个房门中间的墙壁上一个贴着内容为“主祷文”6的带边框展板，另一个上面贴着一排红色剪贴字：“JM 我们的家”。

市还存在着多个类似的民间宗教群体。

4 为了避免给调查对象带来不必要的麻烦，本研究所涉及到的教会名称和机构名称、人名全部用字母替代。
5 全文为：我信上帝，全能的父，创造天地的主。我信我主耶稣基督，上帝的独生子；因着圣灵感孕，从童贞女马利亚所生；在本丢彼拉多手下受难，被钉在十字架上，受死，埋葬，降在阴间；第三天从死里复活；他升天，坐在全能父上帝的右边；将来必从那里降临，审判活人，死人。我信圣灵；我信圣而公之教会；我信圣徒相通；我信罪得赦免，我信身体复活；我信永生。阿们！
6 全文为：我们在天上的父：愿人都尊你的名为圣。愿你的国降临。愿你的旨意行在地上，如同行在天上。我们日用的饮食，今日赐
事实上，这一个稳定而温暖的“家”，是JM教会多次搬迁后的地方。新成员已经不记得他们曾经搬迁过几次“家”了，至少有 4、5 次吧。最早的聚会场所是在家庭里，是名副其实的“家庭教会”。之后教会一直是租房聚会，只是到了3年前这个写字楼房间被一位弟兄买下来，教会才固定下来。

作为一个有着自己名称的独立的宗教群体，JM教会是在2008年出现的。具体来说，JM教会是从另一个较大的同样是家庭教会的JY教会中分离出来的。JY教会的主要负责人是Q老师，他曾经是SF大学的副教授，获得过博士学位，研究领域为中西文学。在经历较长时间纠结后，他最终在1997年受洗成为基督徒。之后，以他为主成立了JY教会，他所在教会也成为南京较有名的家庭教会之一。

据称，JM教会是W姊妹等人从JY教会中分离出来的。W姊妹同样是文学专业的博士、SF大学的副教授。分离的准确原因已经很难调查出，受访者只是表示JM教会与JY教会在一些具体的理念和仪式上的看法存在差异。相比之下，原来的JY教会“比较保守一些，更极端一些”，例如，他们“唱诗只能唱《圣经》“诗篇”，不能唱现代的赞美诗”。最初JM教会的成员主要是老师，不过，经过几年的演变，最初成员大部分因各种原因离开JM教会，他们中间只有W姊妹一人还继续留在JM教会，作为重要的同工在服侍。直到2015年年底，W姊妹才主动退出同工服侍。

大约在2010年，DN大学的两位老师X师兄和Z姊妹先后进入到JM教会。X老师在2010年获得哲学博士学位后来到南京DN大学任教，在此之前他就已经受洗成为基督徒。Z姊妹是该大学工程专业的老师。现在，JM教会里又陆续加入了多位来自DN大学的老师，在一定程度上与X老师和Z老师的早期加入有关联。目前在教会里担任日常事务的W兄弟、Y兄弟、A兄弟等人都是DN大学哲学系的。当然，也有该大学管理学系的H老师。

在大约2012年的时候，L师兄进入了JM教会，他身份是一位已经取得成功的企业家。不过，在做生意之前，他曾经是参与1989年学生运动的一名大学生，并为此入狱一年。当L师兄自己寻找到JM教会后，他逐步就成为了目前教会的一个重要同工。据说，目前教会所在的房产就是他自己买下来的。以便为教会提供一个稳定的聚会场所。

在2012年期间加入JM教会的还有一位重要成员，他是年近80岁的M兄弟。M兄弟成长在一个基督教世家中，他的一生本身就充满了传奇。M兄弟在JM教会中是担负着一个重要的职责，每次敬拜活动中的唱诗，都由M兄弟的吉他伴奏。他年近80岁，在一个基督教世家中出生。M兄弟的母亲在20世纪30年代在街头听到宋尚节博士的传福音后受洗成为基督徒。即使在“文化大革命”时期，M兄弟也没有放弃他的信仰。之前M兄弟在南京一个很大的“三自”教会聚会，后来因为看到该教会牧师的一些腐败行为，就离开那里来到了JM教会。

教会的其他成员主要来源于三个类别。一是初始成员的家人，好几位同工通常都会带自己的妻子、孩子和父母来参加敬拜；二是初始成员的朋友或同事，这些人部分是慕道友，也有一部分是在其他教会参加聚会的基督徒；三是主动寻找宗教群体的人，通过各种渠道来到教会。愿意进一步加入教我们。免我们的债，如同我们免了人的债。不叫我们遇见试探。救我们脱离凶恶。因为国度、权柄、荣耀，全是你的，直到永远。阿们！
会的慕道友可以参加查经班学习。经过 8 年的积累，虽然有一些人先后离开了 JM 教会，但这个小群体现在已经有 40~50 个稳定成员。

目前，虽然 JM 教会还没有专职的牧师教会，但已经形成为一个能够自治的宗教群体，内部的治理和组织分工架构初步形成。教会最核心的组织者是 5 位同工，其中有三位是大学老师。要成为教会的同工，首先要感受到有这样的呼召，自己内心愿意；在程序上有一个扩大同工部会，由教会固定的弟兄姊妹和参加服侍的弟兄姊妹认可，以表决的方式来决定。如果不同意的话，就不能担任。作为同工的 W 兄弟、Y 兄弟、L 兄弟和 ZH 姊妹等都是大约 2010 年后在 JM 教会里受洗的。这些同工在 JM 教会里成长起来，担负着 JM 教会的日常组织任务。此外，在教会的敬拜侍奉安排上，还有日常每周负责主持、领诗、证道以及领祷的 12 位弟兄姊妹的名字，他们同时也是 JM 教会重大事项的决策参与者。教会内部还成立了两个小组“青橄榄”和“以便以谢”，教会里的值日分别由两个小组来承担，每个月的“爱宴”也轮流由这两个小组来准备。

由于一些担任同工的老师住在较远的校区，为此，一些同工在 DN 大学开设了查经班。在查经班的基础上，2014 年又成立了 JL 堂（教会）。JL 堂建堂所需要的房租等费用约 25000 元，都由 JM 教会提供。

三、日常聚会与年度成就

敬拜、祷告会和查经是 JM 教会最主要的三项活动。敬拜是在每个周日上午，祷告会是在周三的晚上，查经通常是在周二晚上。每个月四次敬拜活动，在内容上是不同的。两次敬拜是以证道为主，由教会的同工自己承担；一次敬拜是圣餐与奉献，由聘请的牧师来主持和讲道；一次敬拜之后是爱宴，即在证道结束后参加敬拜的人一起聚餐。同时，在每次敬拜时，都会有孩子们的主日学校，根据孩子的年龄，分在两个小房间内进行，有专门的姊妹或弟兄负责。

为了能够更加真切地了解 JM 教会的敬拜过程。我们选择一次典型的主日敬拜，记录如下。

本次主日敬拜是在 2016 年 1 月 17 日，共来了 45 人；其中弟兄 19 人，姊妹 26 人；60 岁以上的约为 5 人，30 岁以下的约为 9 人；参加的大学老师为 9 人；另外还有参加主日学校的儿童共 8 人。每次参加敬拜的人中有大约四分之一的是没有受洗的慕道友，其余的都是受洗的信徒（在领受圣餐时，未受洗的人不用站起来，据此得出次数据）。敬拜活动是在 9：00 正式开始，绝大部分的参与者都能在 9：30 分之前到来，在 9：30 之后来的有 3 人。

每次周末的敬拜活动基本上都有以下 14 个流程：

1. 9：00 练习唱赞美诗，主要是当天敬拜中所要唱的诗。在这个过程中，参加敬拜的人陆陆续续到达。

2. 9：32 主持宣布 2015 年×月×日的主日敬拜正式开始，要求手机调为静音。投影字幕显示：“请安静在主前预备心灵敬拜”
3. 9:33 一起诵唱“主在圣殿中”，投影字幕显示全文。
4. 9:34 屏幕显示“宣召”，主持领读诗篇中的两段文字。
5. 9:35 主持宣布唱诗，屏幕显示“我的心里称颂耶和华”。
6. 9:36 屏幕显示“经训”，大家一起合读“以赛亚”、“格林多全书”、“约翰福音”中的段落。
7. 9:42 屏幕显示“使徒信经”，在主持带领下，大家一起大声诵读使徒信经。诵读后主持宣布各自祷告，参与者都低头默默祷告或小声祷告。祷告内容主要包括对主的感谢，期望主对教会和弟兄姊妹的恩典等。
8. 9:48 为孩子们祝福。6位孩子站在前面，主持为他们祝福。
9. 9:50 由同工W弟兄（大学老师）证道，题目是：“真心行善”。在证道之前先一起朗读圣经中的相关段落，然后开始祷告。祷告后证道的同工开始讲解。主要内容包括：我们的信仰要求我们的道德从神而来，不是从人而来。因信称义，而不是因善成功。证道结束后，同工让大家出声祷告。
10. 10:52 合唱赞美诗“主，我愿像你”。投影上显示歌谱。
11. 10:55 屏幕显示“回应”二字，参与者进行祷告，感谢神赐给宝贵的话语等。主持带领全体最后以“主祷文”结束今天上午的敬拜。
12. 11:05 屏幕显示“成人主日学”，主持先朗读问题，参与者一起朗读答案。
13. 11:06 屏幕显示“欢迎新朋友”，第一次来教会的朋友请站起来做一下自我介绍。之后，所有人合唱“爱使我们相聚在一起”。
14. 11:09 “报告”时间。由负责财务的人员汇报本年度的财务收支情况。

“圣餐与奉献”的流程与平常的敬拜大部分相同，其差别主要体现在以下几个方面。

一是请当地一所神学院中的一位L牧师来主持圣餐礼和证道，JM教会的同工们只是协助完成。每次教会付给牧师“来回路费”300元。虽然L牧师算是“三自”系统的牧师，但其个人的信仰和品行得到JM教会的认可。

二是前面九个流程都完成后，由L牧师来证道。

三是证道结束后是圣餐礼，由以下几个流程构成。

1. 投影屏幕出现对话。L牧师与众同进行对答。L牧师：“弟兄姊妹，主耶稣与你们同在。”众人：“也与你同在。”L牧师：“你们的心要仰望主。”众人：“我要一心依靠主”。L牧师：“我们要感谢主，我们的上帝。”众人：“上帝是圣洁的，他有不灭的慈爱。”然后，L牧师进行祷告。

2. L牧师讲解圣餐礼的意义，“圣餐是一项圣事”，“有四大基本意义和价值”。“

注释：
7全文为：主在圣殿中，主在圣殿中，普天下的人，在主面前都应当肃静，肃静，肃静，应当肃静。
8爱使我们相聚一起；爱使我们相聚一起；上帝的爱使我们合而为一；爱使我们相聚一起；让我们一齐高声唱；让主爱从我们开始；我们手拉手，让世界知道；爱使我们相聚一起。
3. 牧师宣布已经受洗的弟兄姊妹可以领受饼和杯,暂时没有受洗的不领受。牧师接着讲:“圣餐记载在哥林多前书第十一章 23 到 29 节,使徒保罗教导我们说:“我当日传给你们的,原是从主领受的,就是主耶稣被卖的那一夜,拿起饼来,祝谢了,就擘开,说,这是我的身体,为你们舍的。你们应当如此行,为的是记念我。饭后,也照样拿起杯来,说,这杯是用我的血所立的新约。你们每逢喝的时候,要如此行,为的是记念我。你们每逢吃这饼,喝这杯,是表明主的死,直等到他来。所以无论何人,不按理吃主的饼,喝主的杯,就是干犯主的身,主的血。人应当省察,然后吃这饼,喝这杯。因为人吃喝,若不分辨是主的身体,就是吃喝自己的罪了。所以我们当省察自己,谦卑认罪。”这段话同时也在投影屏幕上出现。牧师请所有的弟兄姊妹都静默,谦卑默想,想在上帝面前,自己对人或对上帝所犯的可见和不可见的罪过。在静默中,牧师祷告。祷告完毕后牧师说,“我以我主耶稣基督的名宣告,我们的救主耶稣基督已经赦免了我们昨天、今天和明天一切有形和无形的罪过,主的平安赐给了我们,主的平安就在我们中间,所以,弟兄姊妹,所以我们应当互祝平安。”众人开始互相握手,互祝平安。

4. 牧师洗手,戴手套,拿起饼说:“我主耶稣被卖的那一夜,拿起饼来,祝谢了,就擘开说:‘这是我的身体,为你们舍的;你们应当如此行,为的是记念我。’然后牧师将饼分成小片,由同工逐个送给已受洗的人,受洗的人站立领受。在领受的过程中,牧师带领大家唱“领受饼杯歌”,投影屏幕上显示出歌谱。在全部站立的受洗信徒都领受完饼后,牧师拿起酒杯说:“饭后,也照样拿起杯来说:‘这杯是用我的血所立的新约,你们每逢喝的时候,要如此行,为的是纪念我。’”牧师将红酒分倒在小酒杯中,由同工端着分发给众人。同时,牧师带领大家继续唱“领受饼杯歌”。在领受完毕后,牧师为多个层面的人进行了祷告。查经班是 JM 教会的另一个重要活动,其主要功能是帮助那些慕道友了解《圣经》和基本的基督教神学,这是增加受洗信徒的主要渠道。查经班是在周二晚上 19:00-21:00 举行,参加的通常只有十几人,其中慕道友只有 7、8 人。查经班在 19:30 之前是一起学唱赞美诗,之后进入读《圣经》和分享阶段。每次读一章节内容,先是由所有人依次读一句,接龙读完全章。之后同工做祷告,再逐句进行讲解,每讲解完一段,同工会询问大家有没有问题,如果有提问的就进一步交流。在讲解完全部经文后全体参与者进行分享交流。结束时,同工再次带来大家做祷告。

一个教会群体能否成功发展,必须要有一定的收入。JM 教会虽然没有固定的牧师,但已经能够
为信众提供主要的服务，也能够获得必要的奉献收入，这可以说是该教会在成长中取得的重要成就。我们以 2015 年的收支情况为例，来了解该教会的财务状况。

依据 JM 教会公布的费用收支资料，我们了解到 2014 年费用结余为 52895.71 元。2015 年收入合计 172899.41 元，支出 117627 元（包括了 JM 教会及分支教会 JL 堂的支出），2015 年结余为 108169.12 元。如果仅从教会财务结余来看，显然 2015 年在开支增加的同时，收入有大幅度增长。但是这只是会计成本，没有将诸多同工的无偿服务计算进去。如果该教会聘请一位专职的牧师的话，也许财务就很少有结余了。对此教会同工有着清醒的认识。在 2015 年全年收入中 “奉献收入” 为 155193.62 元，占比 89.76%；“特别奉献收入（例如为了给外地教会弟兄治病等）” 为 10290 元，占比 5.95%；“（另一家教会）租金收入” 为 7200 元；银行利息收入 215.79 元。由此可见，“奉献收入” 是支撑 JM 教会成长的关键。

在开支上的主要项目为：“房租及管理费” 66000 元，占总开支比例为 56.11%；“特别奉献支出”（主要是用于大凉山儿童事工等慈善）19290 元，占比 16.40%；“杂费” 11869.4 元，占比 10.09%；“差旅费” 5701 元，占比 4.85%；“水电费” 4850 元，占比 4.12%；“查经小组经费” 2700 元，占比 2.30%；“主日学费用” 1350 元，占比 1.15%；“主日证道津贴” 2700 元，占比 2.30%；“图书费用” 2447.6 元，占比 2.08%；“招待费” 719 元，占比 0.61%。在全部开支中，JL 堂的开支共 39557.5 元，其中 30000 元是房租及管理费，占 JM 教会全部支出的 33.63%。在该分支机构还没有奉献收入的时期，全要依靠 JM 教会的财务支持。

表 1 是 JM 教会 2015 年 2-12 月份的每月奉献款（由于在 JM 教会的总收入中还包括了特别奉献收入，因此各月奉献款的总和并不等于全年的收入），从中可以发现这样几个特点。一是每月的奉献款波动幅度不大，除了 4 月份超过 20000 元万，其他月份都只有一万多元。二是如果每个月奉献款平均以 13000 元计算，参加奉献的信徒以 40 人计算，则人均月奉献为 325 元。按照 2015 年南京城镇居民人均可支配收入 46103.62 元来计算，就算人均月奉献占人均月可支配收入的 8.46%。三是除了常规奉献外，信徒还会有临时性的特别奉献。加总起来看，信徒奉献的水平还是较高的。四是可以推测，随着教会信徒人数的增长，在房租收入一定的情况下，教会的奉献收入还有增长的空间。

### 表 1  JM 教会 2015 年 2-12 月份的每月奉献款  （单位：元）

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2月</td>
<td>3月</td>
<td>4月</td>
<td>5月</td>
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<td>7月</td>
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<td>9月</td>
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<td>11月</td>
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<td>13115.00</td>
<td>12495.92</td>
<td>24090.00</td>
<td>12597.00</td>
<td>11855.00</td>
<td>13698.00</td>
<td>10900.00</td>
<td>12460.00</td>
<td>12315.00</td>
<td>16171.00</td>
<td>17196.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

综上所述，JM 教会经过八年的成长，已经初步形成了可以良性循环的多方面条件。首先是具有了稳定的聚会场所，能够举办日常的各类活动；其次，聚会能够吸引更多有能力的同工；再次，同工可以提供更高质量的宗教服务；第四，高质量的宗教服务会吸引更多信徒加入；第五，更多信徒带来更多的奉献收入；第六，更多奉献收入有利于场所的维持和扩大（见图 1）。
四、不同需求的皈信者

2016年10月16日，JM教会举行了一次受洗仪式，共有8位弟兄姊妹受洗。这是该教会近些年来一次比较大规模的增加新成员。这表明，城市基督教会的扩展速度并没有想象中那么快，尽管有很多的人在寻找信仰，有很多慕道友，但决心受洗成为基督徒的人数依然有限。当然，另一方面这也是由于城市教会更注重信徒的品质，通常要求信徒有一年左右时间的查经、决志过程。受洗先由每一个皈信者做见证，然后由牧师举行受洗礼。

8位受洗者的见证表明了他们在接触、了解和接受基督教的过程，也反映了个人潜在的信仰需求。W先生已经70岁左右，他开诚布公地表明了自己对政府和政治宣传的异议。L女士是大学老师，她在见证中表明自己是“八九”一代，自然就具有了追求自由民主宪政的认识。她也因为自己的言行受到了学校的压力和处罚。W1女士也是一位大学老师，她说自己之前一直是懵懵懂懂地上大学、工作，一直有茫然的迷途感，想去寻找可以带领自己的东西。后来读了哲学专业研究生，在高校中任教，但是面对的挑战更大。她解决问题的方法就是“读书读书再读书”。然而了解了历史和现实后，却看不到未来，无法面对课堂，无法面对内心的挣扎，快到了奔溃的地步。W2女士是一位家庭女性，她之前是抑郁症患者。Z女士是大学学生，她在接触教会之前长期处于“歇斯底里，非常痛苦的状态，身边朋友亲人无法理解，也无法解开我当时愤怒的心结。”D先生是大学生，“在上大学后遇到一些事和挫折，虽然父母都对自己很好，但知道自己内心很空虚，不知道在世上的意义。”G先生也是大学生，之前他有一位高中同学准备自杀，感到害怕，不知道怎么办，开始思考人生意义。现在教会象家一样。C先生也是大学生，“觉得之前我是一个很自私的人，我把人与人之间的关系看得非常淡。”他的父母经常吵闹，他不愿意回家。到教会后觉得这里的每个人，每句话都很真诚。

从上述见证中，我们可以发现，皈信者的出发点和动机有较大差异，大体上有三类：对政治体制的不满；对人生意义的迷茫；对社会关系的失望。但是，深入分析表明，这些动机其实有着共同的根源，就是各类权利的缺少，由于法治的不健全，人们的各项权利受到不同限制，最终会转变为对现状
的不满、愤怒和迷惑。例如，在公办教育中，学生无法接触到所需要的思想和知识，也缺乏有效的社会支持，必然会向宗教寻求帮助。

不过，信徒者有差异化的权利关注和信仰需求必然会对教会未来所提供的服务形成挑战。因为，教会很难同时满足包含着不同权利需求的信众。如果教会逐步成为一个争取政治权利的平台，就会让一些寻求温暖的普通信徒望而生畏；如果教会逐步演变为一个互助组织，则难以留下有理想的信徒；如果教会演变为一个社会慈善组织或心理咨询机构，则难以满足那些具有更高理性思维信徒的愿望。同时，教会还不得不在信众需求与政府管理之间寻求平衡。事实上，在这次受洗仪式上，就有政府有关部门的人员到场。而且该部门人员提前给教会打过招呼，教会同工也提前提醒受洗者不要说政府不满的话。

五、互动中形成的教会区位

由于没有任何一个宗教组织能够满足所有需求。宗教经济理论认为，所有宗教经济都包括一套相对稳定的市场区位。“区位（niches）是共有特定宗教喜好（需要、趣味和期待）的潜在的信徒市场区段（segments）。”研究发现，“即使阶级是区位的一个基础，它也不是惟一的基础，甚至不是最重要的基础。”“除了阶级之外，还有很多其他因素影响宗教喜好，其中很多是横切的。实际上，社会化的作用在阶级之上。”“当然也不能忽视生活中特殊事件所造成的生存因素。”罗德尼·斯达克和罗杰尔·芬克进一步得出几个重要命题。“命题 76：甚至在竞争有限的地方，宗教公司也能产生高度的参与，如果那些公司是社会冲突的主要组织载体。”“命题 79：新宗教公司成功进入相对无管制的市场的能力跟既存宗教公司的效率和多样化成反比。”“命题 80：宗教组织主要是通过小教派的形成而产生。”“命题 81：得以维持和增长的教派运动倾向于降低它们跟社会文化环境的张力，从而离开它们原来作为基础的市场区位（这个过程被称做从小教派到大教会的转型。）。”“命题 90：如果宗教组织可以由一小群成员来维持，它们就容易形成。”“命题 91：多数宗教群体都是从一个相对高度的张力开始。”

通过对 JM 教会的调查，笔者发现，上述几个命题都能够在很大程度上得到验证。不过，对于一个教会区位的确定，并不是单方面设计的结果，而是教会负责人与信众之间互动创新而逐步形成的。具体来说，就是教会负责人会依据自身的需求和对信众需求的推测来提供活动和服务的；在得到信众的反馈后逐步对活动和服务进行改进。随着活动和服务的改进，新的信众会逐步增加，小教会也开始逐步向大教会发展，推动着教会活动和服务的进一步创新。下面结合 JM 教会的情况，具体分析该教会区位形成的特点。

1. 城市新兴宗教群体的出现，是因为在特定的中国的制度环境下，人们有较高的信仰需求。为什么城市新兴宗教群体遍地开花的出现？前面提及的“命题 76”和“命题 79”已经揭示了其原因，一方面是“社会冲突”的存在；另一方面是“既存宗教公司的效率和多样化”比较差。这两个特征在 JM 教会出现和成长过程中都能够清楚地发现。通过访谈，笔者发现大部分 JM 教会的信众和慕道友都

11罗德尼·斯达克和罗杰尔·芬克著，杨风岗译，《信仰的法则：解释宗教之人的方面》，中国人民大学出版社 2004 年，第 240、248-249、250-252 页。
有一些共同的特点，就是他们对人生和社会有较为深刻的思考和探索。这些思考和探索虽然有各自工作和研究的影响，但更多地是来自于对社会的制度环境的反应。对于“大学老师”群体而言，不是只满足于吃饱穿暖，他们会思考自己一生的意义和价值，会对社会事件做出评价和表明观点，他们也会积极参与社会，影响周围，希望能够改变制度和环境。然而，客观的制度环境却往往让这样的思考和行为显得“不合时宜”、“格格不入”，甚至会招致指责和攻击。在此情况下，这些“思考者”就逐步转变为“寻找者”，他们不仅希望能够寻找到可以解答自己内心一切疑惑的思想指南，也希望能够寻找到自己日常行为的合理规范，还希望能够寻找到可以“守望相助”的志同道合的群体，并以此为基础，寻找到服务社会和改变社会的力量。

对于JM教会的大多数早期成员而言，他们都经历了这样一个思考、寻找的过程。然而，现有的登记宗教团体和宗教场所通常没有能力提供高品质的服务，满足多样化的需求。为此，一些有能力的“寻找者”就会自行建立教会。例如，JM教会中，DN大学的老师们是以哲学系为主，哲学虽然引导他们深刻思考世界和人生问题，却无力给出对终极问题和现实问题的解答。在此情况下，基督教显然具有足够的资源来满足“寻找者”的需求。因此，我们发现，在JM教会中，除了DN大学的哲学老师们，还有NJ大学的Z老师、NL大学的两位老师都是从事哲学研究和教学的。同时，在JM教会中也有一些关注自由和权利的人士，他们从学理上主张自由和权利的保障，在遇到制度“壁垒”后，开始反思和寻找更高意义的信仰。作为企业家的L弟兄寻找信仰的过程就很有代表性，他在后来的谋生过程中，对人生和社会的思考从未停止过。先是从读《四书五经》开始，接着读《金刚经》等佛经，再读《圣经》，终于有一天开始寻找教会。作为慕道友的RK大学的L老师和XZ大学的S老师，他们也很类似，他们从对社会和制度的关注开始逐步转变到对人生和信仰的关注，并且通过参加教会的学习和活动，让自己的态度和行为发生变化。当这些老师自己的信仰需求在教会生活获得后，通常他们又会介绍其他的学生，以及学生的朋友进到教会来。

另一来自于制度环境的“逼迫”是由基督教信仰本身所带来的。对于家庭教会而言，不仅教会团体的身份得不到政府的认可，就是教会成员的基督徒身份也得不到认可。特别是对于在体制内大学工作的老师来说，自己读《圣经》没问题，自己周末去教会参加敬拜也可以。如果一旦向其他同学或老师传福音，则必然受到外部的限制。然而，作为教会的同工所担负的责任不同于普通的信徒，传福音成为他们的分内之事。在此情况下，有形或无形的外部“社会冲突”使得信仰自由和信仰需求成为更为广泛的诉求。生活在特定的制度环境下，教会也不可能对外部发生的与基督教有关的事件无动于衷。事实上，JM教会的同工在祷告时，通常都会为其他地方受到“逼迫”的教会、弟兄姊妹祷告，同时也为这个国家、这个城市祷告。

人们对信仰和教会的需求还有现实生活层面的原因。这些原因内容多样，包括遇到灾难疾病时的相互救助、朋友间的交流等。例如，JM教会已经为个别身患疾病的教友做过特别奉献。最近，有一位来自上海的姊妹的儿子身患重病，教会不仅为她们祷告，也在积极沟通提供更多帮助。
2. 城市新兴宗教群体的区位，是由早期成员所决定的，会有较高的张力。JM 教会的成长和现状也在很大程度上表明了“命题 80”、“命题 90”和“命题 91”的客观存在。如果追溯源头的话，JM 教会可以看作是一个从大教会里分裂出来的小教派。正如 L 兄弟所说的，“教会就如同细胞一样，到了一定时候会自然地分裂，这种分裂很正常。”而且确实在 JM 教会的早期，一直是由一个小群成员来维持的。作为一个小群体，其优势在于防止有人“搭便车”。这一点从 JM 教会稳定的奉献款收入上可以看出。

作为一个小群体，JM 教会是从一个相对高度的张力开始的。这一张力并不是体现在他们与外部社会的尖锐冲突上，而是体现在他们对自我信仰和行为的严格要求上。在其成长的过程中，较高的张力使得 JM 教会内部分歧较多，导致了教会内部的频繁流动。那些离开的信徒一是因为服侍方向的不同，二是认识上的分歧。L 兄在访谈中提到，“有一对夫妇走的时候，是在与“三自”关系问题上发生争议，那位丈夫是在“三自”中长大的，在情感上接受不了 JM 教会中其他人对“三自”的批评。还有个做证道的姊妹是河南的，从小是在“三自”长大的，读神学的钱也是“三自”给的。所以她会把这种情感带到教会来。也无法忍受其他人对“三自”的批评。”“之前的同工在这些问题上没有达成共识，后来矛盾就慢慢出来了。然后就有人不断有离开的。逐步形成一些共识，现在在这些问题都没有多大的分歧。”不过，在经历了这些冲突之后，JM 教会形成了自己对待“三自”教会的更为温和的共识：一方面他们不接受这种政教关系，但是对“三自”的牧师是个别化甄别承认的、对“三自”的兄弟姊妹全部承认。“也为他们祷告，希望他们能够从这种束缚中解放出来。”“不管牧者是怎样教导的，相信“三自”的弟兄姊妹都是读同一本《圣经》，对政教关系是很清楚的。”对他们“不要以仇恨报复的心对待恶人。”这样的自我要求显然在现实社会中是有难度的。不过，哪些原来从 JM 教会出来的人，刚开始虽然有些不痛快，但时间长了，关系都挺好的。对于基督教中福音派和灵恩派，JM 教会除了极端的灵恩派外，对一般的灵恩派都能接受。

现在 JM 教会的同工都是在后来受洗的，他们的证道较为集中地体现了目前教会对待各类言行的态度，也体现了作为高学历信徒的特点。教会 W 兄弟的几次证道在内容上都体现了这样的要求。作一位老师，W 兄弟的证道条理比较清晰，通常按照经文字面意思——各种错误做法——正确的理解和做法——对现实生活的要求四个层面来分析。这样的证道内容显然对于一些学历层次较高，理性较强的听众而言是比较容易理解的，但对于学历层次较低的听众而言，就有些吃力。

笔者听到四次证道的题目分别是“废弃冤仇”、“大爱无敌”、“真心行善”和“诚心祷告”。在“废弃冤仇”的证道中，同工 W 兄弟讲解的是《圣经》中的这段经文：“只是我告诉你们，不要与恶人作对。有人打你的右脸，连左脸也转过来由他打。有人想要告你，要拿你的里衣，连外衣也由他拿去。有人强逼你走一里路，你就同他走二里。”W 兄弟在证道中要求信众“不要报复”“不要以仇恨报复的心对待恶人。”这样的自我要求显然在现实社会中是有难度的。

在“大爱无敌”的证道中讲解的经文是“只是我告诉你们：要爱你们的仇敌，为那逼迫你们的祷告。”W 兄弟提出，“我们象犹太人一样，我们的恨超过我们的爱。我们不可能爱我们的仇敌。”“我
们的这些行为不符合我们主耶稣所要求。”“神的爱具有普遍性。”“去爱那些伤害我们的人，去爱那些
不可爱的人”

在“真心行善”的证道中讲解的经文是“你施舍的时候，不要叫左手知道右手所作的。”“要叫
你施舍的事行在暗中，你放暗中察看，必然报答你。”W弟兄提出，“施舍和行善完全从神而来，
如果不是出于神，我们不会真心行善。我们行的只是罪人的善，是假冒伪善。”

在“诚心祷告”的证道中讲解的经文是“你祷告的时候，要进你的内屋，关上门，祷告你在暗中
的父。你放暗中察看，必然报答你。”W弟兄提出，“祷告是属灵的呼吸”“好的祷告要‘倒空’自
己，让圣灵和神的话进入我们的心中。”“祷告要简单、直接、真实，从心里涌出来。”

JM教会的同工们不仅对爱、恨、道德、慈善这些重要的行为做出规范，也要对日常的行为做
出规范。例如，在春节后的第一次证道中，W弟兄讲道：“中国有许多传统的风俗是有悖于我们的信
仰的，在过年时对我们有信仰的有很多的试探，比如中国有许多的迷信。在过年是要祭祖，给祖宗
磕头，烧纸钱，这些世俗的节日，我们作为蒙住拣选的，应该如何看待这些做法。但我们的信仰告诉
我们只有我们的主耶稣，我们的神才可以敬拜。按照我们的信仰，我们不应该祭祖，我们不应该去磕
头，我们不应该去烧纸钱，我们要在文化当中活出我们的信仰，更新我们的文化。”显然，这样的要
求还是与外部世界存在一定张力的。

正如JM教会成员在聊天是笑着说的，“别人以为加入教会有什么好处。其实，加入教会不但没
有什么好处，每个月还要奉献。”尽管有较高的成本，但作为一个小教会，JM教会还是能够吸引足够
多的信众来参与，而且其规模也在逐步增长之中。

3、随着城市新兴宗教群体规模的增大和专门神职人员的出现，其区位会逐步变迁。“命题81”
揭示了从小教派到大教会的转型的过程。虽然在JM教会，这个过程还只是刚刚有个迹象，不过区位
的转变会逐步随着其成员的增多和神职人员的专门化而加快。具体来说，在教会早期随着大学老师的
增多，JM教会的区位发生过变化。在这个过程中，大学教师的弱点也得以暴露。例如，L弟兄回忆有
一次教会从网上买了一个柜子需要组装，结果几个大学老师折腾了一下午，才完成了对柜子的组装。

现在，随着教会的发展，包括企业家、白领、普通居民、退休人员等各种身份的人开始加入教会，大
学老师的比例在下降，教会也逐步变得多样化。在证道上，同工带有知识分子的特色，既是特点，也
是需要改变的地方。针对不同学历层次的信众，同工们就需要学习“白居易”，让证道变得更加通俗
易懂。不过，就目前教会来看，说理还是最主要的一种讲道方式。此前，教会曾经邀请过一位来自农
村的同工来证道，结果该证道者又唱又跳，完全难以让JM教会的人员接受。他们私下里说“简直像是
是得了精神病”。

另一个可能推动JM教会区位变化的因素可能是牧师。作为专职的牧师通常希望教会规模能够尽
快扩大，为此必须逐步降低张力。以教会聘请的L牧师为例，他在证道中所讲的内容就显得更为平和。

他圣诞节前一场在题为“恩典信息”的证道中，L牧师叙述了第一个圣诞的故事，耶稣诞生的故事。
他讲解道“世界，上许多人不知道恩典来了。”牧羊人的信息显示“上帝的荣耀永远是那样。”“上帝
的能在不信上帝的人身上生发功效，” “我们要多多的思想玛利亚，怎么样谦卑、忍耐，等适当的机会做真见证。”

在春节后的第一次题为“努力面前”的证道上，L 牧师讲的经文是腓立比书是保罗在监狱里写的。在该信中，保罗虽受苦，书信却洋溢着喜乐的情怀；他的事奉虽受限制而失去自由，他事奉的心境却是坦然的。为此，L 牧师指出，要效法主，“不能以自己的成绩拴住前进的脚步”，“不能被罪捆绑”。“前面的去路是明确的，是有一个定向的，主已经走过，主就在那里，已经有一个标杆。”所以要“忘记背后，努力面前”。从神学信仰上来看，L 牧师的讲道当然完全正确，但这样的内容毕竟与客观现实的事件隔了一层，更多地是从自我内心来反省，而不是对外部制度的思考，显得比较平和。

六、面临的挑战与应对

作为一个新兴城市宗教群体，JM 教会有着较为独特的资源，也具备了良好的基础。不过，与一个完善的教会相比，还是面临着不少挑战。具体来说，需要解决以下几个方面的问题。

一是教会缺少专职的教牧人员。在中国，牧师本来就少。对于新兴的城市教会而言是不可能有专职牧师的，甚至连专职的同工也没有。但这并不表明教会不需要专职的教牧人员。就目前的情况来说，JM 教会实际上是自我牧养。对此，L 兄弟和其他同工也有清醒的认识，他指出，“受洗时间不长就担任同工，这是不符合《圣经》教导的，只是一个权宜之计。不管是生命也好，装备也好，是不足以担任服侍的重任。”“同工最好是一家信主的，如果一个家都治理不好，怎么能治理好一个教会呢？”“第二个同工要有足够的装备，要有很好的生命。同工的生命很好，遇到不同意见就能不一样。这需要一点一点地去更新。”“知识分子有一个时代特点，都比较忙。”“现在没有长老会和执事会，而是合二为一。自己做生意很忙，三个老师也很忙。如果有慕道友来，要有人与他们进行很好的沟通。我们也为此在认罪祷告。”L 兄弟还谈到，教会在治理层面上，只能来自于同工的榜样作用。“如果教会的长执会的同工的生命很好，教会就能得到很好的发展。”“自己感觉 JM 教会有点不冷不热，也能看到教会的更新，看到与其他教会的差异。”在 2016 年，JM 教会将同工培训作为核心工作，他们请牧师来为同工讲课。在今后，他们中间也会有人去读神学院，成为专职的教牧人员。

二是教会需要提出系统的神学观点。作为一个教会，其最重要的核心是信仰宣言和生活伦理的要求。特别是在一个转型的社会中，教会不仅需要在神学上对信仰做出解答，还需要从神学出发对许多现实问题做出规范。这样的神学观点既是为解答慕道友的疑惑，也是为教会吸收新成员提供标准。L 兄弟谈到，“对中国的种种问题，信仰要做出回应；信仰应该进入中国社会的方方面面，要关照每个领域。例如，雾霾，教会要做出回应的。”在这方面，教会内的大学老师们显示是有优势。“知识分子还可以在基督教文化、在文化的对话、基督信仰在中国的应用方面做一些学术的工作。如果应对文化的挑战，如何在坚持基要真理的时候，把外在的形式做出创新。”事实上，教会每次敬拜都面临着对一些现实问题的回应，例如在最近的聚会中，同工对于“贵阳活石教会”、“江绪林自杀事件”、“张凯在温州电视上认罪事件”都有思考并发表看法。
三是教会有待建立较为规范的组织制度。JM 教会“现在还是一个松散的，没有会友制，没有确立会友的资格。”L 弟兄表示，“应该是建立的，我们希望能够尽快的建立。”没有会友制，不仅会带来成员的不稳定，也会导致内部意见的分歧甚至分裂。L 弟兄说，“有时候看到人员的变动，伤害啊，就觉得教会散掉了。如果不是上帝的保守，可能早就散掉了。”在 JM 教会中，大学老师是核心成员，“中国的知识分子是最反对共同体的。”目前当 JM 教会的规模还比较小的情况下，无论是日常事务管理还是财务管理都可以依靠个人的信仰和品德加以完成。但是，随着其成员的增加，今后需要更为规范的内部治理结构。在这方面，值得 JM 教会学习的榜样很多。例如通过网络，他们对于成都秋雨之福的运行模式比较熟悉。

四是需要获得公开合法的团体法律身份。作为一个城市新兴基督教群体，虽然 JM 已经走出了家庭，但他们还是被政府称之为“私设聚会点”，被民间称之为“家庭教会”。虽然说在相当长时间内，没有明确的法律身份并不影响教会的成长。但是，社会团体身份的缺乏却时刻有可能给教会带来多方面的“逼迫”。显然，解决这一问题的道路还很漫长。随着新的《宗教事务管理条例》出台后，政府部门会对教会采取怎样的措施是一个巨大的挑战。

尽管还面临着诸多的挑战和难题，JM 教会已经作为一个群体存在了，而且他们希望通过自己的事工让更多人能感受到福音。在不久前，JM 教会的同工和成员带着几把吉他送给了另一个“福音戒毒团契”，希望能够帮助到他们。对于未来的事工，L 弟兄有许多思考和期望，他提出，“知识分子比较多的教会，理性成分比较重。如果没有理性的引导，会容易走向神秘主义，甚至把地方的风俗带进来。但农村教会的信仰很尽情，没有文化的信徒特别爱主。中国的城市教会对农村教会是有负担的，但应该把自己的资源分享下去；另一方面，城市教会要对进入城市的农民工要有一个牧养。”或许，公益慈善将是 JM 教会今后的事工的一个方向。

七、结论与展望

本文通过 JM 教会的案例讨论了中国城市新兴基督教群体成长的原因、区位的选择、面临的挑战，从中发现许多普遍性的特点、发展趋势和内在规律。这些发现还需要更多的个案调查来比对、完善和补充，对于 JM 教会的观察和了解也需要继续进行。从 JM 教会的成长中，笔者也感受和思考了更多的问题。这些问题超越了单个宗教群体，是普遍存在于这个转型社会的共同问题，不仅在宗教群体中表现出来，也在其他新兴社会团体中表现出来。

一是学者与企业家的相互理解与合作。在应试教育体制下，无论是成功的学者还是成功的企业家，都有其先天的弱点。对于一个社会转型而言，不仅需要学者在思想理论上的引导和探索，还需要企业家在资源和实干能力上的支持。在宗教群体中能够聚集学者和企业家，这两个群体的相互理解与合作决定着中国宗教群体乃至其他社会群体的质量和功能。13

二是宗教群体的内部自治是一个探索的过程。与企业组织相比，中国许多新兴的宗教群体和其

13 在南京以及其他的城市中，有越来越多的大学老师、企业家、专业技术人员、普通员工参与到读书会、民非公益组织、文化团体、宗教团体的活动中。
社会群体而言，都非常缺乏内部治理的经验和做法。在这个过程中不可避免地会出现各种问题，通过试错和“边干边学”，这些问题应该能够得到逐步解决。

三是普及宗教知识任重道远。对于一个宗教群体而言，在坚持自己信仰的同时需要表明对多方面宗教文化现象的态度，包括需要说明宗教内部不同教派的关系、不同宗教之间的关系、宗教与科学的关系、宗教与法律的关系、中国传统文化与现代普世文明的关系，等等。普及这些常识，仅仅依靠宗教群体是很难，而是需要各类教育机构和个人的不懈努力。随着宗教社会科学知识在全社会的普及和传播，宗教自由与政教分离才能具有更好的实现基础。
Strategy Choices and Organization Structure of Localized Christian Sect in Mainland: Based on the Research on the “Disciple Society”

XIE Ying 谢颖 Guangzhou University

Abstract:
Christianity with the nature of heresy or worship is rapidly rising in rural China. Among them, the Disciple Society is one of most influential sects in Mainland with a lot of followers. This Sect had been strictly banned from the beginning. Based on triple market model, we explained the organization, resources, and rituals of the Disciple Society, and analyzed its graying practice. It seeks legitimacy through a variety of strategies. By adopting strategic obedience to the authority and compliance with the laws, the sect reduced the likelihood of conflict with the government, and gained some space to survive and spread rapidly. And the sect, using the localization appeal, developed the hierarchy organization. This could lead to a graying cult facing uncertain future.
Strategy Choices and Organization Structure of Localized Christian Sect in Mainland: Based on the Research on “the Disciple Society”

谢颖
广州大学
袁浩
香港中文大学

摘要：具有异端或膜拜团体性质的基督教在中国农村迅速崛起。信徒众多的“门徒会”是其中一个典型案例。本文参考宗教三色（红、黑、灰）市场理论，阐释宗教黑市中门徒会的组织、资源和仪式，分析其灰色化实践。门徒会在政府强势管制的背景下，通过多种策略寻求合法性，降低与政府冲突的可能性以及冲突的程度，赢得了一定程度上的生存空间。门徒会未来的演化是一个值得研究的宗教社会学议题。

关键词：三色市场 门徒会 政教关系

为了分析中国大陆宗教的复杂情况，杨凤岗（Yang, 2006）提出三色市场模式：红色市场（官方允许的宗教）、黑市（官方禁止的宗教）和灰色市场。该模型提供了有用的框架来分析宗教领域。然而，对日益发展和变化情况，我们需要更详细的研究。一些官方宣布的“邪教”尽管被禁止，但仍然在农村地区广泛传播。“门徒会”是中国宗教运动的一个典型案例。它有很多关于内地的追随者，已经获得了一些灰色空间，得以生存和扩张。

这些信徒众多的宗教派别应该得到更深入的分析。门徒会相信什么？它是如何组织的？它如何处理政教关系？本文在宗教管制的中国政教关系处境下，参考宗教三色市场理论，阐释宗教黑市中门徒会的灰色化实践，并进一步讨论宗教市场的演变机制。

一 研究背景和理论工具

基于不同的标准，宗教社会学家对宗教（宗教组织）进行不同的分类，并考察它们的演化与变迁，比如罗伯特·贝拉提出的宗教演化理论，并将宗教演化区分为五个阶段：原始宗教、古代宗教、历史宗教、前现代宗教与现代宗教。但本文并非在宏观意义上探讨宗教的演化，而是以某一个宗教组织为分析单位，分析宗教组织的变迁过程。接下来笔者将简单介绍一种名为“教派-教派类型学”的方法。这种类型学最开始是由神学家恩斯特·特勒尔奇从理论上给予充分阐释，而后再马克斯·韦伯将之引入社会学。之后，许多社会科学家对此加以
使用和发张。①

根据宗教组织与社会之间张力的差异，宗教组织可划分为“教会”、“教派”两种类型。教派是与主流社会对立的宗教团体，教会则与外部社会关系融洽(Benton, 1963)。约翰斯通在其专著中提及区别于教会、教派的一类宗教组织——膜拜团体（cult），他认为，这类宗教组织使用新的宗教术语与符号，一般较为神秘。与其他宗教组织相比，膜拜团体重视超自然力量提供之启示与新顿悟，更可能是一种卡里斯马领导人为中心的宗教群体。这类领导人被赋予特殊的启示与知识，并且为那些跟随者打开通往真理与顿悟的门。在教会-教派连续体中，有研究者用膜拜团体取代教派，执光谱一端。

关于三者之间的演化。约翰斯通认为，群体规模的扩大、教派内部不可避免的出现亚群体，以及卡里斯马领导人的常规化/神圣化，都带来教派的演化，或逐渐转化为教会，或向膜拜团体演进。

考察宗教组织的变迁，还需参考宗教社会学家罗德尼・斯达克和罗杰尔・芬克等学者的论述。在《信仰的法则》一书中，斯达克与芬克使用宗教经济这个概念，并建构宗教经济的结构和过程的模型。他们认为，宗教经济是由一个社会中的所有经济活动所构成的，包括一个现在的和潜在的信徒“市场”，一个或多个寻求吸引或维持信徒的组织，以及这些组织所提供的宗教文化。②关于小教派到大教会的演化过程，斯达克、芬克主要以美国宗教为案例，在无管制的自由宗教市场中，从供应方的变化，来寻找小教派与大教会之间的区位变化以及互相之间的演化关系，如命题 80-85 所示。教派在其成立之初往往教义激进性，因此与外部社会存在较大张力，从而减少“搭便车者”，确保参与者的虔诚和传教的动力。这导致世俗社会关系紧张的教派往往成长的最快(Robbins, Anthony and Richardson, 1978)。但组织规模扩大后，教派往往会逐渐修正其教义和生存策略，变得相对温和(卢云峰, 2008)，与外部社会的关系趋于融洽。

1978 年中国改革开放以来，国家放弃对宗教的消灭政策，对宗教组织实行不同的管制方式，这样一来宗教组织的分化以及前所未有复杂性。三色宗教市场的理论是研究该问题的一个经典视角。杨凤岗(2008)指出，高度宗教管制导致具有不同运作机制的三色宗教市场的出现，可以进一步划分为红市、黑市和灰市。红市由所有官方批准的合法宗教组织、信众和宗教活动构成；黑市由所有官方禁止的非法宗教组织、信众和宗教活动构成。灰市由所有合法性/非法性地位处于一种模棱两可状态的宗教和信仰组织、信众和宗教活动构成(Yang 1998)。宗教领域中，即便在高度的管制下，宗教并不会因此衰落。③。宗教领域下，红色市场的发展受限一个超出政府预期的后果是将宗教组织和信众推向黑市和灰市，从而使宗教市场复杂化。中国语境下的宗教灰市范围庞大，是滋生新兴宗教的沃土。对宗教管制的实施者而言，三色市场的存在和它们之间的互动意味着政府有形之手难以掌控的领域。

三色市场理论是解释中国宗教复杂性的一种有效工具，需要结合中国宗教的丰富案例来进一步验证、拓展这一理论。特别的，结合中国基督教范畴中新兴宗教/异端的案例，我们试图弥补以往研究中的不足之处。斯达克与芬克在一个无管制的、有高度发达的竞争和专门化的宗教经济中探讨教派-教会的变迁。然而他们的研究并不能解释另一种处境下的宗教变迁：当宗教处在一种高度管制的社会环境中，如何演化？杨凤岗以中国宗教为例提出的三色市场理论回答了这个问题。在实行寡头垄断体制的国家，当国家对宗教组织实行不同程度的

① 罗纳德・约翰斯通：《社会中的宗教——一种宗教社会学》，四川人民出版社，2012 年，95 页。
② 罗德尼・斯达克、罗杰尔・芬克：《信仰的法则》，中国人民大学出版社，2004 年，237 页。
宗教管制，宗教如何变迁？灰市、红市与黑市很好诠释了中国宗教的复杂性。而三色市场各自的运行机制以及相互之间如何转化，杨凤岗并没有给出相应的回答。卢云峰在研究台湾一贯道时提出一些独到见解，开创性的研究台湾的宗教黑市。然而这项研究与发现不能回答中国大陆的情形，尤其是中国宗教市场内部的竞争和演化。

因此，本文通过分析门徒会案例，可以补充三色市场黑市宗教的运行机制及转化变迁。具体而言，本文将利用教会-教派-膜拜团体分类及三色市场理论，结合门徒会个案来探讨宗教黑市与灰市的运行机制与演化，并将我们的讨论扩展至中国语境下的宗教管制和宗教发展的演化机制。

二、个案介绍：门徒会

1980年代以来，在乡村中国快速、大规模传播的基督教，融合民间宗教而衍生出来相当数量的本土基督教异端，如三班仆人，灵灵教，门徒会（门徒会）、主神教及被立王等。上述异端组织的共同点是：第一，更改基督教教义，尤其是基督论、末世论等。第二，神化宗教领袖，视之为再来的基督。第三，追求神迹奇迹等。由陕西人季三宝在1989年所创立的门徒会就是其中的一个案例。

1、创教者：季三宝（1940-1997）。


1995年国家有关部门认定门徒会为邪教，并在各地进行取缔打击运动。官方文件如此介绍门徒会，并解释门徒会为何成为邪教：

“门徒会”（在湖北等地又称“旷野窄门”）是由陕西耀县农民季三宝于1989年创立的，内部设有总会、大会、分会、小会、小分会、教会、教会点等7级机构。到1995年初，该组织活动已涉及14个省的300多个县，受蒙骗群众35万余人。

季三保歪曲《圣经》，编造所谓“七步灵程”，自称是“神所立的基督”、“神的儿子”，可以行神迹奇事，曾禁食32天，治好瞎子、瘫子，使“死人复活”。

该组织骨干制造、散布“祷告治病”、“赶鬼治病”、“一天只吃二两粮，种庄稼没有用”、“学生信主不学也自通”等迷信邪说，致使大量中小学生辍学，许多年轻人整天“祷告”，放弃生产，变卖家产，准备“升天”，或有病不求医，因贻误治病而死亡。一些骨干以“传教”为名，从事拐卖、奸污妇女、诈骗群众钱财等违法犯罪活动。一些骨干公开攻击党和政府，提出要“先夺人心，后夺政权”，煽
动闹事，抗拒计划生育，围攻基层党政机关，报复制止“门徒会”非法活动的党员、干部、严重危害了部分地区的社会政治稳定。

1995年11月，中央办公厅、国务院办公厅下发《关于转发〈公安部关于查禁取缔“呼喊派”等邪教组织的情况及工作意见〉的通知》（厅字[1995]50号），明确“门徒会”为邪教组织。

官方文件显示，门徒会发展迅速，短短十年之间发展到十四个省35万信众。官方认定门徒会为邪教，主要基于四方面原因：第一，歪曲基督教教义。季三宝歪曲《圣经》，编制新教义“七步灵程”。新教义赋予季三宝神性，称之为“神所里的基督”、“主的儿子”，并行神迹奇事、使死人复活等。第二，冲击现存的家庭社会秩序。门徒会的新教义及其宗教实践，挑战、冲击现存的家庭生活及社会秩序。体现在如下几个维度：首先，过度强调末日论及传教，忽视家庭生活、孩童上学及农业生产。其次，宣传祷告治病、赶鬼治病，忽视科学及医疗卫生。第三，以传教为名，欺骗群众钱财。第四，挑战现存政治体制。官方文件提及，门徒会“一些骨干公开攻击党和政府，提出要“先夺人心，后夺政权”煽动闹事，抗拒计划生育，围攻基层党政机关，报复制止“门徒会”非法活动的党员、干部”。

总而言之，门徒会成为官方视野中的“邪教”，并被取缔打击，是因为该组织发展迅速，新教义及宗教实践冲击、挑战现存的家庭、社会与政治秩序。笔者认为这一结论亦有更大范围的解释力，同样适用于2000年中国公安部下发文件所认定与明确的其他十三种邪教组织。

就其与社会的融合度而言，门徒会与能在公共（公开的、大规模的）场所传教的基督教（天主教）的主流派别而言还有相当距离。因此，在教派—教会理论框架下，门徒会属于相对游离于主流社会之外的教派组织。三色市场理论进一步指出，由于强大的政府管制力量，在中国进入宗教黑市的代价非常高。宗教黑市中的领导和信徒将面临遭遇政府管理部门的取缔与制裁。进入黑市的高昂代价使得其仅成为宗教嗜好者的选择。在宗教管制体系下，门徒会一度被禁，被官方归于邪教的类别，至今仍不能获得法律上的合法性，属于典型的“黑市”教派组织。

然而，以“黑市教派”来概述并不能有效描述门徒会的现状及变迁。网络搜索显示，门徒会已经遍布全国各地，其组织化程度与规模已与呈分散化的地下教派明显不同。进入门徒会也并非要付上高昂的代价，门徒会开始出现“黑市教派”的分化，与某些黑市教派如全能神的运行机制区别开来。同为宗教黑市的教派，门徒会则主动调整发展策略，在现有管制环境下追求合法性，从而赢得一定的生存空间。

刘燕舞（2009）的调研发现，湖南环洞庭湖一带门徒会的活动已经常规化，对于教会内部的问题，这个组织已经有一套非常组织化、常规化、制度化的机制来处理，而且其与政府的关系并不紧张，活动已经半公开化，甚至还有工作总结报告。

作者对门徒会的关注来源于近年来每次回老家L市的宗教经验，家中一个亲戚手持圣经、不厌其烦地跟我传福音。实际上，这位亲戚所信奉的是三赎基督。基于此问题的浓厚兴趣，笔者于2008年5月和2009年春节两次在老家L市进行调查。调查访问及参与观察门徒会的活动为主。在此期间，笔者多次参加L市三自爱国教会的活动，并且访谈了
一名脱离全能神的成员S，得以了解三自爱国会及全能神教派的情况。与此同时，笔者也访谈当地相关政府部门的官员，了解政府主管部门的态度。

接下来，笔者介绍宗教黑市中门徒会的运行机制。

三、宗教黑市中的运行机制

1、组织结构

根据笔者的调查获知，门徒会的活动组织性很强，通过逐层管理传播教义，发展信徒。以全国来说，门徒会设有总会、大会、大分会、小分会、大分点、小分点、聚会点七层机构，有专人负责，有固定的活动据点，组织内有专人单线联系。

在访谈中发现，教会中越是高层越紧张，警惕性越高，不愿意告诉你组织的详细情况。在起初的几次传福音会中，我企图询问教会的组织形式。但是活动中一个中年女性每次在谈到这个话题时总是很简洁的告诉我说传福音是为了别人好，并不存在管理和分层负责的事情，或者说我并不需要关心教会的组织。从她回答的内容和神态可以看出，她对我询问这个问题隐约有些不安和警惕，并且一直在怀疑我的身份。事后得知，该女性正是L市的负责人之一X，她和另外一个中年女性负责把上级的“道”和“见证”抄送给L市各个分点的负责人。

笔者第一次参加传福音会期间，曾直接询问信徒其组织结构，并没有获取任何有意义的信息。实际访谈中，对教会的组织形式的了解是我跟远房亲戚H深入学习“门徒会”的过程中逐步深入的。在H相信笔者没有政治威胁后才和我开始谈论门徒会的组织结构。

根据H的讲述，门徒会在L市设有小分会，据H称08年四月开始采取分层管理。以前的见证会和传播福音的集会小分会、大分会、小分会的负责人人都会有人去参加，现在一般是分层负责，小分会的负责人只负责召集大分点的负责人一起学习上面的最新“指示”，以此类推。上层的“指示”以每个月一次或两次的频率下达到下层。

组织形式为每20人组成一个分会，由三个人管理，成为分会执事。分点执事必须是信教一年以上的信徒，并且要热心教中事务，并且要学习分点执事守则后才能上任。聚会的规模不大，三个人每个人各领六七个人聚会（即为聚会点）。X强调政府规定不能聚众活动，要遵守政府的规定，所以教会从不组织大型的学习和集会活动。

值得注意的是，教会从2008年开始开始禁止信徒之间使用电话联络，要求信徒依靠祈祷联系（宣称通过感应联系）。按照H的话说，“只要去其他教友家之前的那天晚上和神祈祷，告诉神你要去，那个教友必然会在家等你”。在他看来，通过祈祷和感应来协调成员之间的见面是神伟大力量的显现（尽管在外人看来可能会是一种躲避政府管制的手段）。

了解门徒会组织结构的过程显示，尽管门徒会对于有兴趣的局外人表面上持欢迎态度，但其组织者仍然心存警惕。对于没有威胁的局外人，传教者可能会宣传其教派的全国性组织以增加吸引。但是当前的宗教管制下，一个有全国性组织的存在会增加政府打压的风险。因此，门徒会派对不同的接近者有着不同的策略。特别是对于无法确定来意的局外人，更是三缄其口。尽管笔者有与虔诚信徒H是亲戚关系，但仍无法获取更高一级领导的信任。由此可知，门徒会其金字塔式的管理体制中，越高级别的领导越清楚其“合法性”的脆弱性，对于任何带来政府强力管制的因素都越谨慎。

2、宗教仪式和话语

宗教组织需要惯例性的宗教仪式不断激活和强化成员的群体认同。门徒会的仪式主要包括读经、定期聚会分享见证和安息日集体祷告等。通过宗教仪式，信徒们不断强化自身的群体资格，不断地体验和构筑神圣共同体的群体资格。
门徒会信徒每星期守安息日，学习上面传下来的“道”和见证（手抄本）。聚会的地点是在信仰比较热心的信徒家里，聚会时间由信徒商量而定，一般会是某个固定的时间，但也允许因情况微调。

聚会过程中的话语包括唱灵歌、分享“见证”、圣经学习和祷告三项内容。灵歌是由一些民间小调或流行歌曲的曲调配上新歌词，这些歌词也是他们的“道理”，是劝人悔改信神、地狱恐怖、天堂永生和跟从主之类的教导。在他们学习完见证和道理之后，就会开始祷告。一般每个信徒的家里都有一个红色十字架，在祷告中他们都必须面对十字架跪着，不停喊“主啊！神啊！三赎！”

聚会过程中的讨论内容可以分为两类：“道”和见证。

所谓“道”就是手抄本的“圣经学习指南”，类似于教会的圣经学习（Bible Study）。“道”的学习，是对圣经章节逐字逐句的解读，强调对神的崇拜和敬畏，这和我在三自教会接触的圣经学习大同小异，没有什么特别之处。实际调查中，作者发现“道”与正统基督教的学习资料类似，由于“道”带有强烈的神学性质，没有神学素养的老百姓很难对此产生亲近感，因此“道”名义上重要，实际上只是给门徒会的话语系统罩上一层基督教的帷幕。

见证才是信徒传教的首要传播话语。手抄本的各地见证内容为某个地方的信徒信了神后的奇迹和信心带给信徒的好处。比如瞎子看见、瘸子行走和疾病痊愈等。在实际的传教过程中，以复述见证为主。在我参加的聚会点的活动中，对圣经的解读往往一带而过，而对见证的宣扬则会不遗余力。当时所谓的“道”和见证只能够手抄，不许出去复印，不许在电话里面谈论，以示虔诚。如上文所述，这种方式能保证具有“合法性”的《圣经》是教派中唯一的印刷品，同时有助于营造神秘性和群体认同感。

根据距离信徒实际生活的远近，“见证”的内容可大概分为两类：琐事和神迹。

凡涉及自己的见证大都是生活琐事，和实际生活有关。笔者在见证分享会中记录下信徒讲述自己的一些例子，比如：

“信神不要钱，不要粮，只要有信心。老婆爱打麻将，我说了几句罗嗦话，第二天就喉咙痛，我就晓得是神让我不要去指责别人，而是要去传福音。于是，我就跟神祈祷，让他原谅我，并且跟老婆一起祈祷，第二天喉咙痛就好了。”

“有一天我感冒，病得很重。有知道我信神的亲戚来看我时对我说风凉话，说什么你的神怎么不保佑你了。我就跟神祈祷，求基督治好我的病，让我能成为神的见证。结果正好过两个礼拜，60 大寿请客，当天我就好了。我明白神是显大能，让我能够在亲戚聚会上的时候现身说法，成为神在地上的例子。”

为了说明自己和神的交流，有人讲了这么一个经历：

“从前段时间我便秘，比较痛苦，我想这是神给我的暗示，告诉我不能顺利排便。我祈祷以后，我开始花更多的时间和神亲近，第二天果然马上就好了。”

她接着说，“信神以后，身体就属于神，身体的疾病就是神的指示。脚痛，表示让你多出去走动，传教。下身痛，提醒你不要有邪念，不能淫乱。肚子痛，表示你要出去传教，多说话。

见证过程中，信徒们强调对于病症，信多少，好多少。如果病痛不能完全好，则是你的虔诚度不够。唯有继续祈祷和传教才能好的更彻底。

而对于不是发生在身边的事情，时间或空间都很遥远的事情，则神迹色彩明显比身边事情浓厚得多。类似于圣经中“瞎子看见，瘸子行走，哑巴开口”的故事。

如一个手抄本的见证是这样写的：湘乡 S 市有一个老人，是个瘸子，心脏一直有问题。心刚硬一直不信神。其儿子一直劝说，最后病危，心想自己反正行将就木也不想再让大家不高兴，勉强为自己难了信了，但并未信实。但是门徒会宏恩的爱唤醒了他。最后因说了“我相信神”这
一句话，当场起来行走，心脏病瞬间平安！让他在神的大能面前得救。他于是到处只是凭无愧的良心说出自己的经历，希望大家能够认识神，敬畏神，感谢神！

四川5·12地震后出现了很多神救世人的见证：“北川城郊，陈弟兄归主以来全家为主作见证，在5·12地震来之前，家里的人在地里干活，自己在家祷告，祷告完了后坐在凉椅上，突然空中有大声音说：‘快出去’，见一白衣人一闪而过，随即见一只大手把自己从椅子上提起一甩就放在20米远的安全地方，一声巨响地动山摇，废墟一片，2分钟后，到处是死尸，房屋成了废墟，自己全家3人都平安无事，连声感谢神，立即寻找所牧养的弟兄姊妹，见到他们都平安，如县医院的李、景二姊妹在地震时，李被圣灵感动刚从医院出来到院坝里去了，景带一病人上厕所到院坝中间（此医院除3人外全部死亡）。李琼英老姊妹在家正祷告是一只大手把她提到安全地方后，房子倒塌等，都蒙神搭救，他们到处见证主名，劝说软弱的弟兄姊妹20多人归主，并劝回亲友20多人归主，继续作见证之中。”其他见证大同小异，都是神兵天降，或者天使降临拯救信徒的故事。神警告或者不救助不信的人，而对于虔诚信主的人则大显神迹，大施救恩。

以上神迹的分享显示了门徒会与当代基督教主流教派之间的区别，显然，在三自教会的教堂里听到如此神奇的当代故事并不容易。三自教会的公开传教中的大部分事例却是家庭琐事，偏重道德说教，神迹色彩明显减弱。笔者多次参加三自教会的礼拜中，牧师的讲道如果要宣扬神迹，则以圣经为限，既仅以圣经中的故事为例宣扬神的大能，而不会涉及到当今社会中的神奇事件。

而根据S的说法，全能神派的聚会过程中，总是说信主就能逃脱世界末日，聚会中以唱歌和情绪激动地祈祷为主，一般不涉及具体的生活道理。

与前两者不同的是，在门徒会中，发生地点较远的见证由于信徒无法验证，则神迹色彩浓厚，以彰显神的大能。身边的见证则总是以自身为例娓娓道来，极具亲切感。在这样的氛围中，见证的分享一次又一次的让信徒们感受神的力量，憧憬来世的“天堂”。

四、追求合法性

在门徒会发展历程当中，因应不同的社会与政治处境，其发展策略是否有变迁？宗教黑市的教派，其运行机制一成不变，还是有不断改进？在门徒会的发展历程当中，笔者发现在政府较强势管制下开始了追求合法性的尝试。

1、另类中国化：处境化的尝试

门徒会的信徒并不会否认他们是基督教，相反他们承认是基督教，只不过他们通过三赎寻找永恒的基督徒。

对于笔者这样的新人，他们先说明以下两点

（1）圣经对三赎来源的启示

信徒会引用圣经的话来强调基督的救赎会通过中国人实现的必然性。摘录如下：

“耶和华神在东方的伊甸立了一个园子，把所造的人安置在那里。”（创世纪，2, 8）。东方指的就是中国。

“看哪，这些从远方来，这些从北方，从西方来，这些从秦国来。”（以赛亚书，49, 12）。秦国指中国的山西，而陕西正处于西北方（相对湖南而言）。这是上帝的暗示。

“太初有道，道与神同在，道就是神”（约翰福音，1, 1）。这句话和《老子》的“道”暗合，表示中国的先贤已经感觉到了耶和华神的存在。

由上文可见，门徒会对于新人首要要强调就是其在宗教教义上的“合法性”。门徒会首先把自己教义上的合法性与基督教绑在一起，声称自己是基督教的一个派别，然后通过解释圣经中的字句将西方的基督教和本土的先知联系到了一起。东西结合的方式利用了基督教在
一般老百姓心目中的神秘地位(Addison 1925)，一般来说，民众不会怀疑基督教，反而因为基督教在西方发达国家的地位而容易对其有一定的兴趣。同时，通过圣经语句一些自创的解读将基督教和三赎联系起来，在文化背景上拉近与中国老百姓的距离。

2、政教关系：强调顺服

聚会点的负责人表示，“我们从不谈政治，更不用说反党什么的了。上会的人经常会让大家为当官执政的人祷告，并要顺从掌权者，因为掌权者也是神所拣选的，是上天所拣选的。不可违背，更不可抵抗掌权者。”

“有人说我们是邪教是被国家禁止的。其实是他们不懂，太无知了。我们是门徒会。是支持国家的，国家不会禁止的。”

在访谈中，他们一再强调其要尊重政府的权威，并给我大声朗诵了圣经的相关经文（罗马书，13）：

在上有权柄的，人人当顺服他。因为没有权柄不是出于神的。凡掌权的都是神所命的。
所以抗拒掌权的，就是抗拒神的命。抗拒的必自取刑罚
所以你们必须顺服，不但是因为刑罚，也是因为良心。
你们纳粮，也为这个缘故。因他们是神的差役，常常特管这事。
凡人所当得的，就给他。当得粮的，给他纳粮。当得税的，给他上税。当惧怕的，惧怕他。当恭敬的，恭敬他。

由上文可以看到，门徒会革新教义，强调教义的合法性，还尝试从政教关系入手，寻求政治上的“合法性”。门徒会试图通过宣称遵守当权者的管理来获取政治上的空间。圣经的明示就是他们表明自己政治无害的证据。在采访过程中，聚会点的负责人一再强调他们严格遵守政府规定，从不进行大规模的集会，聚会一般不超过二十人。

网络搜索的结果从一个侧面折射了门徒会从“黑”从“灰”的转变。尽管门徒会曾在1991年遭到政府的取缔，然而在此基础上转土重来的门徒会从行为到意识上都更符合灰市教派的特征。

3、宗教竞争

笔者进一步发现该宗教组织已经在意识形态和行为上把自己“正规”的基督教堂、其他黑市教派如“全能神”相区分。

门徒会对当地“正规”的基督教堂（即周日在公开的礼堂做礼拜的三自爱国会的基督教教堂）的批评主要是教堂的捐献问题。在L市每次基督教堂活动后，都会有教堂负责人当众宣布今天要祈祷的人和事（多为祈祷治愈其病痛的），而这种在教堂宣布的祈祷是要向被祈祷人收取捐献的，一般是200元左右，多则不限。

H跟我讲述了一个和教堂争功的实例。“上次有个教友得病，我们实心祈祷，他好了之后，教堂的人上门说是他们祈祷的功效，结果他跟教堂捐了钱。”门徒会坚持不要捐献不要钱的原则带给信徒们道德上的优越感，给了他们批评三自教会的资本。

而对于“全能神”，门徒会信徒毫不犹豫的认为是邪教，必须坚决打击。L市负责人Z跟我讲述了一个告发“全能神”的故事。Z说，全能神派得到国外的资金、物资支持，公开煽动推翻政府(里通外国，推翻政府在信徒看来是一大罪状)。在当地全能神的信徒经常和他们争夺信徒。所以一旦他们发现闪电派的人活动，就会上报国安局，要求政府以邪教为名处理全能神的成员。

不管是在语言上还是在实际行动上，门徒会对政府的态度都与全能神有相当区别。门徒会基本上是采取顺从的姿态。而全能神更多是宣扬世界末日的观点，行动隐秘。曾加入全能神的S表示，“当时总是说，世界末日快来了，加入我们才能避祸，政府管我们，就会通通下地狱。不要理会他们。”

谈及门徒会本身是否邪教的话题，信徒们并不避讳，倒是非常平静的说出很多道理。”
什么理由说门徒会是邪教呢？和我一起信教的人都是喜欢帮助他人的人。兄弟姊妹们首先被告知十大诫命。前四条都讲敬上帝，不拜偶像；从第五条起，孝敬父母，不杀人、不骂人，不恨人，奸淫，见妇女，不动心，不偷盗，财物不分大和小，私意去拿算偷盗。不枉证，不贪财，不贪心。另外还有六条原则，一要忍耐，二要和睦，三要改脾气，四要学好态度，五要爱人如己，六要在家孝父母。” “如果一个社会，人人都能遵照这十条诫命六大原则，这个社会将是多么的和谐与美好！要是人人都信门徒会，小偷都不用抓了！”

### 4、教会捐献

维持组织的生存和发展需要有相应的资源。对此，笔者的调研过程显示，门徒会获得经济资源的途径十分有限，组织收入远远低于能组织大型礼拜活动并且获得捐赠的三自教会。教派始终强调入教是绝对免费的，不收钱的。所有的花费只是一本圣经的钱，而圣经是严格按照标价出售的。他们的圣经就是三自爱国会的标准圣经，而且价格还要稍微便宜一点。书10元每本，十字架15元每个（白布上面一个红十字架）。据调查，所用的十字架也是成本价提供，是有信徒专人购买原材料定做的。

在教会中不需要捐献，同时也禁止捐献。在当地的传教过程中，至少在县级市一级，笔者并没有发现有哪个传教员有可能通过传教敛财。没有丰富的经济资源意味门徒会派必须控制活动成本。由于不用租用大型活动，定时请专业牧师和公开参与社会慈善活动等，教派的传教不需要太多的经济成本来支持其活动。

同时，门徒会除了圣经外其他学习资料均为手抄本。不用印刷品而靠手抄本的传播方式也可以减少信徒的经济负担，只要廉价的笔和纸就可以完成圣经的学习。虔诚的信徒通过不断抄写的见证故事来见识神的伟大之处。（平均每个星期可以接到一次道和见证，每次“道”大概有四张材料纸左右，见证六张材料纸左右，认真抄写一份大概2个小时，同样是逐级负责抄送，其抄送的分数依照领导人直接下级人数而定）。

2006年，教会曾经买了4万元的书（大概4000册）。据称，这四万元的圣经是当地一个信徒先垫付的，该信徒有极其有钱的儿子。他们家也是接待外地信徒的聚会点。而在发展一个会员，点执事便从他那里购买书。采访中发现，L市的负责人认为，这些书的数目就是L市信徒发展的大概数字。因为入他们的教是进入天国的窄门（见《圣经·新约马太福音》7章13-14节），信徒的人数肯定是有限的。

上述方式对门徒会的生存和发展至少有以下三方面的影响：（1）禁止捐献可以赢得其对三自教会的道德优越感。当地三自教会活动做完礼拜后都固定有捐献的仪式，而门徒会强调教派的活动和信徒之间的互相帮助中不涉及到金钱，这种策略可以吸引更多普通民众的参与。（2）三自教会可以公开的展开捐献实际上证明其政治“合法性”，而门徒会派的“不捐献”策略则可以保障“非法敛财”罪名的不成立，减少了法律上的风险。（3）对学习资料（包括圣经解读和见证）的抄写方式既降低了组织运行的成本，同时因为虔诚信徒不会有完成抄写工作的足够奉献精神，这种形式能有效减少搭便车的现象，确保信徒的纯洁性。同时，信徒通过费时费力的材料抄写过程能潜移默化的塑造对教义、对集体的认同感，不断地强化教派内部的道德共同体。而且，没有印刷品能规避非法出版的法律风险。

### 5、生活中的张力

尊崇圣经和上帝的教派话语体系中，“天堂”的存在是信徒信仰的动力。通过门徒会的“窄门”进入天堂是信徒的梦想。然而，信徒们始终在现实世界中生活。天堂与尘世、梦想与现实之间不管如何何去何从，信徒都必须直面生活中的痛苦。

一个关于“白血病”的见证折射出信仰的“能”与“不能”。大体事实如下，2007年，一位信徒家的大儿子突然大病，开始试图通过祷告治愈，不得已送到医院，后在湖南最好的医院湘雅医院确诊为白血病，前后花费四万多元治病仍无法好转。后来该信徒决定让孩子回家，进行集体祷告，并让孩子去传福音以感动上帝。两周后孩子去世。
当事人家长 Z（虔诚信徒，大分点执事）告诉我：“很多人说我信教害死了孩子。但是这是完全错误的。我怎么会害死自己的孩子？治病的时候，孩子他妈每天都哭。”然后给我出示了湖南湘雅医院的收费单和化验报告。“当时孩子自己非要去医院治病，不听我们的祷告。去了最好的医院，治了快大半个月，医院说没有好转，反而恶化。每天要花很多钱。现在我把这些单据都留着，免得别人说我怕花钱不让孩子看病。

后来孩子说，我和你们回去，信神。回来之后，信神，求神保佑，病好了很多。吃饭也恢复到了以前水平。为了让他好，祷告的时候神暗示我们让他去传福音，他去传了几天，病好的很快，脸色也好了。但是传的时候很多亲戚和熟人都嘲笑他，并且让他去看病，别听我们的。

他的信心动摇了，也拉不下面子，就停止了。最终他离开了我们，临走前对我们和弟弟说，我走了，神是好的，但是暂时救不了我。他睡去了。但是不要紧，我们在永生的世界里重新见面。”

Z 所在乡村是个典型的熟人社会，大家抬头不见低头见。根据笔者的调查，不信教的左邻右舍对其行为一致谴责，他们觉得孩子有病不去治病，用‘集体祷告’的歪门邪道救人，拿病人的生命做赌注，拖延治疗时间害死了孩子。

以上的事例彰显信仰和现实的纠结。这种纠结是在门徒会前期发展中所少见的，也为其祈祷治病、赶鬼治病主流话语所不允许的。而这种纠结反应门徒会在信仰实践上并不以祈祷治病为唯一标准。我们可看到其信仰行为体现了与社会的融合。

总体来说，门徒会事实上已经有相当的生存空间。L 市的相关部门告诉我们，对于门徒会，政府密切关注。只要该组织没有集体抗议、诈骗和强迫入会等行为的存在，在没有上级干预和群众上告的情况下，政府并没有取缔的计划。而对于全能神，政府相关部门态度则要严厉的多，L 市宗教局的一名官员证实了门徒会信徒举报全能神教派的事情。对此，他说“全能神恶名在外，总是吓唬老百姓，还说自己是国际性的组织，打着老外的幌子骗人，行动也很反常，我们对他们秘密活动的区域很注意，对老百姓宣传全能神的危害，像当年对待法轮功分子一样转化我们掌握的全能神信徒。”

1995 年官方从门徒会的宗教教义及信仰行为认定其为邪教，认为该团体挑战与冲击了现行的家庭、社会与政治秩序。L 市的个案显示，门徒会在政府强势管制的处境下，从多方面革新、寻求合法性，降低与政府冲突的可能性以及冲突的程度。

五 总结与讨论

综上所述，门徒会在政府管制力量仍然强大的背景下，成功的降低了政府对其的管制意愿，赢得了一定的活动空间，可以将其视为从黑市宗教通过自身调整向合法化宗教组织转化的典型案例。上文不同的侧面对解释了门徒会的现状，指出基层的门徒会信徒从自我身份认知上已经将门徒会与‘非法’组织相区分。在发展策略上，门徒会采取多种手段来赢得生存空间、发展信徒。从圣经中引经据典来表明对当权者的支持，不收捐献、手抄见证、控制聚会人数等方式在有效的规避了管制风险，同时也是门徒会内部维护‘道德共同体’的有效手段。

如果将中国宗教组织的光谱根据其活动空间划分，处于光谱两端的是最具合法性的官方规定的五大宗教团体（包括三自爱国会），以及完全为官方所禁止的各类邪教组织如全能神等。门徒会虽然不属于灰色市场的非登记教会，但在宗教市场中开始向中间位置移动。以上文叙述为基础，笔者试图将门徒会与三自爱国会和全能神的区别通过下表揭示:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>组织类型</th>
<th>三自爱国会</th>
<th>门徒会</th>
<th>全能神</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>特征</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>对政府的态度</td>
<td>支持/但不会刻意强调</td>
<td>强调对政府的支持和顺从</td>
<td>反对、抨击、冒险对抗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>活动空间</td>
<td>公开，组织公开的大规模礼拜</td>
<td>半公开，无大规模集会</td>
<td>完全地下活动</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>政府策略</td>
<td>给予宗教场所等方面一定支持</td>
<td>没有明显打压</td>
<td>严打，包括严格的监管相关的网络信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>资源</td>
<td>仪式上收取信徒公开的奉献</td>
<td>有限，仪式中禁止奉献捐钱</td>
<td>据称有国外资金支持</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>传播话语</td>
<td>解读圣经，以宣扬生活道理为主</td>
<td>神迹、魔术占有相当比例</td>
<td>神迹、魔术为主</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>吸收信徒的方式</td>
<td>公开传播和私人传教相结合</td>
<td>半公开的私人传教</td>
<td>隐秘的私人传教</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>信徒宗教虔诚性</td>
<td>参加者成分复杂，虔诚度不一，存在大量“搭便车”现象</td>
<td>信徒虔诚度较为一致，基本无“搭便车”现象</td>
<td>狂热的宗教分子</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

三者之间的相互认知：
- 认为后两者是邪教
- 认为前两者是歪曲和别有用心
- 后者是邪教

首先是对于参与者组成的分析。走进 L 市三自爱国教会的教堂，一个明显的现象是，做礼拜的大部分是老年人（连四五十岁的中年人都不多见），女性明显多于男性。显然，他们的一大部分人很难理解牧师的讲道，不太可能真正读过圣经。而参加门徒会活动的则以中年人居多，男女比例相对均衡。对于不同宗教派别参与者年龄、性别、教育背景、地域分布与虔诚度等因素的统计与比较分析是一个值得深入的研究论题。

门徒会未来的演化同样是一个有趣的社会学议题，值得跟踪研究。尽管曾经在政府的管制下黑市化，但当前门徒会派事实上已经有灰色化的生存空间。自然科学中的“灰色”意味着不确定性，该教派未来的演变同样充满变数。维持现状、继续灰色化生存是一种可能。如果维持现状的条件有变，则门徒会则面临两种截然不同的演变方向。第一个演变方向是，门徒会遭到政府的强力打压，重新“黑市化”。网络搜索的结果表明，门徒会的传播范围十分广泛，网民对门徒会的负面评论亦随处可见。加之门徒会全国性组织的存在，因此，或许出现地方社会中的门徒会与政府的矛盾趋于激化导致地方政府对其进行严厉管制。这样门徒会重新回到 1990 年代初“黑市化”的生存状，如法轮功、全能神的结局。

另一种可能是，尽管灰色教派的教义一开始因“标新立异”而被传统主流宗教或当局视为“异端”加以压制。经过不断与主流宗教文化博弈和调整，从而逐渐与社会主流化靠拢，获得社会的认可，从而融入主流社会文化，如美国的摩门教。宗教管制的放松会导致一些教派制度化，台湾一贯道的变迁就是这种演化路径的典型代表(Lu and Lang 2006)。最终发展成为与主流社会关系相对融洽的宗教组织最终会出现何种结果取决于政府、教派和信徒之间的博弈路径和行为选择。

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刘燕舞，2009，门徒会在湖南的传播[J]，战略与管理(8)。

⑥ 当然，这个人员组成与广州（大城市）教堂礼拜的结构大为不同，其中缘由也值得探讨。


Interests Relationship and Belief Conflict——A Study of a Seaside Church in a Town, Zhejiang Province
ZHAO Cuicui, East China Normal University

【Abstract】With the clue of the event that “the worship of fiery trees” in the process of building a new Christian church, the paper discusses the origin, occurrence, development and confrontation after investigating the historical tradition and its belief changes of one seaside church, and analyzes the underlying reasons of conflicts between Christian church and folk belief, which illustrates that the faith conflicts are not only fight and struggle between faith groups activated by interest relationship, but also to present the complex interweave between faith and personal relationship, legal rules, religious systems, and primary power, which explores the internal connections between personal relationship and belief conflict. In order to investigate the communication relationship between folk beliefs and Christianity in different regions and backgrounds, the author uses “the extended case method” and uses the case study of a seaside church in Zhejiang Province as the center, in addition of the case studies of belief relationship in the area of Putian in Fujian, Yugan in Jiangxi, and Caikou in Guangdong, to discuss the intrinsic influence of the interests relationship in belief relationship. Furthermore, the author hacks the different function and status of the folk beliefs and Christianity in different situations, and the constructive factors of their interaction or their difference.

利益关系与信仰冲突
——以浙江海滨教会的研究为中心
赵翠翠

【内容摘要】论文在考察海滨教会的历史传统及其变迁中，以基督教新堂建造过程中所遭遇的一起“神树喷火”事件为线索，在论述该事件的缘起、发生、发展与对峙等过程中，讨论基督教教会与民间信奉群体之间发生冲突的深层次缘由，说明这起信仰冲突事件不单是一场被利益关系所激活了的信仰群体之间的较量与斗争，更呈现出信仰关系与私人利益、合法性规则、宗教制度、基层权力等之间的复杂交织，旨在揭示利益关系与信仰冲突之间的内在关联。另外，为了更好地深入地探讨民间信仰与基督教在不同区域背景下的交往关系，论文运用扩展个案法，以浙江海滨社区的个案研究为中心，同时辅之以福建莆田、江西余干、广东蔡口的信仰关系研究，集中论述利益关系在信仰关系研究中的内在影响，进而梳理不同场域、不同情境下基督教与民间信仰其不同的功用和地位，以及二者互动或形成差异的结构性要素。

【关键词】信仰关系 利益关系 神树喷火 信仰冲突
《利益关系与信仰冲突——以浙江海滨教会的研究为中心》

作者姓名：赵翠翠
学科专业：社会学
研究方向：宗教社会学
作者单位：上海社会科学院

2017年2月
一、对象与方法

本文所讨论的宗教群体个案是海滨教会,信徒约四百余人,归属宗教名称为基督教,地位于浙江某镇海滨社区。

在研究方法层面,通过作者分别于2013年10月、2014年1月,2014年3月-4月先后三次共计两个月的田野调查,本个案共访谈92人。具体的资料收集方法,主要是通过文献收集法、参与观察法与无结构式访谈三种方法。在92人的访谈资料中,访谈的人员分类大致为:党员34人,群众57人,团员1人;镇村级干部合计34人,普通村民58人;基督徒26人,非基督徒66人。这些访谈对象的确定,大体分为与事件直接相关或间接相关的对象。具体包括民间信仰群体、基督徒,以及地方基层镇级干部、村一级干部、村民代表、老人及老年人协会、普通村民等。

访谈地点一般选择在被访人的家里进行,以交朋友、拜访等名义尽快拉近与被访谈对象的关系。使其在舒适、轻松、愉快的氛围中,尽快地融入到作者所涉及的谈话主题中来;当然,这也是为了避免外界噪音、人事等所带来的各种干扰,以顺利高效率地完成整个访谈过程。为了让个案研究不仅仅局限于主要事件,作者通过对该地人口、经济、宗族、土地、信仰等方面的考察,都使得个案资料一步步丰富起来。在梳理与分析这些资料的同时,逐渐把握了相应的研究内容,形成了其中的研究主题。因而,对该个案的考察,又带有实地研究的特征。

至访谈资料的引用,作者抽取了一些能够反映事实和真相的访谈资料,以加强研究的信度与效度,提高对研究主旨的解释力度。在对资料的分析与把握层面,作者采用“关系/事件”(relation/event)研究法,以把握民间信仰与基督教之间的交往关系。正是一个个事件链所构成的一组关系/事件,才使得我们对于该事件的认识与理解不断加深,更提供了一种动态的关注事件中不同人人关系、人神关系、人群如何构成,及信仰者者灵活多变的行动策略之选择过程。正因为这样的方法引用,也让基督教与民间信仰的关系研究呈现了动态的变迁过程。

为了更加深入地研究基督教信仰在地方社会中与地方传统信仰之间的交互关系,作者运用扩展个案法(extended case method)的研究技术及其叙述路线,以浙江某镇海滨社区的信仰关系为中心,同时辅之以福建莆田、江西余干、广东蔡口的信仰关系研究,集中论述利益关系在信仰关系研究中的内在影响,进而梳理不同场景、不同情境下基督教与民间信仰其不同的功用和地位,以及二者互动或形成差异的结构性要素。

在论文中,所谓“信仰关系”,是指信仰民间诸神灵的人群与基督教信仰群体之间的交往关系及其实践,它将宗教信仰关系视为一个实践过程来对待。

1 由于当地人口分布密集,居住结构错落交织,故本文将六个行政村合称“海滨社区”。
2 具体详见附录三。
   Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993)
二、背景与个案

海滨社区不但历史悠久，其“十庙九祠堂”的信仰传统更是经久不衰。九十年代以来，随着国家宗教政策的不断恢复，该地庙、庵、寺等信仰活动场所，也在老百姓及其善男信女的热心支持下得到逐步恢复。

从信仰活动场所的数量来看，整个海滨社区的寺、庙、庵共计有二十余座，而基督教教堂却仅有一座。从信仰人数来看，海滨社区共有八千多人，而基督徒却仅有三百四十余人。平时聚会信徒大约为二百人，逢年过节时，尤其是基督教圣诞节时，信徒人数可达四五百人。从信徒人数分布来看，海滨社区六个行政村人数不一，其中唯有东魏村较多，九经村最少，仅有二十余人。另有其他信徒来自于海滨社区周边的其他村落。

在总体人数较为稳定的情况下，海滨社区基督教之所以能够慢慢发展，信徒人数得到逐步增加，出自于民间信仰群体人群与基督徒之间的相互融入。传教方式上，海滨教会大多以口头传教为主。由于基督教信徒大多喜欢见证“神迹”，加之“信耶稣得永生”、“信耶稣可以治病”等说法，从而吸引了不少民众的加入。在经历了快速发展的时期之后，近些年来基督徒人数增长较为缓慢，处于平稳阶段。从信仰传统及其人数上看，该地基督徒相较于民间信仰，不但人数较少，仅占到本地总人口的约5%左右，而且从基督教自身的传教历史来看，也仅有五六十年的历史。

地处于信仰传统浓厚的海滨社区，基督教在当地的发展历史不但远不及民间信仰深厚，还因为其内在的信仰结构之差异，与非基督徒之间构成了一种内在紧张。基督教与民间信仰在发展历史、群体大小、行动规则、仪式展演等方面的诸多差异，都使得二者在日常生活中充满了潜在的话语冲突，以至引发冲突。

（一）缘起：“神树喷火”事件的发生

基督徒和民间信仰者在大多数情况下能够处于相互尊重的交往状态。然而，一旦被某种利益或某种事件所激活，他们之间潜在的冲突便会立刻得到显现。2011年9月14日，基督教新堂建造过程中所发生的一场“神树喷火”事件，就此打破了村庄生活中以往的平静。

具体情况是这样的：2011年9月14日晚上8点左右，有人看到离改建中的海滨教堂不远的山坡上，一颗大树的两个树洞里突然喷出火来。紧接着第二天，“神树喷火”的事件，便纷纷扬扬地散布于海滨社区民众的耳中。更为重要的是，这一消息越传越离谱，最后竟然传到荒唐到极点的谣言：“神树着火，是因教堂的建造，触动了树神的怒气”。与此同时，一些心存不良之图者，还煽动不明真相的群众，把矛头直接指向了正在进行教堂改建工作的海滨教会，认为海滨教会改建新堂——是触怒树神的原因。

更为厉害的是，策划神树起火的人，还策划了一场攻击教会的集体行动。这就是发生于2011年9月19日早上的“闹事风波”，他们纠集了三、四十人，集体冲向海滨教会乱砸乱打；这些人砸了已浇灌好的立柱，敲掉已包裹好准备浇水泥的木板，还殴打了当时在做工的工人。幸亏教会一个负责信徒及时赶到，才严厉制止了该事件的发展。
（二）变故：冲突的发展及升级

这场“神树风波”并未就此结束。其后那些策划的人们又传出“神树再一次喷火”，以致吸引了更多的村民前去观看。表面上看，大树着火与教会修建新堂并无关系，但正是因为民间信仰群体对“树神”的神圣强调，致使这场“喷火事件”在海滨社区引起了不小的动静。

基督徒称：“他说我们建教堂，这个树神都发怒了。……肯定是树神不允许我们建呢，一定要阻止。后来叫来道士说，不能让我们建，造了以后海滨社区不平安的。从这样以后老百姓都开始反对了”。

依据民间信仰传统，大树是有灵气的。一位民间人士说：“树在教堂后面，树有一百多年了，树很灵，有灵性的，建教堂么，这棵树不愿意，树就生气了，人家老人都这样说的，教堂建好后把树压住了”。在这些观念的传播下，本来与大树喷火事件毫无关联的新堂建设，逐渐被演变为“神树发怒”的直接原因。

依照民间信仰群体对于大树着火事件的叙述，即如“巫婆说了，要是（基督教新教堂）造起来的话，海滨社区百姓会不平安，男人会死掉一半”。如此言论，一传十，十传百，最终凝聚起来似乎就建构了巫婆谣言的神圣性，促使人们确信了巫婆话语之象征与灵验。村民们说，“就是巫婆主要讲的那些话，影响了大家的心。村民们说，巫婆说教堂的建造把他们的大树盖住了，没有光线了，说海滨社区地方要不平安了”。一旦新教堂建造完工，其十字架可能会盖过了风水树。而教堂处于东门口，必定会遮挡了人们看大海、看风景及民众观察东门外农耕生产活动的视线。一些极为信仰的人们甚至认为：“东南西北，东为大，东面好像是人的脸一样，不能遮住人的脸面啊”。这样的神圣构建过程，同时也构成了当地民众的“恐慌”心理，形成了一种未知、困惑、不安定氛围。

于是，这棵位于海滨社区东门的“枫树”，被民间信仰传统建构为海滨社区的一棵“神树”，成为象征海滨社区村庄安全的一棵“风水树”。作为当地一场蹊跷和神奇的事件，“神树喷火”事件不但引来了海滨社区村民们对于基督教修建新堂的极大关注，还因为民间肇事者所散布的谣言和舆论，从而使“神树喷火”事件的真相淹没于民间信仰群体的神圣化叙述中。

（三）结果：新堂建造的中断

作为冲突的双方，民间信仰群体与基督教教会信徒们都为此事件而承受了巨大的心理压力。作为海滨教会的信徒，他们在“神树喷火”事件后，时刻受到来自民间信仰众多民众的压力，很多基督徒还不约而同地发出“信耶稣怎么这么难”的无奈与感慨。为此，教会信徒们只好在教堂内通宵祷告，在别无他法之际只好期盼神的帮助，使新堂建造能够顺利完工、两百万钱的经济损失能够挽回。

“神树喷火”事件是一起夹杂着风水、与海滨教会新堂建造紧密相关的一起
非常复杂的信仰冲突事件。随着民间舆论的逐渐散播，当地县农业局等所判断的“排除自然原因”的说法早被淹没，随之而来的是民间老百姓对于教会新堂建造的多次阻扰。“神树喷火”事件所带来的，不但是民间信仰者和基督教教会信徒之间的紧张关系，它还直接引发了民间信仰者、乃至更大范围内的人群对于教会新建新堂的联合性反对，具有深厚的舆论与民间信仰基础。

当时，消防队曾经过来灭火，认为这是一起“人为纵火”事件。当地电视台也曾给予采访与报道，认为这是一起人为现象，并非谣言所传的“触怒了树神”。但是，这个真相很快就被村里的舆论所遮掩，教堂的修建就此中断了下来。

虽然“神树喷火”事件的性质已经很明确，但那些启事者们并没有停止反对。他们拉拢更多的人，暗地里继续行动。只要海滨教会开工建造，就会出现一些人群去围攻教会。致使海滨教会新堂建造多年来都处于被迫停工状态，“半截子工程”成为这场冲突事件的一个象征，象征着当地民间信仰与基督教的冲突。

三、冲突与对峙

平静的乡村生活，往往是井水不犯河水，你好我好地方好。虽然众人皆为私己，但是礼尚往来护臂侵犯即是。海滨社区民间信仰与基督教的交往关系，本来也是如此，虽然现有不同，却也能各自为己。出乎意料的是，教会新建的教堂及其“神树喷火”的事件，搅乱了这种各己为私的信仰关系，由此激活了其中相关的土地利益、风水信仰、合法性规则、基层权力等人情纠葛，进而构成了结构性的冲突与对峙，终究是悬而未决。

（一）土地流转与私人规则

民间信仰与基督教之间的冲突，从来都不是单一或单向度的原因所造成的。群体性冲突事件的爆发尽管只是一个具体事件，但也并不是毫无征兆的。其实，“神树喷火”事件发生之前，民间个别信仰者与基督教教会之间的利益冲突，即“一万元”欠条的事件，早已为二者之间的冲突埋下了的伏笔，在神树的激动之中双方都动用了相应的私人规则与信仰资源，在私人话语与私人关系主义结构中彼此对决、一争高下。

这里的利益矛盾，是指新堂建造过程中与曾流转给教会新堂地皮的土地流出代表张陵洸等人之间的“一万元欠条”事件所引发的冲突。正是因为教会会计秦子耀私下许诺张陵洸等人的“一万元”，但自身又未及时给予支付，而此时的教会对此事并不知晓。其后，当海滨教会在得知秦子耀私下许诺了“一万元欠条”事件后，也并没有及时地处理好这一利益矛盾问题。相反，当时的教会认
为，以张陵洸为代表的土地流出方所提出的“一万元”加价问题，在本已完成土地流转手续的情况下是不太合理的。经过慎重的考虑，教会堂委会成员一致认为，等新堂建造完工后，再给予张陵洸等人“一万元”的加价赔偿，以顺应近年来农村土地流转价格的提升趋势。

然而，正是因为教会这一延迟支付“一万元”的态度，使得土地流出方代表张陵洸等人颇为生气，并留下了“我让你们造不成”的狠话。而不久之后“神树喷火”事件的发生及其接踵而至的民间信仰群体对于基督教新堂建造的极力阻挠，才使得基督教堂委会成员及其信徒们开始意识到当时“一万元”欠条事件的重要性，并认为“一万元”的利益问题，使得这场矛盾逐渐地扩大化了。

而此前，基督教与民间信仰群体之间的潜在冲突也在此过程中被爆发了出来，成为村庄生活中的公开化冲突。这一公开化冲突，就是在“神树喷火”事件发生之后而逐渐凸显起来的，并夹杂着信仰、利益及各种私人矛盾，是基于利益关系所引发的信仰冲突事件。最初的私人“利益之争”一方面被“风水”这一神圣资源的启用被淹没，一方面也把这一风水的神圣资源在无形中被私人化了。

一桩私下里的土地交易，最终构成为两类信仰群体之间的公共冲突事件。土地流出方因为未能尽快拿到原来承诺的一万元钱而借助于传统手法，以风水、神树闹事，追求其个人私利。神树起火之后，个人私利被风水信仰所淹没，双方冲突在信仰关系之中，各执一端而不知退让，终成对立。

(二) 被利益所激活的冲突

通过上面的论述可以发现，一万元的欠条事件与“神树喷火”事件具有一定联系，更加重要的是“神树喷火”激活了民间信仰与基督教之间的矛盾，一个是无所不包的风水信仰，一个以神的信靠为核心的私人群体。

在教会信徒看来，作为土地流出方，二十八户村民已经于2004年5月协议将土地流转给了教会，2011年教会修建新堂时，应当没有理由再由土地流出方提高价格的；即使教会同意他们提高价格，信徒们也表示，这要等到教会新堂建造完毕后再行补给。当时以张陵洸为代表的土地流出方，其实同意这样的协议。然而，利益问题往往是引发冲突的症结，而利益的冲突往往又会激活了信仰的冲突。就在教会尚未能够赔付土地流出方所提高“一万元”之际，以张陵洸为代表的土地流出方代表，其实已经于2011年的五、六月份，多次找寻海滨教会会计秦子耀，试图追索他们希望追加的这一万元。然而，张陵洸实际上是私下个人找的秦子耀，海滨教会负责人并不知情。

在诸多利益的驱动下，张陵洸于2011年五六月份期间多次找寻海滨教会秦子耀谈及涨价加钱之事。无奈之下，秦子耀私下里在当年6月12日答应补偿张陵洸等一万元，并亲自立下欠条，声明于2011年8月20日之前付清一万元欠款。这一欠条中提及的“尚欠苏叶根土地征用费”，指的就是东魏村第十组二十八户村民群体索要的款项。但秦子耀这样写下的“欠条”，实在让教会管理委会成员颇感压力。这一欠条的生成，完全乃秦子耀与张陵洸等人之间的私人协定，教会堂委会成员及其信徒并不知情。教会一旦承认了该欠条，并付给张陵洸这“一万元”，而欠条上又只写着欠“苏叶耕”一个人的名字，于是，教会就担心这一万
元被张陵洸拿去后，很可能会引起其他土地用户的不满，尽管张陵洸自称是二十八户人家共同追加的钱款。

因此，当时间到了当年的8月20日，张陵洸等人在还未拿到这一万元的追加钱款时，便有理有据地找到教会负责人询问这“一万元”如何处理时，教会人士则是一无所知，而张陵洸等人却已心怀不满。一方面，正是因为乡村土地流转的随意性和非正式性，使得乡村土地流转中或流转后，容易因为土地价格的逐年提高等，从而产生交换双方的利益冲突。一方面，利益的双方皆有不同的信仰关系潜藏在其后。利益无法实现之后，很容易借助于信仰不同来激化其间的矛盾。

正是这“一万元”追加钱款的诉求，使得以张陵洸为代表的土地流出方，萌生了反对新堂建造的强烈情感与理由。既然你不给我钱，我就不会让你们造新堂。至今为止，虽然谁都没有说这一万元的欠款事件，就是引发“神树喷火”事件的直接原因，但它却在事件发生的前因后果上，直接或间接地引发基督教新堂建造破坏了风水的事件。

可见，“一万元”利益问题，确实是当时民间信仰与基督教之间发生冲突的一大征兆。但作为当时的教会而言，他们并没有意识到这一“欠条”会给教会及新堂建造带来巨大的危害与阻扰，谁也不会预想到民间信仰群体以“神树喷火”为事实，在散播谣言或舆论的过程中，扩大并激活了这场潜在的冲突与利益纠纷。以至于造成了“六个村都不同意造（教堂）”的局面，甚至出现了民间信仰者对于教会新建手续不合法的群体上访与上告。民间信仰群体中的核心分子们以正式的“文本材料”极力阻扰新堂建造。

一名言辞激烈、情绪激动的中年妇女说道：“随便教堂买的地，我们村里的人卖给他的也好，我们村里人就是不同意他们造教堂，一方面，钞票一万元还没有拿到，我们还可以闹的，教堂还欠我们钱啊；另一方面，如果他们（教堂）要还钱，我就能够把村里所有钱拿回来给教堂，但他们没有手续，也没有盖章，什么都没有，也没有（村民代表）签字，所以，我们把教堂告到县府去了。我们去了五个人，我们到信访局去了，到了县府，到了信访办，要告到县委书记那里”。这些都足见其反对的厉害程度。

该妇女不但是民间反对新堂建造的核心分子，更是上告基督教的重要成员。正是因为和这位女士的交谈，作者才获得了这场冲突中最为重要的上告材料：“要求收回海滨社区东门外教堂申请报告”。这份报告写于2011年9月25日，是民间信仰群体中的核心分子向当地县、镇级城建局起草的反对新堂建设，并要求收回新堂地基土地使用权的申请报告，并加盖上了六个行政村的村委会印章。由此将这一事件扩大化，成为海滨社区无人不知，无人不晓的大事件，使当地民众因为神树喷火事件而深感这其中的对立与紧张。

为此，信仰关系成为了利益冲突的象征，也可以把利益神圣化或正当化。对内，民间信仰者只在风水与十字架上面争吵，对外，则是将风水、利益、合法性等多重关系介入，最后不得不改变了地方社会中两种不同信仰之间的交往规则，并大大地强化、深化了双方之间的误解。

1FCFL5访谈记录，2014年3月16日。
2FLYJ8访谈记录，2014年4月4日。该女士是2013年底新选任的第十组村民代表之一。
（三）结构性的冲突与对峙

前述“利益之争”及其被激活的“信仰之争”，虽是源自于一张欠条，但却是土地、道德与信仰资源的象征之一。当基督教新堂建造即是因为一张“欠条”而缺乏完备的行政合法性手续时，这一正当性与神圣性的象征功能就被发挥到了极致，风水与教会之间的矛盾与冲突倍加升级为海滨社区六个行政村的重大事件。在此过程中，风水与教会双方均能在此过程中不断地反思，并根据情境规划自己的行动，通过左右不同私人关系，以使自己能够在这场正当性的对决中占据主导地位。

虽然利益、风水、龙脉等，对于民间信仰群体而言，是一种可资利用的总体规则和配置性资源，但这些资源都不能成为风水群体反对教会修建新堂的合法性规则，只是被转换为风水一方用于反对新堂建造的内部规则而已。风水信仰是总体的，但与风水信仰紧密相关的土地肯定不是风水一方所私有的，而风水的信奉者也无法因为土地的流转而构成利益共同体，恰恰是因为土地流转中的私人利益关系（一万元），风水一方反对教会教堂一方的出发点最初总是私人的。

神奇的是，风水一方对内通过对“树神”的神圣化叙事，强调风水、龙脉等信仰资源，能够把不同身份的人整合起来，把私人的利害关系整合一个盖天盖地的风水信仰结构中来，最后集合了更多的人群参与到反对新堂修建的过程中来。对外，他们则以新堂建造缺乏“行政合法性”的规则作为反对的正当性理由。前者对于教会一方来说是内部的，也是私性行动，后者却是借助于土地征用与流转的规则呈现为公共规则，最后整合了内外两种规则，把基督教建造新堂的各种关系纳入到风水信仰结构及其制约之中。

仔细深究其中的问题，我们发现，风水一方在强调教会建堂所需之行政合法性的同时，其自身是有意地规避了“行政合法性规则”对于自身修建神宇的普适性。风水一方具有如下行动策略，他们说：“到政府去说风水没有用的，他们不听的，这样子不管的，我们就说他们新堂没有批下来，不能给他们造，他们没有手续，不说风水的，这是迷信啊，怎么说呢”。

可见，风水作为信仰，只是信奉者的资源，政府无法直接认同，当然也不会反对。但在正当性层面，风水一方如果直接以新建教堂破坏了风水为由而加以反对，很可能就会导致无果而终。至少海滨教会是政府予以登记的，而新堂也是当地政府同意改造“危房”的才得以新建的。这也是一种行政正当性。至于风水信仰是传统、是大多数人信奉的神圣化的人、地、神诸种关系，但在政府管理项目之中却是无法找到对应的行政条目的。所以，风水只是内在的资源与规则而已，不能明白表达出来的。风水一方要通过土地配置规则为风水信仰提供道德资源与正当性，咬住新建教堂尚欠“最后一道手续”为由。

1 FSJ7 访谈记录，2014年3月28日。
2 据调研发现，海滨教会老堂数年已久，加之信徒人数逐年增加，老堂墙壁已经出现了较大的裂缝，实为危房。当地镇、县有关部门在检查教会安全并指导工作时，曾多次提出教会要注意这一潜在的安全问题，一致认为老教堂已经处于“危房”状态。在这种情况下，海滨教会才逐渐萌发了新建新堂的想法。
3 “教会的事情，它的审批手续是改建，但是它实际上是新建。拆建、扩建、新建是三个不同的概念。他是改建，就是原拆原建” MWYC54 访谈记录，2014年4月1日。按照这一说法，海滨教会新堂建造确实属违建建筑。但这一新建的行为是在镇级干部允许“一边批，一边建”的情况下进行的，只是在这一新建的建筑物，办理手续时是以“改建”为名的，且改建手续还未齐全。此种情况下，村里又发生了“神树喷火”事件，致使相关手续办理无法从基层村委会得以通过，进而使得新堂建造中断。
在这场反对教会修建新堂的过程中，民间信仰群体主要以风水、龙脉等信仰资源为私人理由，启用“行政合法性规则”的公共规则，对新堂修建给予了强烈的反抗。持之中，教会则运用当初修建新堂时、地方镇领导所许诺的“一边批，一边造”的权威性资源，展开对修建新堂的合理性证明。同时，基督教同样运用“行政合法性规则”，也对不少民间庙宇修建的合法性程序提出了质疑。虽然风水一方对此类问题给予规避，但很明显，在此过程中，行政合法性规则、风水、龙脉等信仰资源、权威性资源的运用，在风水一方与教会一方都不断地被重新解释，私性发挥，成为双方各自回应、反对对方、争取对己有利的私人性规则和资源，并期待由此改变信仰冲突中的结构化关系，在对于配置资源规则的过程之中表现为明显的依附性私人化倾向。

四、调解与困境

纵观海滨社区的这场冲突事件，基督教新堂建造遭遇当地民间信仰群体的阻挠大致分为六个阶段：
私人反对阶段（2011.3—2011.8）
集体反对的延续阶段（2011.9.19—2011.11）
无反对阶段（2011.12—2013.3）
集体反对阶段（2013.3—2013.4）
无反对阶段（2013.5—至今）。

在此过程中，冲突最为激烈的时间段共有两次，分别是“神树喷火”事件后的“闹事风波”（2011.9-2011.10）和2013.3—2013.4期间的集体阻扰。

海滨教会修建新堂遭遇民间信仰群体的多次阻挠后，镇里多次组织人员并召开调解会，但总是因为二者之间的话语冲突、私人情绪，基督教群体、民间信仰群体对于自身利益的维护和坚持等终而无果。更有意思的是，“开会的人都没有来反对，我们以为可以造上去了么，但他们又给你翻倒”。这样的反复阻扰，致使教会新堂建造迄今为止都处于被迫停工状态。面对民间信仰群体的屡次阻扰，一些基督徒深刻地体会到，“信耶稣的人好像是个弱势群体”，很多人基督徒还不约而同地发出，“信耶稣怎么这么难！”的无奈与感慨。

据海滨社区办事处武主任介绍，这起冲突事件，大大小小的调解会开了好多次，正式的调解会开过四次，但每次调解会都未欢而散，没有任何进展和结果。调解会大体分为较为正式的“一起协调”和“单独协调”3。所谓“一起协调”，即召集民间信奉的人、基督徒，一起来参加调解。单独协调则是调解主体针对某一方的单方面调解。尽管镇级调解主体都希望双方能够各自让步，以达成和解，但每次都因为行动者各自所坚持的私人利益及其立场终而无果。

另外，作为公共权力代表的镇村级干部，他们在冲突事件的调解过程中，发挥着非常重要的公共决策功能，但从整个冲突事件发生发展及其调解来看，上述
谈及的私人性交换关系，却深刻地影响了公共规则的公正化实践。这里分别从镇政府已调离的当事人官员，新任镇政府官员，村委会的村长及书记，以及村民代表等四类权力代理人出发，探讨这其中的利益交换及其规则缺失的过程。

（一）已调离官员的私人许诺

作为地方镇政府已经调离的官员，他们在基督教新堂建造初期，由于宗教用地指标的难以审批、办理手续困难、程序复杂等问题，同时又考虑到新堂是“危房”，于是提出“一边批、一边造”的行动策略。这是基层干部根据实际情况对于规则做出的私人化选择，但也展现了公共规则缺失的事务处理状态。

镇里让我们“一边批、一边造”，他们是出于好心。再说土地指标给我们，我们没有钱给他们，他给别人指标，他们有钱拿的。比如哪个单位几亩，他给我们就没有税收。所以他们说你们“一边批、一边造”，慢慢来，没有人反对，你们造好了，土地指标就不要了。只是后来说这个树烧起来了，搞起来了，人吵起来了，所以才停止了。但如果我们现在找他，他肯定说我让你们“一边批、一边造”啊，他肯定否认了。1

表面看来，地方镇领导曾提出来的“一边批、一边造”的做法，是一个很好的方法和策略，对于基督徒及其处于危房之中的海滨教会而言，能够重建新堂在当时至关重要。但实质在于，地方官员用私人化的、人情化的土地指标利益替代了公正的公共事件处理。在此过程中，他们也试图通过尽快修建新堂，以避免新堂危房所带来的潜在风险与责任，这种正式规则的非正式运用及对土地指标利益的诉求，确实呈现了宗教事务处理过程中的规则缺失状态。

（二）新任官员的“维稳”原则

由于新堂建造期间，当时许诺教会“一边批、一边造”的镇级官员已经调离。因而，新任官员对于该信冲突事件的态度，一方面对其情况不是很熟悉，且忙于地方经济建设，根本无暇顾及这一历史遗留问题；另一方面，面对这一较为复杂的冲突事件，新任官员虽也同情教会，也希望能够建造，但却主要以“维稳”为处理原则。

虽然在调解会的几次开展中，地方相关官员由于最初的“一边批、一边造”策略而很同情教会，“对于我们自己来说，我还蛮同情堂委会的人，他们要给他们信徒解释为何造不上去，毕竟涉及到二、三百人，要取得他们的信任啊”2。但这种“同情”对于该事情的处理并没有带来实质益处，也没有按照曾经乡镇官

1 FHMF28 访谈记录，2014 年 1 月 18 日。
2 FDKY53 访谈记录，2014 年 1 月 19 日。
员所承诺的那样去竭力支持修建教堂，或是提出一个方案得以解决。为了显现公共权力的公共权威，他们甚至采取一种所谓“钻空子”的做法。

我就钻了一个空子啊，如果你们教堂，哪怕你们造好了，手续差一点，但是造好了你们已经在用了也就用了，不可能把你拆了。打比方，他们造庙一半时候，你们信徒来揭发他们了，阻挠他们了，那我们行政命令什么的，这个庙也要拆的。但凡违章建筑都要拆的哦，我就是撇开我这个身份的，我们都是希望村里和谐的。他们修庙的话，没有人反对，修上去也就修上去了。你们教堂要是修的时候，要是没有人反对，也就修上去了。问题是你造了一半了，他们的人来阻挠了。1

这种“钻空子”的好处在于，一方面提出了“无人反对”是修建庙宇或教堂的正当性理由；另一方面，则意在表明民间信仰群体的“有人反对”，是教会新堂修建中断的依据。此种情况下，民间信仰群体对教堂手续未办妥的合法性质疑，就成为地方政府官员平衡民间信仰和基督教关系的唯一标准。从其实质来看，“钻空子”的做法，其实是从私人意志出发而来的“结构性私人化”表达。这种“结构性私人化”的最大危害在于，以私人化的方式实现了对于公共规则的支配，用个人所能够行使或支配的权力，掌握和平衡着民间信仰群体与基督教之间的交往关系，在对规则的选择和取舍中，实现了资源在私人层面的配置，实质是对民间信仰的信仰偏好。

（三）村干部的权力关系网络

作为村委会的村长、书记，他们对于民间建造小庙、小庵等事件大多持默许态度。在土地资源的使用方面，由于地方基层政府主管部门领导“睁一只眼闭一只眼”，以及乡村社会中村干部的“权力网络”等，都使得民间庙宇的修建过程相对容易，且可以进行土地流转的私人交易。因为，“如果村干部不给我们说的话，因为我们不可能天天去那里”。2这就是说，只要村干部没有上报的，如果是已经修建了的，就能成为一种“合法的”存在物。而大多数时候，乡村庙宇修建时的土地审批手续往往处于“空缺”或“非法”状态。

作为基层自治组织，村委会书记、村长对于此事，一般也不太轻易干涉，有的甚至就是庙宇的直接修建者。用民间老百姓的话来说，“只要造的时候，没有人反对就可以了”。3一名村长更是提出了，“民间庙宇是留下来的，是文物，有历史记载的”3正当理由，直接成为庙宇得以修建的支持者。

1 FDKY53 访谈记录，2014 年 1 月 19 日。
2 FDKY53 访谈记录，2014 年 1 月 19 日。
3 MJYM61 访谈记录，2014 年 4 月 9 日。
但国家对于基督教的修建，则不但有宗教事务条例的规定，更有一套严格的土地审批程序。面对海滨教会的新堂建造，村委会书记、村长等对于民间庙宇的修建程序，以及涉及到的土地审批手续等避而不谈，只是一味地指出海滨教会新堂建造的违建之处，并声明民间庙宇存在的历史性和合理性。这就是一种在强调新堂建造行政合法性规则缺失的同时，又以历史合理性规避了这种规则对于庙宇修建的普遍适用性，明显是一种规则使用过程中的私人化逻辑。可见，同样是乡村社会中村民，村委会村长及村干部的态度，会明显偏向于民间信仰的诸多事务，这在村委会支持村落做戏时的资金资助中也曾有诸多体现。

（四）村民代表们的态度模糊

基于上述镇级官员、村委会村长、书记态度的模糊性，村民代表们在此事件的协调过程中，也经常扮演态度模糊的角色。

尽管村民代表是村民选举出来的代表人，在村委会的重大事件中具有发表意见的权利，但由于民间信仰群体人数多的人群结构，他们在此事件的几次协调过程中，大多处于互相看，或持不发表意见的态度，谁也不敢得罪人。这种基于个人利益、面子、人情考虑的私人性做法，不但没有发挥村民代表所发挥的公正态度，也深刻地影响到东魏村为此事所召开的几次调解会议的果校。

由于东魏村村民代表不发表意见的私人做法，使得“听证告知书送达回执”和“土地协议补偿书”等审批手续更难以办理。按照正规的土地流转程序，只有东魏村二十四位村民代表签字同意，教会新堂地基所占的1.36亩土地，才可以转换为教会所有，进而办理新堂建造的相关手续，否则仍然属于村委会集体所有。

但在此事的态度上，由于“神树喷火”事件以来的深刻影响，村民代表们在其态度上尤为谨慎。每次“提教堂的事情，他们同意也不讲，反对也不讲，当面就是不说”。虽然村民代表中有两个教会信徒，但“别人不说，他肯定也不说。别的人多啊，说了也没用”。1 “去年交接后，有村民代表、党员，共有四十来个开会，没有一个人反对，没有一个人说话。我说那我们可以建上去了，他们没有一个人反对。结果我们动工了，他们又来把我们翻倒（墙）了。”2

关键的问题在于，村民代表之间存在面面相觑的“互相看”问题，其实质是“谁也不想得罪人，谁也不敢承担责任”。在众多的乡村民众面前，面对两种不同力量的相持，大多数村民选择了“沉默”的态度，但这种“沉默”中又充满了太多的反抗与不负责任，以私人意志的“沉默”，使这一公共事件陷入了僵局。

上述四类权力代理人其各自的行动规则，充满了对于自身利益及其权力关系的私人维护，这其实是对公共规则的滥用，更是一种公共规则缺失或模糊的状态。

就此而言，民间信仰和基督教之间的信仰冲突，并非一个简单的合法性问题，而是一起夹杂着人情面子、利益交换、权力网络、信仰惯习等诸多因素的冲突事件。上述四种角色的权力代理人，他们之所以没有呈现出对该信仰冲突事件的明确态度，也无法通过既有的正式规则或非正式规则，对其进行彻底的解决，最大的原因在于，他们以私人的立场与偏爱，决定了他们在不同情境下的利益选择。而这种利益选择，又决定了他们处事方式中不得不呈现出相当明显的私人规则。

这种私人行动的逻辑，只关注信仰冲突事件中对于自身利益或信仰问题的解

1 FHMF28 访谈记录，2014年1月19日。
2 FSXJ33 访谈记录，2014年3月20日。
决，并没有因为各类关系的公私转换，建构出一种对于民间信仰和基督教关系处理的普遍性规则，寻求问题解决与规则治理之间的平衡。更没有因为这种规则和资源的运用，对信仰互动及其交往形成一种规范性要求，只好陷入规则和资源使用过程中的“因时因地因人性”，进而导致了一种依附于公共规则并实现自身私人利益的结构性私人化，但冲突与矛盾却始终无法解决的结构性困境。

五、个案比较与讨论

民间信仰与基督教之间的交往关系，既有政教关系、民教关系的内在影响，亦受到中国社会中如人际关系、权力关系、利益关系、家族关系的深刻影响。为此，乡村社会中民间信仰与基督教之间的关系问题，虽然大多处于较为平静的状态，然而，一旦因为相关事件中的利益、情感、权力、家族因素所激活，二者之间的矛盾及其冲突就由此爆发了。在此过程中，我们主要关注那些造成民间信仰与基督教信仰各自地位或功用，乃至其信仰实践差异的显性要素。

值得注意的是，冲突在不同的区域、场域中都有其不同的表现。冲突分为显性冲突和潜在冲突；或直接冲突和间接冲突。如果说，海滨社区这样的冲突明显属于前者，并由利益关系所激活的话，那么，在福建·莆田、江西·余干和广东·蔡口，则主要体现为一种潜在的或间接的冲突关系，或多或少也会涉及利益因素。通过这些个案其主要特征的论述，论文旨在挖掘造成各区域背景下民间信仰与基督教各自的信仰实践，以及二者交往关系的结构性差异及其要素。

（一）浙江·海滨社区：被利益所激活的信仰冲突

利益关系直接或间接地引发了“神树喷火”事件的发生，而诱导其冲突的机制即为各自的利益关系及其行动逻辑。正是因为这些私人利益及其行动逻辑，总是促使这一围绕着“神树喷火”的信仰关系双方，在利益之争、信仰之争与合法性之争这些复杂的问题面前，更加错综复杂、剪不断理还乱，各种关系与私人利益、信仰关系、合法性关系搅和在一起，形成冲突双方都无法超越的结构性关联。

民间信仰与基督教的冲突关系，最初矛盾的焦点实际上就是私人化的利益关系，只是因为私人利益关系无法实现了，才借助于信仰来表达其中的私人利益。但随着双方矛盾的逐渐升级，风水与教会二者之间的关系就被纠结成为私人交往、利益关系与信仰关系、权力关系、正式与非正式等嵌套、交织起来的乡村大事件。

表面上看，海滨社区基督教与民间信仰者之间的冲突，是一个合法化问题，但实质乃信仰与村民利益、乡村土地、权力关系、宗教制度等之间的复杂交织。在他们在各自的信仰关系及其实践过程中，信仰差异本来不是问题，但是一旦“有事情”把不同信仰关系纠结在一起，公共权力处理其关系之际，如果缺乏公共规则的普遍性，自然而然地就成为了信仰冲突事件。而在此事件之前，地方政府对于民间信仰和基督教的管理及其对公共事件的处理，也缺少使用普遍性的公共规则。

就此而言，基督教和民间信仰之间的冲突，并非一个简单的合法性问题，而是一种对于不同信仰及其信仰关系实践与表达的信仰规则缺失与重构的重要问题。一旦当“人数多”、或是“无人反对”，成为处理与平衡民间信仰和基督教关
系的依据时，这也忽视了信仰关系及其交往之合法性规则，人事利益关系就成为地方乡镇行使公共权力过程中不得不呈现出的私人化特征了，个人的信仰偏好、个人的人情关系，以及依据反对者的人数多少，来决定一个事件的处理方式。

因此，海滨社区基督教与民间信仰之间的交往关系，在论文中具体呈现为被一起“神树喷火”事件所激活的状态。冲突虽然源于利益关系，却以信仰冲突为导火索，进而与合法性、权力关系、家族关系、宗教制度等复杂交织，在此过程中，无论是基督教信仰者群体，还是民间信仰者，亦或是调解和处理这一冲突的权力代理人们，他们都在此过程中呈现了极为明显的私人化特征。正因为如此，这场冲突事件自发生以来，调解多次而终而无果。

（二）福建・莆田某海岛：妈祖信仰的强大与兴盛

如果说浙江海滨社区的信仰冲突事件，源自于利益关系。那么，莆田地区某海岛妈祖信仰与基督教之间的关系，则是一起潜在的、间接的利益冲突关系。

作为妈祖信仰“圣地”的莆田某海岛祖庙，其信仰及其神圣性构成的延续，无疑需要民间信仰权威的传承。因此，为了保持妈祖信仰的延续性，同时又能在宏观上指导和参与祖庙之各种信仰仪式、活动，地方政府主要是通过第一代信仰精英“阿祖”之子的任命，逐步实现了对妈祖祖庙运作方式及其活动开展的掌控权。妈祖祖庙经由地方政府的运作，成为地方权力参与指导下的民间社团，进而在地方政府的参与下，妈祖信仰活动的开展，妈祖祖庙的管理思路及其运作模式等，无不体现出极大的制度化建构等特征。

为此，该岛的妈祖祖庙走上了一条借助于政府公共权力的信仰复兴之路，妈祖祖庙也因此从单纯民间复兴方式转为半官方的运作机制。妈祖文化在海峡两岸关系中的独特性，决定了妈祖祖庙其性质发生变化的必然，是地方政府进行统战工作的有效工具；而对于妈祖信仰而言，妈祖祖庙也希望借助于地方政府公权力而得以复兴弘扬。

与兴盛的妈祖信仰比较，基督教在该岛与其共存一岛，虽有两个教堂，却远不及其地位。一个是湄洲堂，乃“三自”爱国会下属的基督教堂，在管委会那里叫“宫下教堂”。湄洲堂教会使用的宗教场所乃属租赁性质，基督徒只能在宫下村的敬老院（私人房屋）中进行日常聚会。这座在历史上曾经有过的湄洲堂，只因一直没有历史材料根据，因而无法追回其教堂的土地使用权，土地问题因此成为湄洲堂得以发展的最大难题。由于基督徒人数少、资金薄弱等，也无法承担修建教堂及其内部运作的各种费用。另一个教堂属于真耶稣教会，又称真耶稣会湄洲堂，传教历史也仅有四十年。

无论是湄洲堂，还是真耶稣教会，他们举行宗教活动的范围大多局限于教堂内部，无法举行像妈祖祭奠那样大规模的活动。另外，由于教派性质的不同，湄洲堂与真耶稣教会二者之间还存在着无形的竞争关系，使教会内部无法团结。但对政府而言，他们却没什么区别。虽然海岛上的基督教依旧具有信仰共同体的特点，但已不是制度宗教，而是被公权力及其宗教制度设计于一种扩散而又边缘的地位，唯有妈祖信仰形态成为这种制度安排的核心内容。这种基于权力关系而来的不平等性，决定了他们各自信仰方式及其表达的差异。

从利益关系的角度来看，公共权力在某种程度上决定了信仰关系中的偏正与主从，也决定了这两种信仰类型的社会影响力及其实践方式。教会一名姊妹的话语充分说明了这个问题：“我们这个真耶稣会也是政府批准的，地也是他们批的。”
妈祖有经济来源，但他奉承我们，就没有经济来源了。他奉承妈祖的话，就没有经济来源啊"。这就是说，妈祖信仰能够与公共权力实现整合并实现互惠，但基督教却不能成为被整合的信仰类型。

在此，宗教的制度或扩散的存在形态，已经变得不重要了。与妈祖之兴盛的现状相比，基督教在该岛上处于一种被边缘化的地位，属于妈祖信仰的“陪衬物”。妈祖信仰虽是一种被定义了的民间信仰形式，不属于体制性宗教的类型，却能够因为公共权力的参与和建构，以“文化”、“信俗”等方式，表达出了一种制度性宗教在地方社会中的建设性功能；与此相反，基督教虽是一种制度性宗教，却因为其传播历史短、信徒人数少、资金较薄弱、人才相对缺乏等现实因素，最终在该岛上呈现出较为分散性的一面，体现出对于公权力的某些依附性。

该个案不但体现了权力关系对于信仰类型的建构，更呈现了同一“权力生态”背景下，资源在配置过程中因为其整合机制的不同所造成的结构性差异。

（三）江西·余干：基督教兴盛的历史与现实

福建莆田某海岛上的妈祖信仰与基督教的关系对比，说明了地方权力在建构民间信仰方面的强大力量，并且能够通过与地方民间权威之间的利益互惠、整合等，实现信仰方式的文化转型。不似宗教，胜似宗教。江西余干地区基督教较民间信仰历史与现实，则说明地方社会中“权力建构民间信仰”逻辑的另外一种表达逻辑。

余干地区，历史上是一个多种宗教文化并存共生的地区。民国以前，佛教、道教及官方认可的“正祀”信仰一直占据主导地位。民国期间，余干地区佛教一度兴盛，道教在民间社会中的影响也较为深厚，火居道士类的斋醮活动极为频繁。建国初期，佛道教及以儒释道混合的民间信仰，却一直被视为封建迷信予以打击。

余干地区民间信仰相较基督教衰落的原因有很多：其一，是历史上恢复、传承的佛教教庙宇较少，民间信仰大多衰落。其二，经济发展水平的相对落后，是该地区民间信仰难以兴盛的具体原因。在江步乡，即便有几座庙宇，也相当破旧，杂草丛生，看起来一副衰落的景象。虽然江步乡、瑞红地区的民间信仰群体大多信仰“社公”——土地爷，但“关键是要老百姓去社公那里拜一拜就完了，即使是祠堂，也不一定是什么时候去拜的”。民众的信仰表达，极为松散、零星、个人化。在江步乡基督教兴盛的背景下，当地陈坪村，包括张家、阮家、施家、老头陈家、老头张家等以姓氏为名称的单姓村，也几乎看不到任何宗祠的影子，至于那些佛道教寺庙及民间小庙、小庵，在当地根本无从看到。

据考察，当地在文革期间对于各类信仰类型的压制属于同一阶段，只是在那种被压制的环境中，当时的基督教能够坚持了下来，落实宗教政策后，基督教又得到了恢复性的发展而已。与此同时，民间信仰及佛道教也与基督教同时间开始恢复信仰活动，只是由于民间信仰、佛道教在恢复与传承阶段上的某些中断，致使当地很少出现较大的、香火比较旺盛的佛寺道观。这一点深刻地影响了当地民间信仰的发展与走向，因此也无构建出类似于沿海地区那些有规模、有组织性的“烧香团”，或敬拜地方神灵的香火组织，也就无法从文化、信仰、旅游等角度，刺激并带动地方社会的发展。此种情况下，也就无法实现如同妈祖信仰与地方权力之间的利益整合关系。而从基督教来看，正是因为这种兴盛的历史与现实，
也使得地方权力因为文化的选择性认同而持谨慎态度。

通过论述余干地区民间信仰的衰落，与基督教兴盛的历史与现实，我们试图说明，同一种社会环境之中，基督教得之于历史上的发展、福音基础好、信仰表达方式独特等原因，呈现出较为兴盛的状态。但这并不是说，基督教的这种兴盛曾经得益于所谓的宗教生态失衡，或权力关系对佛道教、民间信仰的打压等，直接导致了该地区民间信仰的衰落。所以，基督教在余干地区的相对发展，远非公权力或权力制度的安排所致，而是一种历史传承，固有的信仰延续和信仰认同为背景下的自然选择结果。

它说明，在一些地方社会结构中，权力关系可以成为民间信仰与基督教产生差异的根源，但在另外一种变化了的地方结构中，它可能就无法实现这样的秩序构成与利益整合。但这种类型的权力表达，都不意味着“权力建构信仰”实践规则的有效性缺失。只是与前一种实践逻辑相比较，它有了其新的实践特征。

（四）广东·蔡口：民间信仰与基督教信仰的关系平衡

前三种个案讨论中，基督教与民间信仰之间的关系，受利益关系的影响呈递减状态。蔡口村的个案也将说明，当地基督教与民间信仰之间的交往关系，会因为宗族这一中介，而使其呈现出一种理性互动的平衡，而非简单的利益关系。

蔡口村是一个极为有特点的村落。不但民间信仰等文化传统深厚，更有作为与民间信仰相异的基督教与天主教信仰传统。虽然蔡口村形成了三大信仰传统及其群体，但和周围大多数村落相同，蔡口村大多数人群是民间拜老爷的人。这里的“老爷”，是广义上的称谓。所谓“老爷”，当然是指老爷信仰，但这种称呼在民间社会，其实还包括了村落及其周围村落的所有神灵。比如元帅爷、伯公、太子、招财爷等。村民在祭拜时，更是缺一不可，宁可多拜，也不少拜。

从人口比例上看，整个蔡口村属于行政村落，全村人口约七、八千人，其中基督徒和天主教徒合起来约一千余人，是“不拜的”人，其他人都是民间拜老爷的，在当地属于“拜的人”或“世俗的”。至于村落中的信仰为何呈现此分布特征，主要基于村民家庭信仰选择的传承与惯习。一般来说，祖宗家庭是信仰什么的，后代子孙们便会跟着选择信仰什么，出现改宗的几率很少，甚至是没有。对于村民而言，一年当中最为重要的除了拜老爷外，还要举办浓重的拜祖宗仪式，而每个姓氏所在的宗族祭祖时间都不一样，祖先崇拜特征尤为明显。

作为一种组织性较强的宗教，基督教在该村落中的发展与传承，已有近一百多年的历史。该教堂最早建于1900年，即“蔡口教案”发生之后，由长老会传入福音。迄今为止，蔡口堂已有一百一十多年的堂史。近些年来，随着乡村社会结构的变迁，人口流动、生产生活方式的转变，教会的发展呈现了一种较为衰败的迹象。由于出外打工、学生上学等原因，蔡口村教会群体中大多只剩下些中年人及其老人、小孩。虽然还有很多人在家种菜务农，但却常常忙于家务和生活，周日聚会的人寥寥无几，很多时候只有十几个人参加聚会，且主要以老年人为主。平常的日子也没有安排夜聚会，更无从谈及福音传布和社会服务等事工。

虽然在日常生活中，民间拜老爷的民间信仰群体与基督徒，各有其不同的信仰方式及其实践特征，但作为宗族内部成员，或某一支系的小家庭，他们在大多

1 1900年的教堂，是在蔡口村第一位信徒陈超湘在圣灵的感动下，召集众村民所建的。参见基督教PN·蔡口堂堂委会编:《基督教广东·PN·QL蔡口堂创会一百一十周年献新堂十五周年暨附楼落成感恩纪念册》，2011年。
数情况下，还是比较强调同一宗族这一规则，这种现象在蔡口村是极为普遍的。此浓厚的宗族内认同，致使基督徒在处理“做礼拜”，还是“帮亲”这件事情上，能够做出比较适宜的选择。同理，这样的逻辑也适用于民间拜老爷的人群。

因此，当宗教信仰与宗族事务相撞时，明显存在着宗族事务第一，宗教信仰第二的选择。这是乡村社会中不同信仰者之间的交往理性所致，也是蔡口村浓厚的宗族祭祀之重要体现。此时，基督教信仰往往退而隐之，但这并不影响信徒者对他们自身信仰的认同，也并不意味着他们对自身信仰方式的不重视或忽略。只是当二者发生时间冲突时，他们大多会以宗族事务作为其处理的优先规则。

追究其主要原因，其一是当地深厚的祖宗崇拜传统；其二，传统信仰的历史根基；其三则是社会结构的相对稳定。这是信徒和民间拜神的人之所以能够呈现出较为理性的交往态度的原因。当然，这也并不意味着二者之间并不存在日常生活中的摩擦与矛盾。

六、结论与余论

基督教与民间信仰在四个不同的区域背景下，会因为其各自的结构化环境，呈现出不同的交往特征。福建莆田、江西余干、广东蔡口与浙江海滨社区，基督教与民间信仰之间的关系，虽然分别呈现出民间信仰强、基督教强、自然平衡、对峙相持的特点，但都处于一个“权力生态”背景之下，并且分别呈现出他们交往过程中较为明显的利益关系、权力关系、历史关系和家族关系特征。

如果说，福建莆田某海岛上海妈祖信仰和基督教的关系对比，呈现了公共权力在构建妈祖信仰过程中的强大力量，那么江西余干基督教相较民间信仰兴盛的历史与现实，则说明权力关系对于余干地区民间信仰建构的另一种逻辑。一旦失去了同样妈祖信仰的历史底蕴、神圣性、灵验、信仰需求，以及该地经济发展水平等要素，即使余干地区的民间信仰与公权力之间存在某种整合或利益互惠的关系，也无法与妈祖信仰在海岛上的“一尊独大”地位相媲美。

福建莆田某海岛与江西余干的个案说明，地方社会中一种信仰方式的实践可以依附于地方公共权力，但地方公共权力对于信仰模式的建构也具有其不稳定性。地方信仰关系的互动特征，远非公共权力所能够安排，它还与信仰自身的传统及其信仰方式，地方社会中的经济发展水平，信仰需求，信仰精英等因素紧密相关。福建莆田某海岛上海妈祖信仰兴盛于基督教的现实，与江西余干地区基督教兴盛于民间信仰的现实，都有其存在关系的结构性因缘，并非简单的因果对称关系所致，更不是“宗教生态失衡”或权力关系支持或打压所致。

从利益关系角度来看，如果说妈祖信仰兴盛于基督教的现实，说明权力关系对于妈祖信仰的利益整合，那么江西余干地区基督教兴盛的历史与现实，则并非完全是利益互惠的整合关系所致。至广东蔡口基督教与民间信仰的情况研究，虽同样地处一个权力生态背景下，但我们没有看到一个强大的公共权力对于某一种信仰类型的安排与偏好，也没有看到蔡口民间信仰与基督教相比，哪一种信仰类型呈现更为兴盛的历史与现实，它呈现给我们的是，无论是拜老爷的民间信仰群体们，还是基督教教教会信仰者，他们的信仰选择及其表达，都是一种自然而然的家庭式传承特征，是一种基于历史而来的信仰选择与实践。

与上述三种个案一样，浙江海滨社区民间信仰与基督教之间的关系，仍然是“权力生态”背景下的信仰关系及其实践。只是与前三种个案相比较，浙江海滨
社区基督教与民间信仰之间的交往关系，源自于“一万元”的利益关系，进而以“神树喷火”事件为导火索所爆发了出来，并随着该事件本身的发展与升级，掺杂有土地、利益、权力、合法性等诸多关系，是一次被激活了的动态的交往关系。

公共权力能够建构、复兴吴祖信仰，是因为能够实现其与自身之间的利益互惠，但这样的互惠逻辑，在江西余干、广东蔡口的个案中却无法完全体现。这是因为，一方面，地方社会中的历史文化、信仰传承、经济发展水平、信仰精英等结构性要素的不同，致使公共权力无法实现与当地民间信仰之间实现利益互惠。另一方面，为了能够体现公共权力的公共权威，相反，地方权力主体需要对余干地区兴盛的基督教保持某种谨慎，或是根据实际情况对基督教进行有效管理，以遮蔽隐藏在其管理方式背后的非选择性文化认同。至于广东蔡口基于家庭传承下来的地方信仰关系之构成，基于宗族这一理性的中介与规则，使得二者都无法构成大规模的信仰实践，更无法实现与地方权力之间的利益整合，仅限于一地一隅罢了。至于浙江海滨社区基督教与民间信仰之间关系，更是呈现了信仰关系与利益关系、权力关系、人际关系、家族关系等之间的复杂交织。

值得注意的是，信仰者人数的多少，确实能够大致体现出一种信仰类型在一个地方社会的兴盛与否，也能够影响或左右一个地方社会中的社交关系。然而，它并不能完全说明，民间信仰与基督教在一个地方，就会呈现一种“此消彼长”的二元关系。其实，民间信仰与基督教之间的关系，并非就是一种对称性的因果关系。他们之间的具体交往特征，与该地区不同信仰类型的发展历史、经济发展水平、信仰传统需求、信仰场所重建、宗教精英等要素相关，还与该信仰类型与地方社会中的公共权力、资源运用利益交换的背景相关，并非前者决定后者，或后者决定前者的你弱我强，或你强我弱的“反相关”关系。

基督教与民间信仰之间的关系研究，是宗教社会学研究领域中一个极为复杂和前沿性问题。他们之间的交往特征，取决于宗教与社会的互动关系，更取决于二者与地方文化、族群结构、权力关系等之间的复杂交织，亦取决于非宗教信仰者等社会大众对于宗教信仰群体本身的认知与判断。基督教与民间信仰地处于什么样的结构化环境，就会呈现与此特征相关联的交往特征。在此，结构体现为诸多关系资源和相关规则在时空中不断交互组合而来的结果和产物。

附录一：作者简介

**赵翠翠**，女，法学博士，上海社会科学院宗教研究所助理研究员；华东师范大学社会学系在职博士后，研究方向为宗教社会学。

近年来，在A&HCI、CSSCI等期刊以第一作者、独立作者刊发论文十余篇。其中，A&HCI论文2篇（道风·基督教文化评论），宗教学一级学科权威期刊1篇（世界宗教研究），CSSCI来源期刊5篇，CSSCI扩展版3篇。其他普通期刊、内刊、会议论文等十余篇。

曾在上海市宗教学会举办的青年学者论坛中相继获“论文一等奖”、“论文二等奖”。2014年12月8日—12月11日在香港中文大学参加“第七届基督教与中国社会文化”国际年青学者研讨会”，其论文入选《基督教与中国社会文化：第七届国际年青学者研讨会论文集》。
结合相关的课题与研究，曾赴陕西宝鸡、福建莆田、江西余干、浙江象山、温州、广东汕头、上海等地进行田野调查。参加宗教社会学相关的学术会议十余场。目前，主持和承担上海社会科学院宗教研究所所内课题“当代中国宗教关系的法治化问题研究”。

通讯地址：上海市淮海中路622弄7号上海社会科学院宗教研究所
邮政编码：200020
邮箱地址：ilyzisefengling@163.com
手机号码：13917468794

附录二：个案比较图

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<td>日常生活中的私人矛盾与信仰矛盾</td>
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#### 信仰类型
- 佛教（观音）、民间信仰（刘晏、关公、三官、风水）、道教（城隍）、基督教
- 妈祖、土地公、佛教、三一教、妈祖、土地公
- 社公等民间小庙；佛教、道教、基督教
- 老爷信仰（三山国王、伯公、三太子、招财爷等）；基督教，天主教

#### 大型活动
- 清明会
- 十月醮会
- 妈祖庆典等
- 民俗庙会
- 游老爷、庙会
- 圣诞节
- 圣诞节
- 圣诞节
- 圣诞节

#### 信仰方式
- 民间信仰
  - 个人信仰方式，多神信仰。分散的、个人的，大多在庙会、节日时去拜拜；烧香型、朝圣型。
- 基督教信仰
  - 群体信仰方式，一神信仰。周日礼拜、夜聚会、唱诗班、读经分享、主日学。

### 管理制度
- 民间信仰
  - 一般有庙主，或住持，或在家人，或出家人管理；一般有庙管会，由会长、会计、出纳等
- 基督教信仰
  - 堂委会管理，由堂主任、会计、出纳、委员等

### 组织方式
- 民间信仰
  - 仪式专家（灵媒），仪式承包者（重要组织者等）
- 基督教
  - 牧师、堂主任、执事等组织活动

### 附录三：访谈记录详情表

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F代表女性，M代表男性。

### 附录四：访谈资料清单表

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附录五：田野调查图片资料

（一）浙江·海滨社区：“十字架”与“风水树”

![图片](image-url)
福建·莆田某海岛：妈祖信仰与基督教
(三) 江西·余干：基督教与民间信仰
（四）广东·蔡口村：基督教信仰与老爷信仰
Religious Regulation and Churches Responses: A Case Study on the Anti-demolition Action of Christianity in Wenzhou
Jianzhong Zhu 朱建忠, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstract: This article focuses on the discussion of the characteristics, causes, and patterns of the anti-demolition action by Wenzhou churches. Based on my six field researches from July 2014 to February 2016, I discovered that: (1) The contentious actions are more explicit in Wenzhou churches owing to their regional distinctiveness; (2) A wide difference can be observed among Wenzhou churches due to their doctrinal diversity; (3) “Poor pastors” have taken the leadership role in the anti-demolition activities instead of “boss Christians.” Considering the ongoing tension in the Chinese religious environment between the central government planning and free market operation, the author offers the “price-return” exchange theory to explain the pattern of contentious activities of Wenzhou churches.

从“拆十运动”看温州地区的宗教管制与教会回应

[摘要]
本文主要讨论温州教会在面对“浙江拆十字架运动”中，抗拆行动的特点、原因及模式。作者通过2014年七月至2016年二月，六次的田野调查，发现：一、温州教会的区域特色使得他们较其它城市的抗拆表现更为突出；二、不同基督宗教团体在教义传统上的差异也影响了他们在抗拆上的不同表现；三、“穷传道”取代“老板基督徒”成为抗拆行动中的领导角色。由于中国大陆的宗教环境仍处宏观的计划调控与有限制的市场自由两者的张力之间，作者提供“代价-回报”的交换理论来解释温州教会的抗拆行动模式。
引言：本文的研究问题与论点

自2014年1月以至2016年4月，席卷整个浙江省的拆十字架事件引起国际关注。一般人的印象却往往将此事当作只发生在温州的个案，却不知道浙江的其它城市如杭州，十字架被拆的比例比温州还高。究其原因，一方面当然是温州教会的教堂数量远超浙江其它城市；另一方面其表现的整体性抗拆也是非其它城市可比。但是同为温州地区，不同基督宗教团体在回应“拆十字架”时也有不同表现。再进一步，即使在同一个教会，不同阶层信徒的对应观点与回应行动也是不同的。

因此，一个值得留心的问题是：在具有相同宗教信仰的基督教徒，面对同样“拆十字架”处境中，他们展现不同观念与回应的原因与特点是什么？本文基于笔者2014年7月至2016年2月，六次的田野考察及期间多次的交流讨论，提供以下三项发现：一、温州教会的牧区特色使得他（她）们在“浙江拆十运动”中较其它城市表现抗拆更为突出；二、不同基督宗教团体在教义传统上的差异也影响了他（她）们在抗拆上的不同表现；三、“穷传道”与“老板基督徒”因为各自在教会中教化程度与利害关系的不同，在抗拆过程中，前者取代后者，成为领导角色。

温州被称为中国的耶路撒冷，其宗教环境的自由程度向来较其它城市为高。但在此次“拆十运动”中，温州基督教受到的宗教管制却又较其它地区、其它宗教更严。借用市场经济与计划经济的讲法，本人认为中国大陆的宗教环境亦是处在宏观的计划调控与有限的市场自由两者的张力之间。一方面，当权者仍在以行政手段不时的控制宗教；另一方面宗教也在逐渐开放的社会中争取自己的信仰表达空间。在这样的宗教环境下，笔者尝试提供一个解释教会抗拆的宗教行为模式：一个教会考虑是否抗拆的时候，他们评估的是所付出的“代价”（如：停水、停电、企业被查、教会领袖被抓等）是否能够交换到足够的“回报”（可见回报：

1 根据笔者2015年9月16日、2016年2月7日在杭州的田野。
3 本文谈到基督宗教的时候，即为广义基督教概念，包含基督新教、天主教、东正教。一般无特别说明时，文中的教会指基督新教的教会。
4 “穷传道”为温州教会对传道人的笑称，主要是因为传道人的工资低，生活较贫穷。
5 教化程度在本文中指宗教教义对信徒在实际行为中的影响程度，主要包含两项因素：教义的理解度与信仰的忠诚度。
十字架有可能守住，不被称为犹大等，信者回报，得到天上赏赐，荣耀上帝，实施信仰等)。作者将这一种教会行为原则，称之为“代价-回报”的交换模式。

2 “拆十运动”中的宗教管制

2.1 “拆十运动”的背景

“拆十运动”是在浙江“三改一拆”的背景下发生的。早在2012年12月“中共浙江省委关于认真学习贯彻党的十八大精神扎实推进物质富裕精神富有现代化浙江建设的决定”中，已经提到要“实施三改一拆”三年行动计划。所谓三改一拆即是指：“深入开展旧住宅区、旧厂区、城中村改造和拆除违法建筑”。

“三改一拆”行动分为三个阶段：第一阶段：制订方案、明确目标。2013年3月份前。第二阶段：落实措施、全面推进。2013年4月至2015年底。第三阶段：总结表彰、巩固成果。2016年上半年。

到了2013年的1月前，省国土资源厅就召开理论学习扩大会议，明确接下来一年的工作重点就是具体的来推进“三改一拆”。随后，省内各地，慈溪市、温州市龙湾区、衢州市、湖州市等，便陆续结合省政府“三改一拆”进行行动部署。到了2月21日，省政府办公厅向省内各市、县（市、区）人民政府，省政府直属各单位发布了“浙江省人民政府关于在全省开展“三改一拆”三年行动的通知”。

在涉及当事人为宗教团体的违法建筑上，政府在5月份的文件规定应由宗教事务部门督促其自行拆除。在“当事人在违法建筑执法机关决定的期限内不自行拆除”时，有关单位可组织实施强制拆除，但“应当严格依照法定程序进行，并按规定予以公告”。

政府在是年12月4日专门召开全省“三改一拆”涉及宗教团体的违法建筑上，政府在5月份的文件规定应由宗教事务部门督促其自行拆除。在“当事人在违法建筑执法机关决定的期限内不自行拆除”时，有关单位可组织实施强制拆除，但“应当严格依照法定程序进行，并按规定予以公告”。政府在是年12月4日专门召开全省“三改一拆”涉及宗教
违法建筑处置工作会议。会议之后，政府在内部出台了“‘三改一拆’涉及宗教违法建筑处置工作实施方案 2013”。方案指出：

一、工作目标与原则：

......纠正一些地方宗教发展过快、场所过多、活动过热现象......用大约一年的时间开展专项整治工作，力争在半年内，取得阶段性成效，一年内，取得突破性进展和显著成效。

二、主要工作内容：

......解决十字架等宗教标志物超高、亮灯等问题。对全省宗教活动场所建筑屋顶十字架等标志物进行全面清查整改，除特殊宗教节庆日外，一律不得亮灯；重点拆除高速公路、国道、省道线两侧宗教活动场所的十字架；分期分批把十字架从屋顶移到建筑立面上来。

到了 2014 年元旦后，浙江省各地教会开始陆续接到通知要求拆除/整改教堂十字架。1 月 1 日，杭州市余杭区良渚镇勾庄基督教会接到通知要求拆除教堂十字架。有消息传出，1 月 8 日，省委书记夏宝龙曾到舟山视察，路过白泉镇基督教堂，到该教堂十字架太醒目，太张扬，“这是十字架的天下，还是共产党的天下？”要求宗教局具体落实，把十字架拆下。到了 2 月 27 日上午九时，位于余杭区的黄湖教堂十字架被强行拆除。至此，十字架事件在“三改一拆”行动中渐渐浮出水面。

2.2 “三江事件”：宗教拆违与管制

拆除/整改十字架，在温州地区受到强烈抵制，以三江教堂被拆事件最为引起关注。外界一般认为“三江事件”涉及的是违建问题，是以小建大、农地转用地的问题。笔者在 2014 年 5 月，随团访问国家宗教局时，亦向在场的蒋副局长问及“浙江拆十”之事。对方的回答直接是指向“三改一拆”的违建问题，并表明不是国家宗教局的政策。就连浙江省基督教两会的网站，亦是称，“温州市永嘉县三江基督教违法建筑是在未办理土地农转用手续、土地征收手续和规划建

12 2014 年 5 月 12 日，笔者随“崇基神学院内地考查团”访问国家宗教局时的问答。
设审批手续的情况下擅自开工建设的，并大大超出原定的面积和高度，这是严重的违法行为。⑫

不过据当地信徒称，温州永嘉三江教堂在 2013 年 8 月时就已经被当地政府告之，为准备省领导（省委书记夏宝龙等人）的视察提议将“显眼”的十字架拿下来，但遭到教堂方面拒绝。⑬ 到了临近省领导视察的 11 月份，政府重提此事，且态度强硬。教堂方面内部开始产生不同意见，最后交由牧区⑭处理。牧区的安排是在教堂上悬挂了“荣神益人”“爱国爱教”“坚决反对宗教歧视”的横幅，及安排了六、七十位的信徒在户外的台阶上唱诗祷告。⑮ 据称这次静坐及横幅的场面被 610 办公室⑯上报到浙江省，之后便由省委书记签字要求彻查三江教堂违建。

2014 年 3 月，政府部门开始施压要求教堂拆下十字架，遭到教会拒绝。之后，教会开始安排每日在教堂聚会，并经过网络平台的传播，本堂以外的基督徒纷纷涌来聚集。在离第一次清拆期限 4 月 2 日临近时，据称有近五千人在三江教堂聚会。清拆期限之后延迟到 22 日，又有数千基督徒聚集聚会，教堂几位负责人被捕。25 日政府相关部门告之三江堂委，“如果再不疏散，三江事件就是属于攻击政府、社会暴动，整个基督教江北牧区将被取缔。”⑰ 到了 28 日凌晨五点左右，政府出动了上千名武装警察及保安人员等，进行封路、封电讯信号，进行强拆。一直到当天晚上 8 点 35 分，三江教堂被全部拆毁。

“三江事件”是整个温州教会的集体记忆，也是温州教会抗拆的起始点。三江教堂确实有违建的成分，但政府暴力拆违的手法及来自更上层仇视十字架的意图，也开始趋于明显。不少后来抗拆的教会，都有过派人或自发的参与过三江的守护聚会。至此，一个更大的“拆十”与“抗拆”运动在温州教会展开。

2.3 “三江事件”之后的教会抗拆行动

三江教堂被拆后不久，中国的首部国家安全蓝皮书《中国国家安全研究报告

14 2015 年 5 月 30 日与三江信徒 L 兄弟的交谈。
15 牧区是温州教会常见的教会区域划分，一般是由多个临近教会组成的以联合教牧事工为主的组织。各牧区在不同程度内管理、协调所属教会的人事、工作、经济等事务。
16 此段过程，三江教会不同肢体均有提到。
17 中央 610 办公室即中央防范和处理邪教问题领导小组办公室（官方简称防范办），因成立于 1999 年 6 月 10 日而得名“610”办公室。
18 林思思，《拆违还是违拆－永嘉县三江教堂遭遇的纪实》（未刊稿）。
（2014）》也正式出台。蓝皮书提到中国的意识形态受到严重威胁，尤其是受到了宗教方面的挑战，“宗教渗透对中国社会主义信仰认同构成威胁。西方敌对势力对中国宗教渗透的方式更加多样，范围更加广泛，手段更加隐蔽，公开与秘密并举，具有很强的煽动性和欺骗性。境外宗教渗透势力已经把触角伸向中国社会的各个领域，渗透态势愈演愈烈。”

而全国政协民族宗教委员会主任朱维群，则强调要坚决抵御境外势力利用宗教进行渗透，因为“境外渗透有的出于传教目的，有的则既有宗教目的又是一种政治渗透”。

如果说三江教堂被拆，还有违建的因素，那之后一连串的教堂十字架被拆则难以再冠此名。三江被拆后的三个月，据民间统计又有近一百八十间教堂十字架被拆，其中百分之九十以上都集中在温州。在这些被拆十字架的教堂中，不少教会的建堂的手续都是齐全的。而且当政府人员以拆除违建来要求教堂自行拆下十字架，遭教会人员拒绝时，他们便直接讲明了就是要来拆十字架。事实上不同的政府部门及执行人亦对“拆十”有不同的想法。作为拆迁办工作人员又同时是基督徒的XW就说，“自己也不想拆十字架，但因为是政治任务不得不做。”也有些人拆十字架的执行人员，当他们去拆的时候，反而成了教会信徒传福音的对象。

教会对于“拆十”的回应也逐渐分作了两种：一种是消极的接受但不自拆；另一种是积极的抵制。抵制最激励的主要是在温州的平阳县。当地教会以牧区联防的方式抵制政府的“拆十”工作。在7月21日凌晨两点左右，政府方面出动约五百警力（其中很多为临时工）欲拆除平阳县水头镇的救恩堂十字架。由于教会方面已经有预防守卫工作，附近教会的基督徒也纷涌而至，人数达到七、八百人。最终两边人员隔着移动铁门争吵，而一些未能及时避入教堂的信徒被打受伤，最终导致四人轻伤、四人重伤。7月24日，平阳黄益梓牧师与一些基督徒到平阳县政府“讨说法”，在党员活动室唱诗祷告，后被捕判刑一年。

到了2014年10月，温州地区内的拆十字架行动有所暂停，期间共有约三十
间教堂十字架被拆。而整个浙江省范围内的“拆十”行动也在十月份之后减弱。十一月、十二月仅零星见到宁波、台州地区有拆十字架行动。而在2015年的四月前，更是少有教堂被拆十字架的消息。这也符合笔者所看到的那份文件有关宗教建筑的时间计划：整治工作分为三个阶段，“包括一三年十二月到一四年二月调查摸底、制定计划阶段；二零一四年三月到九月的全面实施整治阶段，以及十月到十二月的总结验收巩固阶段。”

二零一五年四月份之后，“拆十运动”主要在丽水金华地区发生，但遇到个别教堂强烈抵抗。稍后的五月、六月，拆十运动在杭州地区深入开展，但未遇到明显抗拆。据杭州的同工介绍，除了崇一、思澄、天水三间之外，杭州其它教堂的十字架都拆了。到2015年7月，温州遭遇新一轮强拆。而这轮强拆却也遇到更全面及多种形式的抗拆。7月22日温州平阳麻步牧区、温州鹿城藤桥牧区、温州鹿城下岭教堂、温州鹿城三一教堂等多个牧区、教堂，相继发表声明，表明自己抗拆立场。25日平阳水头镇凤卧基督教会牧者甚至发出邀请函，邀请全球基督徒、海内外媒体，“来到凤卧基督教堂和我们一起守护基督十架，捍卫信仰尊严，见证历史时刻”。

但是到了八月底及九月，张凯律师及多位温州教会领袖共计十八人被捕。同时平阳多个教会：萧江牧区雅汇教会、麻步牧区显桥教会、上周教会，鳌江牧区彭家山教会也积极重立教堂十字架。十月到十二月，浙江省内只听到台州石柱教会十架被拆（11月30日）。到了2016年1月原先被监视居住的人员，多数在春节前释放，但同时暂停了三个月的拆十工作似乎又开始。1月7日早上，温州瓯海区东庄教堂与南湖教堂十字架被强拆，到3月3日又共有49间教堂十字架被拆。期间，1月21日，浙江省基督教协会会长顾约瑟被免去崇一堂主任牧师之职，到29日，省基督教两会通告：顾约瑟牧师涉嫌挪用资金罪被捕。2月25日张凯律师首度电视认罪。

24 见〈浙江省「三改一拆」涉及宗教违法建筑处置工作实施方案 2013〉。
25 朱建忠，丽水联都教会 X 传道的访谈，2016年1月5日。
26 朱建忠，杭州 CFS 牧师，LXA 弟兄的访谈，2015年9月15日。
3 教会在“拆十字架”中的不同回应

3.1 突出整体抗拆的温州教会

3.1.1 杭州教会在“拆十字架”中的回应

我们知道浙江省的拆十字架行动，并非是从温州开始。从现有的资料来看，首先收到拆十字架通知的是杭州地区，而第一个被拆掉的也是杭州市余杭区的黄湖教堂十字架；然后收到“拆十字架”通知的是宁波地区，省内第二个被强拆的十字架也是宁波舟山的白泉教堂。杭州、宁波的教会也是反对拆教堂十字架的，与温州的教会相比，他们表现的较为温和。

黄湖教堂十字架被拆后，当地一位牧师讲：“我们是自教会，他们讲，十字架过于明显，要‘上改下’（从屋頂移到室内），大改小（挂在室内）’，他又说（当局称）‘宗教标志过于明显’，以这样的理由。我们认为没有必要，不是好好的，干什么去改它？”。而宁波舟山的白泉教会在 2014 年 2 月底第一次遇拆的时候，也是有所抵制，以至于政府第一次并未拆成。

杭州市萧山区的教会在遭遇拆十字架的时候也是有反对，只是方式有所不同。萧山一乡镇 GL 教会的同工 Y 弟兄告诉笔者，“我们也不让他们拆。但是没办法，他们多是一些老年人，他们都是年轻人，手上有专门工具的。”另一位 ZH 姊妹说，“那有什么办法？教会么，大家都在一起祷告。他们拆是政府要来拆，没办法的。”

如果说农村的教会人比较少且老年人较多，那城里的教会又是什么情况呢？笔者来到萧山城区最大的一间教堂了解。教堂的同工告诉笔者，“他们过来拆的时候，我们也把车子什么的堵在路口，但没办法，他们用拖车拖走，然后就拆掉了十字架”。教堂的牧师在这个问题上不愿谈的太多，“这事情没办法的。我们也不想让他们拆的，但没办法，萧山的，都拆了。这是上头的意思来的。”

27 “浙江、安徽等地基督教堂十字架不保 逾两百人强拆杭州教堂十字架”，对华援助新闻网 2014 年 2 月 27 日 http://www.chinaaid.net/2014/02/blog-post_27.html 2/24/2016。
28 朱建忠，“GL 教会 Y 传道的访谈”，受访者教会，2016 年 2 月 7 日。
29 朱建忠，“GL 教会 ZH 姊妹的访谈”，受访者家中，2015 年 12 月 24 日。
30 朱建忠，“CX 教会 WY 姊妹的访谈”，受访者教会，2015 年 12 月 25 日。
31 朱建忠，“CX 教会 ZH 牧师的访谈”，受访者办公室，2015 年 12 月 25 日。
3.1.2 温州教会在“拆十运动”中的回应

继杭州、宁波之后，2014 年 4 月初温州地区也有基督教建筑遇拆，但尚未明确是针对十字架。一直到“三江事件”发生，引起国际关注，大家才把眼光聚焦到温州。其中最主要的原因，就是在“三江事件”中，温州教会开始了有规模的、持续的抗拆守护。这也是有些人将浙江“拆十字架”误解为只发生在温州地区的原因之一。

“三江事件”中之所以教堂方未能与政府妥协，按照当地信徒的讲法主要就是对十字架整改方案有不同意见。一位三江教会的青年同工这样描述当时的情景，“我们想十字架不放在塔尖上面，十一米就没了。这样就不超高了。但他们的整改跟我们的整改不是一个概念。他们后来很明白直接的告诉我们，整改就是要把十字架拿下来。”再加上当时部分信徒看到了政府内部文件“‘三改一拆’涉及宗教违法建筑处置工作实施方案 2013”，得知政府的主要工作内容就是“对全省宗教活动场所建筑屋顶十字架等标志物进行全面清查整改……分期分批把十字架从屋顶移到建筑立面上来。”经过微博及微信群的传播，温州不同的教会都关注及参与到了三江教堂的守护工作。

笔者2014年7月在温州作田野的时候受到了一位当地传道人Y的热情接待。Y传道义务开车带着笔者及一报社记者到访温州多间教会，并将自己的经历与体会告诉我们，“我们就是整个牧区协防的。如果一个教会收到了限拆的通知，那牧区其它的教会都要来支持。我们现在已经在门口装了监控。教会长老还在考虑要不要买些钢管过来。……我对教会的肢体说，如果要坐牢，我第一个。”而温州龙湾区 W 教会的传道则告诉笔者，“我们教会因为抗拆早已经被停水停电了。……我们教会人少，他们过来拆的时候，我们也挡不住。但他们一走，我们又把十字架放上去。现在已经是第三次了。”

在温州做田野期间，笔者也参观了五间不同教会的十字架守护聚会。这五
间教会在守护十字架时的共同点就是都会有牧区协调人员参与守护及讲道。当笔者被牧区的一个同工开车带到守护的教堂时，发现教堂的大门口已经堆满了大石头，以防止政府的吊机进来。因为接到拆十字架通知的期限将到，教会增加了每天讲道聚会的场数为四场，而参与的人数也明显增加。在中午休息的时候，教会特别邀请了另一镇的教堂主任来向同工分享抗拆经验。参与组织这次守护聚会的L牧师略带遗憾的告诉笔者，“这次被（基督教）两会的人搅了局，不然还可以做的更好的。”

3.1.3 温州教会整体性抗拆的原因分析

此次温州教会在浙江拆十字架运动中表现出其它城市不具备的整体性抗拆，在笔者看来，主要是因为其区域性特点。温州教会的区域性特点主要包含教会组织的牧区制与温州地方的“事工”文化两个部分。牧区制的组织模式使得温州教会在抗拆行动中更为一致；而“事工”文化的区域特点，影响到温州教会采取抗拆的方式。

（一）温州教会组织的牧区制

温州基督教的一个组织特点就是每个教会（新兴教会除外）都有一个归属的牧区。而牧区在此“拆十字架事件”中发挥了重要影响。三江事件的开始主要就是牧区在其中发挥了重要影响。三江教会的与政府协商/抗争的过程中，牧区组织了多次的开会，并调动区内其它的教会一起参与守护。同一牧区不同教会的ZQF告诉笔者，“我也是牧区说要去支持三江教会才过去的，但后来不知为什么又说不用再去了，就变成自发了。”

也是在牧区组织参与守护的基础上，后来温州各地的教会信徒借着微信的传播加入到了守护的行列。

在温州守护十字架行动中，平阳（县）教会的抗拆又非常显眼，其中很重要的原因也是牧区协防的结果。温州平阳的万全牧区在抗拆期间发出了公开声明，其中写到，“我们将会组织各教会的定期聚会；我们将会聘请律师进行维权；我们将一起到北京上访；我们将与各教会互相联系、互动、协作。”

而该牧区MY教会的L牧师，进一步提到早在三江教堂还没有拆的时候，万全牧区就开了

38 朱建忠，“FWG教堂守护聚会”，2014年7月22日。
39 朱建忠："江北牧区ZQF姊妹的访谈", 温州永嘉，2014年12月25日。
会，预备抗拆的事，“我们（牧区各教会）彼此之间承诺，任何一个教会的教堂被拆，其它十四个教会就要奉献出钱再建一个同样规模的给他们。而且，在这过程之中，其它教会还要派出传道人去牧养他们的羊群。”

（二）温州信徒的事工文化

温州文化最为人所知的是永嘉的「事工之学」。「事工之学」在南宋时期，渐成体系，并与朱熹的「理学」、陆九渊的「心学」呈三足之势。黄宗羲指出：「永嘉之学，教人就事上理会，步步着实，言之必使可行，足以开物成务。」。其中叶适是永嘉学派中之集大成者，他注重经世致用，反对「空谈心性」。永嘉学派的重商、功利思想与后世温州人宗教、经济等方面的发展表现一致。

温州的这一种事工文化，在教会参与抗拆过程中，起到了对抗拆评估与方法选择的影响。温州教会的信徒人数及堂点数是整个浙江省中最多的，这也反映在教会的抗拆总是努力聚集人多。而在三江教堂的守护期间，教会方面使用了多种不同的方式，如静坐、拉横幅、到中央找关系等。在多种方式的选择中，往往是以有效者为先，教义的思考为后。而平阳一教会为抗拆写的诗歌中，副歌为鼓舞士气，用上了国内拆迁户的标语，「人不犯我，我不犯人；人若犯我，我必犯人。」这种事工文化影响到教会回应“拆十”行动较为明显的是温州永嘉的BL牧区。BL牧区的一位同工告诉笔者，“在三江教堂被拆之后，我们牧区就召开会议，最后决定对待“拆十”不进行守护与抵抗。但后来看到平阳县的教会进行抗拆及组织守护聚会，并未使教会蒙受太大的损失，我们的牧区也就开始抗拆了。”

另外，在笔者访谈过程中，多数的教会原先并未选择聘请律师走法律程序，
他们的回答是，“法院与政府都是一家的，走法律程序都是没用的。” 但当张凯律师为黄益梓牧师案的辩护赢得各方声势后，超过一百多间的教会聘请律师来维权。也有的教会采取上访的方式，当他们成功的阻断了地方政府的一次拆十字架行动后，他们就四处推广上访的抗拆方式。而当教会上访不成功时，他们也会因此反思这到底是不是神的意思。所以温州的地方文化在教会的抗拆过程中起了评估结果的影响。

3.2 不同基督宗教团体的差异

3.2.1 天主教与基督新教的对比

天主教与基督新教共同面对浙江拆十字架运动，因他们的神学传统各有不同，他们的抗拆表现上也有差异。相对来说，天主教会由于是统一在一个教区的，所以他们比基督新教在抗拆上的表现更为一致。比三江基督教堂被拆更早，在 2014 年的 4 月 24 日，位于平阳县仓箭岙天主教堂被拆。信徒在此事件中用行动表达了抗拆诉求，以致最后计有六名天主教信徒被打伤。从 2014 年的四月到七月的三个月间，共有十七间天主教堂的十字架或部分建筑被拆，但每个教堂均有不同程度的抵制。不但如此，当温州的天主教会面临十字架被拆时，浙江省外的天主教神职人员有不少进行声援，如天主教湖南湘潭教区王振江司铎，西安天主教北堂贾少飞神父，邯郸教区杨祥太主教等。相对而言，基督新教虽然在温州呈现了整体性的抗拆，但也有个别教会的堂委配合了政府的拆十字架工作，甚至有教会自己将十字架拆了下来。而且当浙江省内在拆教堂十字架时，也罕见国内其它地方的新教人士为此声援。

同样作为政府与信徒桥梁的基督教两会与天主教爱国会，虽然两者在不同时期均有发出公告或声明，但在措辞上，天主教的也比新教的用语更为激烈。比如温州教区对《浙江省宗教建筑规范》就表达了强烈的不满，称「从情感和理智上都没有
办法接受如此规范」。教区的响应还指出六点，其中包括批评当局不尊重历史及粗暴干预教会，缺乏法律依据。55 在温州教区全体公开神职人员于 2015 年 7 月 28 日发出“呐喊吧！不要再沉默了！ ——天主教温州教区全体神父向全国同胞和基督徒的呼吁信”后，天主教地下神职人员翌日联署《关于强烈要求停止强拆十字架的声明》。该声明以：义愤填膺！匪夷所思！来作开首：“近年来以‘三改一拆’名义专拆教堂十字架运动的行为令人发指！……我们温州教区全体神职人员与信徒坚决抵制与强烈反对！”56 而在基督新教方面，省两会 2014 年 4 月的公告是沿袭“贯彻落实十八大精神”、正确理解积极参与“三改一拆”为主调。直到次年，“三自会”与“基协”意见分歧扩大，最后由省基督教协会单独发公开信，称“拆十运动”严重影响了基督徒感情……是严重的违宪行为。”57

3.2.2 新教内不同教派类型的对比

就基督新教来讲，温州教会原来主要有六个宗派：循道公会、内地会、中华耶稣教自立会、中华基督教自立会、聚会处、安息日会。58 到了 1958 年，中国大陆的教会因为在大跃进的背景下，实行联合礼拜。名义上所有的教会从这个时候开始不分宗派的进行聚会、活动，但仍有一些宗派保留了下来。在温州保留宗派特性的主要是聚会处与安息日会。

笔者看到有安息日会的信徒在守护聚会的时候，向教会负责人写纸条，为本教会在抗拆行动上没能优于非安息日教会而羞愧；59 也有聚会处家庭教会的信徒，自发到面临拆十字架的三自教堂去参与守护。60 我们的另外一个观察是，如同牧区内的教会是优先支持本区的会堂，宗派性的教会在抗拆的支援上也会优先在同宗的体系内，然后才是其它的教会。61 笔者曾在 2014 年 7 月 22 日跟随一位安息日会的牧师去参加一个教堂的守护聚会。聚会的模式并未与其它教会形成明显不同，但发现过来参加聚会的均为安息日会的会友。62

57 浙江省基督教协会：致省民族宗教事务委员会的公开信，2015/7/10。
58 见支华欣编，《温州基督教》 (杭州：浙江省基督教协会出版，2000.5)。
59 2014 年 7 月 22 日在温州苍南参与 FTG 教会守护时看到。
60 2016 年 2 月 25 日与温州瑞安一传道人的交谈。
61 基于本人在 2014 年 7 月的温州田野。
62 本人 2014 年 7 月 22 日在温州苍南的田野。
除此之外，我们并未观察到温州的宗派教会与其它教会在回应教堂十架被拆的事情上，有更多明显不同的地方。这里的原因可能是两方面的，其一是十字架作为基督信仰最普遍的标记已经超越了宗派的差异。抵制拆十字架，基本上大家的观点都比较一致，认为拆十字架就是拆基督信仰的标记，就是信仰逼迫。其二是聚会处与安息日会虽然保留了原宗派的传统，但由于长期没有自己独立的神学培训系统及与海外教会建立组织性的连接，他们也就难以在自己的宗派上获取抗拆的神学思想资源。

3.2.3 教义传统对教会回应的影响

经过温州地区不同基督宗教团体的对比，我们发现教会的不同教义传统会在行动上产生不同的影响，这最明显的是表现在天主教与基督新教的对比上。尽管整体上基督新教也十分看重十字架的信仰标记，但在程度上却不如天主教教义对十字架及教堂建筑来的强调。在天主教温州教区就《浙江省宗教建筑规范》（征求意见稿）提出的声明就指出，“在近两年的所谓宗教建筑拆违中，天主教会是最大的受害者，因为在所有基督宗教中，天主教是最有传承感的，‘这传承感不但表达在信仰上，也由此衍在在宗教艺术上，特别也表现在我们的宗教建筑——天主教教堂上’”。

而稍后，温州天主教地下教区的抗拆声明亦是说明了十字架标志的神圣性，“十字架是我们基督信仰的神圣标志，理应受到尊重，我们强烈呼吁立即停止非法强拆行为!”

在温州基督新教的不同宗派上，由于他们对十字架作为信仰标记的教义差别并不是很明显，以及缺少可供反思的宗派神学资源，我们并未发现他们在抗拆行动上有较大差异。不过近些年，由于和海外教会加强交往，在温州不少教会的传道人受了改革宗神学的训练，也有传道人自称属于安立甘宗传统。这些受改革宗神学训练下的传道人往往喜欢从神的公义角度来思考浙江的拆十运动，进而也都参与了教会的守护行动。这些传道人中，有的也建立了独立的城市新兴教会。

63 天主教温州教区：《浙江省宗教建筑规范》的几点意见，5/18/2015，载于天亚社中文网 http://china.ucanews.com 2/26/2016。
65 温州的改革宗神学传入主要由唐崇怀、唐崇荣兄弟，及赵天恩博士。
66 网上通过微信与平阳一传道人的交流，2016年2月5日及26日。
他们虽然未有自己的教堂建筑，但有的却因着积极参与抗拆而受到不同程度的逼迫。67

### 3.3 老板基督徒与“穷传道”的对比

#### 3.3.1 老板基督徒的失声

之前人们谈到中国大陆的教会时，往往用三多现象来形容：老人多、妇女多、文盲多，并且将农村教会视为中国教会的主流。68 不过，这个情况已经发生变化，陈村富教授与他的学生经过在温州等地的田野调查，得出了新的观点，“中国教会主流是城市教会，而不是农村教会；‘基督教在中国未来的角色’不是农村教徒（尽管现阶段在数量上是最多的），而是现代的新兴基督教群体；‘老板基督徒’、‘知识精英基督徒’和‘年轻一代的神职人员’”。温州老板基督徒在外的闻名，不仅是因为他们在教会信徒中占据一个较高的比例，更为重要的是温州不少教会的堂务委员会的当选人中很多都是做老板的。

温州“拆十事件”中，原本在教会中拥有话语权的老板基督徒群体，却因为政府威胁查税而集体失声。政府对教会施压的时候，往往首先对教会中的企业家施压，而常用的手段便是以要彻底查账。三江教会在抗拆过程中，政府后来威胁要对建堂奉献五万以上的人进行彻底查税，便能说明问题。平阳救恩堂的负责人起初也是坚定的抗拆者，但到后来教会中办厂的信徒均遭到工商局、税务局刁难，最后不得不让步。70 另一位老板基督徒也是温州鹿城区的政协委员及基督教两会委员。但当他参与抗拆事件后，当地政协副主席就专门提醒他，为了事业着想，不要再为抗拆发声。71
3.3.2 “穷传道”在抗拆中的崛起

相对老板基督徒的失声，原先在教会中只有“雇工”身份的“穷传道”逐渐成为了抗拆中的领导角色。笔者访问过抗拆最坚持的温州五溪教会和河边教会都因为教会由无产阶层的传道人主领抗拆，而成为温州基督徒讨论中受到肯定的例子。

五溪教会在抗拆的事件中被关注是因为这个教会三次十字架被拆，他们又三次在拆后重立起来，并且通过一定的程序法律维权。教会传道人告诉笔者，教堂已经建了几十年，违建的是教堂旁边的车棚，但来拆的人明确的说，就是要拆十字架。教会不肯让他们拆，他们就查会友的公司和厂的帐。但因为他们几个主要的传道同工并未有个人企业而影响较小。

而传道人 YWJ 所在的 HB 教会，也在十字架被拆的名列中。据他本人说，当时他提出来，“自己没企业，如果因为抗拆教会有人要坐牢，他就第一个。”相似的，乐清一个牧区的传道人告诉笔者，“牧区为抗拆的事专门开了会，叫一些有企业的同工，退居二线；那些没有企业的、勇敢的同工上第一线。”在抗拆最为出名的平阳万全牧区，L 牧师自他 2011 年到了这里后，“教会有一些变革，主要是在质和教导上，从义工制到主任牧师制”。而这些变化也影响了之后牧区在抗拆上的行动。

3.3.3 穷传道取代老板基督徒的原因分析

据温州教会的一位传道人讲，温州在 2000 年左右的时候，也面临过一次教堂被拆的事件。当时教会建堂并不想到要去办各项证件，而是直接买块地在那里建，因为温州当时兴起的私营企业及其它的建筑也都是这样建的。据称 1997 年的时候，温州就有多处教堂被拆，以永嘉县、洞头县被拆的比较多，而市区主要有「上陡门教堂」。2000 年又有划龙桥教堂，及南门、西山、市中、朔门教会，在东风山上的房产，以及西门教会的平天山教堂。当时主要也是以违建的名义来拆，并且同时也确实其它的违建都在拆。这样的情况下，每个教堂都在想办
法托一些企业家去找关系，甚至都争先恐后，唯恐晚了就来不及。

在进入宗教市场化的进程中，温州教会的老板基督徒确实非常值得被关注，因为在中国特别是温州，整个大环境下，经济是相对于其它行业最先也是最广开放的。曹南来的《建设中国的耶路撒冷—基督教与城市现代性变迁》以宗教人类学的方法，展示了「老板基督徒的信仰和实践如何具体展现了后改革时期社会重构这一宏大过程」。78 不过值得商榷的是，本书揭示温州商人基督徒正重构的社会秩序其实只是一个表面现象。在这表面现象之下，我们可以看到宗教市场的自由度仍然受到很大限制。一些教堂在未拿齐证件而在政府默认甚至当时的支持下兴建，实际上也反映了管理者仍留有后手的根源。由于温州的商业模式并非是一种成熟、稳定的经济结构，它所形成的经济秩序在政治秩序之下完全无制衡而言。

此次拆十字架事件的情况已经与两千年时的不同。教会中的老板基督徒已经起不到教会与政府中间人的角色。这次事件中，不少教会提出宁可被拆也要保住十字架的观点。在这种情况下，老板基督徒身受两难，站在教会这一边，则自己公司的经营将不断被查；而若站在政府这一边，有可能会上教会犹大（叛徒）的骂名。

4 宗教管制与教会回应中的行为模式

4.1 温州基督教在宗教管制下的发展

温州被称为中国的耶路撒冷，这一称呼在很大程度上也反映出基督教在温州兴盛的情景。从上世纪九十年代以来，温州教会在信徒的人数及事工的范围上有了长足的发展，教堂也随之在各处起建。从 1949 年到 2004 年，基督教堂（包括聚会点）在温州的发展如下图所示：79

78 书中将教会群体置入到地方经济文化结构中，为我们展示了经济发展下信徒群体与社会文化的互动。见曹南来，《建设中国的耶路撒冷—基督教与城市现代性变迁》，页 19。
79 资料来源：The 2004 China’s Economic Census Data with GIS Maps (Beijing: All China Market Research Co., LTD, 2005)
从图中，我们可以发现，上世纪九十年代是温州教堂数的急增期。据此，我们也可推测上世纪九十年代亦是温州基督教人数的急增期及建堂环境的宽松期。这也可从中国社科院在2010年公布的《中国基督教入户问卷调查报告》得到佐证。据《调查报告》统计，1993年后归信基督教的人数占到信徒总数的73.4%。

除了基督教之外，温州的佛教与道教也在上世纪九十年代起呈现宗教建筑急增的表现。从1993年到1999年宗教单位数的增长数来看，温州的三大宗教都有明显的增长：基督教在这六年的增长量占了总数的35%，佛教为25%，道教为26%。这三大宗教：基督教、佛教、道教在温州各自的堂点数在宗教总数的比例上也比较接近，如下图所示：

从以上的数据，我们可以看到，在上世纪末，温州宗教的发展趋向于一种宗教自由市场的模式。不同的宗教、不同的教派可以在这个相对宽松的市场里自由发展。我们在访谈过程中了解到温州教会的发展情况也跟以上的数据相吻合。温州教会的主日学事工、大学生团契事工、对外宣教事工及神学培训事工均是在上世纪九十年代发展起来的。  

尽管自然的宗教市场在上世纪末趋向于自由、开放，但中国政府并没有给予相应的自由政策，而是以计划的模式进行调控。温州教堂在两千年的时侯受到一定程度的打压亦是说明了政府采用计划宗教的方式：一旦发展过快，便进行控制、调整。自 2000 年以来，中国的宗教发展，整体而言呈现的是基督热的现象。而这种基督教热主要在大学校园与知识分子中蔓延。在这种情况下，浙江省作为基督教发发展快、人口多的一个省，政府对基督教发展进行打压也成了它以“计划宗教”的方式来管理、调控的一个手段。这与浙江省政府内部出台的“‘三改一拆’涉及宗教违法建筑处置工作实施方案 2013” 提到的工作目标与原则是要“纠正一些地方宗教发展过快、场馆过多、活动过热现象” 相符。  

从这个角度而言，“拆十”与“抗拆”亦是宗教市场与计划的一个博弈表现。政府的“拆十”放在“三改一拆”的名义下来进行，而非像上世纪五十年代那样直接占用，这本身也说明了它有所顾及，明白今日的宗教处境已非完全的计划模
式。而教会在是否抗拆及如何抗拆过程中的艰难争取亦是说明了他们在朝向市场宗教的迈进与努力。

4.2 “代价-回报”交换理论中的行为模式

从前面讲到温州区域的事工文化时，我们就已经提到这种文化将混合在牧区组织性里面，影响到温州教会的抗拆行动。这里我们要讲温州教会的抗拆模式具体是怎么运作的。在宗教计划与市场张力中教会行动模式中，不可能是一个纯粹的教义-实践的行为，也不可能是一个完全由政府控制-执行的行动。教会在回应政治、社会处境当中除了受到教义的约束，也必定也受到现实利益的考虑。所以，教会在面临政府拆十字架行动时，他们决定是否抗拆，所评估的是：所付出的“代价”（如：停水、停电、企业被查、教会领袖被抓等）是否能够交换到足够的“回报”（可见回报：十字架有可能守住，不被称为犹大等；信心回报：得到天上赏赐，荣耀上帝，实践信仰等）。笔者将这一种教会行为原则，称之为“代价-回报”的交换模式。

这种“代价-回报”的交换模式应用在三江事件中，我们可以这样来解释。首先，三江教堂在兴建的过程当中尽管手续未全，但仍被三江新城建设委员会默许，甚至在当时被评为标志性建筑。这一方面，说明当时的宗教环境是较为开放，属于趋向市场宗教的情况。但政府又未完全批出所有的章，也说明政府留了后手，以便在必要时可以进行管制。另外，这些案例也说明了不同级别的政府在不同时期、不同利益或权责之下所做的不同措施。

当教会接到县政府的通知要将塔尖十字架拆除放到立面时，教会是否守护十字架所展示的亦是付出的代价是否可以交换足够的回报。具体而言，教会考虑采取抗拆，所付出的代价先是召集更多的人聚集、与政府关系变差等，而可能有的可见回报是十字架不被拆下及信心回报是荣耀主或其它。

三江事件的中期，抗拆的代价不断加大：堂委主任被抓、信徒企业被查、附属楼要拆；而预计的可见回报不断减小（十字架难以守住）。教会是否抗拆变得越来越模糊，不同的声音开始出现。当教会的抗拆成本不断加大时，并且投入更多的人力物力时，政府的强拆成本也越来越高，以至于事件很难停下来。

到了三江事件晚期，抗拆代价急剧加大，拆平整个教堂势在必行；而抗拆的
可见回报要守住十字架几乎为零。在这种情况下，不可见的回报也未有增加。这样的天平便倾斜于代价这边，原先的抗拆信众纷纷弃守离开。最终，整个教堂被拆。

按照“代价-回报”的交换理论，政府要推动拆十字架时，所采取的做法就是加大教会抗拆的代价，同时减少其抗拆的回报（包括：可见回报与信心回报）。当然政府这样做的时候，同时也加大了自身的强拆成本。政府加大教会抗拆代价的做法，我们看到的有：使抗拆的教堂停水、停电，查教会信徒的企业公司税务，拘留教会的同工领袖等。而减少教会抗拆可见回报最直接的做法就是让守护的信众明白没有可能守住十字架；以及减少不可见回报：污名化抗拆的基督教领袖及否定守护十字架的信仰意义。

政府的操作，我们可以在2016年张凯律师的电视认罪中看出。温州一位知名牧师因在一个微信公共群中为张凯律师辩护而当天被公安局约谈，并被告知张凯背后的真正罪名是“习大大访美一切不幸遭遇的主要肇事者”。不管这样的按罪是来自省政府或更高层，这已经足以将温州教会衡量抗拆的可见回报值降到最低。由此，温州教会的抗拆行动也就有可能一蹶不振，除非有强大的不可见回报作支撑。这从2016年元月开始的温州“拆十”行动顺利进行可以得到佐证。

转过来，教会若要推动抗拆行动，亦可从减低抗拆代价同时加大回报入手。当预测回报值重于代价值的时候，教会的信众便容易走向抗拆守护。比如，政府的“拆十运动”是以“三改一拆”为名进行的，而三改一拆的最后阶段“总结表彰、巩固成果”就是止于2016年上半年。所以，如果教会领袖要推动教会的抗拆守护，按照“代价-回报”的交换理论，就可以加大抗拆的回报值。从可见的回报值来计，可以说“黑夜已深，白昼将近”拆十字架三个月后就要停止了。再从信心（不可见）的回报值来讲，可以说，守护是为基督而守，要为基督“打那美好的仗”来宣传。

4.3 管制与回应中的牧区角色

前文讲到当前温州教会处在计划宗教与市场宗教的张力之中，教会在面对这
种张力的行动时，采取的是“代价-回报”交换理论的行动模式。中国大陆的基督教发展也像经济模式一样，是从单一的国家宏观调控的计划经济逐渐向自由的市场经济迈进。在这种情况下，基督教的发展也是趋向于多元化且主体化。正如市场经济下，政府应该尽量少插手干涉。同样政府也应该尽量少干涉教会的自主发展，以推动宗教的市场化运作。

温州教会地域性的牧区制特点，从前文的叙述，已经成为此次抗拆重要因素。牧区在温州教会一定程度上也起到了宗派的组织性功能。我们知道在1958年中国大陆实行基督教联合崇拜后，宗派组织在中国基本上就消失了。而宗派的功能，在教堂重开之后，主要是被基督教两会取代。基督教在温州呈现的“牧区-教会”布局实际上是受上世纪五六十年代特殊的宗教管治下，“教会-聚会点”发展而来。所以，尽管教堂重开之后，两会掌握了神职按立及堂点登记等功能，但宗派性的组织功能却是由牧区执行。

我们在此次抗拆过程中，可以清晰的看到，正是牧区组织了大规模的抗拆运动。在这过程中，网络通讯，尤其是微信群，更是把以教会-牧区范围的人进行快速联络与信息分享。牧区在抗拆过程中发挥的作用，我们在三江教会、平阳救恩堂、显桥教堂几个重要的个案中都可以看到。温州教会的一些同工也以自身教会的例子同意这样的观察：一个强有力的牧区往往可以帮助到教会的抗拆，而那些松散的牧区，其中的教会往往容易被各个击破。温州下岭教会的抗拆过程中亦是从侧面反映出，当所在牧区倾向于政府一边时，单个教会要实行抗拆就会非常困难。

由于在“拆十”过程中，基督教两会的表现既得不到教会也得不到政府的认可，可以预见两会的认授性会越来越低。不少温州的牧师都提到，拆十运动之后，温州的教会就更加去三自化了。甚至牧师的按立，都不在三自系统了。亦有原来在两会任职的人，在“拆十”过程中，提出辞职。相对于教会中两会的不作为，老板基督徒的无能为力，以专业传道人组成的拟宗派的组织牧区在此次事件中脱颖而出。牧区在“拆十”事件中扮演了联络、交流、互助及指导（部分教会）的角色。我们看到江北牧区、万全牧区、水头牧区等都做了这样的工作。

87 2016年1月10日，与温州教会 X 兄弟与 Y 传道在香港的葡萄园教会的一次交流。
88 朱建忠，下岭教会 XZE 传道的访谈，2015年10月，香港。
89 基于2014年7月及2015年9月在温州的田野。
90 这些牧区都做了牧区立场的声明。
在这种情况下，预备进入自由的宗教市场中，牧区将发挥重要的宗派性功能。这些牧区、教牧同工圈等都不同程序的扮演着宗派组织的角色。在外部的压力下，教会实际上最担心也是最容易发生的就是内部分裂，在这种情况下，谁真正掌握了宗教资源谁就越容易影响到教会。昔日的宗派主要以共同教义、联合事工、资源整合为功能，在今日的这些拟宗派组织中，我们也看到了类似的功能。笔者认为这对目前中国大陆的宗教环境将起到很重要的作用。在从计划宗教走向市场化的途中，与欧美国家相比，中国大陆目前尚不具备宗教市场化的市场理性与契约精神。在这种情况下，双方的信任并未建立起来，而各自的期待与实际又形成较大落差。因此，在走向宗教市场化的过程中，发挥宗派组织功能的牧区便可以起到市场无形之手的作用。

5 结论

中国大陆的教会在改革开放之后，已经不再是如原先理解的单一型教会，而是开始迈向多元化；并且在不断与外界的接触中，教牧人员也趋于专业化。这是市场经济带动的宗教市场自然发展的结果，同时也使得他们在应对社会、政治动作时产生不同反应。而这些不同反应的行动原因，并非单纯的由于对教义的不同持守，也不是仅凭社会政治的外力因素。他们的行动结果常常反映的是两者的结合，其中也有重新诠释。

本文通过对2014年以来，浙江“拆十事件”的叙述，比较不同地域教会、及同一地区不同基督宗教团体，再到同一教会中的不同阶层的不同回应；分析这些差异背后的原因；说明了基督教在中国大陆处在计划宗教的宏观控制模式与市场宗教的有限自由模式的张力之中。一方面，政府的强拆反映出他们仍停留在宗教的计划管理模式，即对宗教发展，尤其是基督教采取控制；另一方面，因为经济体制的不断开放与国际化，基督教会的发展也开始走向多元、专业化，这使得政府无法简单的以宗教计划的模式来控制宗教。

在这种中国大陆整体宗教性状之下，笔者认为把宗教现象与社会的互动约化为市场供需的宗教经济模式会有所不足。由于双方缺乏市场理性与契约关系，笔者提出了“代价-回报”交换理论来解释温州教会抗拆中的行为模式；并认为由

91 我们可以在万全牧区及江北牧区中的声明中看到这一点。
传道人、义工组成的拟宗派组织在宗教市场化过程的双方博弈中将扮演重要角色。就本次浙江“拆十运动”而言，温州教会由于从上世纪末以来广泛的非官方的神学培训的影响以及具有较强联络、组织功能的牧区制，使信众的教化程度与群体的紧密度得以强化，在整体上突显抗拆行动。
The Transformation of Migrant Workers’ Church in the Process of Contemporary China’s Urbanization: Case Study of “Mount of Olive Church” in Beijing

YUAN Hao

Abstract:

This is an empirical study of migrant workers’ church in the context of China’s urbanization. The researcher adopts case study as the primary research method. Based on in-depth interviews and participant observation at the "Mount of Olives Church" in City A, the study explores the relationship between urbanization and migrant worker churches by describing the rise, growth and transformation of this church. Previous research on migrant worker churches has mostly been conducted via an anthropological approach, taking individual Christians as the unit of analysis, to explain the meaning of faith to migrant worker Christians. While this study still focuses on migrant worker Christians, it approaches from a sociological perspective, taking church organization as the unit of analysis. The study finds a bilateral interaction between urbanization and church transformation: on the one hand, urbanization leads to the rise of migrant worker churches and shapes the churches in terms of resources, institutionalization and culture; on the other, church leaders have actively pushed for reforms and adapted churches to urban life.

Keywords: Urbanization, Migrant Workers’ Church, Church Transformation

当代中国城市化进程中民工教会的转型
——以北京橄榄山教会为例 *

袁浩：博士后研究员，香港中文大学基督教研究中心

摘要：这是一项关于当代中国城市化处境下民工教会的实证研究。本文采用案例研究作为主要研究方法。建立在对北京橄榄山教会深度访谈与参与观察基础上，本文通过描述橄榄山教会的兴起、增长及变迁，试图寻找城市化与民工教会的互动关系。此前学界对民工基督徒的研究，主要从基督教人类学出发，以基督徒个体为分析单位，阐释信仰对于民工基督徒的意义。本文仍以民工基督徒为研究对象，但以教会组织为分析单位。这是一项宗教社会学研究。通过这项研究，笔者得出两个结论：一方面，城市化推动民工教会的兴起、增长，并形塑民工教会的诸多方面，如资源、制度及文化。另一方面，民工教会并非完全被动，在城市化处境中主动改革、调适，推动教会转型、融入城市。中国城市化进程，亦是民工教会由信仰共同体挣扎转向公民共同体的进程。

关键词：北京、城市化、民工教会、教会转型

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城市化与民工教会

从文化大革命后期到一九九零年代末，基督教在乡村中国孕育、兴起与大发展。围绕中国农村基督教，学术界研究集中在政教关系、身份认同、基督教发展原因、基督教与民间宗教等领域。与基督教在中国农村兴起同步，中国为追求现代化开始实行改革开放、加速推进城市化，四十年来中国社会出现巨大变迁。城市化的推进与农村基督教会的兴起，作为两项重要的社会变迁同时发生在当代中国社会。然而，关于社会变迁、城市化与基督教的关系探讨常被学者忽略。城市化作为中国社会变迁的一个重要维度，深刻影响农村基督教的发展。本文尝试探讨城市化与民工教会之间的双向互动关系。

目前学界对中国城市化与民工教会研究成果较少。段琦从宏观视角探讨城市化对中国基督教带来的变化与影响。黄剑波以安徽的颍上团队为例，探讨民工教会兴起及归信的几种解释。此外袁浩对中国城市化的概念作进一步阐释。综述文献，笔者粗浅发现现有研究不足之处在于：（1）分析单位：学人多以民工基督徒群体为分析单位，堂会组织为单位的研究缺失；（2）单向度研究：城市化对民工教会的形塑有所涉及，但民工教会与城市化的回应被忽略；（3）宏观叙述较多，对一个堂会的微观研究较少。

本文以北京橄榄山教会作为研究个案，探讨民工教会与城市化之间双向互动关系，尤其是民工教会转型以及对城市化的回应。本文要回答的研究问题有：北京市民工教会是如何兴起？民工教会的日常运作如何？中国城市化的具体特征是？城市化对民工教会带来怎样的冲击与挑战？民工教会与城市化如何回应？民工教会是一种怎样的信仰共同体？

研究设计

理论框架
笔者采用堂会研究的理论作为解释框架，用来探讨教会组织与社会变迁之间的关系。关于教会组织与社区变迁的互动关系，美国宗教社会学家南希(Nancy Ammerman)等学者提出堂会研究的解释框架：资源(resources)、权威结构(the structure of authority)与堂会文化(culture)。4

该分析框架所要探讨的堂会资源，包括物质性资源、人力资源以及组织网络；物质性资源含教会的成员属性（人数、社会经济地位、奉献金额等）以及教会房产（聚会场所）等；教会的人力资源包括专业性的行政人员、神职人员、平信徒。借这些要素来评估教会的有利或不利因素，以及教会的潜在动力。

至于堂会的权威结构，主要涉及教会如何决策、哪些角色参与决策。有些教会是独立性教会，则独立作出决策。有些教会则不然，比如具有宗派归属的教会，其决策受宗派传统程度不同的制约。至于参与堂会决策的角色，有牧者、执事、平信徒等。

教会文化。从文化的角度可以探讨教会组织各项的信仰活动、仪式，如何训练、教导新成员；此外还要考察教会的建筑风格、内部摆设。上述因素都参与形成教会的特色文化。一间教会是由许多成员组成，他们创造出这个组织特有的风格、特色与气质，也就是形成了教会组织的文化。而这种文化往往成为教会成员寻找自我身份的依据。

该分析框架整合了结构研究、有机体研究以及处境研究，可有效解释教会组织与社会变迁的关系，因此笔者将采用该分析框架，从资源、文化与权威的视角，探讨城市化对民工教会的冲击，以及民工教会对城市化的回应。

在城市化进程当中，民工教会的回应与变迁是一个动态的过程。那么民工教会的基督徒群体是一种怎样形态的共同体？本文引入滕尼斯(Ferdinand Tönnies)与普特南(Robert D. Putnam)关于共同体之理论进一步讨论转型前后民工教会其共同体特征的变迁。滕尼斯提出传统社会向现代社会变迁中的两类理想型(ideal type)社会组织——共同体与社会。前者有共同价值观与生活，在基于自然基础的群体中（家庭、宗族）实现，共同体内部人际关系的纽带是情感。血缘共同体、地缘共同体与宗教共同体是共同体的基本形式。5改革开放后的北京，民工教会处在传统向现代过渡的进程之中。因此，滕尼斯的理论在北京处境下具有适切性。

普特南认为公民共同体的特征包括：公民参与；团结、信任及宽容；合作的社会结构。公民共同体的连接纽带是横向的互惠与合作关系，而非纵向的权威与依附关系。6笔者认为，普特南关于公民共同体四维度的界定，与南希关于堂会资源、文化与权威三层次的分析框架存在叠合之处。也就是说，普特南在四个层次上的衡量标准，基本是以资源、文化与权威三个层次展开论述的。

5 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society (ed. Jose Harris; trans. Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 26-27
重要概念

民工教会。民工基督徒是指离开农村、在城市中生活与工作的农民基督徒，由民工基督徒组成的教会是为民工教会。基督教神学一般认为，教会有普世教会与地方教会之分，并没有社会阶层、职业之别。本文所提到的民工教会，仅代指一种社会学意义上的民工教会。

城市化。城市化是指在城市经济日益繁荣、管理及政治组织增加以及交通网络逐渐普及的处境下，人口不断前移入城市生活的过程。城市化不仅是经济、社会与人口的变迁，亦是一种生活方式、行为方式与文化的改变。城市化其基本内涵有：农村人口大量涌往城市；城市面积不断扩大、取代农村地区或非城市地区；一种城市的文化与生活方式。

本文之所以选择北京作为田野考察地点是因为：（1）北京是中国政治、文化与经济中心。（2）北京城市化较为显著。在高速城市化与现代化背后，充分暴露传统社会向现代社会过渡的特征，可以说北京是中国城市化发展的缩影。北京城市化从 1990 年代以来民工教会在北京市发展迅速。从 2010 年到 2015 年间，笔者进入田野，使用滚雪球的方式参与观察民工教会11间；访谈教会领袖、普通信徒20多人次，形成20万字的访谈资料。访谈设计采取半结构与结构性问题相结合的方式。

北京城市化

依据上文对城市化概念之界定，结合有关统计数据，可从人口、城区面积、文化与生活方式来展现北京城市化的面貌。

城市人口急剧增长。北京城市化进程中人口增长主要是透过外省移民，其中从农村来的移民占很大比重。第六次人口普查显示，截至2010年底，北京市常住人口达1961.2万，与十年前相比增加604.3万人。而2010年北京市民工数量约500万，约占全市人口25%。民工来自全国各省份，主要分布于河北、河南、山东与安徽四省。10

城区面积持续扩大。自一九九零年代，市场与政府推动下北京城市化进展较快，城区面积年均增加30平方千米，城市面积从1981年346平方千米，增加到2005年1209平方千米，
进而增加到目前 1400 平方千米。随城市化推进，城中村、城郊农村相继拆迁、被整合到城市当中，成为城市居民区、商业区或者工业区。

文化与生活方式呈现多样性。改革开放以来大量外来人口从中国各省份涌入北京市，不同地方文化开始重塑城市的文化与生活方式。外省农村移民在北京生成以地缘与血缘为联系纽带的各省族群共同体，比如“河南村”、“安徽村”、“浙江村”与“新疆村”等，较有名的是“浙江村”。各省族群共同体内部仍然维持家乡文化与生活方式。1982 年甘斯（Herbert Gans）对美国波士顿意大利人的研究，1967 年利博(Elliot Liebow)对华盛顿特区黑人研究，都反应了类似的文化隔离模式。11 西方国家城市发展已进入相对稳定期，文化多元主义下不同族群聚居区可长期维持现状。北京市面对急速城市化与现代化，大规模拆迁与重建使得各省族群共同体遭到冲击而趋于解体。各省份族群共同体所代表的传统的文化与生活方式因缺少空间支持而处于变动状态。

（4）户籍制度、公民身份与城乡之间的“边缘人”。户口制度是国家对人口进行控制的制度性安排，该制度使得民工无法取得城市户口，失去公民身份，从而民工在城市的基本公民权利、社会权利都无法保证。民工群体成为城市中的“边缘人”，12 这种边缘人的身份，不仅体现在经济地位，更体现于文化意义。关于移民与同化，帕克（Robert Ezra Park）提出“边缘人”的概念，认为“边缘人”是生活在两种不同且对立的社会与两种文化的边缘。13 民工其“边缘人”的身份，致使很难融入城市现代生活，返乡后亦很难适应农村生活。

北京民工教会

民工教会，作为一种教会类型在中国城市的出现，是中国社会经济与政治变迁的结果。1990 年代之前，北京的教会类型较为单一，只有两类：三自教会与传统家庭教会。1990 年代后期，随着市场经济改革的启动以及城市化进程的加速，作为国家政治、经济与文化中心的北京，自然是较早受到这一巨大结构性变迁的影响。因此，更多类型的教会在北京浮现，例如民工教会、温州人教会以及独立的海归团契、校园团契等。接下来笔者将简单介绍民工教会兴起的处境、兴起的原因及增长。

民工教会兴起的处境

12 黄剑波：《中国城镇民工的宗教生活》，刊自《二十一世纪》2008 年第 19 期，页 104。
以河南、安徽农村基督徒为主体的北京民工教会兴起于1990年代。民工教会在城市的产生，与1980年代以来中国人口流动存在密切联系。从社会运动的政治机会结构与资源动员理论来看，民工教会在城市的不断建立，作为一项社会运动，需要足够资源以及相应的政治机会。而农村基督教复兴、城乡宗教市场分化、市场经济建立等中国结构性变迁为民工教会兴起提供了政治机会与资源。

第一，农村基督教的复兴。自文革后期农村基督教开始复兴，这股浪潮一直持续到1990年代末期，苏鲁豫皖四省农村基督教发展更是引人注目。有学者称河南为“耶稣窝”。第二，城乡宗教市场的分化。国家在城市与农村实施不同程度的宗教管制，导致城乡宗教市场的分化。日益多元与开放的城市生活，为宗教组织在城市发展提供更大空间；尤其是城乡结合部与城中村，是政府公共管理较薄弱地区，客观上为民营教会产生及发展提供了灰色空间。第三，城乡二元结构的瓦解。进入1990年代全能政治时期形成的城乡二元结构逐渐松动，为大量人口（包括农村基督徒在内）从农村向城市流动创造了条件。第四，市场经济在城市的建立与发展，为流动人口提供诸多就业机会。

教会的生成与增长

城市化推动大量外省农村人口涌入北京市。农村基督徒亦被这个移民运动所席卷。现有田野资料及研究表明，农村基督徒其宗教生活的维系，除参加三自教会，他们还自发组织祷告、交通等信仰活动。如有宗教精英的参与、组织，以及家乡教会支持，初级的信仰社群往往发展成一个聚会点或教会，是为民营教会产生。从1990年代末期开始，在中华福音团队、华人归主教会及颍上团队的推动下，民工教会在北京陆续建立。进入2000年民工教会在北京发展迅速，刘琪及袁浩的研究表明，颍上团队与中福团队在短短几年间在北京市建立几十个聚会点，会众人数多达上千人。民工教会主要循以下两种方式实现快速增长。

会众持续增加。中国政府持续推进的城市化，源源不断吸引农村人口（含农村基督徒）进入城市，为民营教会新成员再生产提供基础。作为民营教会的橄榄山教会从1999年发展到现在有26个聚会点，会众人数多达2000人。民工教会新成员的增加及教会数量快速增长，并非开展城市宣教所致，而是将散落在城市中的农村基督徒聚合起来。
组织持续性裂变与复制。北京城市化的大规模开展，政府不断拆迁城中村、城郊农村，这一社会变迁客观上促成民工教会的裂变与扩散。面对城市拆迁，教会依会众住址而分为若干区域小组。宗教精英参与区域小组，吸收附近新成员，新聚会点一个个建立起来。橄榄山教会即以组织裂变与复制的方式实现教会增长。

橄榄山教会简绍

1990年代末以来，北京有不同农村教会的支派建立的民工教会。而橄榄山教会是城市民工教会的典型代表。本节叙述教会的建立过程、组织内部的具体信息。

建立过程

1990年代末期，在农村地区兴起与发展的中华福音团队差派宣教士到不同城市进行移民宣教。1999年河南农村一对基督徒夫妇移民北京开展宣教。几经探索他们发现，他们并不了解城市文化，只能在民工群体宣教。北京有大量的外省移民，尤其河南人居多，这成为他们的宣教禾场。外省民工群体，一般住在成本较低的城中村或城郊农村，居住较为分散。这对宣教士夫妇进入民工群体居住的区域，宣教，建立聚会点，一个个聚会点在北京不同地域建立起来。十年间该教会目前有会众近2000人，其构成以河南籍民工为主。教会宣教依赖于会众个人的社会网络——同乡、邻居、亲戚，教会人数持续增加。接下来笔者将从会众、治理模式、制度建设三个层面进一步描述橄榄山教会。

教会组织

会众。民工教会信众多数来自外省农村，进京后面对工时长、收入低、居住条件差的压力。民工是名符其实的“异乡人”，没有城市户口，无法取得“市民”身分，不被主流社会认同，难以建立对城市以及教会的归属感。民工教会的会众，其社会阶层出现分化。少数会众较早在北京创业，在市场竞争不激烈的情况下在某一行取得成功。笔者发现，即使回收垃圾这一行业，有会众积累过百万资产。而这少部分会众在教会的身份是义工，参与教会决策。

治理模式。橄榄山教会实施“轮换制”，传道人约三至四年轮换一次，调动悉由刘牧师决定。以靛厂聚会点为例，传道人与义工约12人构成教会核心。同工由传道从会友中挑选有心志及教育水平相对较高者担任。但民工教会同工，并未形成参与教政的实体，只扮演“协助者”角色。他们并非由会友选出，对教会事务的参与程度，也视不同传道人的作风。

组织参与。第一，教会组织化程度较低。即使是人数较多、规模较大的教会，其内部的团契、小组等组织很少：现有的组织，其功能、角色等不清晰。第二，组织的运作方式。现有小
组有组长与副组长等角色，但是他们并不清楚自己的角色及功能，并不能行使相应的职责，而小组维持与运转很大程度上依靠组长与成员之间的熟悉程度。

通过访谈、参与观察，笔者发现，从聚会点的人数规模、聚会场所的类型来看，东三旗聚会点、靛厂聚会点与名佳聚会点，这三个聚会点在橄榄山教会有多件事情要处理。比如，二十多个聚会点当中具有代表性。

东三旗聚会点。最大规模的聚会点，几经搬迁，目前已经迁入天通苑居民楼单位聚会。2002年建立，属于橄榄山教会系统规模较大、建立较早的教会。该教会位于城市北部的东三旗村，租赁村中大院作为聚会场所。教会有一位主任牧师、十几位义工。据该教会传道统计，信众80%以上来自河南省固始县，多从事于废品回收。

靛厂聚会点。中等规模的聚会点，经过八九次搬迁，目前在城市南部居民区租赁商业用房聚会。始于2005年，目前教会拥有会众100余人，专职传道1位，义工12位，小组团契4个。信众多来自河南固始县。2009年该教会传道推动教会进小区楼房，但遭失败。2012年另一位传道再次推动教会进入小区。20

名佳聚会点。最小规模的聚会点之一，在城市北部居民区租赁民居作为聚会场所。2009年东三旗聚会点中的名佳花园居民组建名佳小组，后搬迁到名佳花园，租赁居民楼单位聚会。现发展成教会。位于城市北部的名佳花园，属于小区教会，信徒多数是本小区居民。教会有一位专职传道人，信徒三四十人。

城市化对教会的挑战（一）：资源危机

正如上文所言，城市化是一种在经济、社会与文化领域内的变迁，城市化的内涵体现在多个维度：人口、城区面积及文化类型等。因此，不同维度上的城市化对教会的挑战亦体现在多个层面，从物理空间到权威结构，从教会文化到身份认同。

首先，城市化表现在地方政府对非城市区的大规模拆迁。房地产业推动公司企业用地及建设公共服务设施，近些年北京市政府加快对城中村及城郊农村的拆迁。在北京官方网站，笔者找到多份关于政府用地规划及拆迁的文件。聚会场所分布在城中村与城郊农村的民工教会，面对城市拆迁，教会空间与会众的稳定性受到严重影响。因此，在城市拆迁的意义上，民工教会首先面对的资源危机——聚会场所的频繁变迁及会众群体的流动性。

聚会场所

2013年该教会将两个聚会点整合为一个教会，再次搬迁。在一位信徒（从事房产中介事业）帮助下，该教会搬入一个面积较大的居民楼单位。
城市三自教会使用固定、公开的教堂，新兴教会租赁甚至购置写字楼、居民楼单位。与之不同的是，民工教会租用城中村与城乡结合部的平房、大院、仓库及废旧工厂等作为聚会场所。一方面，城中村、城乡结合部租金便宜。另方面，民工生活与工作地点分布在上述区域，他们一般就近寻找教会。

城市拆迁意味着城乡结合部、城中村消失在城市视野中。分布于该区域的民工教会其聚会场所也在拆迁之列，他们被迫一次又一次寻找新聚会场所。靛厂聚会点自 2005 年成立经历六七次的搬迁。平房、仓库、饭馆，甚至公园都曾是聚会场所。2008 年朝阳区政府开始拆迁十八里店多个农村，教会在该地区的多个聚会点同时面对失去聚会场所的危机。

教会会众

民工基督徒的流动性教会搬迁之后一般分化为若干小组。一方面，小组的裂变与复制吸引新的民工基督徒加入。另方面，教会搬迁总会带来一定数量信徒的流失。这种随拆迁节奏而流失信徒、吸引新成员的模式，加之民工基督徒没有稳定的职业，因此会众流动性较大。拆迁导致民工教会与信众都处在一种流动当中，拆迁不停、流动不止。民工教会其聚会场所的频繁更换，以及会众群体的不稳定性，导致教会没有一个稳定的空间环境进行内部建设，事实上，民工教会成为一个流动的信仰共同体。

城市拆迁处境下，民工教会最直接的挑战是危机。对此，橄榄山教会的同工深有感触。访谈中一位传道告诉笔者，经过这些年的拆迁与搬迁，教会传道们都成了“找房专家”。这十年北京城区不断扩大，对橄榄山教会带来最为直接与明显的影响是：教会失去聚会场所，聚会或者更加碎片化，变成规模很小、更大分散的聚会点；或者聚会消失在北京社会当中。对此，教会领袖首要考虑的问题是教会的生存。

教会应对资源危机（一）：置换空间

城市拆迁带来聚会场所及会众的不稳定，教会如何应对这一挑战？橄榄山教会在发展前期采取消极的方式来应对。开发商的推土机一开到，教会就选择搬家。拆迁不停，教会搬迁不止。2005 年，橄榄山教会所在的牧区——北京牧区——推动下属教会开展城市植堂与教会转型。北京牧区对教会发展的新理念，赋予橄榄山教会应对资源危机的新方法。随后橄榄山教会召开多次同工会讨论教会是否及如何开展转型。应对资源危机这一议题上，橄榄山教会主任牧师与聚会点传道人进行协商，达成的共识是：教会尊重并支持下属聚会点以自己的方式解决教会的间题。过往几年在北京的田野考察，笔者发现教会应对资源危机有若干方式，结合研究个案来说明。
靛厂聚会点：从平房迁入楼房

靛厂聚会点自 2005 年成立，聚会场所以经多次搬迁，历任传道人都尝试推动改革。2009 年聚会点胡传道推动教会从城中村的平房搬迁到南三环一个居民楼单位。在新址聚会不足一月，教会不得不再次搬迁。主要原因是，邻居到物业管理处、街道居委会投诉，称教会在周日的唱歌声音太大，以至于早晨无法睡觉。在多方压力之下教会被迫迁出，重返平房聚会。

远传道自 2012 年担任该聚会点传道以来，再次推动教会迁入居民楼。但教会同工层对迁移堂址持不同意见，有人消极对待，有的危机感较强则支持。远传道认为，改革第一步是将教会堂址从平房迁入城市居民区的楼房。迁到楼房：第一，可避免堂址不断变迁，为教会发展与转型创造一个稳定空间。第二，可发展小区福音工作，吸纳本地居民参与教会。远传道是改革支持者与推动者，他的愿景是建立以大学生、小区居民为主体的本地教会。有同工持强烈反对意见，除顾虑租金外，也流露出消极态度：“我们在这里两三年就会走，何必费这么大的劲呢？”未几，由于现有聚会地点的拆迁期逼近，无论如何要另觅新地。几经转折终于在邻近租用一处商住两用的楼房。为此，他特别拟订问卷，而收回的问卷显示，大多数同意迁入小区。但迁至新地方后，教会却流失了三分之一（40 多人）。其中包括较有经济能力及愿参与事工的信徒。这反映信徒对转型未能达到共识，部分选择离开。

名佳聚会点：从小区小组到小区教会

对于靛厂聚会点的转型，柳牧师有不同看法：“我感觉转型需要一个跳板。比如我们教会主要是民工，但有些信徒是小区居民，10%；但抓住这 10%的人在小区中建立小组，稳定发展，有了这个基础，在小区植堂，这样教会转型会健康些。”名佳聚会点的建立正是柳牧师所推动的结果。

东三旗聚会点会众 200 多人，有少部分信徒是名佳花园的居民。2009 年柳牧师决定发展小区教会：第一，在名佳花园租赁楼房作为聚会点，并差一个传道主持聚会点事工。第二，邀请名佳花园基督徒参加本小区聚会。第三，与小区居委会建立良好关系。发展小区教会的模式取得一定成效，三四年下来名佳聚会点发展到三四十人，稳定聚会的有二十人。虽为非登记教会，但名佳聚会点鼓励信徒服务小区，比如清洁卫生、节假日送礼物等，与本小区居民及居委会建立良好关系，为小区传福音工作赢得空间。名佳聚会点的建立，主要依靠本小区基督徒的参与，缓解教会与小区有可能出现的紧张关系，而且不会出现文化差异与适应的问题。鉴于名佳聚会点的成效，2012 年柳牧师从东三旗聚会点差派一批信徒，到天通苑建立小组，并计划以小组为基础建立天通苑教会。

访谈橄榄山教会柳牧师，2012 年 8 月于北京。
柳牧师对橄榄山教会发展有自己的一套看法，简单概括：筹款建堂、建立母会、服务分会。柳牧师计划在全教会发起筹款，于东三旗聚会点附近的屋苑购买一处房产，作为整个教会系统的母会，既可以作为聚会场所，又可以承担神学培训，以服务各分会。

柳牧师的教会发展计划在讨论阶段就遇到部分传道人的反对。反对者以守望教会户外崇拜为例，坚持认为：第一，筹款建堂风险太大，教会的公开化与堂会化有可能产生紧张的政教关系。第二，城市房价如此高，而会众经济实力有限、奉献有限。即使购买房产，只能购买面积较小的房子。小房子作为教会聚会场所，以及神学培训中心都不实用。尽管存在众多反对声音，柳牧师是主任牧师，推动全教会的聚会点奉献捐款：于2015年在天通苑购置了一个居民楼单位作为橄榄山教会的母会。

从上面几个案例可看到民工教会传道人在应对聚会场所危机上的努力，主要方式是从平房教会迁入楼房教会。面对城市化挑战，教会的空间问题大致可以解决。然而，教会迁入居民楼聚会之后，衍生出新的挑战。

**城市化对教会的挑战（二）：教会文化**

城市化在多个层面展开，城市化不仅仅是一种物理空间的变动，也是一种文化生活方式的碰撞与变迁。橄榄山教会聚会场所在物理空间的转变，随之进入文化的场域，教会文化与社区文化之间产生张力在橄榄山教会淋漓尽致的体现出来。在信仰实践中，楼房中的民工教会遇到更多、更深层次的困扰。这些困扰或者挑战有两个：

第一，规则与公共意识的缺乏。一个聚会点迁入居民楼聚会后不久，信徒纷纷向传道人反应意见。访谈中柳牧师这样分享信徒们的感受："进来房子要脱鞋，手纸不能乱丢。民工有很强的拘束感。后来教会又搬到天悦小区，但就一两个月，信徒高低就不去。因为进小区需办卡、刷卡。进屋之后他们感到拘束，不自由、不随便。"城中村的卫生环境、公共秩序都较为混乱，在城中村的教会，亦沿袭这一习惯。在聚会的大院子里，信徒可以随时起身取水喝茶，也可以小声说话。但迁入楼房，没有规则与公共意识的行为在狭小的室内更为凸显出来，这让信徒也不舒服。迁入楼房聚会，教会急需培养公共与规则观念。

第二，灵恩主义的信仰模式。在访谈中就民工基督徒的文化适应议题，柳牧师如此说："在楼房聚会，信徒们觉得缺乏圣灵的工作。再后来在北湖附近租了一个平房聚会，在这样环境下，他们就很适应、释放。祷告敬拜他们哭鼻子、流泪都行，他们就觉适应、舒服。但在小
区，他感觉差距太大，很难适应。22 灵恩主义的信仰表达，较为注重情感表达及肢体动作，但是在楼房聚会当中，很难满足这一信仰实践。

橄榄山若干聚会点，成功迁入象征现代生活方式的楼房聚会，城市拆迁带来的资源危机似乎迎刃而解。未能预料，迁入楼房的橄榄山教会，遭遇文化适应问题。一方面折射出教会固有的文化特征，另一方面让教会反思，如果继续在楼房聚会，是否以及如何改变教会的文化特征。

教会应对文化危机（二）：辅以理性，培养规则

橄榄山教会的远传道，看到规则与公共意识对未来教会发展的重要性。不仅传道，教会中少数信徒亦认为规章制度对于教会的重要，并坦然规则意识在民工基督徒群体中实践的困难。如信徒卫满所言：

很想教会有好的制度，因为没有制度就没有方圆。每一项事情都必须有制度性，不是乱七八糟的，都是有分寸的。不过是有难度的。比如说，我们传见证会给弟兄姊妹说：见证之前你们要登记，向传道人或是服侍同工说一声。登记上来，不是说今天登记下周二就执行，需要经过几星期。没有打招呼而直接上去的。以前没有这个制度，教会讲道完了，先欢迎新来的，接着有见证的可以做见证，大家就哗哗的起来。23

固然，民工教会需要在规则意识与公共意识有待改变，但笔者在田野过程中发现民工教会建设的积极一面。靛厂聚会点主日崇拜结束后设立一个环节是信徒见证。教会实践做见证的初期，没有规则，秩序较乱——愿意做见证的信徒都站起来，拥挤在讲台前；有时一位信徒没有讲完，其他信徒就开始窃窃私语。作见证的信徒大多讲家乡话。这也是信徒卫满所不满意的。就此番情景，远传道就制定报名规则——做见证的信徒需提前一周报名，而且要准备见证内容，以避免到时候说不清楚或两分钟却没有内容的情况出现。最后，作见证要尽可能使用普通话，为使得更多人听明。自实施报名规则，信徒开始学习普通话、学习报名以及尊重秩序。

民工教会的公共生活有助于培育信徒的规则意识与公共意识。橄榄山教会同工每月都有培训，参加人数超过一百人，时间是每月某周六，地点一般选择面积较大的聚会点。每月培训大会，教会准备午饭。厨艺较好的信徒负责做饭，而中工信徒就在大院子一起进餐。2011 年 6 月份笔者曾参加培训大会，午间观察信徒就餐的秩序。中午 12 点，大院中的信徒 100 多人自觉排成两支队伍，大家端着餐盘安静等待饭食同工为他们加餐。与农村公共秩序较乱的情境相比，民工基督徒在教会公共生活之中发展出城市的生活方式。

22 访谈橄榄山教会柳牧师，2012 年 8 月于北京市。
23 访谈靛厂聚会点信徒卫满，2012 年 5 月于北京市。
信仰寻求理性

橄榄山教会宣教对象多是城市中的边缘群体。教会发展初期注重赶鬼治病。这种灵恩色彩较浓的的宣教方式，流行于1980年代开始的中国农村基督教大复兴。民工教会基要主义、灵恩主义以及私人宗教的文化特征，受到城市化与城市生活的挑战。城市化是现代性的组成部分，城市现代的文化与生活方式挑战民工教会的文化类型。如帕森斯《社会系统》中所说，现代社会是一种世俗文化，这种世俗文化具有韦伯所言的祛魅性，赶鬼治病等灵恩色彩的信仰模式在世俗化城市中市场较小。而城市基督徒更倾向于理性与知识的信仰模式，基督徒书店在城市的兴起，以及基督教书籍在城市基督徒群体中的传播就是有力的证据。

城市的快速变迁以及城市化，促使宗教领袖去关注国家与社会时事新闻，并非仅仅关注信仰共同体之内。而城市生活中发达的信息传媒与网络，很大程度上改变了教会会员中社会成员与经济条件较为富裕的群体，使得他们有更加宽广的视野而更多关注社会。

从文化延续性角度来说，橄榄山教会很大程度上把乡村文化移植到城市，是为城市中的乡村教会。然而同时教会处在一个充满现代性的城市，教会自身无论是信仰教导、教会治理模式、宣教方式等，为适应城市生活而不得不做相应调整。笔者在研究中发现，作为乡村文化载体的橄榄山教会亦有追求现代性的一面。

灵恩的宣教方式被年青传道所质疑。年青传道多来自农村，但他们在城市读书与生活。这种城市生活背景与理性的思考方式，使得他们对教会灵恩的信仰表达保持一定距离，甚至有批判与质疑。事实上，受城市生活影响较深的年青传道，对城市的认同感较强，也更愿意融入这个城市。有传道在分享自己的现实生活与未来理想时这样说：

自己虽然生活在这个大城市，可自己这么低的收入，只能过着一种拮据的生活。虽然在北京已经生活若干年，但感觉与这个城市格格不入，不是这个城市中的人。我家孩子在家乡很短的时间就回到北京了，你也知道，农村那环境……虽然我们生活不太好，但总是在城市中，教育生活等各方面都不错。不想让孩子在农村待着，也不想让父母带我们孩子，他们的观念方式太陈旧了。

这位传道的自白无疑将自己内心对城市生活的向往，以及与现实生活之间的挣扎叙述出来。从他们对孩子的教育就可以看到年青传道自己及下一辈留在城市生活，从而脱离农村人身份，成为城市人。

教会权威：城市化对教会的挑战及教会回应

随1990年代基督教在中国城市的兴起，大学生、知识分子及专业人士加入教会，城市社会呈现一种新的文化现象，即基督教在文字、出版及社会服务等领域开始参与。比如在北京，基督徒书店有若干间，晨光书店经常性的公开举办学术文化讲座，具有较大影响力，基督教出版机构亦日渐增多，如橡树文字工作室，翻译出版博士基督教神学经典书籍。

访谈橄榄山教会远传道，2012年5月于北京市。
中国农村基督教组织化、制度化水平较低，是一种彻底的复原主义。26民工教会承传农村基督教的运作方式。橄榄山教会建立后一直没有成文的规章制度，其运作主要依靠惯例、经验和牧师或传道人的推动。教会创建者柳牧师的属灵权柄及魅力运作，在教会建立及运作过程中起关键影响，体现“魅力权威”(charismatic authority)的形态。然而低水平的制度化与传道人主导型的教会治理，受到城市化与城市生活的冲击与挑战，具体而言：教会规模的扩大，城市社会发达的组织及组织的制度化与科层化，教会年青人对教会权威的挑战。而这三个因素都与城市化存在密切联系，共同促进教会治理制度的变迁。

第一，城市化推动民工教会规模急剧扩大。2008 年橄榄山教会聚会点数目增至 25 个，教会规模扩大。北至北六环的沙河，南到南四环的大红门，北京五个区都遍布橄榄山教会的聚会点，柳牧师无法如同教会发展初期的事工模式，每个聚会点都参与。聚会点的增多，同时意味着教会事务急剧增多，柳牧师亦无法如此前那样事无巨细必躬亲。因此，在城市化推动下，教会日益要角色的分工与专业化。27任何一个组织，包括教会，其内部分工出现并日益专业化的过程，客观上即是教会主任牧师权威被分离与削弱的过程。橄榄山教会主任牧师决定增聘聚会点的传道人，保证每两个或者三个聚会点有一位传道人，并且在同工会议上妥协，向聚会点传道人让渡治理教会的权力。依据笔者过往四年参与观察民工教会的经验来看，整体趋势上，橄榄山教会主任牧师与聚会点传道人之间的权力分配与权力让渡，日益摆脱家长制治理模式，走向公开与民主，但这一过程充满张力，甚至冲突。

第二，城市社会理性化与科层化组织为民工教会的制度变迁提供典范。开发以来城市正在发生一场广泛的社团革命，各类社会组织大量兴起。28城市社会组织制度化与科层化发展到一个相当的水平。进入城市的民工基督徒如同其它民工一样，是城市暂居者，遭遇就业排斥、生活排斥、交往排斥。29但民工教会的宗教精英社会交往较多，与社会关系较为密切。城市社会组织的发达及其制度化，这种城市图景对民工教会的影响，主要通过宗教精英来实现。比如橄榄山教会一些传道人，初中毕业就从河南农村到广州、北京市等城市生活、读书与工作，基本融入城市生活。其二，城市新兴教会的典范作用。较之于城市其它类型教会，新兴教会制度化治理走在前列，30对民工教会的制度变迁起到推动的作用。推动作用之所以实现，得益于城市跨教会的组织网络的建立。2007 年北京教会建立教牧联祷会，这个跨教会的组织网络，主要以城市新兴教会为主；后来不断接纳新成员，包括民工教会及温州人教会的牧师，联祷会

26 参考梁家麟：《改革开放以来的中国农村教会》（香港：建道神学院，1999 年），页 147-153。
27 罗纳德·约翰斯通著、袁亚愚译：《社会中的宗教：一种宗教社会学》（成都：四川人民出版社，2012 年），页 78-80。
28 何建宇、王绍光：《中国式的社团革命——对社团全景图的定量描述》，高丙中、袁瑞军主编：《中国公民社会发展蓝皮书》（北京：北京大学出版社，2008 年），页 161。
29 李强主编：《中国社会变迁 30 年》，页 120-127。
30 何哲：《城市中的灵宫：一个知识分子及其家庭教会的发展实录》（香港：明风出版，2009 年），页 139-143。
中的教会成员更加多样。橄榄山教会的柳牧师以及其他几位传道也参加北京市联祷会。在跨教会组织，教会之间交流经验及互相学习。对民工教会而言，这是一个学习与模仿的窗口。守望教会的教会转型及其长老制对牧师权威的制约，为橄榄山教会提供了一个典范。而新。最后，新兴教会直接帮助民工教会推进教会治理的制度化。随城市化扩展，北京市郊区农村的聚会点搬入写字楼聚会。有远见的教会领袖看到社会变化与教会需要，便在教会推行改革——草拟信仰告白、教会纪律与规章制度。而该聚会点改革得益于另一新兴教会的支持。31

第三，年青会众对教会权威的挑战。持续进行的城市化为民工教会增加新成员。进入民工教会新成员年青人日渐增多，他们受教育程度更高，较少受传统束缚，更容易融入城市生活。他们对权威的认可不同于以前，笔者曾参与橄榄山教会青年团契活动，与其讨论中观察到教会年青世代对教会现状并不满意，他们渴望更多的机会参与教会，并能改变教会的某些运作方式。他们为此会与教会负责人分享，当建议不被接纳，有些年青同工甚至离开教会，这无形中推动教会制度的改变。

总结与讨论

文章总结

本文尝试在当代中国城市化的社会变迁处境中，探讨民工教会的兴起、增长及变迁。本文特别关注的研究问题是，在外来社会巨大变迁——城市化冲击下，城市中的民工教会其危机是什么。结合社会学家南希等学者的堂会研究理论，笔者认为不同维度意义上的城市化，给民工教会带来不同维度之内涵的冲击，从外到内、从表到里的冲击依次是资源危机、文化危机，而资源危机与文化危机又带来权威的危机。城市化影响，形塑民工教会的过程，同时也是民工教会逐渐认知并回应城市化的进程。本文认为，民工教会通过置换教会空间、重建规则意识与理性的信仰生活来回应资源与文化意义上的危机，而教会内部透过艰难的协商与博弈，在逐渐打破家长制的治理模式，权威分配上趋向于制约与民主，但不可否认的是，通往开放与民主治理的道路还很漫长。

透过城市化与民工之间冲击与回应的模式，笔者得出两个结论：第一，城市化推动民工教会的兴起、增长，并形塑、冲击民工教会的诸多层面，如资源、权威及文化。第二，民工教会处于城市化之进程中，但并非扮演完全被动的角色。教会领导人及部分会众开始学习城市文

31 自 2010 年教会向城市教会的转型，得到北京守望教会教会治理委员会某一牧同工的帮助。
化，在一个新的社会文化环境下主动改革教会，调适教会与社会之间的张力、冲突，着力于教会转型，以适应新环境、融入城市现代生活。

文章讨论

进一步讲，中国城市化进程中民工教会变迁与转型的过程，亦是民工教会由传统的信仰共同体挣扎转向公民共同体的进程。接下来笔者将结合滕尼斯与普特南的共同体理论对这一结论进一步解释。

作为中国社会变迁的城市化，推动民工教会在一九九零年代于城市中崛起。城市中的民工教会，是否依然维持传统社会的某些特征？是否如学者所言，民工教会是“城市中的乡村教会”？也就说，民工教会是何种性质的信仰共同体？

首先，民工教会是作为特殊主义（particularism）的共同体。帕森斯在模式变量中提出传统社会向现代社会过渡的五个特征，其中特征之一是特殊主义与普遍主义。沃纳认为，在发展方向上，基督教会会更倾向于一种特殊主义而非普遍主义。当代中国民工教会的生成与维持，很大程度依赖于血缘与地缘的社会网络。整体而言民工教会是一种特殊主义的共同体。那么，这种特殊主义的宗教共同体是否维持一成不变？是否有可能发展成现代的、公民性的共同体？

橄榄山教会是北京典型的民工教会。而北京城市化给橄榄山教会带来很大冲击，在资源、教会文化及权威分配等领域对民工教会形成挑战，并形塑民工教会。面对城市化以及城市生活，在教会有改革意识的宗教领袖推动下，民工教会开始革新：尝试搬迁城市小区，发展城市小区的成员；尝试将教会管理制度化，并分散教会领袖的治理权力；突破传统的具有灵恩色彩的信仰实践。在教会转型、融入城市生活的这一变革中，笔者看到：

第一，教会转型的推动力。具有现代意识与革新思想的宗教领袖是民工教会转型的推动力。而这个宗教领袖群体，在教会内有其同盟军。民工教会会众呈现经济与社会地位上的分化。大致分为三个群体：拥有一定量资本、雇若干员工的信众；拥有少量资本、独立从事经济活动的信众；占有很少资本、被雇佣的信众。教会义工多数来自第一个群体，他们对城市认同感较高，更愿意融入城市生活。经济资本与社会资本较为丰富的群体可以取得基本的公民身份，愿意委身于现有教会，成为教会传道改革教会的同盟军。

第二，教会转型的方向。城市化进程中的民工教会，是继续维持一个传统的宗教共同体，还是发展出一种现代意义的公民共同体？我们可以看到城市的现代生活与文化在形塑民工教会的文化类型，这首先表现在部份宗教领袖融入城市生活的愿意甚为强烈，是这个群体带领教会走向一种现代的与公共的方向。

第三，特殊主义的共同体孕育积极因素。这包括：部份会众及宗教领袖对制度化有初步的认识以及推进，民工教会提供了一个公共空间，便于会众培育参与精神与规则意识。灵恩色彩的信仰不再居于垄断地位，理性信仰与反思开始在会众中传播。不仅关注共同体内的事物，部份会众开始有更大关怀，包括对其他群体福祉的关怀以及对社会的关注。这些都是宗教共同体迈向现代性与公共性的迹象。

以上显示，民工教会作为传统的信仰共同体，在受到城市化的渐进式挑战当中，逐步由滕尼斯意义上的传统信仰共同体，逐渐向普特南所界定的公民共同体转化。即使出现若干积极变化，当代中国民工教会仍然无法像拉美或美国移民教会那样提供一种充足的社会资本。拉丁美洲有些国家在城市化中，灵恩的五旬节基督教在贫民区广泛传播，为会众提供技术培训，以及信徒之间的互相支持。教会产生的社会资本帮助移民更好融入城市生活。34美国有研究表明，城市移民教会扮演服务俱乐部的角色，在生活工作诸多方面帮助移民融入当地生活。35

"三色市场” 中的少数民族基督教生存状态探究
——以红河哈尼族地区为例

"Tricolor market" in Yunnan Ethnic Minorities of China
- A Case Study of Christian living condition in Honghe Hani

姜伸  何玲

Abstract: Through the three-color market theory, the author tries to explain the development of Christianity in the Hani area and tries to describe the survival of Christianity in the black market, red market, and during the transition of the black market to the red market. The emergence of black and red market conditions in the Christian market is not only an unilateral cause from the government, but also from the disorder and chaos during the dissemination of Christianity, the relationship between church and state, and the relationship between Christian believers and non-believers and the tension between Christianity and the traditional religion. This paper discusses the key to the restriction of Christian faith and the factors that influence the change from the black market to the red market. The protection and defense of traditional culture, the "cult" phenomenon under Christian coat, the prevention of religious infiltration and the historical prejudice of universal existence are the important factors that affect the status of Christianity in the black market. To achieve the change from the black market to the red market, it requires the compromise and cooperation from the government, religious elite, and believers.

摘要：本文通过三色市场论对哈尼族地区基督教的发展现状进行解释，对基督教在黑市、灰市和红市状态下的生存进行描述。基督教市场出现黑、灰、红三种类型不仅是政府单方面的原因，基督教自身传播的无序和混乱、政教关系和民教关系以及基督教与传统宗教关系的紧张，是基督教信仰遭打压的重要原因。文章从云南红河哈尼族基督教信仰与传统宗教信仰的关系出发，对基督教信仰为什么被限制？及影响其由黑市或灰市向红市转变的因素进行探索。

关键词：三色市场  哈尼族  基督教

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从国家或政府对于宗教市场管制的角度出发，高度严格的宗教管制不但不会导致宗教市场的衰败，而且由于正规宗教市场不能满足人们的宗教需求，人们可能采取隐蔽非法的方法满足自己的宗教需求，从而可能会导致非制度化宗教市场的繁荣。而高度严格的宗教管制会导致宗教市场更加复杂化，宗教管理更加困难。杨凤岗基于国家或政府对不同宗教与宗教团体和组织的管制所采取的不同策略，把我国的宗教市场分为三种类型。一是由官方承认，具有合法地位的宗教信众、团体和活动构成的红市；二是官方明确禁止、打压的，处于地下秘密进行的非法黑市；三是介于两者之间，官方既没有承认也没有明令反对，即不合法也没有作为非法事件进行打压的宗教灰市。他认为只要国家或政府对于宗教组织或团体的数量和活动限制的过多，管制的过严，宗教黑市就会出现，宗教灰市就会更加繁荣。2

杨凤岗的上述具有启发性的理论总结，主要是基于中国汉人社会的宗教经验。3然而对于具有56个民族的中华大地上，还存在55个少数民族。在这些少数民族聚集区，三色市场论有多大的解释空间，少数民族地区的政府又是基于什么样的理由对宗教市场进行管制。这些被严格管控的宗教组织、群体和活动存在什么样的问题而引起政府对他们的关注及管控，宗教市场出现这三种类型是真的只是政府单方面的原因吗？

2015年1月对云南红河哈尼族地区基督教活动较为活跃的红河县中的两个乡，采取以典型个案调查为主，问卷调查为辅，以云南红河哈尼族基督教信仰与传统宗教信仰的关系为出发点，对哈尼族地区基督教信仰黑市和红市状态下的生存状况进行描述，并对基督教信仰为什么被限制及影响其实现由黑市或灰市向红市转变的因素进行探索。

一、基督教在红河哈尼族地区传播与发展状况

云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州红河县以哈尼族为主，兼有汉族、彝族、傣族、瑶族等民族，全县14个乡镇91村委会823个自然村，共有人口29万人（2010年），少数民族人口占95%，其中哈尼族人口占78%。4有佛教、基督教、原始宗教这三种主

2杨凤岗，中国宗教的三色市场，中国农业大学学报（社会科学版），2008年。
3杨凤岗，中国宗教的三色市场，中国农业大学学报（社会科学版），2008年。
4http://km.xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model38/newsvue.aspx?id=4866
要宗教信仰。据相关人士介绍，红河县的基督教是1976年由外出打工的当地农民传入的，随后在当地传播开来，信徒人数最多时达到2000余人。

在历史上红河当地的少数民族一直信仰传统宗教。自20世纪70年代中期基督教传入以后，因活动混乱，1998年被定性为非法宗教，并受到当地政府进行的多次治理整顿。为了解红河哈尼族基督教的生存状况，选择当地具有代表性的L乡和B乡进行了实地调查。在我们的两个调研点中，L乡是一个纯哈尼族乡，总共有人口两万六千余人，除了流动人口以外都是哈尼族，其中有信徒1000多人，全部是哈尼族。B乡总人口两万六千余人，以哈尼族和彝族为主，其中信徒200多人，有25%左右是彝族信徒，其他是哈尼族，由于彝族能听懂哈尼族的语言，但是哈尼族听不懂彝族的语言，所以活动的时候都是讲哈尼族语言。

基督教传入之初，发展速度较快。当地政府认为传播过程中存在着较多不合规的现象，认为传播人员利用信仰者文化水平不高、缺乏辨别事物能力的特点，为争取更多的信徒，采取了一些较为出格的做法和手段，如异能的说法、巫术的做法，以此来诱导群众、蛊惑人心并向上信信徒收取各种费用，进行敛财活动。在基督教团体内部也因各种原因发生分裂，而各派林立，增加了政府对宗教事务进行管理的难度。在有基督徒存在的村寨内部，部分的基督教信仰者挑战村寨里的传统权威（龙头），把哈尼族传统的祭神活动和一些传统习俗当成“封建迷信”，说他们是偶像崇拜、拜鬼怪等，拒绝参加村寨集体活动，造成基督教信仰者与信仰传统宗教的群众之间严重的隔阂。而不信基督教的群众认为不过祭龙活动的基督徒不是哈尼族。行为过激的教徒更是把不信教的当成是昆虫，把政府当成是魔鬼。部分基督徒打着“上帝”的旗号，不遵守当地执法部门制定的法律法规，不支持当地政府的各种政策，造成了与当地政府关系的对立。

基于对基督教活动频繁且无序、混乱的印象，当地政府认为基督教传播影响到了当地民族团结和社会的稳定。加之该地区特殊的文化地理环境，红河县处于中越边境，表面上宗教场所不多，实际上宗教活动频繁，党政部门不放心（基督教），担心哈尼族传统文化的流失、丧失等多方面的原因。在1993年以后，当地政府对基督教开展了历时十年的多次整治活动，并在整治过程中出现了一些过激的行为，如对基督教传播者进行抓捕，烧毁传教的宣传物，对信教群众进行打骂，逼迫其退出基督教等，希望能够彻底根除基督教。在治理整顿的大背景下，对基督教生存而言，
是典型的“黑市”状态。

然而坚决的取缔、严厉打压的政策，不但没有根除基督教的存在，反而严重伤害了政府与信教群众间的关系，造成政教关系和基督徒与信仰传统宗教群众间关系的严重对立。在这种状况下，政府采取了更加科学的方法，积极引导基督教与政府合作，通过加强自身的管理水平，加大少数民族农村的基础设施建设，改善群众生活，宣传民族团结等方法处理好与基督徒间的关系，同时对于符合开放条件的基督宗教活动场所进行开放，承认其在当地的合法地位。同时表示：“只要是正常的宗教活动，只要不影响当地的教育和建设，政府还是支持他们的开放，州政府专门去（调查）了两次，从思想上引导他们积极与政府靠拢，积极开放，要求双方要相互尊重，相互理解。”

2003年以后，随着全面治理整顿工作的停止，当地的政教关系、基督徒与信仰传统宗教群众间关系有所缓和。在这一阶段，当地基督教发展出现了两种状况。一方面，在B乡，随着政教、基督徒与信仰传统宗教群众间关系改善，同时（基督徒）也积极要求开放，在当地政府看来：“B乡有神学院毕业的人员，对党的宗教政策比较熟悉，条件相对成熟，可以起到示范的作用。”所以现在已经批准开放了B乡的基督教活动点，也不在干预教徒的正常的宗教活动，基督徒也开始筹集资金，建设基督教堂，基督教市场状况由黑市、灰市转为了红市。另一方面，在L乡，虽然信教群众的数量远远超过B乡，但是由于L乡的基督教与其他群众的关系也较为复杂，矛盾较为严重。尽管也积极要求开放，但并没有获得政府和三自教会的认可，直到现在仍然处于“非法”状态，当地的基层干部还不时采取干预措施。而且乡、村的基层干部仍然不承认当地有基督教，或是就基督教问题避而不谈。而当我们来到有着20多户信徒的W村上寨，村里的干部对于基督教表现的相当反感，要求彻底取缔，而不信仰基督教的村民很多对于基督教信仰都避而不谈，因而这里的基督教市场仍然处于灰市状态。

从上述过程看，红河基督教市场经历了杨凤岗所说的“黑市”或“灰市”和“红市”状态。对当地基督教在以上状态中的生存状况进行调研，有利于我们认清基督教在少数民族地区的发展状况及处于该状况下的原因和解决问题的矛盾点。

二、黑市中的基督教生存状态及转变为红市的曙光
（一）黑市中的基督教

黑市状态下的基督教，可以说与政府间的矛盾相当的尖锐，同时与信仰传统宗教的群众之间的关系也同样相当紧张。在政府的强势整顿和不信教群众的不认可的状况下，基督教一度被看成是邪教，最后被明确定义为非法宗教，受到严厉的打压，基督徒同时受到其他群众的敌视和排挤。

在历史上，当地少数民族一直信仰传统宗教。基督教的传入，首先对少数民族传统文化造成了重大的冲击；其次伤害了具有强烈以村寨为集体归属感的少数民族群众的感情。政府对于新出现在当地的基督教，管理经验不足和历史偏见，对基督教持有一种敌视的态度，所以内部一致同意把基督教定性为非法宗教。基督教狂热及不当的传播活动也给当地的政府留下了不好的印象，在政府看来，基督教在当地的传播渠道是不正常，接受基督教信仰的群众的文化知识水平又不高，对本身信仰的基督教认识不够，多数基督徒对：“什么是耶稣，什么是基督教都不知道，不能正确认识基督教。”基督教的传播活动的内容又存在偏差和过激。在政府眼中“基督教活动搞的乱七八糟，他们多数在家里秘密聚会，不给小孩读书。据调查甚至有些聚会活动上，找人跳裸舞，扮演耶稣下凡，然后说自己会飞了，学鸡狗叫等等歪门邪道。有些教徒有疾病不医治，媳妇死后，再也讨不起媳妇。”这些状况给政府一种信仰基督教的群众都是识别能力差，易受外界的诱惑的人，自然对基督教没有什么好印象。

基于上面所述的状况和印象的情况下，对原本就存在偏见的基督教信仰，采取了极端的做法，进行打压和取缔。有些干部甚至认为：“彻底清除非法宗教（基督教）是有可能的，可能需要三五年时间，也许需要更长的时间，也许还会受附近地区的影响。”

在L乡，基层的干部对取缔基督教更是坚决，且动用了不少非法和暴力的手段，对于基督教的领导人员进行监禁，烧毁基督教的书籍和宣传物。而坚定虔诚的基督徒对于政府的做法同样采取了强硬的态度进行回应，不与政府合作。最后，双方矛盾的激化，致使信徒被关押致死的现象。教徒李某描述当时的状况：“他们（干部）不到这里，就到那里抢吃，什么都抢，田地、猪、牛、鸡、茶叶、草果、棕树都有被没收的。现在还没有归还，他们自己管着。他们没有落实宗教信仰自由政策，说是搞封建迷信活动。从02年以后才没有来过，1993年我们有27人被抓到L乡上去游
街，不准信耶稣，回去以后继续信的还要抓，他们拳打脚踢，问：还信不信。信的就打，不信的就不打，打死也不负责。1994年XXX带了100多人来抓人，当天晚上被带到XX派出所，第二天转到XX看守所，1996年才释放。1998年我的两个儿子被抓，理由就是不能信耶稣。大儿子在L乡关了十六天后放回来了，小儿子被带到XX看守所，不到三四个月就被打死在看守所了。尸体都不让见，要去的每人出四十块钱才能见，最后见到了坟墓。实际上，他们是来抓我的，由于我当时害怕，逃到了昆明以打工为生，不在家。之后我还是不敢回家，1999年的时候，在夜里试着从小路偷偷回来，2003年的时候才正常回家。2002年的时候，他们最后一次逼迫，以后就没有来过了。这是最严重的一次，除教育部门外其他部门都参加了，有100多人，连说话阻拦的人（我女儿，非信徒）都被拷打。”在这种状况下，对于基督徒来说无疑是遭受到了重大的灾难。

在B乡，为了限制基督教的发展，对参加聚会的基督徒进行罚款。有教徒表示：“之前，乡政府和宗教局不让基督教徒过圣诞节和复活节，不然就要罚款。我们只能在自己家聚会，偷偷过节。因为政府怕基督教发展起来不好管理，影响教育。政府对聚会的基督教徒采取罚款的措施，根据级别来罚款，X长老和X助手分别罚了两百多元，其他基督教徒也被罚款。XX民宗局说要处理基督教徒，但是我们不怕，仍然继续坚持做礼拜，因为我们认为我们没犯法。”对于不合作的基督徒，采取强硬的做法。如2006年在B乡W村委会的W村，在祭龙活动时，村委会与村民小组拉了三户信徒家的猪，一家一头。除此之外，还对信仰基督教的信徒进行打骂，甚至拉信徒游街示众，不发放国家的补助给信教的群众，不给信教的群众办理各种证件等等做法，以此阻止基督教在该地区的发展。

在与信仰传统宗教的村民关系上，彼此同样是相互指责与谩骂。基督徒则是采取加强内部团结的方式以抵制外部的压迫。在涂尔干看来，社会的整合可以靠宗教的力量得以实现。但是如果一个社会中存在两种相互敌视的宗教信仰，就有可能出现撕裂社会的现象，就像布劳认为的群体内凝聚力的增加是实现社会整合的悖论。

基督徒之间以兄弟姐妹相称，相互帮助及互亲互爱，吸引了很多的人加入到他们的团队中。有基督教负责人表示：“我们虽然没有他们（信仰传统宗教）人多，

5涂尔干著，宗教生活的初级形式，林宗锦、彭守义译，北京：中央民族大学出版社，1999。
6皮得·M·布劳著，社会生活中的交换与权力，李国武译，北京：商务印书馆，2013年，第90-101页。
但是我们的兄弟姐妹有困难的时候我们都会出钱帮他们，而他们呢？他们的人遇到困难都不互相帮助的”。然而这种教徒间的凝聚力加大了与信仰传统宗教群众之间的隔阂与敌对。观念的差异映射在了现实的生活中。哈尼族的传统信仰与他们历史和现实生活息息相关。信了基督教的人不再参加哈尼族传统的节日，也不再参加村寨的集体活动，而这些节日、祭祀活动和各种仪式的举行，是凝聚哈尼族村寨的重要表现形式。在某种意义上，它们是哈尼族与其他民族相区别的核心。

哈尼族传统的祭龙活动是村寨集体的公祭活动。在传统的哈尼族社会中，举办这类活动的开支应当由该村落中所有的成员共同承担，因为举办这类活动的目的是为所有的村寨成员祈福，是为保护村寨成员的平安。而对不参加这类活动的基督徒，在其他村民心里就是基督徒没有履行自己的义务。在村寨头人（龙头）的心目中：“祭龙是村规民约，不参加就要赶出寨子。教徒不参加祭龙，也要参加凑份子（一只鸡或20元钱，数额由组长、副组长、龙头和老人议定）。我不喜欢基督教，因为他们不参加传统活动。不参加祭龙就跟村寨的人不是一条心，就不算是村寨的人。教徒不参加祭龙，我们（组长、副组长、龙头和老人）做（基督徒的）工作时，先威胁要开除寨籍，你一个人跳不到哪里，我们村有那么多人，然后就按传统村规民约处罚。”

普通村民对于彻底放弃了传统习俗，不再过传统的节日，不参加村寨集体活动的基督徒进行孤立。他们认为：“由于传统活动他们不参加，像祭龙活动都不参加，大家是有些意见。”信仰传统宗教的村民不再与基督徒来往，不再帮助信仰了基督教的人，如基督徒家庭在办红白喜事的时候，他们不愿意参加，更不在帮忙。而基督徒在此问题上也同样进行强硬抵制，有些教徒为了表明自己的信仰，还故意触犯传统禁忌——砍伐具有神圣地位的龙树。所以在两者之间最大的矛盾点就在此处——参不参加村寨的集体祭龙活动。双方之间这种相持不下的态度，加深了彼此的分歧，同时也加深了政府对基督教传播，会对于民族团结和社会稳定产生不良影响的印象。

在黑市中政教关系、基督教与传统宗教关系及基督徒与信仰传统宗教的村民间的关系的全面对立，冲突不断，互不相让。宗教间关系的对立也强化了政教关系的不合。在此状况下，基督教信仰遭受打击，其组织者遭受到严重的迫害，他们或被抓，或逃亡外地，有些甚至因此丢掉了性命。信教群众遭到严重不公平待遇，他们的各项社会福利被取消，因信仰而被罚款，家庭钱财物品被强制没收。遭到周围人
的歧视，更有甚至被打骂。部分基督徒在无法承受的压力下，完全放弃或暂时放弃了基督教信仰。基督教聚集点被查封或解散，部分基督教信仰坚定的信徒也转入“地下”活动，在自己家中秘密进行基督教活动，做礼拜过节日，不敢在人前表露自己的基督徒身份。

然而对于宗教的高度管制不但不能遏制宗教需求，达到消灭的目的，可能导致宗教黑市、灰市的出现或繁荣。所以虽然当地的基督教遭到严厉的打击，但是部分教徒还是坚守了自己的信仰，尽管要付出很大的代价。在虔诚的基督徒心目：“别人认为基督教不是哈尼族传统，哈尼族不能信，因此逼迫我们不要信，威胁要赶出村寨。我认为要赶就走，我们并没有错，别人说我们是非法的，我认为是合法的，但现在别人都说我们错，我们只好承认，要打要杀随便。”

（二）红市曙光的到来

政府的坚决取缔的态度和严厉打击的做法，取得了一定的成效。相关政府人员表示：“对于传统宗教与基督教之间的矛盾，政府用行政手段来制止他们，采取多方面的手段。之前信教的人多，经过治理后少一些，聚会点也慢慢减少，教徒悄悄在家聚会，属于非法的宗教活动。”部分信教群众因此也退出了基督教，据当地基督教的传播者李某也表示：“从87年到89年，我们信徒人数最多，达到600人左右。92年到93年不信的人多了，有一半多人退出了。我们村子五十家人，最多的时候有二十多家（六七十人），现在只有六家（三十人左右）。但是这个结果是付出了沉重的代价获得的，为此当地政府也不得不承认：‘不相信能够杜绝基督教。’

无法彻底取缔，还要坚持打压，无疑是不理性的，当地政府改变了工作方法。对于州上的宗教管理部门来说，他们认为：“总体来说，在当地基督教有点乱，表现在活动方式乱和传道程序乱，也希望通过符合条件的基督教场所进行开放，这样也有利于他们对基督教的管理。但是L乡的基督教并没有被认可、被批准，仍属于非法宗教，虽然现在已经不再去强制干涉。”州宗教事务局没有批准的理由是认为L乡的基督教达不到批准的条件。（批准条件：一是要有教职人员。二是要有组织培训获得的传教证。）而且L乡的基督教按自己的方法管理，我行我素。相关人士也表示：“只要是正常的宗教活动，只要不影响当地的教育和建设，政府还
是支持他们的。”州政府为此专门去了L乡两次，从思想上引导他们积极与政府靠拢，积极开，要求双方要相互尊重，相互理解。当地政府观念的转变，工作方法的改善，及相关规定、政策的提出和落实，无疑为当地基督教黑市向红市的转变，提供了一个契机和奠定了政治基础。

乡政府作为基层政府，在整治过程中是打击基督教的主要参与者。特别是L乡的基督教仍然抱着不放松的态度，虽然不再采取彻底取缔的方法，但是依然认为由于信仰不同，会导致村民内部的不团结，影响到政府各种政策的实施。在信仰了基督教后，部分地区确实出现一些不和谐的现象：老人病故了，信的人要按照基督教的方式去做，不信的人要按照哈尼族的规矩去做，导致在村子里和家庭中形成冲突和矛盾；基督教会也影响青年人的婚姻，信教的人不准和不信教的人结婚，这就干涉了青年人的婚姻自由；在一个地方，信仰基督教的人经常在一起活动，还是有组织的，这就会排斥其他不信教的群众；信教的人和不信教的人由于信的东西不同，生活上也不一样，所以信徒和非信徒群众之间是很难沟通的；还会影响对小孩的教育，这些信徒差不多都是一家人相信，小孩也被带着信教，直接影响了对小孩的教育，给家庭团结带来很多麻烦等等状况的发生。由于基督教信仰的传入，致使村民内部不团结，给当地政府进行社会治理造成负担。

基层政府在处理基督教的具体的做法上，虽然已经不像过去对于基督教组织人员和信教群众进行人身迫害，但是相关部门人士表示：“要加强政府的整顿工作。对群众主要是进行思想教育，对主要的骨干分子主要是进行惩罚，对这些骨干进行了集中教育，让他们学习法律和政策，使他们知道他们信的基督教是国家不批准的，是非法的，在国外是合法的，在我们这里是不允许的。”对于基督教当前在L乡的存在状况，还是不予承认，否定基督教的存在。一些基层干部仍不时采取监视和烧毁基督教经书和宣传物的方式限制基督教的发展。据州两会反映：“2008年11月30日，杨某家被乡武装部等烧毁圣经三本，其他灵修书籍50余本。2010年2月23日，在某村烧毁陈某赞美诗10本，圣经8本，福音光盘50张，福音单张20本。2011年2月9日，由政府人员一行八人以验收卫生路为由，到陈某（当时只有老人在家）家，村公所支部书记受乡书记之托，把陈某的《圣经》、《赞美诗》十本撕毁扔到火坑焚烧，并把基督教宣传黑板和光盘砸碎。到了杨某信徒家，烧了《圣经》、《赞美诗》四本，并把中堂画和基督教日历撕毁。”
州、县政府不再对L乡的基督教采取自上而下的取缔和治理整顿，但是由于L乡的政教关系、基督徒与其他村民间彼此的隔阂过深，因此彼此之间的关系依然是对立的。当前L乡的基督徒也积极要求开放，由于基层政府不同意对基督教进行开放，所以州政府也没有办法批准。而在L乡，基督教领导人与其他村民领导人之间的关系更是势如水火，基督徒与其他村民的关系，在信教群众看来：“关系不好，他们都不理我们，不和我们说话，是敌人了。”而其他村民则对于基督教的事情采取避而不谈的态度。在外面基督徒更是不敢暴露自己信仰基督教的身份，公开宣传和传教行为被严格禁止。

依照当前的社会事实，当地的州和县政府，已经在态度上有了很大的改观。并且为基督教的合法化制定了规则，这样就为基督教由黑市转为红市奠定了基础。但是就像中国民间的一个典故：“县官不如现管”。L乡基督教黑市问题的症结在基层政府、不信基督教的村民与基督徒的关系处理上，问题的解决，不是单方面的问题。州和县政府需要做好调停者的角色，基层政府及相关人员和基督徒需要做出让步。普通村民与基督徒之间，需要明白“远亲不如近邻”，从实际生活出发，思考彼此的关系。

三、红市中的基督教生存状态

在政府已经承认的基督教开放点——B乡，当地基督徒与普通村民的关系是比较和谐的，其原因就是彼此都做出了妥协和让步。如何处理好这种关系？在B乡，两者要么采取更加宽容和多元的认同，有些人认为信仰基督教在这里是一种无聊时的娱乐活动，特别是对于老人。不少年轻人表示：“老人在家闲着没事，信了教，没事在一起唱唱歌，也挺好的。”在B乡的群众对于宗教对于民族内部关系的影响的看法更倾向于多元，70%的人认为信仰不同的宗教不会影响到民族团结，而在冲突较为严重的L乡，仅有21.4%的人这样认为，75%的人认为不同的宗教信仰对于民族团结影响很大或有影响。在B乡，人们对于宗教和民族的重要性认识也较为多元，39%的人认为民族重要一些，23%的人认为宗教更重要一些，同样有23%的人认为两者都重要。对于L乡的调查则是，57%的人认为民族更重要，选择宗教重要和都重要的人是19.05%。8

8此数据是通过问卷调查方式。在2015年12月对红河县B乡和L乡的宗教关系状况进行问卷调查，共收回有
历来婚丧嫁娶都是中国人较为关注的重大家族事宜。对于云南山区中的少数民
族村寨来说，一个村寨里的人口多数就是少数几个姓氏的联合大家族，甚至是一个
姓氏的联合大家族。在一个家族内部如果出现不同的宗教信仰，如何处理好两种信
仰的关系，可能直接影响到一个家族的合与分，甚至是一个村寨的合与分，所以基
督教信仰的传入对于家庭的影响同样是政府所关心的。在基督教传入以后，引起了
部分地区家族内部纠纷。而在B乡，家族内部为了解决信仰上的分歧，基督徒与普
通村民认识到需要彼此协调，相互妥协。如在逝者的丧事上，一个家族的老人去世，
由于家族内部的信仰不同。在为逝者办理丧事的事情上，双方征求逝者的建议，按
照逝者的意愿办理丧事。如果逝者没有给出意见，则是双方商定丧事仪式是按基督
教仪式还是传统宗教仪式，在当地双方最终商定，采取传统仪式与基督教仪式，彼
此交叉进行的方法进行，既请了信徒来唱诗，又请来的贝玛（传统巫师）念经文。
村寨中的其他人不管是教徒还是普通村民都来帮忙。

在已经转变为“红市”的基督教开放点的B乡，基督徒同样会与其他村民一样
积极参加村寨的传统节日，参与村寨的集体活动。虽然基督徒不参加传统的祭拜仪
式，不磕头，不跪拜，不分食祭拜的食物。但是因为基督徒照样参加村寨的集体活
动，出钱出力，同其他人共同承担祭拜活动的任务。所以当地的村民也认为基督徒
承担了自己的义务，他们同样做出了让步，不在计较基督徒不参与传统祭拜仪式等
事情。而且基督徒主动发挥基督教的正功能，主动承担村寨里的慈善事务，主动帮
助村寨里的孤寡老人，发动教徒打扫村寨卫生，为生病的贫困家庭捐款。村寨里的
村民有家有事情的时候主动帮忙……，就像基督徒自己认为的：“开始不信基督教的人
不了解基督教是什么，就捣乱。后来我们做好事给他们看，他们知道了，就理解
我们了。”这些做法改善了人们对于基督教信仰的看法。

当地政府的态度受到民间对基督教的认可的影响。在政府部门看来B乡的基督徒
与其他人之间没冲突，也放心开放基督教场所，承认基督教合法地位。据相关人员
表述：“对于传统宗教与基督教之间的矛盾，基督教与传统宗教的习俗不一样，双
方会因为丧葬习俗不同就发生冲突。后来，信仰基督教的人虽然不参加传统活动，
但还是去，只是去了不磕头，平时不杀生，不参加哈尼族的传统仪式。在当地逐渐

(未完待续)
形成不成文的规矩，信基督教有信的习俗，如果一家人都信基督教就按基督教习俗来办，但基本上按本地习俗来办。”基督徒自己也认为这样确实改善了他们与其他人的关系。他们说：“我们虽然不参加祭龙活动，但是交钱，承担祭龙活动的费用，而且经常捐献，四川大地震时我们就捐献了6000元，还经常修桥、修路、修水沟。与村里的人没有什么矛盾，农忙时也经常相互请工帮忙，大多是根据平时的邻里关系和亲戚关系来请人，与信仰没有多大关系，我们与村民（非信徒）关系都很好。”

而对于现在还处黑市状态中的L乡基督教，他们不但没有得到政府的承认，同样也没有得到当地三自教会的认可。红河州基督教两会的某长老表示：“他们（L乡基督教）的信徒情况较为复杂，派系严重，他们不参加传统的祭龙活动，也不承担费用，与其他村民之间经常会有矛盾和冲突，所以政府领导就会出面维护村民的利益，压制基督信徒。他们信徒人数是红河县最多的，但是问题和矛盾也最多。”

县委政府的领导说：“基督教要开放也是开放B乡的，他们规范又不闹矛盾，他们的人数再多（L乡）也不可能开放, 现在他们都不申请开放了。”

相对于黑市状态下基督教被压制，传教者被迫害，信教群众遭到其他群众的敌视，教会发展受到严格控制，信教群众遭到歧视和不被认可的生存状况，红市下的基督教得到大家的认可。在B乡，政府的相关人员认为：“我们B村的信徒和非信徒，从来都没有冲突过。我们是领导，信基督的人也是我们的村民，我们可以保护他们。”

而部分村民更是认为信仰基督教对于一些人（老人等）是一种精神上的慰藉，并没有什么坏处。在这种状况下，信教与否，才真正成为了私人的事情，信仰才真正成为一种由人们自由购买的商品。信徒可以公开自己的信仰，在政府的批准下，开始筹钱盖教堂。

四、为什么基督教信仰遭限制？

对于宗教的管制问题，杨凤岗认为无管制的宗教并不存在。“上帝的归上帝，凯撒的归凯撒。”这样一个设想，只可能是韦伯的“理想类型”。但是为什么少数民族地方政府要对基督教的发展进行限制，或者说基督教“黑市”的出现与“灰市”发展的原因是什么？把这个问题调查清楚，对于解决基督教信徒的非法处境，使基督宗教市场由灰市，甚至是非法黑市走向红市都有现实的意义。
(一) 对传统文化的保护与捍卫

在文章中，我们强调相对于已经批准开放的B乡来说，仍然处于基督教黑市的L乡是一个纯哈尼族乡。有些学者认为相对于民族成分较为单一、传统文化保留较为完善的地区，一个多民族共处的地方，对于外来文化的包容性更强一些。由于没有形成较完备的文化共同体，对于外来文化的抗拒也可能更弱一些。在现实情况中，我们可以找到实际的例证，如滇西北的丙中洛地区是一个包含了怒族、藏族、白族等多民族的地区，同时也是个原始宗教、藏传佛教、基督教和天主教多宗教并存的区域。然而作为南传佛教的核心区域的西双版纳和以白族本主信仰为主的大理，基督教的传播是艰难而缓慢的。

宗教经济是由一个社会中的所有宗教活动构成，包括一个现代的或潜在的信徒“市场”，一个或多个为吸引或维持信徒的组织，以及这个组织所提供的宗教文化。面对云南这个较为落后的少数民族地区，在历史上由于地理位置处于边缘地带，又处于经济文化的极其短缺的社会状态。在这样的环境中形成的传统宗教文化是不能与基督教这样的世界性的宗教文化相抗衡的。面对当前急剧变化的社会环境，少数民族地区的这种相对落后文化不能满足少数民族群众的需要。基督教文化的传入，无疑对于少数民族文化的发展起到一定的促进作用，同时也对少数民族传统文化形成了重大的冲击。

但是像L乡这样的纯哈尼族乡，哈尼族文化单一且保留较完整，对于像基督教这样的一个外来宗教，它的教义教规与哈尼族传统宗教信仰文化可以说是大相径庭。基督教只信仰上帝，教徒们称自己是上帝的子民，这与哈尼族传统的各种“万物有灵”的自然崇拜、祖先崇拜等多鬼神信仰，可以说是很难调和的。两者之间必然会产生相互的竞争，这是哈尼族传统宗教文化对于基督教文化的一种抗拒。这种抗拒既表现在当地的政府或少数民族干部对于传统文化的保护上，同时也表现在少数民族群众对于传统文化的捍卫上。在现实生活中，不少基督教信徒都表示那些信仰传统宗教的村民都是拜鬼鬼、搞封建迷信、搞偶像崇拜。基督教信仰是反对偶像崇拜的，当地村民在信仰了基督教以后也不再祭祖。而信仰哈尼族传统宗教的群众则认为信仰了基督教，就不是哈尼族了。政府更是怕哈尼族传统文化的流逝，对基督教进行限制。

(二) 基督教外衣下的“邪教”
在少数民族地区，政府对邪教的传播尤其关注，可以说对邪教进行打击已经成为政府及政府的延伸机构（村民自治）的主要任务之一。这个可以从每个乡政府、行政村甚至自然村的宣传栏里关于邪教的宣传资料得到证实。据实地观察上到乡政府下到自然村，所有的宣传栏里的最多的宣传内容都是拒绝邪教、打击邪教、邪教危害的内容。

在对该地区宗教管理部门相关人员的访问中，他们都不承认红河县有邪教的存在，并向我们保证村民们也反对邪教。他说：“红河县没有邪教，村民反对传播邪教。传播邪教的人用基督教的名义宣传，从《圣经》中断章取义，有些基督教传播人员在传教的时候，为了吸引教徒宣传一些不符合实情的和教义教规的内容。”据在农村工作队的何某介绍：“我在三村就职期间了解到，信仰基督教的人到学校对学徒传教，导致学生认为只要祈求上帝，就会考高分。”这样便违反了任何人不得利用宗教干扰教育的政策。而当地的宗教人士也认为一些传教的人士在传教上存在问题，不愿意与这些人接触太多。在对红河州三自爱国会牧师的访问中，他的回答是：“有活动都不敢通知没有被开放点的教徒们，他们利用极端宗教思想传教，情况很严重。”

从以上的情况，我们可以说，政府对于基督教传播的防范心理，限制基督教的传播是导致基督教黑市出现和灰市繁荣的原因。但是在这背后，基督教的无序性传播以及强烈的扩张性，本身很容易受到假借基督教名义的邪教分子利用宣传邪教，无疑本来就受到猜疑的基督教，蒙上一个宣传邪教的面纱，当然会成为政府重点防范的对象之一。

（三）历史偏见与境外的宗教渗透

在历史上，随着我国作为半殖民地程度的加深，而云南又处在与南亚和东南亚的接壤地带，战略重要性凸显。传教士借着殖民势力的扩张之势，也加紧了对云南少数民族地区的传教活动，特别是基督教在向边远少数民族地区的发展取得成效以后，引起了各个教会组织和传教团体的浓厚兴趣。9他们纷纷来到这里，把云南的少数民族地区作为传教的“拓荒地”，并涌现出许多有名的传教士，如柏格理、党居仁在苗族地区的基督教传播、傅能仁在傈僳族中传播基督教等。

当然我们不能否认基督教的传入适应了云南少数民族处于边缘性和经济与文化
极度落后，少数民族整个社会处于一种需求及需求的满足极端短缺的状态。基督
教的传入促进了少数民族的发展，改变了少数民族落后的生活方式。基督传教士不
光在少数民族传教，他们还帮助少数民族创造了自己的文字，如苗文、傈僳文等，这
对于推动少数民族文化的发展起到重大的作用。在基督教传入前，少数民族的生活
方式具有明显的自然和不成熟痕迹，“存粮防饥”的意识淡薄，浮华浪费的习俗盛
行，缺乏讲卫生的习惯。信仰了基督教以后，这种不良的生活方式得到了较显
著的改善，信仰基督教的群众都表示不再为祭龙杀猪杀鸡，不再把大部分粮食拿去
煮酒饮用。在调查期间，我们能深刻地感受到，信仰基督教的家庭多数都不饮酒，
反观不信仰基督教的家庭，一天三顿都要饮酒是这里的习惯。在酒桌上，一吃酒就
要一个多小时才能结束，哈尼族很热情，一直劝我们喝酒，说这酒都是自己家酿的，
不上头，每一次从酒桌下来，都要喝五六两的白酒才行。可以说不再饮酒，为信仰
基督教的群众节省了很大的开支。在基督教传入后改变了过去少数民族中人畜混居
的状况。在调查点，由于是山地，他们根据地势，采取人住楼上畜住楼下的方法。
并且信仰基督教的群众普遍采取生病去医院治疗的态度，很少再去求鬼神的帮助。

但是即便如此，基督教的传入毕竟是伴着列强侵略而来，它是西方国家向近代
中国强行输入的宗教，它的传播时间与列强的侵略基本是同步并呈现复合性。而且
从不少的教案中，我们也会发现基督教被列强利用或相互勾结欺骗和压迫中国人，
这给一些人留下了基督教是“洋教”，是具有侵略性的印象。所以直到现在，很多
人在观念上是不能接受基督教。某部门干部表示：“基督教是西方国家的，是外国
的，不是我们的传统，我们不会要的。这些（哈尼族）长老们也是不会要的。”

在红河州相关人士的配合下，我们获得了当地政府针对基督教渗透活动展开调
查的一些资料。不少基督教团体，甚至个人无法抑制传教的热情，他们可能以提供
各种服务为名进行传教活动。特别是境外人士和基督教传播团体采取了各种方法
在当地进行未经许可的传教活动，如被称为“希望之侣”的美国组织与该地区的某
学校合作后，派遣外教在该校进行英语方面的培训，在课堂上授课经常偏离课本内
容，进行基督教内容的宣讲。该组织人员在与该校师生的交流活动中无声无息地进

10 钱宁主编，基督教与少数民族社会文化变迁，昆明：云南大学出版社，1998 年。
11 韩军学，基督教与云南少数民族，昆明：云南人民出版社，2000 年。
12 秦和平著，基督教在西南民族地区的传播史，成都：四川民族出版社，2003 年。
13 杨风岗，中国宗教的三色市场，中国农业大学学报（社会科学版），2008 年。
行基督教的宣传。美国的另一个基督教组织“福华国际”在1999年就开始在红河各地进行活动，并设立红河项目办，在举办乡村教师、医生的培训的时候，公开进行传教活动。该组织被政府部门查办驱逐出境后，该组织的相关人员又与当地基督教“三自”教会联系，以开展各种义务帮助的活动为由，进行基督教的宣传，并建立了3个非法聚会点。1999年开始，韩国“金麦福地财团”的中国代表金某以“残疾人间福祉”的名义与该地某组织合作，该地区的负责人陈某夫妇在对残疾人进行美容美发、电脑维修的活动中，进行基督教的传播活动。2007年韩国的“基督教青州教会”牧师朴某、李某等10人以旅游为名，在该州进行基督教宣传活动，并建立了“韩国基督教青州教会南西村基督教会”等。14

基督教在少数民族地区的传播，对于云南少数民族地区的发展及对人们生活环境的改善的贡献是不可否定的，但是在历史上，它给人们留下的侵略性及对人们感情的伤害的印象。还有当前这种不通过正当途径，不遵守法律规定，无组织无秩序的乱传活动。它触犯到了政府敏感的神经，为维护法律的尊严，防止境外势力对我们边疆少数民族地区的渗透，加强对境内信教群众的教育，成为了政府宗教工作的重要任务之一。

五、总结与讨论

就当前中国宗教与社会的关系而言，在这些宗教交换关系背后，制度宗教的神圣资源，总是被镶嵌在权力制度之中，难以脱魅。15杨同样是以政府对于各宗教市场的认可，合法与非法来界定中国宗教三色市场的。我们不难推测出，相对于“合法”宗教，“非法”宗教在提供宗教产品和服务方面必定要面临更大的成本。16总之，没有那个政府会完全放弃对于宗教市场的管控。面对这种不可改变的社会事实，不管是基督教的信仰者还是基督教产品的供给者，还是政府管理部门，都应当以信仰群体“现世的幸福”为最终目的，在不影响民族团结和地方安宁的情况下，改善信仰者的基督教信仰的市场环境，减少信仰者的信仰成本。

对于基督教信仰者应当理性的考虑与政府的关系，加强彼此的沟通合作，积极

14该资料来自红河州相关部门的基督教调查资料
15李向平、杨林霞，宗教、社会与权力关系——“宗教市场论”的社会学解读，华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2011年。
16阮荣平、郑风田、刘力，宗教信仰选择——一个西方宗教经济学的文献梳理，社会，2013年。
向政府争取自己正当的权益。就像有些教徒反映的：‘希望领导们不断去做工作，
不能当官不为民做主，信徒也寻求和谐，政府提出的要求只要合乎圣经就能达到，
希望能够批准开放。’同时要正确处理好与信仰传统宗教群众的关系，信仰是个人
的事情，但是任何个人都不可能离开自己身边的环境而独自存活下去。人有信仰的
自由，但是也有承担集体责任的义务。事实也表明，多数群众更多的是反对基督徒
在村寨集体活动中没有承担自己的义务。

对于政府来说，要明确基督教一旦被群众接受，它便成为一个既定的社会事实，
不可被彻底通过行政手段取缔，要遵从宗教发展自身的规律，不可无视群众的宗教
需求。不能完全以保护传统文化的名义而忽略群众对于信仰的需要。要加强自身宗
教管理队伍的建设，加强对于宗教精英人员的团结和引导，增强辨别宗教实质的能
力，把正常的宗教活动与非法宗教和邪教分开处理，防止历史偏见对于宗教事务处
理的影响。就像相关政府人员的回答：‘不能睁眼说瞎话，要正视社会现实，要重
视传教者所传的宗教实质，正规的要许可，不正规的一些小众教就要当作问题处理。
宗教神职人员很重要，不同的教义宣传、信众对不同神职人员的选择、信众对经籍
理解的分歧都会引起纷争，所以要加强教职人员队伍建设。’

对于基督教信仰的供给方，也应当以信仰者‘现世的幸福’为传教的目的，与
人为善，提倡敬人爱人，不光教导教徒加强内部团结，还要注意与外部环境相适应。
宗教生活只是人们社会生活的一部分，为了宗教生活而牺牲教徒现世的幸福，而仅
寻求宗教上的完美是不现实的。基督教作为一个外来宗教，难免与少数民族传统相
抵触。作为宗教的供给人员，要认识到想基督教在少数民族地区扎根，一味地与传
统相抗衡，只会造成彼此的仇视和冲突。适时的妥协，处理好与其他群体的关系，
相互沟通，彼此尊重，才是可取之举。
Between the Sacred and the Secular: the Religious Economic Practice of Daoshi (Taoist Master) in Zhanjiang

YAN Jun

Abstract: The Chinese folk beliefs represented by Daoshi (Taoist Master) in Zhanjiang show the hybrid features of religious appeal and economic goal, and the traditional paradigm of religious market is flawed in dealing with such phenomena. Through theoretical discussion and case analysis, this study proposes a new model of religious market, which extends the action preference of believers and clerics from single stable religious demand to the dual structure of "secular – sacred." This model will help to analyze the complex act of faith and social consequences in real life.

神圣与世俗之间：湛江道师的宗教经济实践

严俊 1 林伟挚 2

摘要：以湛江道师为代表的中国民间信仰行为表现出宗教诉求与经济目标交织的特征，传统宗教市场论范式在处理这类现象时存在缺陷。通过理论讨论和案例分析，本研究提出了一个新的宗教市场模型，将信众与神职人员的行动偏好从单一稳定的宗教需求拓展为“世俗性—神圣性”的双重结构。这一模型将有助于分析现实生活中复杂的信仰行为及其社会后果。

关键词：湛江道师 火居道士 宗教市场 宗教偏好 双重均衡

1 严俊，上海大学社会学院，讲师。
2 林伟挚，上海大学社会学院，硕士研究生。
广东省湛江市城乡地区活跃着一群为村民提供道教传统仪式服务的人，当地人称他们为“道师”。道师的自我认同及生活方式表明，他们属于中国道教正一派中的火居道士。作为民间社会中的信仰仪式专家，火居道士为个人、家庭、村中的庙宇组织，提供禳灾辟邪、醮仪等仪式服务（李向平、李思明，2012）。湛江的道师们普遍居住在乡村社区中，平日过着与常人无异的俗世家庭生活。他们中绝大多数有着与宗教活动无关的主业，仅在节庆、丧葬或特定仪式需要时，才会应主家邀请，穿上道袍、携带一并法器，独自或组团前往操办，事后则根据双方协定或通行惯例收取一定酬劳。

这一行业遵循严格的家族传承规则。由于仪式过程中无一例外需要借助神祇的力量或与之沟通，当地人认为只有拥有历代供奉神仙传统的家族的男性子弟才有继承资格。不仅如此，为获得独立从业资质，继承人还需接受较长时间（一般为三到五年）的跟师培训，并举办“授职”仪式，方可获得同行群体与乡民的认可。

改革开放以来，道师与乡村社区间的关系发生了剧烈变化：“礼物交换”式的公共服务逐步让位于“明码标价”的仪式交易，一个具有明显经济理性特征的宗教市场逐步浮现。在这一市场中，道师和信众构成了供求双方。道师通过提供传统宗教仪式产品来获利，村民则以“购买”道师的仪式来满足信仰或其他方面的需求。不同于想象中“纯洁”的信仰行为，道师和村民的宗教活动均体现出某种“世俗性-神圣性”的混合状态：在经历意识形态松绑或人生重大挫折之后，不少村民的宗教需求出现“从无到有”的变化，并在购买仪式时反复计算宗教满足与经济花费的得失；而作为仪式的主持者，道师们关于宗教“神圣性”的观念却在逐步消解。随着货币收益快速增加，道师的经济诉求日趋膨胀，积极采取各种策略开拓业务来源。

湛江道师的故事并非孤例，将宗教视为一种潜在市场行为而非单纯精神活动
的看法早已有之。亚当·斯密（1997）最先用经济理性人假定来分析宗教活动。延续这一传统，斯达克等人（2004）构建了宗教（经济）市场的研究范式。他将教会等宗教组织视为宗教产品的供给者（宗教公司），将信众视为宗教产品的需求者（消费者），并用供求模型来讨论宗教组织和信众之间的关系，以及由此导致的市场结果。该理论一方面假定信众的基本宗教偏好（对宗教/信仰的需求）稳定不变；另一方面，也潜在默认了供给者以扩大宗教影响力为唯一偏好。

正如湛江道师的行为存在诸多复杂性，在大量宗教活动中都能发现供求双方的混合偏好或策略行为。此类现象对传统宗教市场论范式是否构成挑战？如果挑战成立，如何修正理论来处理多样化经验？通过分析宗教经济行为，能否对经济社会学的文化研究有所启示？以上这些问题构成了本文的研究目标和理论诉求。

通过理论梳理和案例分析，我们尝试提出一个包含双重偏好/策略的宗教市场模型，并据此揭示：1、仪式消费者的宗教偏好并非稳定不变，而是会经历“从无到有”的连续变化过程，且该过程可逆；2、即便对于产生了宗教偏好的仪式消费者而言，偏好结构和行动策略也并非单一，而是呈现出“世俗性-神圣性”的双重均衡特征；3、与消费者行为类似，仪式供给者的宗教偏好和行为也不稳定，同样呈现出双重性。

一、文献综述与分析框架

1、宗教市场论：从亚当·斯密到《信仰的法则》

宗教市场的思想最早可以追溯到亚当·斯密（Iannaccone，1991；刘正峰，2012）。斯密认为，教士受经济利己规则的管辖，追求的是个人经济利益的最大化。作为宗教产品的主要生产者，教士的收入或来自教徒的自愿捐赠，或来自政府的财政供给（斯密，1997，P345）。收入来源差异会强烈影响教士（生产者）的行为：如果依赖自愿捐赠，教会需要用办法来维持和增强信徒的宗教信仰、宗教皈依热情和捐赠意愿，进而供给更多优质宗教产品；与之相反，如果依赖财政供养，教士们则会缺乏生存压力和利己勉励，表现出懒散、懈怠。此外，由于教

5 限于篇幅，本文并未就均衡的模型细节展开深入讨论。
士同样是追求利益最大化的理性人，宗教市场中也充满不正当竞争行为，例如诋毁竞争对手、欺骗信众、介入政治争取宗教垄断等手法并不鲜见（斯密，1997，P348）。对此有学者认为，斯密对宗教供给者的分析完全建立在其追求个体经济利益最大化（世俗性）的动机之上，忽视了宗教供给者存在的非财富性（神圣性）需求（刘正峰，2012）。

美国宗教社会学家罗德尼・斯达克发展了斯密的传统。他借用并修正了经济学的理性行为假设，拓宽了宗教行动者理性选择的范围：“在其信息和理解局限之内，在可选的选择的制约下，在其喜好和趣味的引导下，人们总是试图做理性的选择……由于我们的喜好和趣味如此之不同，我们认为回报之事如此地不同……我们有能力在我们的梦想、希望、爱情和理性中发现回报”（斯达克、芬克，2004，P48）。

其次，与斯密的分析对象只涉及教士不同，斯达克在其理论中加入了对信众的分析，建构起一个包含供求双方的完整市场模型。斯达克认为，宗教经济由一个社会中的所有宗教活动构成，既包括一个现在的和潜在的信徒市场，也包括一个或多个寻求吸引或维持信徒的组织以及组织提供的宗教文化。其中，信众可以看作是以计算代价利益的理性选择消费者，宗教机构或团体则可以看作是提供宗教产品的企业（Stark，1985；斯达克、芬克，2004）。斯达克假定信众的宗教需求（偏好）相对稳定，因此宗教经济内的市场区位（niche）是相对稳定的，而宗教变化主要是供应方面转变的产物，宗教机构可以通过改变教派的张力来赢得不同张力需求的信众。具体而言，宗教公司在宗教市场中的历史地位是可变的，它们主要通过改变宗教政策来吸引不同宗教需求的信众，占据不同的市场地位，进而塑造了宗教市场的宏观形态与变迁过程（Stark and Iannaccone，1994；斯达克、芬克，2004）。

自上世纪七十年代以来，以更体系化方式复兴的宗教市场论遭致了各种挑战。第一类最主要的批评者认为，在宗教领域使用理性行动者的假设混淆了工具理性和价值理性的层次问题。有研究者指出，理性选择论关注的成本和收益计算只涉及工具理性。惟有在完全世俗化的情况下，宗教的理性选择才有可能实现（Steve，1993）；此外，成本和收益简化了复杂的社会关系和文明形式，难以发现宗教背后所隐藏的人类对精神世界和生命意义的渴望（范丽珠，2008；2010）。
还有学者引用布迪厄的理论指出，人的社会行为往往与主观理性计算无关，而是由惯习与场域、能动性与结构之间的关系所决定的（Robertson, 1992）。

第二类批评者认为，斯达克过于强调供给方在市场中的决定性地位。在这种“供给方解释”中，宗教需求稳定是一种值得怀疑的假设。它将信仰者变成宗教产品的消极、被动的接受者，很难审视信仰者个体如何做出选择，忽略了宗教需求对宗教信仰选择的影响（Bankston, 2003；杨凤岗，2010）；也有学者从该理论侧重供给分析的适用性角度展开批评。李向平（2011）认为，宗教经济模型实际已经包含对供需双方的分析，“供给方解释”仅仅出于对互动关系中宗教公司的主动、主导地位的强调。但是在中国，宗教资源总是镶嵌在权力制度之中，因此在一个供求关系不平等的条件下，供给组织即使神通广大也如同“缘木求鱼”。

类似的批评还来自宗教社会资本理论、宗教家庭生产模型、宗教人力资本模型、事后保障模型等宗教经济学研究。他们从需求维度来解释宗教参与水平的变化，假定宗教需求也会发生变化，并构成了影响宗教信仰选择的重要因素。在宗教经济学中，市场其实包含了两部分，即供给和需求，市场均衡的形成与变化必然是供给和需求共同作用的结果（阮荣平，2013）。

第三类批评者认为斯达克对宗教管制与宗教活力之间关系的理解过于简单。斯达克（2004，P247）认为“如果宗教经济是无管制和有竞争的，宗教参与总体程度会高。相反，缺乏竞争、占统治地位的公司会没有效率来维持市场，结果是宗教参与总体程度降低，普通人最小化宗教代价并拖延宗教代价的支付”。但是，实证证据并不支持宗教多元和宗教参与之间有积极相关关系，宗教管制不一定会降低宗教活动水平（Chavas & Gorski, 2001）。管制很难达到控制宗教的目的，它不会降低人们的宗教热情，只会导致红、黑、灰三色宗教市场，使局面复杂化（杨凤岗，2008）。压制（至少温和的压制）也不必然降低宗教的活力，相反会产生一些非预期后果，这些意外后果往往有利于处于边缘地位的宗教发展（卢云峰，2010）。

本文认为，宗教行为中的价值理性属于宗教行动者中的一个理性计算维度，拓展后的效用函数（extended utility model）并不排斥行动者对情感或价值的考量。同样的，场域作用与个体层面的决策并不矛盾。除非能够证明人的行为是场域约束下的无意识行为，那么主动遵守场域要求的个人行为依然可被视为某种
复杂的理性决策过程。因此，将理性行为假设应用到宗教行动领域仍然具有分析意义：其次，虽然斯达克对宗教组织和信众都进行了深入的微观讨论，但是在宗教市场模型里面，信众作为需求者的作用被过分弱化，以致和很多宗教现象不符。一个完整的宗教市场模型尚未建立；最后，斯达克对宗教管制和宗教活力关系的论述的确过于简单，现实中存在更复杂的机制。不过，这些机制如何与新的市场模型有效融合仍需斟酌。

宗教经济模型提出后受到很多学者的欢迎。有研究者认为它推翻了根源于欧洲的、以世俗化理论为核心的“旧范式”（Warner，1993）。这一模型也以“宗教市场理论”的名义，作为一种普遍有效的“新范式”被介绍到中国（林巧薇，2003）。一些学者从其中市场竞争角度来看待中国的寺庙经济，例如，Lang（2005）将寺庙视为宗教市场主动的玩家。寺庙的成败可以通过其推广策略和是否迎合信众宗教兴趣来理解，宗教企业的经营使用了与俗世企业相同的算计和策略。文永辉（2006）发现九福寺通过理性经营以迎合、激发甚至操弄信众，创造需求，以占取更大的宗教市场份额，并尝试从宗教供给面来解读宗教复兴的原因。


值得注意的是，对斯达克理论的讨论与批评形成了一系列的研究成果，推动了宗教市场论的扩散，但少有研究从宗教行动者偏好的角度作深入讨论。与此同时，虽然强调中国宗教地方性的学者们指出了宗教市场论似乎忽视了非西方宗教（乃至一般信仰行为）的独特性，但在使用新经验与理论对话方面依然进展缓慢。本文将尝试对这些问题进行探讨。
2、分析框架：可变的双重偏好与一般信仰分析模型

在田野工作中我们观察到：道师们日益表现出仪式商品供给者的特征，普通村民对仪式的态度则从敬畏神祇逐步转变为践行习俗。如果说湛江民间道教的实践在过去还带有“潜在宗教市场”的特征，现在则具备了更为明显的交易色彩。因此本研究仍然采用宗教市场论的分析进路：将信众视为宗教产品的消费者，将教会或神职人员视为供给者。这一理论的内核和微观基础是“理性选择”，即供求双方都试图实现效用最大化。与斯达克的不同之处在于，虽然《信仰的法则》提供了当代主流的宗教市场论范式，但在分析微观偏好时却部分忽视了斯密最初提出这一思路时所关注的“神圣”人员的“世俗”行为，进而割裂了宗教行为与一般信仰行为之间的联系。本研究将从这两个方面来修正宗教市场理论，并提出一个新的整合分析框架。

（1）可变的“世俗性-神圣性” 双重偏好

信众（消费者）

我们首先讨论信众（消费者）的偏好问题。在建构宗教经济/市场模型时，斯达克明确指出，虽然信众存在不同的具体偏好，但“宗教需求长期来说是非常稳定的，而宗教变化主要是供应方面转变的产物”（斯达克、芬克，2004，P238）。换句话说，“宗教公司”提供各种宗教产品，希望尽可能多地吸引信众；而信众则希望以最小的成本购买最能满足其宗教需求的产品。由于现实生活中改教或改宗的现象并不鲜见，斯达克在也在论述中大量涉及了这类情况（斯达克、芬克，2004，P142），可以认为《信仰的法则》对信众的宗教偏好存在一个潜在的层次划分假定：“非常稳定的” 宗教需求属于人们关于宗教的元偏好，不受具体宗教（产品）的影响；而实际决策结果则同时与偏好和很多其他因素相关，其中不乏世俗性的考虑——这也是宗教市场论在具体分析中可以采用“拓展效用函数”的原因。

不过，在对湛江道师的案例研究中我们发现，稳定的信众宗教元偏好不应作为毋庸置疑的前提，而需进一步辨析。事实上，哪怕是那些深度参与道师仪式活动的“信众”内部也存在巨大的分化：他们中有一些人的确对道师所代表的民间宗教怀有极高的信仰程度，期待仪式活动所允诺的神圣反馈，甚至按照法典来设定自身或家族的生活意义；但也有一些看似虔诚的“信徒” 坚称自己是“无神论
者”。他们将这种矛盾解释为自己仅仅在践行一种社区习俗所要求的行为，用文化传统的延续而非宗教的教义来表达自身偏好；更有甚者，还有一部分信众表现出极具“世俗自觉性”的仪式购买者意味：无论社区中存在宗教或文化习俗偏好，他们选择参与宗教活动的目的都只在于规避“与众不同”导致的群体压力，或者利用这种偏好达到其他世俗性（经济）目标。“信众”多样性揭示的根本问题在于：仪式购买者可能具有复杂形态（二元）的元偏好；不同宗教市场内的信众群体存在偏好形态的分布差异。

据此我们认为：按照偏好的差异，购买仪式商品的消费者可以处于“世俗性—神圣性”偏好连续统上的不同位置。越靠近神圣性，消费者偏好表现宗教偏好（元偏好）的可能性更大（这类消费者属于斯达克的讨论对象）；越靠近世俗性一侧，消费者偏好可能依次表现为“神秘习俗”、“乡规民约”、“小群体规范”等，元偏好的宗教意味降低直至消失，最终抵达纯粹的“个人工具性得失”

在这一连续统上，存在一个一般信仰向宗教信仰转变的过渡带。即从左到右的变化表现为宗教产品消费者（信众）的产生/自觉过程。实际上，消费者可以从世俗走向神圣（遭遇重大人生变故等因素影响），也可以逆转（国家管制、现代化等因素影响），这造成个体在不同时期的区间分布差异。

6 这种分布差异与斯塔克认为的稳定市场区位既有联系也有区别：二者都基于信众的不同宗教需求，但我们认为偏好差异的内涵是世俗性与神圣性的混合构成，而非描述性的宗教产品与社会规范之间的张力。

7 不同于内化的规范或网络压力，而是处于牟利的需要。
除了极少数位于“世俗”或“神圣”两极位置的消费者（他们可能纯粹出于“个人利益”或“神圣意义”的单一需要），绝大多数消费者表现为“世俗性—神圣性”不同混合比例的双重偏好。他们对仪式/神圣产品的购买表现为满足双重偏好的过程。需要注意的是，由于宗教元偏好本身可以变化，消费者在面对积极的宗教厂商时，其行为决策的双重均衡机制和均衡点会发生变化。不同于“世俗性—神圣性”元偏好的内生性（内生并不等于不可变，只是相对稳定），消费者的行为决策还会受到外部结构条件（环境）的影响，使它与偏好之间并不存在固定联系：一方面，不同偏好的消费者可以采用趋同的决策。例如，虽然完全世俗性的消费者不在意仪式的神圣意义，但为了满足周边群体的期待，可能会表现出和完全神圣性消费者一样的仪式精致性追求；另一方面，相同偏好的消费者也可以做出差异较大的决策。例如，同样是神圣性偏好主导的消费者，受制于不同的社会条件或认知水平，会表现出不同程度的仪式追求。神职人员或宗教组织（供给者）

斯达克在《信仰的法则》中并未明确讨论宗教公司的偏好，但他认为宗教市场的变化主要由供给者引导（斯达克、芬克，2004，P238）。换言之，一个积极的宗教公司的主要目标在于通过开发宗教产品、扩充传播途径等方式来吸引信众。同样，消极的宗教公司也会因缺乏创新能力而退出市场。据此我们认为，经典宗教市场论关于供给者偏好也存在一个潜在的层次划分假定：宗教产品供给者具有相对单一稳定的元偏好（扩大宗教影响力和信众数量）；具体的决策过程可能考虑其他世俗性因素。以八十年代初改革开放为分水岭，湛江道师群体的“市场化”进程提供了大量针对这一假定的反证经验。作为生活在村落共同体中的道教神职人员，道师们一直与村民保持着某种“礼物交换”意义上的互动。与经济收益相比，他们更在乎自身在乡村中威望与神圣“守护者”的身份。随着市场化进程不断加深，以经济收益为代表的世俗性偏好在道师群体中逐渐增强，这使得他们从修辞意义上的

\[8\]由于文革时期国家禁止民间宗教仪式，大量道师活动

\[9\]这方面从来不乏有趣的例子：教会拥有并经营着大量的资产，但其宣称的目标从来并非牟利，而是为日后的宗教活动做储备。
宗教产品供需者逐步变成实质意义上的仪式卖家。“扩大宗教影响力” 已经不再是单一稳定的主流偏好，增加信众数量的主要目的指向更多的收入来源，甚至有很多道师自认为“无神论者”。

因此，仪式产品的供给者也可以按照偏好的“世俗性-神圣性”进行分类。越靠近“神圣性”，仪式产品供给者作为一种宗教供给者的可能性越大（这类供给者为斯达克讨论的对象）；越靠近“世俗性”，仪式供给者依次蜕变为“象征意义经营者”、“习俗经营者”等中间形态，并最终到达以牟利为唯一目的的“仪式公司”。在这一连续统中，多数位于中间状态的供给者具有某种比例结构“世俗性-神圣性”的双重偏好。其中，神圣偏好主要表现为宗教教义转播或别的由教义决定的目标；世俗偏好则主要表现为非宗教性的现实收益（包括经济、社会或文化资本等多种可能性）。同时，在偏好连续统上靠近“神圣性”一侧也存在一般信仰向宗教信仰的过渡带，即从左到右是一个宗教厂商的产生/自觉过程。（见下图）

与消费者情况类似，偏好也不能单方面决定供给者的决策行为。后者需要同时考虑环境（包括信众状态、制度结构等因素）的作用：具有类似偏好的供给者并不一定采用趋同的决策；具有不同偏好的供给者则完全可能采用类似的决策。

可能对于某些供给者而言，两种偏好不可以替代且存在最低门槛：消费者的情况类似。
例如，一个完全以牟利为目的的仪式产品供给者，在消费者神圣（宗教）偏好不强且贫富分化严重时，可能对仪式神圣意义的传播或“信众”人数毫无兴趣，而专注于从最有经济价值的那部分消费者身上获取利益；同理，如果消费者以虔诚信徒为主且贫富分化较小，他也有可能表现出跟宗教厂商类似的决策，即专注于仪式神圣意义的传播，同时尽其所能的扩大消费者数量。

这一思路与斯达克关于宗教厂商的分析存在差别：首先，斯达克并不关心仪式产品供给者神圣性的分化，这使其研究对象难以涵盖大量处于连续统左侧的厂商；其次，仅在分析宗教厂商时，斯达克也不关心它们偏好的内容与结构，没有注意到即便对于宗教厂商而言，偏好也可能是双重甚至多重的；第三，斯达克混淆了宗教厂商（乃至一般仪式供应商）的偏好与行为决策。神圣性偏好可以通过增加信徒数量之外的方式来得到满足，而增加信徒数量也极有可能是世俗偏好引导的决策结果。

（2）“世俗化”或“神圣化”进程：从宗教到一般信仰市场分析模型

前文已经提到，斯达克的宗教市场论分析的供求双方均属于偏向“神圣性”一侧的情况，即所谓的宗教市场。在此基础上，他进一步发展了包含多个命题的市场演变模型（斯达克、芬克，2004，P237）。该理论的一个问题在于，如何处理由偏向“世俗性”的供求双方组成的“准宗教市场”？肇始于韦伯（2004）的一类西方宗教研究者认为，中国的民间信仰中带有强烈的世俗性色彩，这也引发“中国是否存在宗教”的争论（Groot, 1940）。与这种民间信仰与宗教间二元对立的观点不同，我们认为，引入“世俗性—神圣性”双重偏好范式，能够将斯达克用以分析“宗教市场”的理论模型拓展至一般信仰领域，并保持逻辑连贯。

不同社会结构条件下，仪式商品供求双方的“世俗性—神圣性”的分布不同。在市场中，供给者既可能面对以改教或改宗为表现的具体决策变化，也可能面对更基础的信众宗教偏好从无到有、从弱到强的过程；消费者面对的既有可能是神圣目标引导的多样化传教手段，同时也可能面对宗教组织的“堕落”或“纯洁化”。

与其说二者的改变是跨越离散的，倒不如说更符合渐变的规律。改革开放后，中国乡村中确实出现了宗教回潮的现象，但并非直接从宗教被压抑或消解状态回到繁荣，而是经历了一个神圣性不断上升的过程，其中需要跨过“民俗”等中等神
圣性的阶段。这一过程显然跟二十世纪中国社会的变迁历史有关。宗教市场论忽视这一点，部分原因在于美国和西方的宗教发展案例中，缺乏一个政府意识形态管制带来的宗教真空期（在这一时期，世俗的某种政治权威充当了广义信仰需要的满足者）。真空期结束后，消费者的“神圣性”偏好逐步复兴，供给者却日益表现出“世俗性”——这一带有中国特色的宗教市场，位于经典理论的分析盲区。强调管制影响的学者（卢云峰，2008；李向平，2011）认为，宗教市场论假定的自由竞争市场在中国并不存在，供求双方实际嵌入在权力结构之中。但该批评对于新的模型未必适用：“不同管制条件下的供求双方会在连续统上如何摆动”，“在确定偏好后，二者又会如何选择相应策略”，“这些策略对市场会造成何种影响”等问题正是双重偏好下行为机制分析的应有之意。

更重要的是，引入“世俗性-神圣性”双重变化偏好有助于弥合宗教市场论与宗教世俗化理论间的隔阂。作为市场论的主要竞争性理论，世俗化理论依据西欧经验认为现代化必然导致宗教多元化，多元主义的环境首先是一种市场环境。在这种环境中，宗教机构变成了交易所，宗教变成了消费商品，大量宗教活动逐渐被市场经济的逻辑所支配。多元还会造成竞争，促使教会改变神学的内容，创造适应需要的新产品。宗教因市场化而变得不纯洁，最终走向衰亡（伯格，1991）。

虽然有大量研究证明多元化与竞争在美国不仅没有导致宗教衰退，反而促进了繁荣（斯达克、芬克，2004），但这种经验性反例并未提供新的整合范式。不仅如此，新的事实甚至表明世俗化理论依具有生命力。有研究者认为，除西欧外，当今世界的确处于“去世俗化”进程中，但在英国等地普遍存在着“信仰而不归属”的状况，即制度性的宗教衰退，个人化的信仰增长，这依然支持着世俗化理论的基本立场（Davie, 1994; Williams, 2001）。

采用拓展后的一般信仰市场模型，将能够在市场论基础上覆盖世俗化理论的逻辑。对于信众而言，现代化与市场化带来的总体变化趋势是具有较高神圣性偏好的消费者比例不断下降，逐步往世俗性偏好方向移动，并在大多数消费者达至“个人工具性得失”后，消解对仪式商品的显示偏好，宗教市场消失。例如：中

11 如果对这一中间阶段做详细考察，也许存在“无法跨越”或倒退的可能性，现代性的力量与神圣诉求之间存在持续角力。
12 这是我们在案例分析中更多采用仪式消费者（而非信众）和仪式/神圣产品（而非宗教产品）的原因。
国市场化改革后，乡村社会中对仪式严肃性逐步下降，并开始与鬼神信仰脱离而成为民俗文化，最终体现为城市居民对仪式意义的无视和放弃购买；就宗教厂商而言，世俗化的过程可以理解为其世俗性偏好不断增大，以致在连续统上向“世俗性”仪式产品供应者方向持续滑动的过程，依次表现为“纯粹宗教组织”、“宗教+经济+社会诉求组织”、“带有神圣意义的经济组织”、“出售神圣或文化风俗符号产品的经济/社会组织”等混合形态。

二、个案情况与调查过程介绍

本研究的田野工作地点位于广东省湛江市，包括霞山区、麻章区的南山、下田仔、石头、宝满、西岭等多个村庄。选择这些村庄，首先因为散居其中的道师们形成了一个比较稳定的社会网络/工作团队。作为当地最重要的道师群体，他们已经基本垄断了该区域的仪式市场；其次，由于这些村庄紧挨着湛江市区和城市港口开发区域，道师和村民们的思想观念和行为方式皆受到了城市化、现代化的明显影响，呈现出对仪式“神圣性”和“世俗性”的诉求分化状态。因此，该个案能够呈现本文所讨论的宗教经济中的复杂行为。

本研究以现任湛江市道教协会会长吴赵武为核心的道师班子作为主要调查对象，通过对相关道师、信众开展深度访谈，并实地参与观察道师主持的宗教活动，重点关注了湛江道师的仪式经营方式，以及他们和信众之间的宗教/经济互动。

八十年代初期，吴赵武（武伯）和其他几位来自道师家族的年轻人聚集到南柳村一户老道师处学习。以这些师兄弟为核心，后来逐渐形成了改革开放后湛江地区第一个新生代道师群体网络。武伯的长辈在文革时期“抵抗有术”，家里完整保留了操办大型科仪所需的典籍，成为群体内唯一可以主持重要祭事的年轻道师。他以家族所在的南柳村为中心搭了个班子（根据基本分工要求，一个班子至少需要 8 名成员），同期学习的珠伯、矮伯、强叔均加入了武伯的团队。由于后来发展扩张期人手不够，武伯逐步拉拢了同为道师的好友康程加入，同时又在村内外收了几个徒弟，最终形成了改革开放后湛江地区第一个初具规模、分工明确的道师群体。2000 年以来，随着道师的下一代逐步加入，该群体进一步扩大为湛
江城乡地区最大的火居道士仪式班子。下图为改革后第一代道师关系圈：

截止 2016 年年初，这个道师群体的成员（以“分散独立经营”加“联合团队作业”的方式）基本掌控了周边城乡地区的仪式市场。其中核心人物武伯的影响力最大。他在广东省各地市都有固定的业务来源，活动范围一度扩展至全国多地乃至海外。我们在调查中涉及的该群体核心成员如下：

(1) 吴赵武（武伯），1960 生，南山村火居道士最重要家族的家长，现任湛江市道教协会会长。
(2) 珠伯，1955 年生，南山村火居道士，武伯道师班子成员。
(3) 矮伯，1956 年生，下田仔火居道士，武伯道师班子成员。
(4) 强叔，1963 年生，宝满村火居道士，武伯道师班子成员。
(5) 森叔，1965 年生，石头村火居道士。相对独立于班子，有自行组队计划。

三、从“乡村守护者”到“仪式商品供给者”：湛江道师的市场化进程

改革开放之前，湛江道师的自身认同是村庄共同体的守护者。作为信众的村
民为道师提供入职仪式所需的经济支持;作为回报,道师则为村民提供“准义务”的宗教仪式服务。上世纪八十年代以来,随着生活水平提高和广义的传统复兴,村民对仪式的投入越来越多,道师主持仪式的收入也越来越高。不同于传统村落中的“礼物交换”,一组潜在却稳定的仪式服务价格开始形成,道师的市场意识逐步确定,自我认同日益转变为仪式商品供给者。

虽然道师的思想观念和行为方式日益变得商业化,但他们对仪式“神圣性”的敬畏或恪守并未完全消解,其偏好和行为策略呈现出“世俗性—神圣性”的混合特征。本文将首先从这个角度,对道师行业的收费制度、仪式类型、业务拓展、道师的声誉和收益偏好、宗教观念等方面来展开描述与分析。

1、收费制度：从礼物交换向市场化转变

收费形式的变化最为明显地体现了道师行业的商业化或市场化进程。传统上,道师去帮村民做仪式,不会主动向村民索取确定数额的钱财。为答谢道师的辛劳,村民通常依据村落内非正式规则和自身经济条件给一个红包,或将部分祭祀的祭品赠予道师作为报酬。根据被调查道师们的回忆,(上世纪八十年代初)村民给的红包通常很小且金额差别明显。平均看来,普通人家做个丧事大概只在四、五块。到本世纪初,这一价格(相对收入变化来说)没有暴涨,大概在100元左右。因为做仪式的前期准备还要自己花钱,整个流程下来基本没有盈余。尽管如此,道师们普通认同这种“义务劳动”。他们觉得操办一个完整严格的仪式是在“为村民办好事”。道师作为神职人员的身份,决定了他们不能纯靠做仪式来维持生计,更不可以靠此敛财。这也是多数道师都有其他营生主业的原因。

村里老人说,以前每条村都要有一户道师,因为授职花费很大,村民捐钱给道师。在仪式上,主持的那个道师会问:“刮风下雨去不去?”被问的人在神灵面前要说:“去!”主持道师会再问:“帮人做事要不要钱?”这个时候在神面前一定要回答:“不要!”但现在,授职的时候直接不讲后面一条,也没有人问了。(访谈资料编号:2016011601)

需要注意的是,虽然仪式价格并未暴涨,但相对统一价格的形成已经暗示了某种市场化条件下道师与共同体关系的世俗性变化。
现在道师的授职仪式花销在十万到二十万元不等，但村民们不再为这笔巨大的支出集资。施舟人（1971）在关于台湾地区的火居道士研究中描述了类似的转变：仅仅在一个世纪之前，村里还为操办仪式所需的耗费而担忧，而今天，这些费用大多由道士家族自行承担，但这些庆祝性的授命典礼依然在当地的庙宇中举办，并且对公众开放。对于道师而言，自费举办开放典礼的主要意义在于向社区宣布其身份合法性已经确立，同时也不乏部分业务广告的意图。虽然在这个场合中，仍有不少村民会以私人名义给红包表示祝贺，但这笔“收益”并不为道师看重。相反，他们还表达了某种特别的“忧虑”：如果那些给了红包的村民以后需要办仪式，道师总要优先甚至无偿提供。这将影响业务日常运作。

2000年以来道师的仪式收入快速增长，这主要得益于村民对传统仪式的经济投入倍增。以日常操办最多的丧事（幽斋）为例：仪式持续一至三天，通常由3至8位成员共同完成，每个主要成员\(^{14}\)的纯劳务费在1500元左右。不过，如果道师能把棺木或灵屋购买、火葬安排、抬棺砌墓等外围工作都包下来，则能大幅度增加收入。同时，通过整合团队内个体的资源和人脉，道师群体倾向于将附近村庄的业务全部包揽下来，进一步提高收益。这种业务内容与范围的双向拓展清晰表明，湛江道师们已经走出传统社区的地理边界和神职人员的心理边界，全面拥抱市场。

另一个重要表现在于仪式收费形式的改变。我们将其描述为从“道师不要钱”向“事主不还价”转变。与传统方式不同，虽然现在的事主大致了解价格情况，仍然会向道师询问应付金额。此时，道师则会根据相对稳定的历史价格并适当考虑事主的实际情况来开价。这个有待考虑的“实际情况”包含了非常丰富的内容：首先涉及社会关系的亲疏。如果道师和事主只是一般的仪式业务关系，则根据市场惯例要价。反之，如果道师和事主存在个人或共同体意义上的联系（尤其对于那些在授职仪式上以个人身份给予过赞助的信众），道师可能会推辞报酬，或者适当降价；第二个考量同样来自某种共同体或宗教的传统，虽然在当下道师的表述中常以人道主义的方式出现。如果事主的家庭经济状况很拮据，或遭遇了重大而悲惨的变故，道师通常会降价甚至不收费。反之，如果事主收入正常或较高，

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\(^{14}\)团队中通过授职仪式、有独立从业资格的道师被认为是主要成员，获得较多收益。道师学徒或乐手等辅助人员相对收入较低。甚至有不少学徒没有报酬，他们以这种方式来间接支付跟师傅学习的费用。
道师则正常要价。甚至存在一些有趣的极端例子，由于认为事主“为富不仁”，道师们甚至会故意抬高价格。在获知价格后，事主通常不会与道师还价。最常见的信众看法认为，仪式之于家族的意义是无价的，还价行为会触犯神灵。但从少数还价者遭遇的他人批评来看，也很难说信众的选择没有考虑社区的压力。幸运的是社区的文化规范同样作用于供求双方：虽然事主不还价，道师也不敢乱开高价，这在客观上保证了市场和宗教的秩序。

不敢讲价，首先你要敬畏。因为死者为大，死人的遗憾是活人最难受的。

为了死人多少钱你都舍得花。所以这个行业没有价讲，就一口价，他讲多少你给多少。或者是为了表示对死者的尊重或者敬重，你给多了，他们也不会退回来给你。正常给一万块的，你给了两万，他也不会退回来给你。有些职业道德好点的，就不要你这么多，说少点就行了。（访谈资料编号：2016011701）

2、仪式类型的商业化：以“买卖契”为例

道师的仪式服务曾经涉及村庄生活的方方面面。在信众的一生中，从婚礼到葬礼，从“鸡不见，猪生病”这类琐碎小事到家族祈福、宗祠奠基都需求助于道师。但在当代道师的活动中，大量传统仪式需求逐步消失，而有一些与市场经济发展密切相关的需求则从无到有、不断壮大。

总体来看，湛江道师们现在的仪式工作主要包括：给村庄庙宇做清斋、葬礼上的幽斋仪式15、引魂、和神灵交易的买卖契、祈福/还福，以及为小孩做的绑桂安名等。近年来，最为兴盛的仪式类型当属“买卖契”。

买卖契，在其他地区又称为买地券（陈国进，2008）。即通过模拟现实生活中的土地契约文书，让生人或死者同各类神祇进行象征性“交易”。在湛江地区，观察到有两种类型的买地券形态，一种是阴契，给亡者墓地做的买卖契；第二种是阳契，给建房（阳宅或寺庙或祠堂）用的买卖契。以下是一则买卖契（阳契）的契文：

15 清斋为阳事，为神像开光和每逢节日做的大型祈福仪式；幽斋，给死者做葬礼的仪式。仪式复杂，需要通过搭班来完成。
该仪式的内在逻辑为：在正式使用一块土地或房屋之前，买家不仅需要完成现实中的产权交易，还需要和掌管这块地的鬼神订立关于土地神圣产权归属的契约，以免事后产生“麻烦”。在这一过程中，道师充当了世俗交易中仲裁人或监督人的角色，并帮助“人-神/鬼”之间实现沟通。随着村民置业范围扩大、类型多元化，传统买卖契仪式也拓展至商业活动的方方面面，而不再局限于超自然力量通常栖息的不动产领域。从产权理论的视角来看，买卖契有可能是世俗层面合同的不完整性导致交易双方诉诸神圣保障的结果；从模式创新效果来看，它也不失为一种市场经济普遍发达情况下道师扩张业务的方法。我们并未在田野中发现更多关于买卖契产生的历史信息，但从这一流行仪式在生活实践中的实现方式和功能来看，它是信仰与市场的混合。
3、业务拓展：跨界竞争与整合创新

作为“守护者”，道师的传统活动范围大体限制在居住村落之内。临近村庄的道师彼此间或为师兄弟，或为合作伙伴关系。实质存在的“势力范围”使得他们认为跨界做仪式是不道义的行为。偶尔特殊情况下，道师会事前告知事主所在村庄同行，取得许可后方才前往。同样受制于乡土社会的熟人关系或出于便利考虑，村民通常也倾向于找本村道师做仪式。因此，当供求关系双方皆受到人情关系制约时，道师有一个稳定的业务范围。类似的规避激烈竞争的非正式制度同样出现在中国其他地区的民间宗教活动中，例如上海川沙火居道士的门眷制度（龙飞俊，2015）和福建的“香花”组织（魏德毓，2006）。一位被访者用商业逻辑描述了传统时代的行业规则16：

因为如果你找本村的道师来做仪式，那么本村道师基于同村兄弟的关系，不
对你讲价格；但是如果你去找外村的道师做仪式了，那么当你下次有事再来
本村道师的话，则有可能本村的道师会要高于平常几倍的价格。（访谈资料
编号：2016011801）

尽管如此，这种格局也在悄然发生变化。道师已经开始逐步拓展业务的地理
范围，并引发日益激烈的竞争。这一方面因为现代社会的高流动性导致乡土社会
解体，村庄内强关系日渐松散，村民可以并不惮于使用弱关系来寻找（价格或资
质）更合适的道师；另一方面，随着仪式收益增加，道师们越来越有动力去获取
并独占更多业务。在那些因管制而失去道师传承的村庄中，道师个人或团队的竞
争已经完成，并形成了完全不同于村落共同体法则的新的利益格局17。事实上，
即便是在本研究关注的成功小团体内部，离心的力量也已经开始萌芽。

提供“一条龙服务”是湛江道师们业务拓展的另一种方式。传统上，道师并
非是村民仪式需求的唯一供给者。由于多神信仰与仪式本身的复杂性，乡村宗教

16 调查中经常遇到的这类情况是，道师在描述传统时代活动规则时，会不自觉地引入当代的市场逻辑来加
以解释。这一方面因为所谓“传统时代活动规则”中也存在交换逻辑，另一方面可能在于被访者无意的错
位表达。但当我们追问传统时代是否存在明确要价时，对方通常会适时纠正调整。
17 依靠社会网络是道师获得业务的重要方式，武伯的姐姐嫁到石头村后，经过姐姐的介绍，武伯在石头
村也接走很多业务，这令石头村的道师们感到不满。
市场内还存在风水师、算命先生、神婆等多个卖家。道师们通常不提供除科仪规范之外的其他服务，信众如有额外要求必须自行联系相关。他们将这一严明的职业分工视为自身专业性和“神圣性”的重要证明，并与其他仪式供给者划清界限。在道师们看来，村民选择神婆占卜来判定仪式成功与否是一件荒诞不经的事情。这类“封建迷信”与他们所从事的具有历史渊源的规范宗教活动格格不入。

但是这一情况同样发生着改变。近年来，越来越多的年轻道师们意识到整合多种仪式活动的意义：这首先意味着业务量与经济收入的增加，其次也能够有效规避仪式中来自不同神圣传统的“解释冲突”。看风水与算命占卜是道师们主要的扩展领域。他们中不乏有人投至专业风水师门下，系统学习相关知识和技能。新生代的道师们甚至开始在理论层面寻找关于自身行为的合法性解释：在论及这一变化时，湛江道协的袁副会长认为这是一种对传统的回归。

我们道教本来倡导的就是一整套生活方式。其中很正常就包括了养生啊，命理啊，风水啊这类内容……他们这种想法不对，本地的道师们也是条件所限，没有那么多机会系统学习这些东西，所以他们不会，后来就说这不是他们的工作范围。实际上你去看正规的道教学院，这些东西都是涉及的。他们现在开始弄，一方面是为了赚钱，这个也不隐瞒，但另一方面确实也是回归传统。

（访谈资料编号：2016012401）

4、道师的个人偏好：声誉与收益的均衡

在神圣与世俗之间，道师的偏好同时涵盖声誉和经济收益。后者取决于仪式业务量的多少，影响声誉的因素则比较复杂，主要涉及道师的品行、职业资质、执掌仪式效果等方面。其中，品行主要指道师的个人道德，是他在乡村社会中人际关系的反映。对于村落共同体时代的道师而言，由于流动性和可替代性极低，作为村落“守护者”的他们非常重视自身的品行，这甚至构成了声誉的全部。但
在市场化日趋明显的当下，道师们愈发重视专业性的声誉来源。

职业资质包括道师的等级、从业资历和文化水平等硬性指标，尤以前两者影响明显。在湛江地区，道师的等级分为六级，由低到高分别为：杜宫、老君、便宜、三洞、金宜和双金宜。当地道师每主持三次清斋可向上晋升一个等级，以此类推。道师等级代表的是仙职高低和能力差异，行业内成员彼此之间非常了解，不过除非仪式特别重大或类型独特，一般信众不会主动探究这类信息，也并不非常在意。

相比而言，执掌仪式的效果是最直接而重要的声誉判断标准。作为观众的仪式购买者们能通过道师念经时的流畅程度、措辞的好坏和韵律、神情动作等做主观评价。在被问及如何保证判断准确性时，供求双方表达了一致的看法：村民未必懂得仪式的每个步骤，然而就像看表演那样，“现场丰富多彩、有气势就是好”。

在仪式市场中，村民评价在很大程度上决定了道师在潜在客户中的声誉。

声誉的影响因素已经表明，它和经济收益并非独立变量，而是彼此交织，互为因果，共同构成了道师的复杂偏好。对于不同时期的不同个体而言，偏好构成差异巨大，体现了现代中国急剧变迁的特征。在道师还不能通过执掌仪式来获得足量经济收益的年代，他们的旨趣在于对仪式“神圣性”的追求和由声誉带来的乡村权威。由于等级代表了超自然能力和神圣地位，将仪式做为信仰旨趣的道师倾向于追求更高的等级，以实现宗教内的自我满足；另一方面，高等级的道师能够为村民处理更多更复杂的事务，相应地也更容易获得社区声望，声誉构成了道师们乡村权威的来源（李向平，2012）。现代社会中，村庄权威已被村庄中的经济精英和政治精英所替代。道师对声誉的追求更多与其带来的经济收益勾连在一起。随着仪式市场的发展，道师作为服务供给者的角色日渐明显，彼此间竞争也日趋激烈。通过有选择性地提升甚至“制造”声誉，可以快速提高经济收入。这一工作的基本原则是，在获取声誉成本与迎合消费者需要之间达到微妙的均衡。

道师们对高等级的追求看似随机，实则深刻反映了获取均衡的环境复杂性。如果活动范围之内鲜有竞争对手、消费者对等级信息不敏感，或简单仪式与复杂仪式之间的收益差别不大，道师则倾向于忽视等级；反之，他们将努力寻找升级的机会。在调查中我们发现，石头村的道师不看重等级。因为该村的道师业务范围从来都只局限于村内，村中道师都没有升职的机会。绝大部分村民不仅不关心，
甚至不了解道师有等级划分，相反的，道师等级在南柳村则是村民茶余饭后讨论的热门话题。该村有三户道师，等级高低不同。拥有金宜（次高等级）职印的武伯能够争取附近绝大多数业务，而只拥有“三洞”等级的矮伯和珠伯的业务量很少。在这样一个竞争相对激烈的市场中，高等级道师不仅具有起点优势，甚至会在日常活动中传播关于等级与仪式效果有联系的观念，进一步夯实自己的领先位置。无论出于神圣或经济考虑，被相对压制的低等级道师也接受了这一看法，并倾向于和前者组团合作，而非直接对抗。例如，同样为武伯的团队成员，来自石头村的森叔只拥有较低的“便宜”，但他不仅不在乎等级，而且一直谋划离团单干。不过这一倡议并没有得到（与武伯同村的）矮伯和珠伯的支持。

5、“矛盾”的宗教观：职业化与突破禁忌

伴随行为的商业化，湛江道师自身的宗教观念也发生着改变。与火居道士的传统定义不同，当代道师们开始放弃仪式之外的营生，逐渐专职化。在这一过程中，宗教的意义开始走下神坛，向“世俗性”方向滑动。据年龄较大的受访者回忆，以前道师们对仪式持有严肃的宗教态度，将神职身份作为个人和家族的终极意义来追求。在文革时期，不少村庄中都有道师因为遭遇打击，家传神像和仪式法本、用具被烧毁而感到信仰崩塌，最终自杀的极端案例。现在虽然仪式活动如火如荼，但心怀虔诚信仰的道师已经不多见。职业化道师从无到有，所谓神职悄然从身份认同向工作选择转变；

做的是迷信，自己也不完全相信，不过就是按照传统的规则来做，仪式做完后，村民安心就可以了。以前跟了一个老师傅，他和我爷爷同辈，爷爷死了后叫我去到跟那老师傅学习。有一次，老师傅拿了个神像回来开光，然后我按足步骤来做。他对我说：“搞少点就行了”。我说这怎么行呢？他说：“行了”。老师傅常对问我说“骗钱东西，骗钱东西”。老师傅的心态都是那样，像这样我还信什么呢。搞了之后心里舒服就行了，没有这么计较。（访谈资料编号：2016011601）

当然这一过程并非一蹴而就。道师们固然能把仪式的操作尽量“世俗化”与
技术化，但却尚未将“神圣性”彻底从日常生活与价值规范中抽离。哪怕是那些极善经营的道师也认为“在神灵面前还是要有一种敬畏的态度。无论你做了多大的官，当你跪在神灵面前，那就要谨慎，不敢乱说话。”而在涉及家族传承问题时，宗教性考虑也扮演了底线规范的角色。湛江地方上流传着这样的说法：家里要是做这一行就要世代代代做下去。做下去家族兴旺，不做则对家族不好。因为祖上有“坛”，供奉着神灵，那就要每天烧香供奉，每逢节日奉上祭品，烧些元宝香烛。神灵也喜热闹，道师云游四海去做仪式的时候神像也可以出游，神像高兴家族也就兴旺了。不然，家有神坛却无人祭奉，神灵也不会让家族兴旺。由于年轻一代大多流出村庄，很多道师家族面临着继承难题。如果继承中断的家族遇到了变故，他们则将其归因为神灵的惩罚。这种想法在道师群体中依旧根深蒂固。

如果说职业化与神圣性之间的张力还存在区隔处理的空间，仪式市场的巨大经济诱惑与宗教禁忌则已开始正面对冲。给死者做超度往生的幽斋是道师们日常仪式活动中最重要的内容。按照道教传统看法，尸体的晦气会让法事失灵，道师在仪式过程中不能接触（甚至不能眼见）死者。随着政府强制推行殡葬改革，死者不能回到农村土葬，而是直接送到城郊的殡仪馆。由于在这种“阴气”极重的环境中几乎不可避免地会接触死者，道师们都不敢去殡仪馆。一批城郊的农民替代了道师的角色。通过模仿日常所见的仪式，他们提供简单且昂贵的法事服务。虽然部分死者家属知道这些人没有从业资格，而且费用比一般市场价格高很多，但出于无奈或便利考虑，依然会选择购买。

对此道师们的态度十分矛盾。他们一方面认为，“这群人都是乱做骗钱，因为如果按传统打斋都是有一定的程序步骤，要做一天一夜才能完成，这批人就拿锣敲一两小时是不可能做完的，也肯定做不好”，另一方面又有不少人非常渴望进入这个被禁忌封闭的市场。在田野工作中，我们了解到至少有两种“权宜之计”来帮助道师突破禁忌，它们无一例外需要借助对宗教规则的修改：第一种是火葬与仪式分离。在了解必须火葬后19，道师们会引导家属将骨灰带回家中，按照传

19 例如，死者生前担任公职或家族成员有公职背景时，殡葬改革执行的压力会很大，他们通常会选择火葬。但对于普通家庭而言，压力则不明显，仍然普遍流行土葬。
统程序操办法事，随后将骨灰盒土葬或送回殡仪馆。道师们的新解释认为，仪式中重要的是引领亡者魂灵回到故土或祖屋，以便进入家神序列就位。至于骨灰盒放置于何处并不重要。这种方案已经被很多道师采纳，虽无法获得包揽“一条龙”服务带来的高收益，但仍然很有吸引力；第二种是在殡仪馆内设置隔离空间。道师们认为，只要不亲眼看到死者或接触不洁之物，法力依然有效。可以考虑在殡仪馆内设置一处独立的房间和过道，按照传统方式操办。这种想法目前仍处于构思阶段。以武伯为代表的道教协会领导们认为，国家政策必须遵守，信众诉求和宗教的严肃性也应得到保护，所以操作办法需要“与时俱进”，这构成道协今后工作的重要内容。

6、市场之外：政治合法性建构

武伯们的看法体现出湛江道师与（政府所代表的）正式规则间的关系变化。虽然改革以来传统逐步复兴，但直到上世纪九十年代，政府对民间宗教活动的态度仍非放任自流，而是屡屡下文要求拆毁各地民间祠庙、清除神像，宫观以外的宗教活动多遭禁止（朱海滨，2009；顾冠福、龙飞俊，2010）。道师的情况也不例外，武伯在回忆从业经历时说：“1985年，市政法委书记说我是搞迷信活动，多次被他们查，后来找了关系才躲过去……90年开始还受到一点影响……直到2005年之后，才会变得比较好点，但还是不算合法”。此类遭遇让他开始认真思考道师身份正式化的问题。最初，武伯和一些道师计划自行筹备协会，让本地道师能够合法执业，但一直未获得政府的积极反馈。后来广东省提出各地市都要组建宗教协会，湛江道教协会于2011年成立。由于湛江地区没有成规模的道教宫观，绝大多数道士都是火居村内的正一派民间道师，武伯作为该群体中最有影响力的代表于2013年当选协会会长。

抱着“正式化”的想法，武伯上任后大力推动设施建设、人员管理与传统改造，试图让饱受“封建迷信”标签污名化的湛江道师获得政治合法性。首先，通过争取政府拨款、募集企业和个人赞助的形式，协会计划在湛江郊外修建一座全新的正一道观。除了便于仪式活动开展和宗教理念传播之外，协会管理者们认为固定场所的意义更在于其象征性：在政府眼中，一个拥有正规道观的宗教群体
显然更具有合法性：其次，在湛江全市范围内建立从业道师名录，宣传号召他们加入协会。一经成为会员，原本散兵游勇的道师个人将能获得官方认可的合法性身份，并可以有更多彼此交流与合作的机会。当然，会员的义务在于每年需要缴纳一定数额的会费 ②；第三，改造道教传统授职方式，引入官方授箓与民间授印并存的“双轨制”。不同于湛江地区道师自办民间仪式后即可获得象征从业资格的职印（stamp），中国道教协会每年会在不同的道场（如江西龙虎山等地）为有限数量的申请人提供官方授箓。武伯认为，虽然民间授印已能保证在本地正常从业，但当道师们需要走出湛江时仍存在各种障碍 ①。正是基于这样的考虑，他在长子入职时不仅花费巨资（20 万元）操办民间仪式，同时也通过社会关系争取到了一个官方认可的名额。武伯认为，这是湛江道师群体未来发展的必然方向。

随着仪式市场日渐繁荣，道师行业的收费制度正朝着市场经济的方式转变；其业务范围也从村庄之内向周边拓展。在以多种策略争取业务的过程中，传统村庄守护者的角色逐步让位于仪式商品供给者。道师们关于宗教“神圣性”的观念正逐步消解，但是其信仰规则并未被工具性的经济诉求完全替代，而是在日常实践中体现出宗教、经济甚至政治合法性等多重诉求的混合行为。

四、从“宗教供养者”到“仪式商品购买者”：道师信众的世俗化进程

与道师的转变类似，村民的宗教观念也正在逐步去神圣化。家族祖先、地方鬼神崇拜曾经是湛江民间社会的主要信仰形式。村庄的祭祀、村民的人生礼仪都需要依靠道师来主持。通过为道师入职仪式筹集资金，村民承担了民间宗教供养者的角色。

近代以来，科学思想的传播、建国后的各类政治运动、新意识形态的教育持续不断地影响着村民的信仰内涵与方式。原本自然而然的信众对民间宗教的看法逐渐世俗化，日趋接近某种“神秘习俗”或者“乡规民约”。随着改革开放以来

② 关于会费的具体金额，我们并没有获得准确的数字。比较常见的说法是普通会员 700 元/年，理事及以上干部则更高。
① 有趣的是，他本人并不能很明确地描述障碍的具体内容，只是相对笼统地表示只有获得官方认可的道师才具有真正的合法身份。
的社会转型，传统乡村共同体在高流动性的冲击下逐步解体, 信众日趋分化, “仪式商品购买者”角色开始浮现、扩大并开始取代前者。对于绝大部分仪式消费者而言, “神圣性”和 “世俗性”的混合偏好主导了他们购买行为。仅在过去三十多年中，湛江道师信众的信仰轨迹就已深刻反映了宗教偏好变化的复杂性。

1、混合行为：从 “礼物交换”到仪式购买

与道师们收费方式的变化类似，村民们在仪式市场的崛起过程中，也经历了从“礼物交换”到仪式购买者的转变。在村落共同体时期，通过参与集体赞助道师民间授职仪式，村民实质上完成了某种仪式消费的储蓄。当道师为村庄提供祈福仪式时，村民可以凭借共同体成员身份享受相应福利；当道师为个人或家庭提供仪式服务时，村民也需要根据通常情理和经济水平来给一个 “红包”（金钱或实物）作为答谢。作为礼物经济的重要表征, “红包”意义不只在于金额的相对随意性，更在于非货币支付形式所暗含的不同于市场交易的价值观。

随着仪式市场逐步成熟，村民们在习惯购买者身份的同时也伴随着复杂观念的变化。悖论之处在于，广义传统复兴条件下村民的 “再信众化”带来了蓬勃的宗教需求，这可被视为一种 “神圣性” 的回归；但另一方面，信众们满足神圣需求时却选择了最世俗化的市场购买方式。这种宗教与市场的混合逻辑首先体现在村民们 “不议价” 的行为中。由于处于对神灵的畏惧，村民们不会将与道师的交易等同于一般交易。

不敢讲价,首先你心理就敬畏。因为死者为大,死人的遗憾是活人最难受的，为了死人多少钱你都舍得花。所以这个行业没有价讲,就一口价,他讲多少就多少。或者是为了表示对死者的尊重或者敬重,你给多了,他们也不会退回来给你。正常给一万块的,你给了两万,他也不会退回来给你。有些职业道德好点的，就不要你这么多，说少点就行了。（访谈资料编号 2016011701）

混合逻辑的第二个表现在于议价过程前置。虽然不敢和道师讨价还价，但是村民们并非放弃经济权衡。在请道师之前，村民们会通过社会网络来比较选择合适的卖家：一方面这个人要能胜任仪式的要求，另一方面他的历史价格要在可承受范围之内。
他们知道请什么样的道师需要什么样的价格，高级一点的要收贵一点，有的
什么要差几千块，不过只要老百姓敢去找这个人，也就接受了这个价格。不
太清楚怎么做（请道师）的村民会召集家人、懂的朋友在一起商量，看谁做
得好，价格怎么样。（访谈资料编号：2016011802）。

2、不彻底的宗教观念复兴：在“神圣性”与“世俗性”之间摆动

与“神圣目标”和“世俗手段”矛盾并存的逻辑类似，村民们复兴的宗教观
念并未从极端“世俗性”（无神论者）径直走向“神圣性”，而是在二者之间摆动，
表现出复杂的组合形式。

在常规传统仪式中，村民的宗教行为更多是遵循习俗的产物，并不涉及明确
涉及道教教义的具体规范。每逢初一、十五、神诞日，湛江村民们都有拜神的传
统。虽然这些仪式大多仍需道师主持（并需要收费），但多数村民更愿意将其视
为某种具备神圣意义的日常活动，自然也会考虑经济因素。

（做了不知道有没有用，但）不做这些仪式也怕，心理不太安定。反正仪式
花的时间也不多，就半天就可以完成，拜神买的祭品（鸡、猪肉）也花不了
什么钱，拜完神之后也是自己吃的，所以做这些仪式就无所谓了。（访谈资
料编号：2016011902）

即便是在涉及个人具体需求的仪式活动中，也存在一类的神圣偏好“粗糙化”
的购买者。固定重复出现的仪式消费证明他们存在宗教需求，而对仪式质量的低
要求则表明这种需求并不简单源于宗教。在谈及道师等级的重要性时，有村民
表示这不是做仪式的主要考虑。

（我）没想过要找等级比较高的道师来主持，因为就我的心理是这些事情办
过就可以了，我也不全部相信这些事情，不用搞得特别复杂。我就是说有这
样的事，办去平安就可以了，还有找这个招那个，还有比较好的，比较好的

22 这种低要求并非因为环境约束导致，而是购买者综合考虑价格与需求强度后的选择结果。
我就要考虑的。（访谈资料编号：2016011701）

当然在涉及重大事件的仪式中，村民的宗教行为也会相应表现出更高程度的“神圣性”，甚至采用多信仰组合来保证意义。即便也认为仪式的效果很难确定，但对这位村民而言，“亡父的灵魂是否回到家中”是一件非常重要的事情，值得以虔诚的态度对待每一个环节。

仪式的回报很难立竿见影，但是总觉得心里上容易接受，会好一点。我父亲二十几年前在医院过世，后来我去问神婆，神婆说没有回到家里做家神。后来我就请道师到坟前引他的魂回来。后来我再去问神婆，已经回到家里做家神，说我祭拜的东西都收到了，听这么说后我就安心了。（访谈资料编号：2016011701）

3、宗教管制：村民宗教偏好变化的结构原因

上世纪八十年代以来快速发展的仪式需求表明，绝大多数村民经历了一个宗教偏好“从无到有”的过程。造成这一变化的结构原因在于国家管制松绑。1949年后，中国政府实行了严苛的宗教管制政策。在共产主义的意识形态下，大量民间宗教被视为封建迷信而遭到清除。这种行为约束与政治宣传结合的管制方式对普通村民的影响尤其深远，直接的后果是造就了两代人截然不同的宗教偏好和变化过程。

共和国建立前成长起来的村民始终对道师和仪式抱有相对“神圣性”的态度。尽管经历了多年政治运动和意识形态教育，他们对宗教的信仰或敬畏依旧根深蒂固。据年长的村民回忆，哪怕是在管制最严厉的时期，村中的仪式祭礼也没有完全中断，而是转到地下。很多较大规模的仪式不得不因陋就简或彻底取消，但大量小规模仪式仍然在夜晚的村民家中悄悄举行。

建国后的一代人情况则有不同。毛时代的教育使他们一度坚信神灵根本不存在，世俗性的政治理想与领袖精神填充了信仰的真空。随着文革结束，极左意识形态不断削弱，这些村民的宗教偏好重新出现。在描述自我观念变化时，有村民
下意识地模糊了世俗性信仰与神圣性信仰（宗教）之间的差别，但这种混淆恰恰说明了信仰偏好变化的连续性。

毛主席的时候我根本不相信鬼神的存在，所以小时候根本不怕鬼，晚上躺在坟墓上睡也不怕。因为毛主席最大，能压的住所有的牛鬼蛇神。毛主席死后，看到羊城晚报报道：天气变，北京故宫就有巫女跳舞，又有说西安有锣鼓敲，马步响。科学家连卫星都能上天却解释不了这些东西，迷信迷信，它这是一个谜。现在想起来，如果到墓地去睡，还真的有点怕（访谈资料编号：2016011901）

4、神通证据与人生境遇：村民宗教偏好变化的实践逻辑

关于管制松绑提供了宗教偏好变化的结构条件，本节关注的问题是：当自由选择空间出现，“无神论”个体是否必然转变为信徒？在湛江村民的日常生活中，这类转变主要以何种方式发生？

通过村民口述可以得知，道师所代表的正一派道教传统从未成为湛江村庄中普遍、严格的信仰。无论过去或当下，影响村民“信不信”的关键始终在于村民对神通的感受。如果有些东西让他们不得不信，这种亲历的神灵显现能够增强甚至激活村民对宗教的信仰。

祖宗传下来的东西，应该相信的就相信，不应该相信的就不信。如果有一点矛盾的，在家里有什么事情搞完了就平安了那就相信。之前村里有个老太，她孩子在医院留医，说话也听不懂，医生也找不到病因。道师说这样是命运低了，可能是在路上被鬼神搞了。后来去问问神公是什么回事，神公也告诉她应该怎么处理。当天晚上他们就去处理了，第二天早上，弟弟就去看哥哥，哥哥说来看我做什么，我不是好好的吗。按照这个事情很奇怪，你说相不相信？

我们认为，宗教的概念外延需要包含更多的内容与形式，但不应涵盖所有的信仰类型。当所有的信仰都归入宗教信仰后，这一概念的意义就因过度泛化而消失了。

即某种宗教信仰并非以共同体意志的方式强迫个体接受。
信咯，大哥马上就好了。（访谈资料编号：2016011702）

类似的变化也可以通过消极的方式发生。当遭遇到重大事故或家族灾难时，村民会将厄运归因于未能很好的完成仪式以满足鬼神的需求。不同强度的厄运会促使村民从无信仰者转变为单纯仪式购买者，甚至虔诚信徒。有一位被访者讲述了自己的亲身经历。父亲去世时，他们一家四兄弟并不相信要按规矩做幽斋仪式，认为“搞这些东西没什么用”。加之当时政府禁止丧葬政策严厉，他们便自行将父亲火化后下葬。后来兄弟们各自的家庭生活都遭遇了变故，在求助于神婆时被告知是因为“没有把父亲的魂魄招回来”，于是只好匆忙找道师补做了仪式。经历过这件事情，兄弟们对道师的看法大为改变。

由于道师与传统社区的紧密关系，仪式所代表的宗教意义已经与家族规范高度融合。因此当村民在经历家族内角色与地位变化时，宗教偏好同样可能改变。年轻村民们经历的变化很好地反应了这一点。随着年龄增长，年轻人将逐步从长辈手中承接家族祭礼的各项事务。当老人们陆续去世后，新的家长们会在履行家族义务的过程中重新发现宗教的意义。

想我以前父亲还在的时候，我也就知道这个事情，但是我就不用操心，父亲去世后，我就要理所当然，自然而然的接上了，传承嘛。到了一定的年纪后就义不容辞的要搞这些东西，像是使命感、要传承。（访谈资料编号：2016011701）

这种源自人间事务的使命感增强了村民们对鬼神的敬畏，足以使一个原本自认为“无神论者”的人产生与世俗道德（孝道人伦）有机统一的宗教观念，并将自我的变化推及他者。

现实中，我看到比我年轻的一代更加的重视，更加迫切，因为在中国的传统文化中有孝道，他们觉得在生前尽的孝道不够，那么死后的排场要更好。所以中国的孝文化是根深蒂固的，所以这个市场²⁵是不会消失的，有那个孝道

²⁵这位被访者并未主动使用“市场”概念来描述道师与信众的关系或行为。这段表述是他对我们表述的借用。
在，那个市场就在那里。（访谈资料编号：2016011701）

村民从供养者向仪式购买者的角色转变体现出信仰世俗化的特征，这一过程从未遵循“单线进化”的规律。高度市场化的行为与“神圣性”诉求彼此融合，使宗教复兴的道路蜿蜒曲折，扑朔迷离。管制松绑为宗教偏好再生提供了自由，但信众在生活实践中不断将信仰拉下神坛，用当代中国流传甚广的市场逻辑将其重塑，最终形成属于这个时代的民间宗教。

五、结论与讨论

正如杨庆堃教授（2007，P39）在《中国社会中的宗教》中所说：“从一个宽泛的视角看，宗教会被看成一个连续统一体，从类似于终极性、有强烈情感特质的无神论信仰，到有终极价值、完全由超自然实体所象征和崇拜并有组织模式来支撑的有神信仰。”包括湛江道师在内，散布于中国社会之中的大量民间信仰都具有某种广义的宗教属性。作为当代社会科学研究宗教现象的重要范式，宗教市场论理应超越其产生的西方“地方性”，在多元田野经验的挑战中完善与发展。本研究的理论诉求首先在于此。

通过深入讨论供求双方的偏好结构与行动策略，我们希望为市场分析范式找到或夯实其微观行动的基础。与此同时，完成这项工作也将有利于扩展理论的解释边界。令人遗憾的是，由于本文所依赖的湛江道师个案中并没有足够的信息可供讨论宗教市场的宏观变化，我们无法在新的理论框架下与斯达克就教派间竞争、信众规模演化等问题展开具体讨论——而这些恰恰是传统宗教市场论的核心关注之一。不过，在其他关于中国宗教现象的研究中已经出现了类似的经验：正是由于神职人员和信众都具有“世俗性-神圣性”混合的偏好，才会出现纷繁复杂竞争、继替乃至剧烈冲突（黄芸，2016；刘大伟，2016；严学勤，2016；姜伸、何玲，2016；闫飞飞，2016）。

本研究的第二个（更重要的）理论诉求在于探索经济社会学对（以宗教为代表的）文化现象的分析范式。伍斯诺（2009）在“宗教与经济生活的新方向”一文中比较了新旧观点的差别：旧研究从理性化模型和市场的角度看待宗教经济
行为，而新研究更强调社会嵌入的意义。对此我们认为，社会嵌入作为一种前提假定的修正或补充与市场模型并不矛盾。如果说宗教的原初意义代表了一种人类社会的规范，那么身处其中的普通人无时无刻不在考虑的问题恰恰是“利益互动与规范互动如何实现双重均衡（包括何以不能实现双重均衡）”（刘世定，2014）。换而言之，建基于偏好讨论的宗教市场模型依然拥有巨大的理论潜力。

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WANG Qiyong 王其勇, Peking University

Abstract
This is a case study of the role and position of one kind of popular religion, i.e., ancestor worship, during the process of contemporary Chinese social transformation in Tengyuan, Huizhou district. This paper insists that, though ancestor veneration suffered seriously in Communist movement in China, this traditional faith penetrated into the red cult which rose after 1949, and had a close relationship with the official or mainstream ideology as in history. On the one hand, the red cult is actually grounded in Chinese ancestor worship, which can be accepted by the Tengyuan villagers. Partially, it is the ancestor veneration tradition in China that help the people to make sense of their “duty” to the red martyrs who were molded into grand “revolutionary elders” by Chinese authorities. In the close relationship with the dominant revolutionary faith and ideology faith after 1949, the ancestor worship of Tengyuan village survived in the “baptism” of Communism. On the other hand, after the collapse of the social structure of People’s Commune and the decline of the ideology of collectivism since the late 1970s, both of which were generated in the Communist movement; the traditional ancestor worship found its position in performing the function of integrating the old community and promoting the village’s self-government. In Tengyuan village, it was through the rebuilding of their founding father’s cemetery and the recovery of the public worship of their common ancestors at the point of 500th anniversary of the village that the members of the rural community got united which made their self-government be possible again.

当代中国社会转型过程中民间宗教的角色与位置——对一个农村社区祖先崇拜的个案研究

摘要
这是一篇是有关当代中国社会转型过程中腾源村这个徽州地区的祖先崇拜的角色与地位的个案研究。本文认为，虽然祖先崇拜在中国的共产主义运动中遭到严重的打击，但是这种传统渗透到了1949年后兴起的红色膜拜当中，就像在历史上一样，与官方或主流的意识形态具有了密切的关系。一方面，官方的红色膜拜实际上是以祖先崇拜为基础的，因而可以为腾源村的村民所接受。部分地，正是中国的祖先崇拜帮助人们理解他们对于被官方塑造为崇高的“革命先辈”的红色殉道者的“责任”。由此，在与1949年后的主流革命信仰和意识形态的密切关系中，腾源村的祖先崇拜在共产主义的“洗礼”中幸存了下来。另一方面，自从1970年代末人民公社的社会结构崩溃以及共产主义的集体主义意识形态衰落以来，传统的祖先崇拜在发挥整合腾源村这个古老社区的功能并促进这个村庄的自治的过程中找到了自身的位置。在腾源村，正是通过在建村五百周年之际重修这个村庄的开基祖墓和恢复对他们共同祖先的崇拜的过程中，这个农村社区的成员重新团结起来，从而使得这个村庄的自治再次得以可能。

Introduction: background and questions
Since carrying out the reform and opening policies in late 1970s, Communist China has witnessed the “resurgence” of traditional religion. However, it seems that five officially sanctioned religions appear to have been paid more attention in the reasearch of religion revival in China. However, in my opinion, popular religions may be the more influential faith form in China. As we shall discussed, for Weber, ancestor worship and other folk cults are crucial to the solidarity and self-government of the traditional sib-village society; and, for C.K. Yang, as the “diffused religion”, the ancestor worship and other popular religions are Chinese native and core faith which had been gone in wide rural society before the institutional religions, Buddhism and Taoism took roots in China. Thus this paper focus on the description and explanation of the change of the popular religions in the social transformation during last several decades, which would be more likely to help us to understand the “religious resurgence” in contemporary Chinese society.

Although Yang affirms diffused religions are the dominant faith in Chinese society, he has a pessimistic view of their prospects in modern China. He holds that, traditional “diffused religion depended largely on the fate of the secular institutions, and did not have the enduring quality of the great universal religions…But in the contemporary period, with its emphasis on science and its strong trend toward secularization, the religious aspect of social institutions has been fast retreating into the pages of history with little likelihood of return. Diffused religion, once a dominant factor in Chinese society, seems to have lost irrecoverable grounds. In other words, the diffusion of popular religion was its unfavorable factor in the coming “secular” society. What’s more, after 1949, for “…traditional Chinese religious life was mostly diffused in the secular social institutions, and that, as old institutions crumbled under the impact of new social pressures, their theistic symbols also waned or died. Continued consolidation of the Communist system would cause further decay of the traditional institutions which, in turn, would bring, progressive weakening or even elimination of the old religious elements diffused in them.” That is, ancestor cult and other popular faith would eventually fade away.

It seems that the assumption behind Yang’s pessimism of popular cults is that: in face of the social and ideological transformation brought by the 1949 revolution, the diffused religions would not survive. While the communist ideology and social system declined, folk religions have experienced a renaissance since 1980s. If Yang’s assumption was too pessimistic, then what the success of the 1949 revolution brought to popular religions? How they survived in the dramatic social and ideological transformation since 1950s? What’s the relationship between the revivalism of the popular religions and the second transformation of the communist China? This paper tries to offer a distinct persepctive through a case study of ancestor worship in contemporary China. Before beginning, it might be well to clarify several related concepts and introduce the case I have chosen.

Related concepts and the case

If we chose ancestor worship as the case study of the revivalism of popular religions in China, then one may ask what are Chinese ancestor worship and popular religion?

In terms of definition of ancestor worship and popular cult, each one has his own point of view. But a tolerant attitude towards of the question of religious definition has been accepted by more and more scholars since Max Weber. As we know, Weber begins to the study magic, the belief in spirits, ancestor worship and other rise of religion without any religions definition in his Sociology of Religion.\(^5\) As for “The one ‘lay religion’ prescribed by the state was the belief in the power of ancestral spirits and its cult. Popular religion otherwise remained, in principle, a completely unsystematic pluralism of magical and heroistic cults.”\(^6\) Here, for Weber, ancestor cult is an important part of Chinese popular faith. The ancestor worship is anchored in village which usually was named after the dominant sib. In the Chinese self-governing sib-village, “The cohesion of the sib undoubtedly rested wholly upon the ancestor cult.”\(^7\) In other words, functionally, the ancestor cult was key to the village’s integration and solidarity.

After Weber, C.K.Yang was among the sociologists who made great contributions to the study of Chinese ancestor worship and other popular religion. He dissatisfied with some western missionaries sinologists as well as Max Weber who viewed Chinese religions from a Christian perspective and mistakenly regarded Chinese people “as a superstitious lot” among whom there was no importance of religious element. As we mentioned above, Yang insisted that there were two structural forms of religion: institutional and diffused religion. The highly developed diffused religion includes ancestor worship and other popular religion, “with its theology, rituals, and organization intimately merged with the concepts and structure of secular”. The institutional religion includes Buddhism and Taoism, “which has a system of theology, rituals, and organizations of its own, independent of other secular social institutions.”\(^8\) Nevertheless, even there was no obvious tension between the institutional religion and the secular social structure. According to Yang, it was “the dominance of diffused religion and the relative weakness of institutional religion” that could explain the obscure place of religion in Chinese society.\(^9\)

While Yang critized Weber’s understanding of the place and role of popular religion in Chinese society, he was also indebted to Weber. On the one hand, Yang’s definition of religion was influenced by Weber’s theodicy; on the other hand, has accepted Weber’s functionalist approach to Chinese religion. As diffused religions, Yang interpreted the popular cults as communal events “outstanding in the local life”, which could “provide a collective symbol that would transcend the divergence of economic interests, class status, and social background, so as to make it possible to coalesce a large multitude into a community”.\(^10\)

It's worth pointing out that the ancestor worship was not included in Yang’s popular cults, for he considered it as the family practice which contributed to the integration of family and helped its

\(^8\) C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society : a Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors, University of California Press, 1961,
members to deal with the crisis in the daily life. In fact, the Chinese rural community used to be an extended family, sib, or confederations of sibs, thus ancestor worship usually was an communal event. Thus the ancestor worship may includes worship to family ancestors and cult of the common community ancestors. Now we may define ancestor worship simply as a popular religion which has diffused into the local social institutions and turned to be part of the concepts, rituals and structures; functionally, it facilitates to the integration and solidarity of the local community by its symbols and practices.

The case in this paper is about the transformation of ancestor worship in a sib-village which was named Tengyuan and located in the northeast of Wuyuan county, Jiangxi province. This rural community used to be part of ancient Huizhou (徽州) district before 1949 and shares the same dialect, custom, food culture, and architectures. Like many other parts of the country, Huizhou is a traditional region with highly developed ancestor veneration and other popular religions in history.11 May due to its geographical isolation and transport hurdles, many aspects of its custom have retained traditional style throughout its history, and the ancestor veneration and other popular are still practiced by the Tengyuan villagers today. Thus the ancestor worship under discussion is a collective cult in a rural village. As described by Yang’s diffused religion, the ancestor cult was and is part of rural community’s social structures, but without independent institutions.

Nevertheless, the choice of the ancestor worship in Tengyuan village has additional and more important considerations. It is obvious that ancestor worship and other popular religions had been sharply impacted by the 1949 revolution. However, if Yang’s prediction of Chinese popular religion’s fata after 1949 turns out to be wrong and the assumption lies behind is too pessimistic, then we have to reconsider the relationship between the traditional popular faith and the communist revolution. We have to bear in mind that, as Yang have noted, communism was very a “new faith”12, which means that it had to take full advantage of the popular religious resources, or it would be hard to accommodate to the traditional religious ecology after 1949 success. In fact, as I will noted, this process had began as early as decades before 1949, and brought a two-way interaction between the new faith and traditional religion, say ancestor. In a sense, Tengyuan village is a social laboratory which happened to combines these factors together by a special historical event and permits us to observe and consider how the ancestor worship suffered but susrived in the new religious ecology after 1949, and revived after 1978.

This article is the result of long-term effort. Participation in Tengyuan village’s ancestor worship enables me to experience and descript the scene. Reading of Tengyu Genealogy and the deep-interview made it possible to have knowledge of this sib-village and its long history. Even the monuments which recount the historical events or record the name and account of the donators facilitate me to reconstruct the history.

Now, let’s put ourselves in two symbolic scenes in Tengyuan village in 1995 to experience the old ancestor worship and the communism faith.

12 See C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society : a Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors, University of California Press, 1961, Chapter XIV.
A paradoxical scene: the intertexture of red martyr cult and ancestor worship

On the 1995 Qingming Festival, the pupils of the primary school in Tengyuan Village were organized to lay wreaths at two tombs around the community under the leadership of the school teacher and the local elders.

Firstly, these pupils with red scarfs (红领巾), which is the mark of the Chinese Young Pioneers(中国少年先锋队), walked to one of a cemetery lying in a small col at the back of the village from their school. Chinese Young Pioneers is a mass youth organization for children aged six to fourteen and is run by the Communist Youth League(共产主义青年团) that comes under the Communist Party of China (中国共产党, CCP). At this time of year, they used to participate the patriotic activity of “sweeping the revolutionary martyr's tomb”(祭扫革命烈士墓).

When the children stood in the front of the grave, their headmaster began to announce the activity agenda:
1. All stood, salute
2. Introducing the heroic deeds of the revolutionary martyr by the teacher
3. Laying a wreath
4. Three bows
5. Lament for 3 minutes
6. Singing the song of “We are the heirs of communism”
7. Making a pledge by all students
8. The end

After all stood and salute, In the teacher’s brief introduction, we learn that the “revolutionary martyr”, who named Zhang Jinxing (张金星), laid down his lives here some sixty years ago. The dead once was a red soldier of the force of Fang Zhimin (方志敏), one of the prominent early revolutionary leaders from the CCP. During its trip north in 1934, Fang’s force encountered then government army, Kuomintang’s (KMT) troops which led to an intensive fighting near the village.

Zhang was one of the badly injured who thus could not keep up with Fang’s force after the fight and had to seek help in the village. Unfortunately, this revolutionary was killed by the “despotic landlord” in this col. In fact, he was buried alive as a common “bandit”, for brigands were popular in this meeting belt of two provinces and the villagers were harassed by them at that time.

Though the martyr’s name was remained after his death, no one knew his native place, family, and other personal information. In fact, there are thousands of graves of unknown warriors in southern Chinese province ——Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan, and so on——which could date back to 1930s when one of CCP’s leader Mao Zedong and others conducted several years guerrilla warfare and established a local regime. Mao’s communist enterprise brought millions of “red army soldiers”13, and Zhangjinxing but was one of the martyrs. After 1949, Zhang’s deserted tomb had been rebuilt by the community and he became a hero or “revolutionary predecessor”(革命先辈). Since then, the village primary school organized Tomb-Sweeping activity every year to visit the revolutionary martyr on Qingming festival with the purpose of helping the students to inherit the “glorious tradition” of revolutionary predecessors and enhancing their enthusiasm of patriotism.

After the ceremony, after the lament of teachers and students for 3 minutes, the patriotic activity culminated in the stage of the pupils’ chorus of “We are the heirs of communism”. At the end of

13 According to the statistical data offered by official Jiangxi Memorial Hall of Revolutinary Martyrs (江西革命烈士纪念堂) in Nanchang, Jiangxi province, there are about 250,000 martyrs during these years.
the song, the students swear an oath with their tender voice: “(We) always get prepared to strive for the great cause of Communism”.

However, with the end of the service, the pupils did not go back to school directly as before. This was a special Qingming festival for the children, for they were asked to attend another ceremony at a newly rebuilt huge cemetery on the hillside of the entrance of the village. They would be amazed to find that all the villagers also had stood before the grave with the community’s elders. At the summit of the cemetery are the words on the tombstone:

_Tomb of Xin An Wu Kou twelfth generation ancestor, the revered Wang Daochong and Lady Wang (_

_All the villagers of Tengyuan (_

_Re-erected on Chung Yeung Festival, 1994 (_

Obviously, this is the cemetery of the village’s ancestors. Xin An is another geographic names of the Huizhou district in ancient. According to the genealogy of the village (村谱), as the twelfth generation of the clan, Wang Daochong led the clansman to settle here from Wu Kou, another village far from Tengyuan, in 1495. The previous year (1994), the village had rebuilt the cemetery for the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of this rural community. As we know, Qingming festival is an important traditional day of ancestor worship for Chinese people to go to sweep their ancestors’ tombs and commemorate their forefathers. Thus the villagers were holding the public service of ancestor veneration before their founding fathers’ cemetery.

During the ancestor worship ceremony, one of the elders served as the temporary priest, other were deacons. The ceremony proceeded in a solemn atmosphere. Firstly, the priest made a short speech towards all the villagers. After that, every sacrifice—pig, lamb, cock, wine, fresh fruit, and the wreath—were offered and put on the altar by the deacons. One deacon slashed to the neck of the cock whose blood was sprinkled over the cemetery which was part of the cleansing ritual. Then they lighted a bundle of incenses which were distributed to the villagers. At the same time, the priest praised their ancestors for the enterprise they initiated hundreds years ago and prayed for the prosperity of the village in future. Now all the villagers bow to their ancestors reverently for three times with the incenses in their hands. After that, these incenses are inserted in a burner. After the priest sprinkled the wine in front of the grave, the two hours of service was over. People began to light plenty of fireworks and firecrackers which shaken the whole small village.

From a historical perspective, this is a paradoxical scene with the intertexture of red martyr cult and the old ancestor worship. The death of the red solider signifies the village’s betrayal of the revolution, which brought the community a political disaster after 1949, for not only the “despotic landlord” and their descendants endured severe political prosecutions in the village’s class struggle, but also the communist atheism that mobilized the red martyr to devote himself into the revolutionary “enterprise” turned to be the orthodox ideology in Chinese society after the success of the Communist revolution. In this background, as discussed below, the traditional religions and faiths suffered seriously, the ancestor worship was banned as the feudal superstition since then. What’s more, the success of the communism revolutionary also generated the red martyr cult. However, paradoxically, in 1995, alongside the established cult towards the atheism red solider, the traditional ancestor veneration regained its place again in this post-communist country.

The question is that, from the perspective of sociology of religion, what it means for the
appearance of the ancestor worship and the revive of the popular religions in this rural community? How should we perceive and understand the relationship between the ancestor worship and the red cult? What’s the role of the traditional worship in the post-revolutionary Chinese society? What are the factors that spurs or promotes the appearance and development of the ancient tradition? This paper tries to answer these questions through the case study in Tengyuan village. The article below will begin with the trace of the veneration in Tengyuan village and the review of the traditional relationship between the ancestor worship and other three mainstream religions in history, then goes back to analyses the realistic factors that promote the development of it in the community. In my view, the combination of the historical and local perspective would contribute to the understanding the development and future of ancestor worship and other popular religion in contemporary Chinese society.

**Traditional religions in Tengyuan before 1949: landscape and relationship**

Ancestor worship was out of the special religious and social context in traditional Chinese society and had a close relationship with dominant religions in history. In this part, we try to review ancestor worship and other popular religions in Tengyuan village before the success of Communism revolution in 1949.

According to our investigation in the Tengyuan village, there was only one Buddhist nunnery, but no Taoist shrine in history. Thus, for the absence of religious architecture and regular clergies, Buddhism and Taoism belief were not obvious. However, Buddhism monks and Taoist priests from other communities usually provided important services in the community’s religious life, especially in the ancestor worship. In addition, some members of the community have the belief in Avalokitesvara and enshrine the Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva image in their home. In a word, Buddhism and Taoism are important component of the village’s faith.

In contrast, the popular religion, especially the ancestor worship once was highly developed in the village. In history, the public worship places and architecture included Land temple (土地庙), Guandi Temple (关帝庙), Wenchang Temple (文昌庙), Wuchang Temple (五猖庙), Longwang Temple (龙王庙), Ancestral temple (祠堂), and the cemetery of the twelfth ancestors (开基祖墓). In terms of faith types, faith of Yin-yang and the Five Elements (阴阳五行信仰), geomantic omen faith (堪舆信仰), reproduction worship, nature worship, agricultural deities faith, patrons of crafts and trades faith, historical figures and hero worship, and, most importantly, the ancestor worship, once were all very prevalent in this community.

The villagers tell us that, until 1949, all the temples and faiths were popular with the continuing incense in various temples and halls throughout the year. According to the elders, the Ancestral temple and the cemetery of the twelfth ancestors used to be the most important religious sites for this community, and the sacrifice and worship were the most significant “public” services in the whole village.

In my opinion, the investigation in the Tengyuan Village indicates that, if the institutional religions, Buddhism and Taoism, usually are out of the the rural community in space and organizational system, the popular religions, such as the ancestor worship, and their religious buildings and institutions, are always part of the community. Regionally, the typical religious landscape in traditional Huizhou district usually centers on ancestor worship, but also with other popular religions and the three major faiths, though the latter may not be apparent. In this sense, the institutional religions may also diffused in the popular faiths.
Historical perspective: interactive patterns in traditional religious ecology

While Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism were the mainstream religions in ancient Chinese society, the popular religion held a special and important place in China’s vast rural areas. In fact, both the three mainstream religions and the popular religion were indispensable to the ancient religious ecostructure. Weber insists that, as the dominant ultimate value system in ancient Chinese society, Confucianism “presupposed the unbroken and continued existence of purely magical religion…it applied to ancestor worship which was equally fundamental for official and popular religiosity…”14. “The leading intellectual stratum, officials and candidates for office”, who usually belongs to Confucianism group, “had consistently supported the retention of ancestor worship as absolutely necessary for the undisturbed preservation of bureaucratic authority”.15 In fact, some scholar holds that respecting-god-and-abiding-to-ancestors([敬天法祖]) is the core faith in Confucianism.16

Additional, ass we learned in Tengyuan village, other two mainstream religions—Buddhism and Taoism—often offer essential religious service and play crucial roles in the ancestor worship and other popular religions. C.K. Yang’s study indicates that, in the two parts of rites of the the traditional ancestor worship, “mortuary rites which immediately followed death” and “sacrificial rites which maintain the long-term relationship between the dead and the living”, some services “were performed by hired Taoist and Buddhist priests”17. The relationship between ancestor worship and Buddhism and Taoism descried and revealed by C.K. Yang could also be affirmed in our case study of the Tengyuan village below.

We may say that, the three major religions was the “great tradition” at the macro level; however, the popular religions operated in the vast rural society and penetrated into people’s daily life directly in history, even the mainstream traditions have to offer services within the “small tradition”. C.K.Yang summarized the relationship between the popular religion and mainstream religions in his masterpiece Religion in Chinese Society: “In many situations institutional and diffused religions were interdependent. Diffused religion relied upon institutional religion for the development of mythical or theological concepts, for the supply of gods, spirits and other symbols of worship, for the devising of rituals and sacrifice, and for the service of technically trained personnel, the priests. Thus Buddhist and Taoist theology, gods, rituals, and priests were used in different forms of diffused religion such as ancestor worship, the worship of community deities, and the ethicopolitical cults. On the other hand, institutional religions relied on rendering such services to secular institutions in order to sustain its existence and development. The two forms of religious structure were thus mutually related in their functional role in the religious life of Chinese society”18. In other words, Yang considered Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and all other Chinese traditional popular religious and rituals as an integrative system which contributes to Chinese social order from above and below retrospectively.

Followed Yang’s approach, David Faure in his Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China describes and discusses how the orthodoxy ideology and the popular rituals and cults

in the clan-based society leads and guides the local community. Faure argues that “corporate lineages of anthropological lore were not a natural part of the social landscape; instead, they were the institutional means that local families adopted to interface with the central government”\textsuperscript{19}. It seems that Faure thinks the corporate lineages conspire with the orthodox ideology to control the local community through ancestor worship the popular cults and rituals.

Recently, Stephan Feuchtwang regards the popular religion as imperial China’s metaphor and uses it to define the relationship between the popular or local religion and the government and its Orthodox. However, he was not satisfied with Yang and Faure’s approach, and insisted that: “There is of course a relation with imperial cults and their ideology. The time in which the imagery of local cults is set is the same cosmic time as the claims to legitimacy of the ruling dynasties. But local cults are created and disappear in a distinctive dynamic. They are constrained by government, but their dynamism does not confirm that of government. So this book definitely does not argue that the religion of local cults reflects and reinforces government”.\textsuperscript{20} Despite him excluding the ancestor worship from his popular religion\textsuperscript{21}, Stephan’s view is very inspiring for me to reflect the ancestor veneration in the Tengyuan village, which I have included in the popular religions.

The brief review of the religious landscape in Tengyuan village and the relationship between ancestor worship and institutionalized religions in Chinese religion history informed us that, the institutional and diffused religions, or the mainstream and popular religions were in a symbiotic relationship and turned to be an integrative ecological system. For a long time, the ancestor worship and other popular religions had taken their roots in the rural society and played an important role in people’s religious life. On the other hand, Stephan’s view informs us that “there was an interplay between orthodoxies and heterodoxies, both of them in the plural, each reflecting upon the other”. In other words, the orthodoxies was unable to unilaterally change and easily replace the popular religions, but the latter had chance to shape the former and to survive in the religious ecology.

**From 1949 to 1978: the fade and reemergence of ancestor worship**

With the success of 1949 revolution, China had undergone the radical transformation from a tradition society towards the Communistic society. Nevertheless, after the failure of the Communism ideal and experiment, Chinese society has arrived at the post-communism era after 1978—as far as the Communist ideology loses its mobilization capability over time. In terms of Tengyuan village, what’s place, if any, left both for the dominant ideology and the popular faiths in Chinese society in the radical social transformation? What the role of religion plays respectively in the two stages of Chinese revolutionary?

First, from 1949 to 1978, while the traditional mainstream religions (Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, etc.) once were strictly limited, popular religions were often suppressed and banned as the feudal superstition. In Tengyuan village, Land temple, Guandi Temple, Wenchang Temple, Wuchang Temple, Longwang Temple, no one is immune to the Communist revolution of atheism and ruined in the movement of “Attack on the Four Olds”—old thoughts, old culture, old habits, old customs. Even the ancestral temple was destroyed and the primogenitor cemetery had been

\textsuperscript{21} See Stephan Feuchtwang, *The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China*, p3, where Stephan makes a distinction between territorial and political religion and ancestral cult in family and clan.
converted for a tea plantation, both of which used to be the most important religious facilities in the village. In a word, the success of the Communism revolution had destroyed nearly the popular religious system in this rural community.

While the ancestor worship and other popular religions were suppressed by the dominant ideology of atheism, the new revolutionary faith was arising in Tengyuan village. On the one hand, the fanatic personal worship of Chairman Mao was of religious in nature. In 1960’s, the village had to “ask for instruction and give reports on morning and evening” (早请示, 晚汇报) and pay homage to the “great leader” before every meal (早敬、餐敬、晚敬) in front of Mao’s “sacred portrait”. The showing of one’s royal and love and the pre-meal service in front of Mao’s portraits are highly “similar” to some religions’ confession, pray, praise and other practices. When Mao died in 1976, people offered their private jewellery and burned them in the village’s public square. It seems this is the funeral ceremony in the traditional ancestor worship as C.K Yang described.

Another newly formed red faith in the Communism transformation is the cult of the red martyr and revolutionary site as we described above. From Jinggang mountain (井冈山) to Yanan (延安), from Zunyi (遵义) to Xibei Po (西北坡), from Bayi Square (八一广场) in Nanchan to the Monument to the People’s Heroes (人民英雄纪念碑) in Beijing, there are thousands of revolution “Mecca” around the country. Every year, say, on Qingming festival, various of observances and Commemorations are organized by the authorities and local communities to “cherish the memory of our revolutionary martyrs” (缅怀先烈) and inspire people’s enthusiasm for patriotism.

Weber once commented: “Yet there is no communal activity, as there is no individual action, without its special god. Indeed, if an association is to be permanently guaranteed, it must have such a god”.22 Thus, he noted that, “This is already true of such primitive groups as the household and the sib, in which the primary bound is the relationship to the spirits of ancestors, actual or imaginary…. A high degree of development in the domestic cult of ancestors generally runs parallel to a patriarchal structure of the household…”.23 He continues, “But as the example of Israel demonstrates, the connection between these factors is not a simple one, for the gods of other social groupings, especially those of a religious or political type, my by reason of priests effectively suppress or entirely destroy the domestic cult and the priestly functioning of the family need”.24 With the success of the communist revolution, the red cult and atheism began to destroy the traditional ancestor worship system in Tengyuan village and the whole country.

However, since 1978, it finds that many popular religions or cults had been preserved rather than demolished in Chinese post-Communist transitions. In Tengyuan village, people begin to worship their ancestor in their family, and, finally, rebuild the primogenitor cemetery of their village by the chance of 500th anniversary of this rural community. We learned that this reconstruction mobilize lots of labor and financial forces, which were contributed by the villagers in and outside the village. Nevertheless, on the 1995 Qingming Festival, it is the first time that the Tengyuan villagers participate the “public” worship of the community ancestors after the worship system being destroyed in the revolution of communism atheism. Since then, the worship of village’s founding father turns to be the annual public service.

Through the review of the fade and reemergence of ancestor veneration in Tengyuan village and the general Chinese society after 1949, it finds that, though the Communism revolution of atheism destroyed ostensibly the ancestor worship system, this belief (and other popular religions)

had been preserved within the Communism revolution, such as in the personal worship of Chair Mao and the cult of the red martyrs around China. This is the background of the development of ancestor worship in the transformation from Communism to Post-Communism China after 1949.

**Interpretation of revival: interactive pattern and structural change**

In his *The Imperial Metaphor: Popular Religion in China*, Stephan Feuchtwang raised one question: whether the politics of mass mobilization under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao-Zedong-thought are best described as “religious”. His is answer is that it might be called “political rituals”.

Because of all the reasons outlined above, it would be sensible to designate it religious or new faith. In other words, a new religion had emerged in Chinese traditional religious ecology after 1949 and we have to explore the new interactive patterns in it. The direct result is that “the effect of rituals of mass mobilization, which replaced, suppressed or destroyed all religious rituals.” However, after 1978, “since the ending of the politics of mass mobilization”, the local cult, including the ancestor worship and other popular, survive and revive.

Then, Stephan asked an more important question which is key to the understanding and interpretation of Chinese contemporary religious revitalization: to what extent do they contain the effects of preceding political rituals?

As discussed in the above section, traditional ancestor worship offers the red martyrs cult a good chance to take roots in the Tengyuan village, which helps to develop people’s enthusiasm of patriotism and reinforce the CCP regime. In the Chinese patriotism education, communist authorities always emphasizes that people should respect and memory the “revolutionary predecessors”, who fought for the founding of the Communism China. I deem, at least partially, it is the ancestor veneration tradition in China that help the people to make sense of their “duty” to the red martyrs and their Communism “enterprise”. The martyr cult in the Tengyuan village reminds me of what W. Lloyd Warner described in the cemetery of Yankee City on the Memorial Day. Just as the civil religion tradition in western society usually have close relationship with the ancient Roman folk religion and Christian faith, the red cult in contemporary Chinese society seems also the combination of the dominant ideology and the tradition religion, say, Confucianism and the ancestor veneration. In the close relationship with the dominant ideology faith after 1949, the ancestor worship and other popular religion survive in the “baptism” of Communism atheism, and develop further in the relative relaxed political environment since 1978.

If the red cult of “revolutionary predecessors”, along with other factors, provides the opportunity for the survival of the ancestor worship, and the policy of reformation and opening at the post-Communism era brings this popular religion a loose political environment, then what’s the very factor that promotes the “revive” of it in the last thirty years in the case of Tengyuan village? For the changing of political environment could not be the very reason of the development of the ancestor worship. Further more, what’s the future of this popular religion in rural society of the post-Communism China? Before we can answer these questions, we have firstly understand: what is ancestor worship in Chinese history? What the social structure does it base on? And, what’s function it performed in history?

Weber insists that “The ancestor cult was the only folk-cult that was not managed by the

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Caesaro-papist government and its officials. Rather, the head of the household, as the house priest, managed it with the assistance of the family. For Weber, ancestor worship was anchored in the self-governing sib-village, “[T]he villages were often named after the sib which was exclusively or predominantly represented in the village. At times the village societies were confederations of sibs”. As a self-governing community, the village of sib regulates its inner customs and rule, maintains its inner order, provides the village basic welfare; it also “faced the outside world with solidarity”. In the self-governing rural society, “[T]he cohesion of the sib undoubtedly rested wholly upon the ancestor cult”. In other words, functionally, the ancestor veneration promotes the integration and solidarity of traditional village.

However, the social structure of the traditional Chinese village had changed dramatically after 1949, which caused the fade and emergence of ancestor worship. From my viewpoint, this change could divide into two stages:

First, after 1949, the traditional autonomic sib-village society transformed to the society of collectivism People's Communes. In the process, the CCP's primary organization penetrated into the rural society, and the private land and estate, which used to belong to the sib and was the economic base of the sib organization, were all put under the collectivism People's Commune. The result was that the People's Communes offers the member of the village all the basic welfare. In this new rural social structure, while being deprived of its economic and social-organizational base, the ancestor worship also lost its necessity of integrating the rural community and maintaining the solidarity of sib, for the collectivism had been the ideological base of the Communism commune and was able to mobilize the rural population to devote themselves to the Communism “ideal”.

After 1978, the collapse of People's Communes in the post-Communism era means that it could not demand basic need and offer essential welfare to the rural population. Though the land was still in the hand of the abstract “village collective” (村集体), the new “household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output”(家庭联产承包责任制) was introduced into the rural society which endowed the member of the community with considerable autonomy and power on the land and agricultural production. More and more rural families left the commune and turned to be the “individual farming households”(单干家庭).

However, for a long time after the reform and opening up, Chinese peasants, as in Tengyuan village, were still forced to undertake the economic and labor burden to finish the public projects, such as dredging river, building roads and bridges, etc, in the name of collectivism in the rural area, even they could no longer enjoy the welfare from the original commune. These burdens were so heavy that made them feel highly dissatisfied and the State Council of China as well as Jiangxi provincial government had to issue two rules in 1997 and 1999 which tries to standardize and relieve the peasants’ burden.

On the other hand, the rural communities, such as Tengyuan village, had been unable to organize their members to repair and maintain the public load, farmland irrigation establishment, and other public utilities for decades after the People's Communes dismantled. For not only the

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32 Since 1990, the State Council of China and the provincial governments issued notices and rules which asked the lower authorities to reduce peasants’ burden until 2006 when most of these burdens were exempted by the Chinese central government.
frequent political struggles after 1949 caused the community to come apart, but also the ideology of collectivism actually was seriously shaken in the collapse of the “people’s commune” and gradually lost its mobilization capacity in the rural society. The result is that the rural society were in a crisis of solidarity, which impeded the operation and development of the rural community.

In Tengyuan village, it was through the rebuilding of their founding father’s cemetery and the recovery of the public worship of their common ancestors at the point of 500th anniversary of the village that the members of the rural community got united which made their self-government be possible again. Since then, this remote and isolated rural community carried on an massive village rebuilding: the farmland irrigation establishment has been regularly repaired and maintained; all the village road has been hardened; new stronger bridges and pavilions are built over the clean-up stream which runs through the village; community convention protects the water source from pollution and bans on fishing in the river; recently, the village even reconstructed a free public parking and two public toilets. General speaking, this rural community has been under effective self-government and construction. In contrast, the official movement of “construction of new socialist countryside” (社会主义新农村建设), which defines the “new socialist village” with the character of “product development, living in affluence, custom civilization, appearance neatness and managing democracy”, was put forward until in recent years.

In his speech at the service of the ancestor worship in 1995, the elder reminded the village that they were of the same clan and origin, thus they should get united and have the duty to carry forward the enterprise of their ancestor began five hundred years ago. In my opinion, one the on side, the self-awareness of their common ancestor and the long history of the village makes them revered their ancestor; on the other side, the consciousness of their mutual-relationship and duty helps them overcome the inner estrangement and distrust caused by the Communist political struggle. From the perspective of sociology of religion, when the social structure—the People’s Commune, which established after 1958—breaks down and the collectivism gradually loses its ability of ideological and social mobilization, the ancestor worship contributes to strengthen the integration and solidarity in the rural society. This may be one of the most direct factor, which promoted the “revive” of Tengyuan’s ancestor veneration in 1990s.

Conclusion

In my visit in Tengyuan village, I have learned that most of the elders who in charge of public affairs are also communists with a party standing of several decades. This indicates that the CCP’s primary organization is still lead the rural society. However, from another standpoint, this also means that, no matter how the CCP hopes to dominate and govern the Chinese rural society, the traditional culture and religions still should be respected and be taken seriously. In Chinese religious history, there existed close relationship between the mainstream faiths and the popular religions in traditional religious ecology. Both the Orthodox and the popular religion are highly dependant upon each other.

To some extent, the interactive pattern discovered by Stephan Feuchtwang have been transplanted into contemporary Chinese religious ecology. The red cult is actually grounded in Chinese ancestor worship, which can be accepted by the Tengyuan villagers. It seems to the villagers that the dead deserve to be treated with respect and it is the living’s duty to visit and sweep their tombs on Qingming festival, even though the dead had no kinship with the villagers or used not to be a member of the community. In fact, on the occasion tomb-sweeping festival, the village people usually worship their ancestors’ “neighbours” who also had no direct blood
relationship with them, for descendants hoping the “neighbours” could help to care for their ancestors in the underworld. From the theological perspective of the ancestor veneration, “Death was considered evil, and a person possessed by death became nonhuman and unpredictable and might do evil even to his own intimate kin…. The living had to adopt precautions against evil influence from their own dead and other associated spirits.” In other words, every dead should be respected. Meanwhile, the red cult of the martyrs, who were regarded as “revolutionary predecessors”, could also be regarded as a more extensive ancestor worship in the modern political community.

These are the reasons why ancestor worship had not been eliminated by the communist ideology and red faith, for the communist orthodoxy also had adapted to the traditional religious ecology and recognized the place of ancestor worship in China unintentionally. Once the people’s communes system collapsed and the Tengyuan village turned to be a limited self-governing community after 1978, the ancestor veneration would have the chance to revive on the clan system, which facilitate the operation of Chinese rural society.

A final note about this paper is that this is a case study of the popular religion, in particular to the ancestor worship. We have reviewed the religious context in which ancestor worship (and other folk cult) existed in history, and described the “fade” and “reemergence” of this faith in the social transformation of China after 1949. However, through the case study in Tengyuan village, we just put forward an local perspective to understand the “revival” of ancestor veneration and other popular religion in contemporary China, but without the intention of drawing more generalized conclusions.

“Three Heads Snake”: Multiple Practice of Local Religion
——The Faith of the God of Wealth in County Y and the Picture of Rural Public Life

ZHAO Hao

Abstract: The aim of this article is twofold. Through describing the worship of the god of wealth in County Y, Sichuan Province, we develop a picture of the complex interactive process among the local religion itself, worshipers and government. The second aim is to show the picture of rural public life. In the practice of worshiping the god of wealth, civic associations such as communities of villages, seniors associations etc have been set up. Groups of worshipers, to some extent, have the property of ethical communities and therefore promote the communication between government and the public, forming a “Local religion-Groups of worshipers- Rural community” connection, and making disperse rural life to be obvious communal.

Key words: Worship of the god of wealth; Multiple practice; Ethical community; Public life; Public characters
近年来，各类宗教新建大量道场，信徒人数剧增，呈现越来越兴盛的整体趋势。不仅是官方认可的五大建制性宗教，而且更为广泛的民间宗教也如雨后春笋，遍地开花，它们借助于相对宽松的政治意识形态环境，利用当地发展传统文化、弘扬特色民俗的机会，迎合广大民众日益增长的灵性需求，恢复、扩建庙观，丰富庙会活动形式，香火兴旺。从空间布局来看，往往形成以民间宗教所在地为中心，聚合邻近乡村的信仰圈层；从信徒群体来看，民间信仰没有严格辨识的宗教身份，信徒主要为普通百姓，且他们不专于某一特定信仰，以地理距离远近作为遴选信仰对象的依据；从民间宗教的类型来看，没有宗教专业人士（僧侣、道士）的寺庙道观、土地庙、龙王庙、关帝庙、灵验的石头树木等，名目繁杂，种类多样。

国内学界对民间宗教的研究方兴未艾，出版了诸多的专著与论文，从整体上概述了民间宗教的现状、类型与特征，同时也不乏深入的田野调查研究，对某一民间宗教或某一地域的民间宗教进行专门探讨。海外中国研究学者很早开始关注中国的民间宗教，并充分肯定了其对中国社会的积极作用，形成了各种不同的理论视角。由于民间宗教种类的多样性，宗教实践过程的复杂性，与具体地域及具体社会环境的高度相关性与互嵌性，民间宗教需要更多的田野研究，将某一特殊的信仰类型在某一特定的地域环境内的宗教实践加以生动呈现，当这样的田野研究积累得越多，越能反映民间宗教实践的真实现状。

本文将做这样的深描，呈现四川省Y县财神垭财神信仰的运作状况，以财神庙为主体，分析它与自身、信徒、政府三者之间互动交往的过程，并聚焦于财神信仰对当地民众公共生活的影响与塑造，以此阐发民间宗教的重要社会功能——促使乡村场域内“公共性”的萌芽。

一、地理环境与庙宇概况

“垭”指两山之间的狭窄地方，多是一处小山包或山间平地，财神垭地处四川省北部Y县林山乡与双碑乡交界地，夹在葫芦山与关顶山中间，山的一边是林山乡某村落，距离林山场镇约四公里，山的另一边是双碑乡某村落，山脚下是一
个大的池塘。财神垭属双碑乡管辖，在双碑乡民众的口中，它地理位置优越，风水好，三面环山，山下有水，远处开阔，这意味着“关”得住，能蓄财富。无论从双碑乡还是林山乡去往财神垭，都只有土路可走，要沿着山湾曲折的道路上山，四轮机动车无法通行，要么步行，要么骑摩托车，一路颠簸。财神垭的位置与传统乡村的佛教寺庙、道观类似，总是处于远离乡镇中心的山上，反倒不及土地庙或药王庙等民间宗教靠近闹市，来往近便。

站在财神垭的山上，在连绵起伏的山峦间还有高灵观、飞龙寺、金子山与之相望，高灵观属于没有道士的道观，飞龙寺是一座供奉观音的寺庙，没有僧侣住持，金子山有一个不知来头的和尚，并由一个道士协助管理。虽然信仰种类不同，但它们的地理布局、信徒构成及运行模式极其相似，信徒在选择去哪一个道场的时候多考虑自身的出行方便，有的信徒这几处道场都走动，因而它们总是将每年大型的庙会时间错开，以避免为争得信众而相互利益受损。群山之间的山坳分布着各个规模不等的乡村，信徒主要来自于这些乡村的居民。

它们的声名此起彼伏，财神信仰最近三年最为盛行，以前飞龙寺与高灵观的名声更大。现在财神垭依靠它独特的历史背景与信仰内容，借助信徒之间的灵验传闻，成为了当地最热门的民间宗教。

由于“垭”的空间限制，财神垭占地面积不大，最前面是一个低矮的小砖房，里面供奉着保存最早的财神像，小房子后面是一颗巨大茂密的黄果树，用石坛围起来，挂着重点保护树木的铁牌，黄果树后面是近些年修建的主体建筑“财神庙”，庙中间供奉着财神像，财神左右分别有两尊神像，左边为药王菩萨、文昌菩萨，右边为观音菩萨、嫘祖像（参看图一；图二）。庙内地上放着一些跪拜的草编蒲团，角落里摆放着信徒购买的香蜡纸钱鞭炮，财神庙台边是一个上了锁的功德箱。财神庙右后方是三间稍显陈旧破烂的平房，平房前面有三、四张石桌。

从财神垭上的房屋建筑与屋内布局可以看出，它与一般的寺庙、道观类似，一样的建筑格局，一样的敬拜仪式，一样的功德捐赠。财神垭中的神像除了自身特色的财神之外，还有人们需求最多的药王菩萨，主管生病健康；文昌菩萨，主管升学考试；观音菩萨，佛教中最亲近大众的神；嫘祖，县是嫘祖故里，这里的微妙原因将在下文分析。财神有时候会寄居于道观或寺庙之中，此种融合在全国的很多地方都存在，甚至财神信仰已经糅合进入佛教道教的义理。

二、财神垭：遗忘的传统与重建的记忆

那么如何证明此地财神信仰的特殊性？笔者通过查阅Y县县志与县档案馆，没有找到关于财神垭的历史记载。但根据看守财神垭的王芝远先生（化名）所说，此地财神信仰从清末已经开始，直到现在香火未曾中断，只是在解放后经历各种社会运动，财神信仰被斥为封建迷信，原来的财神庙被拆毁，然而当地人仍然悄悄敬拜，庙前的小房子就是从文革中保存下来的，近些年财神信仰越来越热门。这与上海的接财神习俗的历史遭遇有相似之处。王的说法得不到客观证实，没有任何的官方文字记载，但他一家三代看守财神庙，他的说法被当作财神垭来历的权威。

财神垭对其供奉的财神类型含混不清，小砖房里的财神面容清秀，文官服饰，应该是文财神范蠡的形象。而财神庙中的财神像面目狰狞，浓眉黑须，手持权杖，身着武将服饰，应该是武财神赵公明或关公。对财神的系统研究，国内的著作并不多，文章也多是文化普及或民俗介绍。

然而实际情况是财神的具体形象及其神学传统对信众来说并不重要，他们更关注这里是否有漫长的信仰历史，有证明此地灵验的故事流传，因此在采访中被访者主要强调两点：财神垭传统久远，未曾中断；这是整个四川境内唯一的财神庙，经常有成都、绵阳市区的人专门赶过来敬拜许愿。据说有人在梦中梦到一个地方，跟财神垭一模一样，最后才找到这里，许愿后果然灵验，发了大财，从今年开始，每年给三千的还愿钱。通过访谈发现，信众来财神垭的主要理由是这里非常灵验，他们多为家人在外工作求财求平安，都能如愿以偿，这种口口相传保证了财神垭持续旺盛的香火。2016年农历正月初十庙会期间，财神垭一天接待了将近一百多名信众，从初一到初十的十天时间接受的捐赠达一万六千元（捐赠部分情况参看图3）。这些金钱由财神垭自己组织的管委会统一管理，其中包括乡镇的官员、当地的村干部与世代看守财神垭的王姓家人。

从财神垭自身的角度来看，在档案资料与历史证据上，传统被遗忘，不能得到有力的支持应证，但它又通过在信徒之间流传灵验故事，讲述过往经历，建立起关于财神信仰的历史记忆，为它成为周围乡村的公共聚集点奠定了基础。当前四川乡村人口普遍减少，大量人口外出务工，乡村凋敝，传统乡村的公共空间不复存在（祠堂被毁尚未复建，池塘边、打谷场等传统的公共场所因为人员减少也不再有聚集的功能），在乡村除了开会、赶集有这样的人数规模，则只存在于民

6 黄景春.上海接财神习俗的历史与现状研究[J].民俗研究，2010（3）：134-145
7 吕微.隐喻世界的来访者：中国民间财神信仰[J].北京：学苑出版社，2001；另外可参看黄景春.30年来财神信仰及其研究状况概述[J].长江大学学报（社会科学版），2008（6）：12-16
8 这一说法笔者尚未证实，四川境内民间信仰众多，还没有统计是否在别处有类似的财神庙。但是财神经常寄居在佛寺道观中，说四川境内只有这一处财神，肯定是夸大其词。
间宗教的庙会之中。开会的政治强制性太强，赶集又太分散，只有在庙会上才形成了有着某种共同需求且自觉自愿的公共空间，虽然每个个人的宗教需求是私人化的，然而它通过一种外在的形式化，将个人的私人化功利化的宗教需求转变为一种可被观察的公共性。

三、财神信仰与信众群体：互惠关系与伦理共体的萌发

民间宗教与信众之间的互动基于互惠原则，宗教输出灵验的宗教产品，宗教产品符合信众的需求，而信众回报维系其生存与发展的捐赠，提升宗教的名气，在这一互惠过程中，彼此建立起稳固的社会关系。研究表明，民间宗教类型总是指向着特定的社会需求，比如土地掌管当地的农业收成，月老掌管着姻缘，龙王则能带来风调雨顺，财神信仰则是与求财求富贵相关。千百年来，中国农村的基本需求没有多大变化，只是不同时期的侧重点不同，传统农业社会，土地庙、龙王庙等香火兴旺，人们所求主要与农业的丰收相关，其次与家庭和睦相关，早生贵子、身体健康、消灾免祸，则给药王菩萨、送子观音等带来了众多的信众，子女升学考试，捧红了文昌菩萨。近些年来，市场经济快速发展，乡村外出务工的人越来越多，社会的价值观转变为金钱至上，发家致富成了一个家庭的最大祈愿，财神信仰理所当然地变成了大热门。

财神垭所提供的宗教产品除了以求钱财富贵为主的财神信仰，还具有多元化的产品供应。药王菩萨、文昌菩萨、观音，这几位乡村最受欢迎、最普遍需求的神灵都出现在了财神庙中，这一过程不自觉地产生一个效应：它不断地模糊各个不同民间神灵的灵验边界，让司职某个具体方面的神灵开始能够管理各种宗教需求。财神垭的财神从管理钱财、掌握富贵的神，逐渐转变为可以满足各种宗教需求的全面的神灵。在采访来财神垭拜财神的信众中，除了求财需求外，保佑身体健康的，怀孕生育母子平安的，官场顺利的，求姻缘的等应有尽有，信众从财神垭获得自己的宗教产品后，他们也能慷慨报偿财神，在新年正月的头几天，不断有信众到财神垭还愿，去年许下的愿望得以实现，今年到此捐赠许下的金钱。从正月初一到初十的捐赠来看，财神垭获得的收入非常可观，2015年的收入总额近六万元，而更重要的是财神垭如何维系这种关系以及如何支配获得的捐赠。日常管理的人员主要由财神垭山下王姓村子的三人组成，他们负责购买香蜡纸钱鞭炮，负责简单介绍财神庙，带领信徒敬拜。信徒将现金投入功德箱，不规定钱财的多少，而对平时来烧香敬拜的信众香蜡纸钱鞭炮都是免费的，信众捐赠数额也随意。钱财由不同的人员组成的委员会民主管理，有效避免了滥用腐败，能将所获捐赠用到合适的地方。所有记名捐赠的信众都登记在册，公示
于财神庙侧墙的黑板上，公开而透明。根据王芝远先生讲述，信徒捐赠的金钱主
要有三个用途：一部分用于财神垭日常开销，购买敬拜用品，办庙会时候准备饭
菜；一部分用于财神庙的维护与扩建，现在这间财神庙主殿的资金来源正是近些
年信徒的捐赠，他们计划积累足够的资金后进一步扩大庙宇规模；最后一部分的
金钱将用来修路，将土路修建成可以通行四轮机动车的水泥路（参看图4：土路与
财神庙门）。从财神垭的金钱管理规划可以看出，捐赠主要用于自身的发展以及
与信徒之间的互惠活动，免费的庙会午餐、免费的敬拜用品，更为方便通行的道
路，都是对信众的回报，因此信众也会对财神庙自身的扩建喜闻乐见。

正月初十是2016年第一次大型庙会，财神垭为从各地赶来的信徒一百多人
提供了免费的午餐，总共坐了两轮十二桌，下午还有陆续赶来的信众。分析这一
现象很有意思，在财神垭庙会的进程中，一个短暂的临时的基于共同信仰的宗教
群体形成了，尽管他们各自的信仰诉求是私人化的，尽管没有证据证明他们对当
前的国家大事社会民生问题交换了意见，但是这个场域的临界状态是公共的，在
当前乡村的社会场域内，没有比在庙会时候更具有公共性质的时间与空间了。从
财神垭与信徒的互惠活动中，指向公共领域的行为作为副产品而诞生，修建道路
是其中最突出的，财神垭准备修建的道路一方面方便了信徒今后的敬拜，另一面
客观上勾连了林山乡与双碑乡的几个行政村落，为民众带来了便利。在目前很多
民间宗教尚没有余力去做超出自身范围的社会慈善事业的时候，这些行动客观上
独立于政府行为，对当地来说也算是一种福利。无不有偶，飞龙寺、高灵观与金
子山的思路和财神垭不谋而合，高灵观目前已经有大路通往山顶，金子山也正在
修建新的寺院房舍。

财神庙会一般会持续一整天，人们在这里会遇到邻近乡村的亲戚或熟人，也
会结识从未谋面的陌生人，一年大型的庙会有四次，正月、三月、六月、九月的
初十，还有一次大型活动是财神的诞辰。这五次活动都会聚集大量的信众，热闹
非常，鞭炮声连天，香蜡从早到晚不熄，源源不断的捐赠进入到了功德箱与账簿，
在这一情势下，财神垭近几年来为了维持自己的信徒群体，一个非常简单的举措
是在乡镇的集市上设立了聚会联络点，形式就像普通的茶馆，每到赶集一些信徒
到聚会点喝茶，看与财神、观音相关的电视剧与电影作品，人们又可以在这里相
互交谈，将不同乡村发生的事情传播，这里会提前告知一些财神垭接下来的庙会
安排，提醒下个庙会的日期。

基于相同需求自主聚集而成的团体意味着人们可以脱离纯粹私人的领域进
入到公共领域，表达思想，有所作为，也意味着人们不受政治强制性的限制，具
有相当的人身自由。结合当前乡村社会的具体状况解读，乡土社会的“私”意味着
局限在家庭之中，不参与任何的公共交换与互惠，而“公”就是要走出家庭，与陌生人、非血缘关系的人形成新的群体，作出超出家庭私事与政府委派强制公事的活动，这样来看，与民间宗教相关连的宗教群体已然具备了伦理共同体的特征，它属于介于家庭与国家之间的社会公共空间场域，它的“伦理”属性不仅呈现了它的“公”大于“私”的特质，而且“伦理”超越了政治认同的局限，开始了奠基于道德主体之上的社会认同。他们所形成的短暂的、周期性的社会场景不能不被当作分散的乡村社会走向共同体社会的一种标志性图景，乡村庙观众多、民间宗教场所林立，庙会一个接着一个，信众的信仰选择又具有重复交叉性，通过民间宗教形成的这一网状的社会状态正在溢出乡土社会特有的“公共性”形态，需要引起研究的广泛重视。他们不是只存在不行动的伦理共体，在面临公共利益的抉择时，共同的民间宗教信仰将发挥组织、动员的社会功能。

四、财神垭与符号化政府：灰色地带的生存策略

根据杨凤岗的宗教三色市场理论9，财神垭处于灰色地带，政府没有正面予以肯定鼓励，也没有给予直接的刁难限制，财神垭曾经历过历史的沉浮，政府的官方话语反对封建迷信，财神垭自然会担忧自身的处境。然而当下政府政策鼓励地方弘扬传统文化，传承地方特色民俗，财神垭找到了可以进入宗教红色市场的契机。对于民间宗教由灰市转为红市，游走在二者之间的艰难过程可以参看两个经典的研究范例，剑桥大学东亚系周越博士的陕北黑龙大王庙研究10，景军的大川孔氏家族的记忆研究11，他们都分别讨论了民间宗教如何在灰色与红色市场之间谋求生存，最终取得了合法性的过程。与财神垭同样作为民间宗教，飞龙寺与金子山“狡猾”地寄居于佛教的名义之下，最近几年Y县佛教发展极其兴盛，县城内的凤凰山不仅新修了金碧辉煌的大雄宝殿，还树立起一尊高大的四面佛，成为了县城的标志性建筑，作为县城的一张名片，大寺兴盛，小寺沾光，飞龙寺与金子山一直将自己定位为凤凰山的下属机构（尽管名义上并没有这样的从属关系）。高灵观有道教作为庇护，四川自古以来是道教圣地，县内各种道观林立，政府自然将道教名义下的高灵观作为道教文化存在的部分。相比之下，财神垭的处境较为艰难，它以财神作为信仰的主要对象，这在整个四川并不普遍，这就要求财神垭能够与意识形态的风险聪明地斡旋，以确保财神垭能够名正言顺地发展自身，举办庙会，吸纳信徒。

9 杨凤岗.中国宗教的三色市场[J].中国人民大学学报，2006（6）：41-47
11 参看景军著，吴飞译.神堂记忆：一个中国乡村的历史、权力与道德[M].福州：福建教育出版社，2013
田野观察发现，财神垭的举措可分为理念的策略与实践的策略两个层面。理念的策略是在宗教观念的宣传上尽量模仿佛教道教，它没有自己的宣传册，没有自己可供读诵的经典，通过仪式的模仿与庙会形式的借鉴，让信众感到财神信仰与寺庙道观差不多。被访的信众就表示信仰财神跟信仰菩萨是一样的，不过是神像有些不一样罢了。财神垭也通过拉横幅或在墙上刷宣传标语来宣示自己的宗教理念，在这些标语之中将目前的国家大政方针容纳其中，构建和谐社会，社会主义核心价值观，全面建设小康社会等，以通俗的表示嵌入在财神信仰活动中。财神垭的墙上最醒目的标语是“四方安宁”，寓意天下和谐太平，另一处是“善者则昌，恶者则亡”，这一观念贴合着中国人朴素的善恶观。通过这些努力以表明财神垭跟佛教道教一样，都是与政府相好的宗教，并不是什么封建迷信，也不会给社会添乱。（参看图5）

财神垭有两项引以为豪的实践措施：第一，在财神垭主殿后面有三间低矮的砖瓦房，房前有一些石桌石凳，在平房正屋门上左边挂着“财神垭乡邻组”，这是属于没有任何政治由头的组织名号，但可以此证明财神垭得到了乡邻的认可，并且为乡邻之间的沟通交流提供了场所。在乡邻组牌子的右边，挂着“财神垭老年协会”，其实应该是“财神垭老年协会”，同时在财神庙正殿的右边也挂着“财神垭乡邻老年活动室”的牌子。近几年县府推动各地成立老年协会，养老问题以及随之而来的老年休闲、老年身心健康等问题成了乡村社会治理的焦点，财神垭在此设立老年协会，平时并没有老年人真正愿意到这里，但老年协会能为财神垭带来政治掩护，即使财神信仰受到谴责，乡邻组与老年协会却都是政府提倡的，政府也允许财神垭挂上这样的招牌，证明它为此作出了一定的贡献，这不仅是财神垭对政府的示好，也是政府与财神垭之间的某种和解，相安无事。第二，财神垭将地方文化主动吸纳到自身的信仰活动之中，Y县是著名的嫘祖故里，养蚕之乡，在财神庙内财神旁边的四尊辅神中有一个是嫘祖，Y县耗费巨资建设了嫘祖陵，一般祭拜嫘祖都会去往嫘祖陵，财神垭将嫘祖像放在了观音旁边，并在财神庙的门口悬挂着另一块招牌“Y县财神垭乡邻组嫘祖文化宣传站”，将自身作为嫘祖文化宣传的一个场所，与县内文化氛围结合，“弱化”财神信仰的风头。（参看图6）

访谈中王芝远先生承认，他们仍然担忧财神垭会被政府当作封建迷信活动对待，他说财神垭不像凤凰山这样的大庙，政府明确支持，如果稍有差错，有可能被勒令取缔。我们告诉他，现在的政府在民间宗教管理上比较宽松，政府的存在只是符号化的，它并不会采取强硬的直接的措施来限制财神垭的发展，但是王认为即使有什么不测，财神垭通过建立老年协会、嫘祖文化宣传站等措施，能掩盖财神信仰的风头，也能为自身争取到良好的政治背景，他们计划等捐赠丰厚之后，
修葺老年协会的房子，让老年人可以真正地在这里喝茶打牌。

通过财神垭与当地政府之间的互动，在博弈之中产生老年协会、乡邻组都代表了一种走出家庭、组建社会团体的公共性。从当前农村的发展现状来看，最为公共性的社会组织莫过于老年协会，由于农村剩余人口以老年妇女儿童为主，人口老龄化的压力波及乡村，来财神垭参加庙会的信众中，老年人的数量占到一半以上，成立老年协会也成了政府的政治业绩考核之一。尽管财神垭的老年协会成立初衷是为了寻求庇护，也没有很好地得以利用，但是我们可以预期未来在财神垭修建道路、修葺房屋之后，老年协会也可能实至名归。同样，财神垭与政府之间的博弈也推进了政府与民间的关系互动，民间力量的自主性得以开发，政府与民间之间的协商通过民间信仰的平台得以小范围内实践，这是“公共性”的利好所在，它一定程度上突破了自上而下单一的“命令—执行”线路，开始了彼此沟通，彼此互惠的进程。

五、“三头蛇”：乡村社会伦理共体及其“公共性”的生成逻辑

上文以财神垭的财神信仰为中心，对其自身发展、财神信仰与信众的关系、财神垭与政府之间关系的三条展开，不仅意图从微观的具体实践上呈现一个民间宗教的日常运作，它如何产生、如何运行、如何发展，而且意在从民间信仰实践捕捉乡村社会正在生成的“公共性”，一个简单的初始的伦理共体初现雏形。当前热衷于讨论中国公民社会如何生成，然而公民社会是一个普遍性的政治哲学概念，它无法容纳多元存在的地方性，更无法用一种模式来涵盖广袤的中国各个具体区域，切合实际的做法是延伸公民社会中有关社群主义、共同体主义的话题，作为一种普世公民社会形成的合理过渡，公民社会的本质是“公”与“私”的辩证关系，“公共性”的发生、发展正是公民构建的内在逻辑所在，显而易见我们在民间宗教的信众群体中捕捉到了“公共性”的属性，“公”不仅意味着政治承认，而且表征了对伦理共体的认同。下文我们将以财神垭以及周围与财神垭同质性的民间宗教，来整理抽象这一伦理共体的生成逻辑。

首先分析这一伦理共体的空间结构，中国民间宗教的空间结构在劳格文（John Lagerwey）想象的乡村中得到很好地阐述，以宗教为纽带的伦理共体典型莫过于西方社会的“社区-教会”连接模式。随处可见的教堂作为社区的中心建筑与精神纽带，不仅成为社区大众的公共集会地，也成为了人们寻求精神寄托、巩固人际关系的场所，教堂的分布广泛，能充分满足人们的需求，以教堂为中心。
的乡邻组成的小型社区成为了在抽象的国家政府与单独的个人之间最为重要的缓冲地带，人们更多谈论的是 community 而不是 state 或 society，社区是公民社会的重要空间表征，社区可以为民众提供养老、医疗、教育等公共服务，同时社区也在不断地演化与建构之中成为某个自然而然的同质社群，以同一学校结成的社区，以共同信仰结成的社区，以相同族裔结成的社区等，这在西方社会随处可见。同样，我们反观财神垭临近的林山乡与双碑乡，传统的乡村在现代化的冲击下产生了诸多形态与结构上的变化，大量外出务工人口导致留在乡土的成员很少，农业机械化的发展解放了土地对人口的束缚，社会变迁中层出不穷问题给人带来各种社会压力，人们需要灵性的安慰，同时传统集体的瓦解、农村公共空间的凋敝使得人们渴望新的团体生活。不同的村庄同质性强，差异不大，村庄与村庄之间的连接由于近些年道路的修建更为便利，各个村庄与村镇县城的交通也更方便。民间宗教多点分散的布局正好适合当前的农村环境，以信仰所在地为中心将周围的村庄连接起来，再通过人们对庙观的重复走动，连接起不同的庙观。财神垭、高灵观、飞龙寺与金子山正好隔山相望，彼此邻近，人们可以就近选择信仰的地方，也可以都去敬拜，通过丰富多彩的庙会活动将信众聚集起来，这不能不让人联想到西方社会的“教堂-社区”模式。这些民间信仰成了连接大众、连接不同社区的纽带，成了人们社交活动、精神寄托的重要选择。宗教场域构成了新的且越来越重要的公共空间，不同于集体时代的政治聚会，也不同于基于市场交易的赶集，“溢出”了更多的公共属性。

其次，分析这一伦理共体的生成逻辑，如何在信仰、信众与政府的叠合实践中产生。借鉴台湾中研院院士黄一农先生在研究明末清初第一代天主教徒时的用词“两头蛇”，以财神垭为主体的信仰实践呈现出“三头蛇”的特征。蛇的形象隐喻狡猾圆润，需要实践智慧去应对民间宗教面临的“灰市”处境。“三头蛇”的第一头，财神垭要处理自身存在的合法性问题，财神信仰的合法性只有通过财神垭不被质疑的历史传统与现实继续存在的合理性加以证明，当前口头相传源自清末的历史，地理位置的风水优势以及曾经遭受的历史沉浮只能博得文化程度低的信众的支持，在今后的发展中将面临着正规合法性建构的考验，能否写入县志，能否做出宗教宣传册都将继续影响到财神垭的后续发展。财神垭同样需要具有规划性，何时扩建庙宇，何时修筑道路，在处理与自身的关系时，也必须涉及到外在的社会关系，走出自身而面向“公”的层面，对中国庙观的借鉴，对信众的社会贡献，对当地社区的贡献，从自身发展的角度，它不得不从一个处在山垭之间的财神小庙走向乡镇、县城，甚至更广阔的地域。被访的负责人提到，已经有来自俄罗斯的记者采访过财神垭，今后还可能更多。
“三头蛇”的第二头，财神垭要设法维持财神信仰与信众之间长期有效的互惠关系。从信众的宗教需求来看，他们所求的内容是私人化的、功利性的，真实反映着当前乡村的社会需求，发财富贵、家庭和睦、出入平安、健康长寿等，但这也是从古至今中国大众信仰的真实需求，镶嵌在当前农村的社会环境之内，它们体现着更多的具体性即时性。财神信仰通过灵验的效应满足了信众的宗教需求，提供宗教产品的同时，它获得了信众的信任，也获得了金钱贡品的捐赠，可以用于财神垭的进一步发展，财神垭主动采取各种措施吸引更多的信众，获取更多的捐赠支持，对老年协会房舍的修筑计划，在乡镇集市上设立联络点，举办庙会的时候准备免费的筵席等，都是它正在付出或已经付出的努力，带着指向社会公众与社区事业的公共性。在财神垭与信徒互动的过程中，信徒组成的伦理共体之能动性体现在通过庙会结交朋友，巩固社会关系，参与公共性质的集会。

“三头蛇”的第三头，财神垭需要处理与当地政府的关系，政府的权威体现在它的意识形态宣传与多变而不稳定的宗教政策中，由躲藏回避到主动亲近、积极争取认可，财神垭设置乡邻组、老年协会，主动为社区做贡献，这种行为容易取得政治好感，树立为当地社会服务的良好形象，其次将县域之内的历史文化传承吸纳进小小的财神庙，嫘祖神像的供奉，嫘祖文化宣传站招牌的悬挂，使得财神垭某种程度上避开了仅仅供奉财神的风头，也能放松政府的警惕。在财神垭与政府的互动过程中，同样重要的后果是政府开始寻找与民间信仰的合作共处，不再是一刀切的宗教压制，财神垭与政府的博弈提供了一种行之有效的民间智慧，这对公民社会的培育非常需要。

本文很少论述政府与信众之间的互动，因为在信众不触犯法律，不走错误的宗教路线的前提下（如加入官方明确打压的宗教），在信仰问题上政府与大众少有交集，浙江温州的教会、北京的守望教会，更早之前的法轮功、东方闪电等，都不同程度地触及了政府治理的底线，因此才发生了直接而激烈的冲突，同样，财神垭的发展存在着隐患，在没有明确的宗教立法之下，财神信仰难以完全进入宗教红市，只能继续游走在灰色地带。“三头蛇”互动之后“溢出”的伦理共体、社会的“公共性”也将在这样的夹缝中艰难前行，悬浮在公民社会建设的表面，集中在信众之间的交往，有限推动着社区建设，实践着民间信仰与地方政府之间的博弈。

六、本文的局限与进一步研究计划

本文的研究还存在着诸多缺陷：首先，田野地点单一，整个研究内容与结论建立在对财神垭这一处民间宗教的长期观察基础上，对其他三处（飞龙寺、高灵、互动之后溢出的伦理共体、社会的公共性也将在这样的夹缝中艰难前行，悬浮在公民社会建设的表面，集中在信众之间的交往，有限推动着社区建设，实践着民间信仰与地方政府之间的博弈。
观与金子山) 宗教场所只是偶尔走访，导致案例单一，从田野调查的时间来看，间隔比较长，主要在每年春节假期进行；其次，由于选取的研究对象地处川北山区，而中国广袤的农村情况复杂，不能贸然以财神垭当地的社会状况推测其他地域社会的“公共性”发展程度，带着强烈的“地方性”色彩，这既是本研究的特色，也是其不可回避的局限；最后，民间宗教实践催生了以信徒构成的伦理共体，本文讨论的“公共性”也仅仅局限于宗教实践之一隅。其他很多地方除了宗教信仰群体外，还成立了石锁协会、戏曲爱好者协会等社会组织，还有很多地方恢复了祠堂，新修了族谱，以家族形态与同姓宗祠组织社会生活，它们同样体现了一种共同体的发展趋向。但是由于本文调研地的限制，在财神垭的邻近乡村没能观察到这些现象。因此需要对更多的农村进行调查，积累更多的案例相互之间比较，才能一窥当前乡村社会发展的全貌。

如果做进一步研究设计，本研究可以在两个方面做更多努力：其一，对与财神垭相邻的飞龙寺、高灵观与金子山做更深入的田野调查，将它们四者作为一个整体，构成以多元民间宗教为中心的社区，研究其基本的社会生活过程；其二，选取外省某个乡村的民间信仰做比较研究，由于财神垭地处川北山区，可以选取一处南方或北方的平原乡村，通过比较研究的结论将会更为丰富也更具有说服力。

附录：文中插图

图 1: 左边为小砖房内的财神像，右边为财神庙中的财神像
图 2: 财神像左边的药王与文昌菩萨，财神像右边的观音菩萨与嫘祖。

图 3: 左边为正月初一到初九的部分现金捐赠，右边为初十庙会的现金捐赠
图 4: 左边为通往财神垭的土路，右边为财神庙正门

图 5：财神垭墙上的两处标语

图 6：财神垭两个门上悬挂的各种招牌
The Role of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement
Shun-hing Chan
Hong Kong Baptist University

Abstract
The Occupy Movement, one of the largest collective actions in the history of Hong Kong, aimed at striving for institutional reform and universal suffrage. This paper presents an investigation of the influence of the Catholic Church on the Occupy Movement from the perspective of social movements, particularly Christian Smith’s proposed concepts on what attributes or assets of religious organizations and believers can help facilitate collective action. This paper argues that the Catholic Church provided “transcendent motivation,” “organizational resources,” and “privileged legitimacy” to the Occupy Movement, which were significant in facilitating the political participation of citizens in general and Catholics in particular during the period of March 2013 to December 2014. The Conclusion section discusses the role of churches in social movements in Hong Kong.

Keywords: Occupy Movement, Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement, Umbrella Movement, the Catholic Church, social movements

1. Introduction

On 26 September 2014, the class boycott organized by the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism to demand constitutional reform came to an end. Many students joined the final assembly in Admiralty that evening. Suddenly, hundreds of students and citizens staged the action “Reclaiming Civic Square,” which was circumscribed by high fences. After climbing over the fences into Civic Square, they were surrounded and arrested by the police. On 27 September, at 10:00 a.m., Cardinal Joseph Zen went to visit the students and citizens outside Civic Square. He reminded the police through a loudspeaker to carry out their duties with conscience: “You are the ones who enforce the law, and I hope that you remember that, within the boundary of law, those who are sitting in Civic Square are our brothers, our Chinese fellow countrymen. They are not slaves, but your brothers. I hope that you respect your brothers within the boundary of law.” On the same day, three Catholic and four Protestant organizations joined together to hold a pray meeting named “Pray for the Peace of the City” from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. In the evening, the Catholic Society at
the University of Hong Kong organized a prayer meeting named “To Pray for the City Overnight.” The activity commenced at St. Vincent’s Chapel at Wong Tai Sin and the Salesians of Don Bosco Monastery at Chai Wan at 12:00 a.m. Bishop Joseph Ha Chi-shing delivered a message during the pray meeting, while more and more citizens gathered outside the Central Government Offices in support of the students. On September 28 at 1:00 a.m., Benny Tai, one of the initiators of the Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement, announced the official launch of the movement. At 8:30 a.m., Father Franco Mello celebrated Mass with Catholic protesters outside the Legislative Council, during which Cardinal Zen delivered a homily.1

The scenes reported above were excerpts taken from a news story in the *Union of Catholic Asian News*, which vividly reflected the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Occupy Movement: Cardinal Joseph Zen took part in the movement in person, and a number of Catholic organizations mobilized their members to support the movement physically or symbolically.

The Occupy Movement was one of the largest collective actions in the history of Hong Kong. According to the report “Public Opinion and Political Development Studies” conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, more than 20% of the population (1.2 million people) participated in action at the occupied areas.2 Many people from different social sectors were involved in the Occupy Movement, of which the Catholic Church was one of them. In the course of the movement’s development, the Catholic Church played a significant role in facilitating political participation in the movement (Chan 2015, 2016).

The influence of the Catholic Church on the Occupy Movement was apparent in two aspects. First, the Church issued public statements and appeals to citizens in Hong Kong, expressing its views on controversial issues during this time of political turmoil. With its high moral legitimacy in Hong Kong, the Church gained sympathy

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1 “The Church organized Prayer Meeting: Cardinal Zen Reminded the Police that the Protesters Were Their Brothers.” *Union of Catholic Asian News* 28 September 2014. Available at: http://china.ucanews.com/2014/09/28%E6%95%99%E6%9C%83%E5%9C%98%E9%AB%94%E8%BE%A6%E7%A5%88%E7%A6%B1%E6%9C%83%E7%9B%E9%99%B3%E6%A8%9E%E6%A9%9F%E6%8F%90%E9%86%92%E8%AD%A6%E6%96%B9%EF%BC%8C%E7%A4%BA%E5%A8%81%E8%80%85%E4%B9%83%E5%85%84/. Accessed 18 June 2017.

from Hong Kong citizens, who directed their support to the Occupy Movement. Second, the Church called on its believers to uphold the principles of faith and organized a variety of religio-political actions, through which the Church was able to mobilize its Catholics to support the Occupy Movement. Even though the Church played such an important role, there has been no research thus far that has provided detailed analyses to explain the influence of the Church on the Occupy Movement (Lam 2014; Leung 2014; Tse 2015; Bosco 2016; Tse and Tan 2016). The current research paper investigated the influence of the Catholic Church on the Occupy Movement from 27 March 2013 to 15 December 2014. The research question in this paper is: How did the Catholic Church provide religious resources to support the Occupy Movement, facilitating political participation in the movement?

Different names for the Occupy Movement need to be explained. The “Occupy Movement” refers to the campaign demanding constitutional reforms that took place from 27 March 2013 to 15 December 2014, and focused on the issue of universal suffrage in selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and members of the Legislative Council in 2020. This Occupy Movement includes both the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (OCLP) Movement and the “Umbrella Movement.” The OCLP Movement refers to the campaign that took place during 27 March 2013 to 28 September 2014. Initiated by Benny Tai, Kin-man Chan, and Reverend Yiu-ming Chu, this movement called for occupying the financial and economic area Central to request that the Chinese Government abide by its promise to allow Hong Kong people to enjoy the rights of universal suffrage. The Umbrella Movement refers to the campaign that took place during 28 September to 15 December 2014. The name of this movement resulted from the international correspondents who captured the moment when protesters used umbrellas to shield themselves from the pepper spray used by the police. Thereafter, the name has been used by researchers in their writings. The Umbrella Movement was loosely led by several groups of social and political organizations, in which the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism were the core. The occupied area of the Umbrella Movement was Admiralty, Mong Kok, and Causeway Bay, rather than Central. Benny Tai once stated that the idea of the Umbrella Movement was different from that of the OCLP Movement. As such, the Umbrella Movement should be conceptually differentiated from the OCLP Movement.

The following sections will explicate Christian Smith’s discussion on the role of religion in social movements, and then explain the background of the Occupy

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3 Ming Bao 31 October 2014.
Movement, as well as the data collection for and methodology of this study. Next, the roles played by the Catholic Church in influencing the Occupy Movement will be analyzed. The final section will discuss the role of churches in social movements in Hong Kong.

2. Theoretical Framework: Religion and Social Movements

Christian Smith (1996), in his pioneering article “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,” pointed out that researchers of social movements have neglected the function of religion in their study of collective action. Smith provided a detailed discussion on what attributes or assets religious organizations or believers possessed that could help constitute or facilitate collective action, which included the following six categories on how religion can make a contribution to social movements:

(1) Transcendent motivation: All social movements confront the problem of motivating their participants to make and maintain a commitment to the collective cause, especially when the activism is costly for participants. Religion offers important and sometimes unique solutions to this problem of motivation (p. 9).

(2) Organizational resources: Movements need a variety of organizational resources by which to mobilize and through which to channel their energy. Organized religion is well-equipped to provide these key resources to social movements (p. 13).

(3) Shared identity: Social movements must construct and maintain collective identities that signify to themselves and the world who they are, what they stand for, and what kind of society they hope to create. Movements lacking coherent shared identities are likely to be culturally and politically ineffectual. Religion, as a pre-existing collective identity that can confer upon or coopted by a movement, represents a valuable resource for the task of collective identity construction and maintenance (p. 17).

(4) Social and geographic positioning: The social and spacial distribution of activists in a society can be an important variable helping to shape the fate of social movements. Religion often enjoys social and spacial characteristics that can promote the strength of social movements (p. 19).
(5) Privileged legitimacy: In many societies, organized religion enjoys a certain authority, legitimacy, and protection not enjoyed by other social institutions and organizations. This authority, legitimacy, and protection can be put to good use for the cause of social movement activism (p. 20).

(6) Institutional self-interest: Religion can aid the cause of a social movement, not so much through its privileged legitimacy, but rather as a result of the purposeful defense of its institutional self-interest (p. 21).

Smith’s proposed categories are illuminative and useful for researchers in their study of religion and social movements. These categories will be employed to investigate how the Catholic Church provided religious resources to support the Occupy Movement. However, among the six categories, not all of them are equally relevant in the context of the Occupy Movement. The following will highlight some of them and show how they could be used as conceptual tools in the present study.

Smith provided a further discussion under the category of “transcendent motivation,” from which the following concepts are relevant to the exploration of how the Catholic Church provided direction to Hong Kong citizens and motivated its believers to participate in the Occupy Movement (pp. 9–13):

(a) Legitimation for protest rooted in the ultimate or sacred: The ultimacy and sacredness associated with God’s will, eternal truth, and the absolute moral structure of the universe can provide a motivational leverage for a social movement.

(b) Moral imperatives for love, justice, peace, freedom, and equity: In most societies, religion has served as a major source of moral standards, from which people can define their situations as needlessly unjust and susceptible to change. In religion, the “is” and the “ought”, the true and the necessary assume and reinforce each other.

(c) Powerfully motivating icons, rituals, songs, testimonies, and oratory: Religion can supply the symbolic and emotional resources needed to sustain collective activism over time. Ideological, expressive, and emotional factors facilitate and constrain the motive of social movement participation and the activism it propels. Religion is well-positioned to lend symbols, rituals, icons, narratives, songs, testimony, and oratory to the cause of political activism.
(d) Ideologies demanding self-discipline, sacrifice and altruism: Religions engender in their followers an orientation of self-discipline, self-sacrifice, self-abandonment, or self-control. These kinds of self-sacrifice can be used for social movement mobilization.

(e) Legitimation of organizational and strategic-tactical flexibility: Strong social movements need to manage organizational, strategic, and tactical flexibility. The sacred texts of all major religions are sufficiently ambiguous that they may be interpreted in disparate directions. Faith-based activists can find legitimations in their sacred texts for a variety of political, organizational, and tactical approaches that may satisfy their movement’s needs.

Under the category of “organizational resources,” the following concepts will be used to examine how the Catholic Church provided material resources to the Occupy Movement (pp. 13–16):

(a) Trained and experienced leadership resources: All established religion takes on some kind of organizational form that necessitates the operation of active leadership, which are invaluable potential assets for a burgeoning social movement.

(b) Congregated participants and solidarity incentives: Social movements need deployable rank-and-file activists to implement their strategies. Organized religion is well-equipped to expand the ranks of grassroots activists by providing ready-made opportunity for network- and bloc-recruitment of new members into movements. When a movement recruits members through religious networks and organizations, along come the well-established structures of solidarity incentives imbedded in those network of relationships.

(c) Enterprise tools: “Enterprise tools” refer to equipment and facilities that expedite information communication and storage. Concretely, they are typewriters, telephone lines, office space, desks, photocopy and mimeograph machines, computers and software, internet access, fax machines, and e-mail accounts. Organized religion possesses many of the “enterprise tools,” and can greatly aid the mobilization of political activism by making them readily available to budding social movements.
The concept “political legitimacy in public opinion” under the category of “privileged legitimacy” is also useful in the present study (pp. 20–21). As remarked by Smith, public opinion accords relatively greater authority to the voice of religion than to other voices in many societies. When a bishop, rabbi, or other religious leader denounces an injustice, lodges a complaint against the government, or calls people to support a cause, it is often taken at least somewhat more seriously than the same declaration spoken by a politician, business person, or secular activists. When religious voices speak on behalf of social movements, they can lend a valuable extra force or earnestness to the movement’s cause. Religion can often capitalize on these factors to draw attention and lend credibility to activist causes, or undermine potential state or counter-movement charges that a social movement represents marginal or extremist elements.

3. Background: Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong

The Occupy Movement in 2014 was an episode of continuous social movements striving for democratization in Hong Kong. In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration announced that Hong Kong would revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, rather than extend its lease as a colony of the United Kingdom. The Hong Kong Basic Law adopted in 1990 stated that Hong Kong could select its Chief Executive and elect the Legislative Council by universal suffrage according to Article 45 and Article 68, respectively. In 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) endorsed Hong Kong’s selection of its Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by universal suffrage after 2017.

However, the Chinese Government has continued to deny Hong Kong people the right of universal suffrage. On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC announced its decision to select the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017, with the following restrictions: (1) only one nominating committee could nominate candidates for Chief Executive, and the number of members, composition, and formation method of the committee should be the same as the previous one; (2) each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the nominating committee; and (3) the nominating committee should nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive. Hong Kong people called this decision “shutting the three doors,” referring to the stringent regulations made by the government to control elections, rather than election by universal suffrage in accordance with the principles of universality and equality. Hong Kong people were disappointed with the NPCSC’s decision. Consequently, many joined the Occupy Movement to protest against the
Chinese Government’s endorsement of controlled elections.

OCLP was officially launched at Kowloon Union Church on March 27, 2013, where the three initiators, Benny Tai, Kin-man Chan, and Reverend Yiu-ming Chu, presented their Manifesto at a press conference (Manifesto 2013). They proclaimed that the movement would employ civil disobedience as a means to strive for the implementation of universal suffrage (Tai 2013). On April 28, 2013, the OCLP secretariat was established and it introduced 10 staunch supporters to the press. Among the three initiators, Tai was a devoted Protestant and Chu was a pastor in the Baptist Church. Chan attended church when he was young and he called himself a non-institutional Christian. Five out of the 10 staunch supporters were Protestants.4

From the very beginning, the initiators presented OCLP with rich Christian language and imagery.5 Benny Tai told the media in an interview, “This is not a political activity. For me, this is a religious activity in which I am preaching therein” (Chen 2013). Kin-man Chan added the words “love” and “peace” to the Occupy Movement, expressing the idea of sacrifice, which is a core value in the Christian faith.6 The venue of the press conference, Kowloon Union Church, was a plain and unadorned adaptation of an English church. In many photos released by the press, there was a huge brown cross behind the three initiators. These people, their language, and the religious symbols displayed a social movement imbued with Christian messages, which was instrumental in granting religious legitimacy to the campaign and mobilizing the emotions of Christians in Hong Kong (Chan 2017).

4 Interviewee 5, 23 September 2015; 26 October 2016, Hong Kong.
5 Interviewee 1, 9 April 2015, Hong Kong.
6 Interviewee 9, 18 January 2017, Hong Kong.
5. The Role of the Catholic Church in the Occupy Movement

As explained in the previous section, the Occupy Movement included both the OCLP Movement and the Umbrella Movement. This section presents the investigation of how the Catholic Church provided religious resources to and facilitated political participation in the two movements.

5.1 The Church Provided Transcendent Motivation for OCLP

In March 2013, OCLP was officially launched, claiming that the campaign would employ civil disobedience to coerce the Chinese Government to implement constitutional reform, allowing Hong Kong people to select the Chief Executive through universal suffrage. During that time, many pro-establishment organizations and individuals attacked OCLP for encouraging illegal behavior and claimed that it would disrupt social order. Behind those pro-establishment organizations and individuals was the state apparatus at work, warning Hong Kong people not to support OCLP.

It was in this political context that the Catholic Church made a bold move. On 24 July 2013, the Church issued a public statement titled “An Urgent Call for Earnest Dialogue and Responsible Action: Regarding the Universal Suffrage and Civil Disobedience Statement from the Catholic Diocese in Hong Kong,” in which it explained the position of the Church on universal suffrage and the act of civil disobedience proposed by OCLP. It stated that the Church urged the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR Government) to implement universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020, respectively, and the Church supported civil disobedience if certain conditions set by OCLP were satisfied (Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong 2013). Later, the Church published this public statement in Ming Bao and the South China Morning Post on 26 July 2013, and in Kung Kao Po and the Sunday Examiner on 28 July 2013. Ming Bao and the South China Morning Post are two leading Chinese and English newspapers, respectively, that enjoy high credibility in Hong Kong. Publication of their statement in these two newspapers showed that the Catholic Church intended to convey its message both to Hong Kong citizens in general and Catholics in particular regarding these controversial issues.

The public statement quoted the words of the late Pope John Paul II from his
encyclical on the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum, explaining that

[t]he Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who govern them and of replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate (“Centesimus Annus,” 1 May 1991, #6).

It also quoted the “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” of the Second Vatican Council, which stated that

the choice of political regime and the appointment of rulers are left to the free decision of the citizens…It is fully consonant with human nature that there should be politico-juridical structures providing all citizens without any distinction with ever improving and effective opportunities to play an active part in the establishment of the juridical foundations of the political community, in the administrative of public affairs, in determining the aims and the terms of reference of public bodies and in the election of political leaders (“Gaudium et Spes,” 7 December 1965).

Based on these documents, the public statement unequivocally requested that the HKSAR Government implement universal suffrage to select the Chief Executive in 2017 and members of the Legislative Council in 2020, so that Hong Kong could build a political system that was democratic, just, and accountable to the people of Hong Kong. To use the concept suggested by Smith, the public statement provided “transcendent motivation,” particularly the “legitimation for protest rooted in the ultimate or sacred.” Although the number of Catholics constitutes only 5% of the population in Hong Kong, the Catholic Church enjoys a high degree of moral legitimacy. This is due to the works of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong, which provides good education and social services to the needy. Hong Kong people consider the Catholic Church as making a valuable contribution to society. Moreover, it is generally regarded that the Catholic Church has no political interests. Compared with political parties and organizations, Hong Kong people are more likely to consider the views of the Catholic Church on political issues (Leung 2009; Leung and Chan 2003).

Regarding the OCLP Movement, the public statement stressed that the conditions that justified “civil disobedience” had to be strict. These conditions included the mandate that an act of civil disobedience had to be carried out in a peaceful and
non-violent manner, which was an act of conscience directed at preventing or removing grave injustice and/or violation of fundamental rights. Other conditions were “all concerned should continue to make every effort at rational dialogue,” “all other peaceful means of redress have been exhausted,” and “the act of civil disobedience must itself be a just and proportionate response to the injustice that it reasonably seeks and hopes to prevent or remove.” In other words, if these conditions were satisfied, the Church would not oppose the act of civil disobedience carried out by OCLP.

On 25 March 2013, Bishop Michael Yeung Ming-cheung explained to journalists the position of the Catholic Church as expressed in the public statement given at a press conference. Later, a staff member of the HKJP also explained to the general public in layman’s terms the position of the Catholic Church on OCLP and civil disobedience on other occasions.7 The public statement issued by the Catholic Church produced two separate effects on the Occupy Movement. First, it proposed moral conditions for the movement. To use Smith’s terminology, the public statement provided “moral imperatives” for peace and non-violence to exercise an act of civil disobedience. Second, it canceled out the effect produced by pro-establishment organizations and individuals who were attacking OCLP. After the press conference, the state-owned local newspaper Wenweipo attacked the Catholic Church by criticizing Bishop Yeung Ming-cheung for instigating illegal behavior and talking nonsense.8

5.2 The Church Provided Organizational Resources and Privileged Legitimacy to OCLP

The Catholic Church provided organizational resources and privileged legitimacy to the emergence of OCLP, particularly “trained and experienced leadership resources,” “congregated participants and solidarity incentives,” “enterprise tools,” and “political legitimacy in public opinion.” The following are some episodes of OCLP, that illustrate how the Catholic Church facilitated political participation.

**Deliberation Days.** OCLP organized a series of Deliberations Days (D-Days) through their social networks, encouraging a wide range of people from political parties and

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8 “It Is a Violation of Law to Instigate Church Members to Participate in Occupy Central: The Political Sector Criticizes Yeung Ming-cheung for Talking Nonsense.” Wenweipo 26 July 2013.
social organizations to discuss proposals for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017. A total of 26 D-Days were organized with parties and members from different social sectors. The Organizing Committee of OCLP collaborated with the HKJP to organize a D-Day for Catholics titled “I Am a Catholic and a Citizen.” The activity was held at St. Patrick’s Parish in Lok Fu on 1 December 2013. Four speakers addressed different issues regarding constitutional reform and universal suffrage, including Father Stephan Chan who spoke on the relationship between democracy, the Church, and the Catholic faith. Many venues for the D-Days were church premises. For example, four out of five venues for D-Day 3 were borrowed from churches, including the Catholic Holy Family Parish in Choi Hung. To use Smith’s terminology, the Catholic Church provided both “trained and experienced leadership” and “enterprise tools” for use in the D-Days so that OCLP could organize their activities smoothly.

**Walk for Universal Suffrage.** OCLP organized the “Walk for Universal Suffrage” on 14–20 June 2014, calling on citizens to cast their votes for the Civil Referendum. A total of 38 political parties, social organizations, and religious bodies co-organized this activity, in which 15 were churches and Christian organizations. Among them were 12 Catholic bodies, including the HKJP, the Hong Kong Catholic Commission for Labor Affairs (HKLA), the Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students (HKFCS), the Secular Franciscan Order, the Justice and Peace Group of the Franciscan Order, and seven Social Concern Groups from different parishes. Cardinal Zen, 82 years old at the time, together with Martin Lee, the founding leader of the Democratic Party, and Audrey Eu, the founding leader of the Civic Party, walked 12 hours a day around Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories, calling on Hong Kong citizens to cast their votes for the Civil Referendum. The Catholic parishes along the routes of the activity opened their doors as stations for the teams to take a rest during their journey. To use Smith’s terminology, the Catholic Church provided “congregated participants and solidarity incentive” to OCLP, building momentum for the movement.

**Civil Referendum.** OCLP organized a Civil Referendum on 20–29 June 2014, calling on citizens to express their will for true elections by casting votes on three proposals

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10 Interviewee 6, 23 October 2016, Hong Kong.


12 Interviewee 7, 25 October 2016, Hong Kong.
for nominating the Chief Executive, which would be submitted to the HKSAR Government. Cardinal Zen called on Catholics to take part in the Civil Referendum in a seminar on 22 May 2014, which was reported by Kung Kao Po later. He said “Use this vote to strive for true elections…. More people casting their votes will make a strong voice for true elections.”13 Cardinal John Tong, the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, encouraged Catholics to express their concerns about Hong Kong’s constitutional development in Kung Kao Po on 30 May 2014. He reminded Catholics that the Civil Referendum was an opportunity for citizens to express their will on elections, through which Christians should “cast their votes according to their conscience.”14 These statements show that the two Church leaders used their “political legitimacy in public opinion” to help direct support for the Civil Referendum.

The Catholic Church also provided “enterprise tools” for the Civil Referendum. There were three voting channels, including mobile applications, a website, and physical polling stations. Voters could choose electronic voting or paper ballots at physical polling stations. Nine out of the 21 polling stations were church premises, Christian organizations, and Christian schools. Among them, six were Catholic bodies. In addition, many parishes were used as service stations, helping citizens to cast their votes via the Internet. A total of 792,808 people cast their votes for the Civil Referendum, equivalent to a fifth of the registered electorate in the overall population of Hong Kong (Ma, Lee, and Chung 2014).

**July 1 Prayer Meeting and July 1 March.** The political organization Civil Human Rights Front organizes the July 1 March every year, which expresses the social and political concerns of citizens in that particular year. Some progressive Catholic and Protestant groups organize their own July 1 Prayer Meeting independently before the march. After the prayer meeting, they join the July 1 March together. In 2014, universal suffrage and civil disobedience were two important issues. Five Christian organizations co-organized the July 1 Prayer Meeting titled “Practice Justice without Fearing the Darkness, Build a New Hong Kong with Universal Suffrage,” of which three were Catholic bodies, including the HKJP, the HKFCS, and the HKLA. In 2013, the number of attendees was around 300. In 2014, approximately 1,000 Christians attended the activity, including Cardinal Joseph Zen and Martin Lee. Bishop Joseph Ha and Reverend Ralph Lee delivered messages at the prayer meeting representing the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church, respectively.

13 *Kung Kao Po* 23 May 2014.
14 *Kung Kao Po* 30 May 2014.
Bishop Joseph Ha gave a homily to encourage those Christians who participated in the prayer meeting. Based on 2 Corinthians 4:1-6, he explicated that Christians in the Roman Empire sacrificed themselves to witness their faith. Many made their voices heard for conscience and justice throughout history. He remarked, “God gives this opportunity to us because he thinks highly on us. Our faith is so precious, which is inherited from disciples who sacrificed themselves throughout history. Therefore, we should make our voice heard today.” After the prayer meeting, all of the participants followed the leaders of the HKFCS to join the July 1 March. To use Smith’s terminology, the Catholic Church provided “congregated participants and solidarity incentives” to the Occupy Movement by way of prayer and the homily in the religious assembly.

Protest against the NPCSC’s Decision. On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC announced its decision to select the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017, with three very stringent regulations. Hong Kong people were disappointed with this decision. On 14 September 2014, OCLP organized a march, walking from Causeway Bay to Central, to protest the NPCSC’s decision. The OCLP organizer claimed that 4,000 people joined this march. Approximately 100 Catholics and Protestants joined this activity. An ad hoc action group named Alliance for Christian Action organized a prayer meeting before the march and took part in the collective action later. Bishop Joseph Ha delivered a message during the prayer meeting, pointing out that although Christians participated in political action or expressed their position on political issues, they were still followers of Jesus. He prayed for those who joined the march to have faith and love, and that they should walk with citizens together. To use Smith’s terminology, the Catholic Church provided “moral imperatives” for faith and love in the collective action of the Occupy Movement, facilitating Christians in political participation.

15 “510,000 People Participated in the July 1 March: Christians Voiced Their Demand for Democracy and Justice.” *Union of Catholic Asian News* 2 July 2014. Available at: http://china.ucanews.com/2014/07/02/%E4%BA%94%E5%8D%81%E4%B8%80%E8%90%AC%E4%BA%BA%E5%8F%83%E8%88%87%E4%B8%83%E4%B8%80%E9%81%8A%E8%A1%SC%EF%BC%8C%E5%9F%BA%E7%9D%A3%E4%BF%A1%E5%BE%92%E7%82%BA%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%BB%E5%85%AC%E7%BE%A9%E7%99%BC/. Accessed 18 June 2017.

16 “Citizens Protested against the Government Using Black Clothes to Surround the City: Christians Prayed to God to Watch over Hong Kong.” *Union of Catholic Asian News* 15 September 2014. Available at: http://china.ucanews.com/2014/09/15/%E5%B8%82%E6%B0%91%E9%BB%91%E5%B8%83%E5%9C%8D%E5%9F%8E%E6%A8%97%E8%AD%BB%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E5%A4%B1%E4%BF%A1%E7%9C%8C%E5%9F%BA%E7%9D%A3%E5%BE%92%E7%A5%88%E6%B1%82%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%BB%E7%9C%8B%E9%A1%A7/. Accessed 18 June 2017.
5.3 The Church Provided Transcendent Motivation for the Umbrella Movement

During the period of the Umbrella Movement, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and many Catholic bodies organized a variety of religious activities to motivate the Catholics to support the Occupy Movement. These activities included Masses, prayer meetings, and the observation of the stations of the cross.

**The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong.** On 28 September 2014, riot police fired 87 canisters of tear gas at the crowds in Admiralty. That day, approximately 50 Catholics joined a prayer meeting held at an open area in front of the Hong Kong Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception. Led by Father Louis Ha, the prayer meeting was conducted in the style of Taizé worship. They prayed for the students and the citizens who took part in the act of civil disobedience, and for peace in Hong Kong. Some Catholics came from the protest zone in Admiralty.17

A special Mass was held in the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception, which was attended by 300 Catholics. Bishop Joseph Ha delivered a sermon during Mass, in which he called on communication between the government and the protesters. In the sermon, he emphasized that the authorities should act in a more constrained manner during the confrontation between the government and the citizens. However, the police used excessive force on the crowds, whereas the protesters behaved constrainedly in their demonstration. He stressed that the government should provide a direction and a blueprint toward freedom and democracy. Nobody knew how these contradictions could be solved or where the exit was. What Christians could do was to pray to God, as “Our Lord is the master of all things.”18

Cardinal Joseph Zen also delivered a message before the closing of Mass. He invited Catholics to give thanksgiving to God for three things: first, the Catholic faith, which was so good, as it provided clear guidance for Catholics when they were in difficulty; second, the citizens and young people who demanded a Chief Executive that would defend the core values of Hong Kong, through which they demonstrated the excellent qualities of discipline, ideals, courage, and wisdom in the protest; third, the young people who demonstrated their love of society by their fearlessness and not

17“The Church Prayed for the Situation in Hong Kong with Different Forms of Prayers.” *Union of Catholic Asian News* 30 September 2014. Available at: http://china.ucanews.com/2014/09/30/%E6%95%99%E6%9C%83%E9%80%A3%E6%97%A5%E4%BE%86%E7%82%BA%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E5%B1%80%E5%B0%A2%E4%BD%9C%E4%BB%8D%E5%90%8C%E5%BD%A2%E5%BC%8F%E7%9A%84%E5%AE%88%E6%9C%9B%E7%A5%88%E7%A6%8F/. Accessed 11 April 2016.
18Ibid.
backing down to excessive force such as pepper spray; in addition, they treated the police as their brothers and sisters, through which they extended their love of society.19

The scenes above show that Masses, prayers, and declarations of thanksgiving were “powerfully motivating rituals” at a time of conflict, which were instrumental in relating Catholics to the situation in Hong Kong, through which Bishop Ha held the government accountable for the excessive forces used by the police. Both Bishop Ha and Cardinal Zen provided “ideologies” that demanded constraint and love, guiding Catholics to exercise virtues during their political participation.

On 4 October 2014, a message spread around Hong Kong claiming that the police would take severe action to suppress the protesters in Admiralty. The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong issued a public statement that night at 11:00 p.m. titled “An Urgent Appeal to All Students and Citizens in the Occupy Central Protests,” urging protesters to leave the occupied zone of Admiralty:

For safety reasons, the Diocese urges students and citizens in support of Occupy Central to evacuate from the protest sites as soon as possible. On the demand of a genuine universal suffrage, we can continue to fight for this goal in an appropriate manner in the coming days.20

On 1 November 2014, the Support Groups for Social Concern in Parishes, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, organized a prayer meeting titled “Waiting for God in the Ravine: To Pray for Democracy in Hong Kong,” employing a soft tone to express the Church’s support for universal suffrage.21 This prayer meeting was once again held in the Hong Kong Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception. Cardinal John Tong officiated the Mass and Bishop Joseph Ha delivered a sermon, which was attended by 500 Catholics. Bishop Dominic Chan encouraged the attendees not to give up praying in a sharing session: “It is not the prayer that is ineffective, but the people who are hardhearted. Those who are hardhearted make unreasonable decisions, speak unreasonable words, and do unjust deeds.”22 After the

19 Ibid.
21 Interviewee 10, 3 August 2015, Hong Kong.
22 “Dominic Chan: It Is Not the Prayer That Is Ineffective, but the People Who Are Hardhearted.” Catholic Post-Secondary November 2014. Available at: https://postsec.hkfc.org/%E9%99%B3%E5%BF%97%E6%98%8E%E5%BC%9A%E4%88%8D%E6%98%AF%E7%A5%88%E7%A6%B1%E7%84%A1%E6%95%88%E5%9B%A0%E7
prayer meeting, dozens of Catholics set off to the occupied zone in Admiralty.

The Catholic Bodies in Three Occupied Zones. The HKFCS organized a series of Masses at the protest area in front of the Legislative Council after the class boycott that aimed to support the protesters who stayed in the occupied zone in Admiralty and introduced spirituality into the movement. They established a communication network with Catholic protesters through Facebook. On 28 September 2014, approximately 200 Catholics attended Mass. Later, they invited Father Franco Mello to celebrate Mass on 12 October 2014, which was also attended by a large number of Catholics.

The Diocesan Youth of Hong Kong organized a prayer meeting titled “Christ Is with Us” at the Our Lady of Mount Carmel Church on 30 September 2014, and a five-day stations of the cross in Admiralty from 30 September to 4 October 2014. These two activities aimed at praying for reconciliation and peace in Hong Kong society. For example, approximately 200 young Catholics gathered in front of Civic Square at the Central Government Offices to observe seven stations of the cross on 1 October 2014 at 5:00 p.m. They were required to reflect on their duties to the Church, family, and society in relation to the Occupy Movement during the journey of the ritual: to witness truth with faith when the peaceful protesters were seen as mobs; to understand the worries of parents and to learn to suffer for love when they participated in the movement; and to take responsibility in building a loving and just society. To use Smith’s terminology, the Diocesan Youth of Hong Kong provided “ideologies” that demanded self-discipline, sacrifice, and responsibility in guiding the behavior of young Catholics.

In the occupied zone of Mong Kok, a group of young Catholics, together with Anglican and Evangelical Protestants, established St. Francis Chapel on the Street.

%82%BA%E6%9C%89%E4%BA%BA%E5%BF%83%E7%A1%AC/. Accessed 11 April 2016.
23 “Christian Bodies Organized a Prayer Meeting: Bringing Spiritual Power to Students Who Participated in the Class Boycott.” Union of Catholic Asian News 25 September 2014. Available at: http://china.ucanews.com/2014/09/25/%E5%9F%BA%BA%E7%9D%A3%E5%BE%92%E5%9C%98%E9%AB%94%E8%88%89%E8%BE%A6%E7%A5%88%E7%A6%B1%E6%9C%83%E7%8C%89%E7%82%BA%E7%BD%B7%E8%AA%B2%E5%AD%B8%E7%94%9F%E5%B8%B6%E4%BE%86%E5%B1%AC%E9%9D%88%E5%A8%9B%E9%87%8F/. Accessed 11 April 2016.
24 “Christians Prayed for Justice and Reconciliation at the Central Government Offices.” Kung Kao Po 10 October 2014. Available at: http://kkp.org.hk/node/13490. Accessed 11 April 2016; “The Church Prayed for the Situation in Hong Kong with Different Forms of Prayers.” Union of Catholic Asian News 30 September 2014, http://china.ucanews.com/2014/09/30/%E6%95%99%E6%9C%83%E9%80%A3%E6%97%A5%E4%BE%86%E7%82%BA%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E5%B1%80%E5%B8%A2%E4%BD%9C%E4%B8%8D%E5%90%8C%E5%BD%A2%E5%BC%8F%E7%9A%84%E5%AE%88%E6%9C%9B%E7%A5%88%E7%A6%8F/. Accessed 11 April 2016.
They celebrated Masses and expressed their faith and values in sermons to the general public.\textsuperscript{25} In the occupied zone of Causeway Bay, the HKJP and the Land Justice League worked together to organize different activities in the initial period.\textsuperscript{26}

5.4 The Church Consolidated the Catholic Community at a Time of Tension

In the latter period of the Umbrella Movement, many people experienced deep tension with their friends and families due to different political orientations to the movement. This tension also occurred in the Church. Mary Yuen, a researcher at the Centre for Catholic Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, made the following observation:

Members of the Catholic Church, like Hong Kong people, were also divided in supporting the movement. Some Catholic students distributed leaflets on electoral reform and the 8.31 decision in parishes during the Occupy Movement, but were scolded by some parishioners, claiming ‘civil disobedience is illegal.’ Most parish priests kept silent on the Occupy Movement in order to avoid further division in parishes.\textsuperscript{27}

This shows that the position of the Church on institutional reform and the Occupy Movement produced a double-effect. It encouraged progressive believers to engage in political participation, but it also led to discontent among conservative believers, which created tension in the Catholic community. The Church needed to solve the problem of this tension and to balance between social justice and community solidarity. On the one hand, the Church had to deal with the problem in a way that would not harm the relationships among believers, and on the other hand, the Church had to set a good example for society.

To achieve this goal, the HKJP and six parishes organized a prayer movement named “Reconciliation,” which took place in six parishes in the afternoon every Friday and Saturday from 14–10 November 2014. The organizers quoted biblical text from Colossians 1:19-20 in the announcement:

Because in him, it hath well pleased the Father, that all fullness should dwell; And through him to reconcile all things unto himself, making peace through the blood

\textsuperscript{25} Interviewee 2, 13 April 2015, 13 May 2015, Hong Kong.

\textsuperscript{26} Interviewee 10, 3 August 2015, Hong Kong.

of his cross, both as to the things that are on earth, and the things that are in
heaven.

As explained by the HKJP, the activities sought reconciliation, love, and justice for
society at a time of tension. Reconciliation, love, and justice are values and virtues
highly regarded by the Church. This shows that the Catholic Church used its religious
resources to consolidate believers from a spectrum of political orientations. To use
Smith’s terminology, the Church demonstrated its “organizational and
strategic-tactical flexibility.”

This prayer movement did not compromise the goal of seeking constitutional
reform. The activities invited three progressive priests to deliver messages to the
attendees, including Cardinal Joseph Zen, Father Stephen Chan, and Father Louis Ha.
Cardinal Zen delivered the following message in one prayer meeting held at St. Jude’s
Church:

We often talk about ‘one country, two systems,’ but what kind of system do we
want to have? It is a system where we can love and people can respect each other.
To achieve this goal, the OCLP trio successfully advocated love and peace. The
HKSAR Government submitted a report that deviated from public opinion to the
Chinese Government in Beijing, which caused turbulence in society. Nevertheless,
we can see that Hong Kong people care about their younger generation in the	urbulence. No matter how the pro-establishment people distorted the facts, many
people expressed their sympathy with those who had been striving for democracy.
We pray for the young people. The society needs alliance. Let us persistently
strive for democracy in solidarity.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has examined the role played by the Catholic Church in the Occupy
Movement from Christian Smith’s proposed conceptual framework of religion and
social movements. It has explained in detail how the Catholic Church provided
“transcendent motivations” and “organizational resources” to the Occupy Movement,
and transferred church leaders’ “privileged legitimacy” to the Civil Referendum. The

28 “Catholic Bodies Organize Prayer Movement: Pray for Reconciliation, Love, and Justice.” Kung
Kao Po 14 November 2014.
The case of the Catholic Church is useful in further discussing the relationship between churches and social movements in Hong Kong. The Catholic Church is a positive example, illustrating the model relationship elaborated by Smith. However, not all churches in Hong Kong had a positive relationship with the Occupy Movement as expressed by the Catholic Church. Protestant churches demonstrated a wide range of attitudes toward the Occupy Movement. Some were supportive, whereas others opposed the movement. A majority of churches were ambivalent on the issue. In addition, most of the public statements issued by Protestant churches avoided stating their position on the Occupy Movement. This discrepancy between the Catholic Church and Protestant churches needs to be explained.

In my view, whether churches can develop a positive relationship depends on two necessary conditions: First, social movements in the contemporary world primarily aim at striving for liberal democracy. Church leaders and their believers should take part in social movements only if the theology and social teachings of the denominations or churches are compatible with liberal democracy. Second, denominations or churches have to be independent of the state, and their resources and spaces for development should not to be controlled by the government, so that church leaders do not have to fear the consequences of supporting social movements. Therefore, the concepts proposed by Smith can apply to those churches that embody these two conditions, explaining how they can develop a kind of positive relationship with social movements.
References


Redefining Religious Boundaries in 19th Century China: Griffith John’s *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzìjīng*

Jesse Ciccotti / 司安傑
Hong Kong Baptist University / 香港浸會大學

**Abstract:** Evelyn Rawsky has criticized Christian missionary efforts at Chinese literature creation, claiming that these works were of low scholarly quality. Using Griffith John’s “Holy Teaching of Jesus Trimetrical Classic” 耶穌聖教三字經, I shall challenge Rawski’s claims regarding 19th century Christian missionary endeavors at literature creation in Chinese.

I. Introduction

A significant part of Christian cross-cultural engagement throughout history and around the world has been the transmission of the Christian message through languages and cultural forms that previously were not carriers of that message.\(^1\) Since the Reformation, widespread public literacy has been a very important part of Christian cultural activity, particularly for the sake of promoting and making Bible reading possible.\(^2\) A vital contribution to the transmission of the Christian message has been and continues to be the translation and creation of literature into languages that previously have not been used to express a Christian worldview,\(^3\) particularly through the translation of the Bible.\(^4\) In 19th century Chinese contexts,\(^5\) publications other than the Bible found to be most effective at bringing about results that the creators hoped for (usually numerical conversions\(^6\)) were not translations into Chinese of foreign language literature, but rather the creation of original works in Chinese.\(^7\) At the China Centenary Missionary Conference in Shanghai

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\(^{1}\) See Sanneh 1989. See also Sanneh 1990, and Walls 1990.

\(^{2}\) See Maag 2016.

\(^{3}\) In some cases this goes so far as to create a written form of a language that previously existed only in oral form. For example, see Covell 1995.

\(^{4}\) There are currently complete translations of the Protestant version of the Bible (this includes the 66 books agreed on by all three major Christian traditions—Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox) in 554 different languages, and portions of the Bible available in an additional 2,378 languages (this latter figure includes complete New Testaments in 1,333 languages and at least one book of the Bible in another 1,045 languages), for a total of 2,932 languages. The impact of this movement on language and culture preservation and transformation is unparalleled. These figures were obtained from the Wycliffe Global Alliance’s 2015 Bible Translation Statistics FAQ sheet, and are current as of October, 2015. http://resources.wycliffe.net/statistics/WycliffeGA_stats_2015_FAQs_EN.pdf, accessed October 22, 2016.

\(^{5}\) John T. P. Lai has published a substantial study on the translation and creation of Christian literature into Chinese in the 19th century. See Lai 2012.

\(^{6}\) See Lai 2012, 212.

\(^{7}\) Lai 2012, 225.
in 1907, a survey from the attendees revealed that the most well-received literature in Chinese were works such as W. A. P. Martin’s (丁韪良) *Evidences of Christianity Tiāndào sùyuán* 天道溯原 and William Milne’s (米慎) *Two Friends Zhāng Yuǎn liǎngyǒu xiāng lùn* 張遠兩友相論. Not far from the top of this list are Christian tracts by Griffith John (楊格非 1831-1912).

Christian literature written in Chinese by foreign Protestant missionaries, particularly with an educative focus, has been strongly criticized by Evelyn Rawski in her essay “Elementary Education in the Mission Enterprise.” This essay has become quite popular, is often cited in studies on the *Sānzìjīng* and Christian adaptations of the *Sānzìjīng* form, and has been translated into Chinese. Given the broad influence this essay has enjoyed, an examination of Rawski’s claims regarding Protestant missionary early education literature creation in Chinese is warranted, and yet such an investigation has not yet been done. Do Rawski’s claims hold up to scrutiny? To answer this question, I will examine one Protestant Christian *Sānzìjīng* written by Griffith John entitled “Holy Teaching of Jesus Trimetrical Classic” *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzìjīng* 耶穌聖教三字經, and compare it with Rawski’s claims, which leads to a further question. As an exemplary and prolific writer, does John’s *Sānzìjīng* confirm or challenge Rawski’s claims? In this paper I will conclude that John’s *Sānzìjīng* not only challenges Rawski’s claims, but that a deeper examination into her claims and her use of sources challenges her conclusions regarding missionary educational writings in Chinese in the 19th century.

II. Evelyn Rawski’s Claims Regarding Protestant Missionary Works in Chinese

One of the unique challenges faced by Christian missionaries in a 19th century Chinese context was encountering an already highly developed education system, with well-informed masses that were slow to accept new forms of education that did not meet social expectations or

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8 From Lai 2012, Appendix D, 289. The original list can be found in: Darroch 1907, 197. This volume is publicly available online at: https://ia802702.us.archive.org/13/items/chinacentenarym00yorkgoog/chinacentenarym00yorkgoog.pdf.
10 伊芙琳 2003.
were not readily seen as a reasonable means for children to obtain commonly held social goals.

Supported by a wealth of evidence, Evelyn Rawski in her essay entitled “Elementary Education in the Mission Enterprise,” 11 describes debates between missionaries preserved in missionary publications about the ways in which Christian education should engage this new context. She focuses on two major hurdles that missionaries faced. One hurdle was finding adequate teachers to teach Chinese. In this case missionary schools almost always had to rely on Chinese Christians, sometimes of questionable quality of Christian character. I will not address this hurdle further in this paper. The second hurdle, and the primary subject of study in Rawski’s essay, 12 was finding or creating adequate literature in Chinese, that both met Chinese tastes and needs and also supported the evangelistic goals held by many missionaries. She evaluates these attempts by Christians to offer an alternative early language primer by asking how well they fulfilled the needs of students wishing to take the civil service examination 13 (and so needing to be familiar with a large quantity of characters).

Rawski spends considerable effort early in the essay to explain traditional Chinese elementary education, which focused on the three texts of the “Thousand Character Text” Qiānzìwén 千字文, the “Trimetrical Classic” Sānzìjīng 三字經, and the “Hundred Family Surnames” Bāijiāxìng 百家姓. “Put together, the three books...provided a beginning student with knowledge of about 2,000 characters (eliminating repetitions), which was the vocabulary acquired by boys from elite families before enrolling in formal studies with a tutor.” 14 The purpose of these primers was to lay a foundation of recognizable characters, learned by rote memorization “at the expense of understanding and reader interest.” 15 The traditional form of elementary education was criticized for its pedagogical style necessitated by the form of the text and for its content. According to Rawski, despite a critical view of these early language primers, particularly in the early decades.

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12 Rawski devotes two pages to discussing “The Native Teacher,” (140-142), and more than 10 pages to questions regarding education literature.
13 Rawski 1985, 137.
15 Rawski 1985, 139.
of Protestant missionary activity in 19th century Qīng empire, missionaries had no choice but to use these three texts in their mission schools.

Rawski then focuses her analysis on one text, the traditional Sānzìjīng, and missionary adaptations of that unique literary form to represent a Christian worldview. The Sānzìjīng originated in the Sōng dynasty as a literacy primer, and over time has become something of a literary form of its own. Although the traditional Sānzìjīng continued to be published by missionary presses for use in mission schools, as early as 1832 missionaries began producing Christian alternatives to the traditional Sānzìjīng, “with the idea that the popularity of the original might help in the dissemination of the Christian Gospel.” These adaptations were written in the higher classical (or wênli 文理) style. Despite this, says Rawski, “Even in wen-li, missionary books generally suffered from poor writing.” She then cites John Darroch, an influential Scottish missionary heavily involved in Chinese Christian literature creation and distribution, as saying, “When the book is published, the best thought is found clothed in poor language.” Rawski then quickly lays aside the question of quality, and moves to content of the works themselves.

A second significant debate, which Rawski identifies as the biggest problem in missionary education in China, centered around the translation of key Christian terms into Chinese language, and which Chinese terms to use to represent Christian concepts. The Term Question is a well-known debate regarding the term or terms to be used for God in the Bible. This debate was the most contested, and carried out in missionary publications in the late 19th and early 20th century, but debates over many other terms were equally heated. Rawski identifies in particular terms for God, soul, heaven and hell, and communion, and the concern of confusion if Buddhist terms were

16 The Sānzìjīng form has been adapted to other worldviews, including Buddhist, Daoist, Muslim, Feminist, and Tāipíng Tiānguó (Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) versions, in addition to Christian versions. See 《太平天國《三字經》》 1853, 吹万老人 2002, 周燮藩 2005, 易心莹 1997, 马典娘娘 1832, 释南亭 1973, and 卢乐山 1995.
17 Rawski 1985, 146. For a list of the authors and publication dates of the texts Rawski examined, see Appendix C.
18 Rawski 1985, 147.
19 Darroch served on the executive committee of the China Centenary Missionary Conference, held in Shanghai between April and May of 1907. In that conference he served as chair of the committee on Chinese Literature. Rawski’s quotation come from his comments in the article for this segment of the conference proceedings.
20 Darroch 1907, 206; quoted in Rawski 1985, 147.
21 Rawski 1985, 147.
22 See Pfister 2004, 187-196 and related notes for a detailed explanation of the debates and their surrounding social
used. Although Christian adaptations of the traditional Sānzijīng form is only briefly mentioned in this discussion (identifying terms for God used in these primers), Rawski seems to imply that the translation challenge made Christian literature creation in Chinese language an almost impossible task.

Rawski’s final criticism of these Christian adaptations looks at their effectiveness as language primers. “How effective were they as introductory readers?” The first point of evaluation is the number of unique characters reproduced in the Christian adaptations. In a table, Rawski demonstrates that the Christian adaptations generally contain many more characters but do not “introduce markedly more new characters.” In other words, “less bang for your buck.” On this basis she concludes that “The tracts were not really intended to serve the needs of beginning readers.” Rawski then raises a second vocabulary question. As a language primer, the key function of the traditional Sānzijīng was introducing characters to students. “How many of the characters introduced in the original San-tzu ching were reproduced in the Christian tracts?” A second table demonstrates that “there was a significant break between the vocabulary of the original primer and subsequent Christian versions.” Only one of the five versions Rawski examines achieves 57% of the total number of original characters as the traditional Sānzijīng. The other four achieve at most only one-third of the characters in the traditional Sānzijīng. Rawski concludes that, “As introductory readers, the Christian tracts were, therefore, unsatisfactory substitutes for the San-tzu ching. Students who were to advance in a Chinese curriculum would have done better to use the original text…”

Rawski’s final conclusion points out the reverse impact of Chinese society and culture on Christian mission in China. The cultural conditions in China forced missionaries towards education as a means of evangelism. Rawski claims that “Missionary efforts to by-pass these demands for the battles.

23 Rawski 1985, 147.
24 Rawski 1985, 149.
25 Rawski 1985, 149.
26 Rawski 1985, 149-150.
27 Rawski 1985, 150.
28 Rawski 1985, 150.
traditional Chinese curriculum and traditional teaching methods generally failed in the nineteenth century...In the short run, Chinese perspectives and values shaped the form and content of the mission primary-school curriculum.”

III. Griffith John and the 三字經

Griffith John served with the London Missionary Society from 1855 until 1912. In that 57 year period he returned to his homeland of Wales only three times. His first six years were spent in and around Shànghǎi, and following the Treaty of Tìānjīn (1858), in 1861, John moved his home to Hánkǒu. Hánkǒu would be his home and base of missionary operations until he returned to England in 1912. Like many 19th century missionaries, John considered itinerant preaching and establishing churches and mission stations his primary occupation, but he also spent a considerable amount of energy producing Christian literature in Chinese. He started the Hankow Religious Tract Society in 1876, which quickly became the most prolific press producing Christian literature in China. In its peak production year in 1910, the Society produced 4.3 million texts, that were sold and distributed all across China. He was also heavily involved in creating original Christian literature in Chinese, as well as Bible translation. In 1898,
the final year the Catalogue of texts for sale was published together with the Society’s Annual Report, of the 102 works available for sale by the Society those under John’s name came to 33 unique items. Some of these were books and others were single page tracts. Nevertheless, compared with any other single missionary-scholar engaged in the translation and creation of original works in Chinese, Griffith John stands out as being particularly prolific. John’s tracts were widely distributed and read throughout the late Qīng empire, often being handed out to candidates after civil service examinations. One tract created by John is a Christian version of the well-known literacy primer, the Sānzǐjīng 三字經, entitled “Holy Teaching of Jesus Trimetrical Classic” Yēsū shèngjiào sānzǐjīng 耶穌聖教三字經, published in 1880. It is this text that I will use for analysis. 

John was not original in writing a Christian Sānzǐjīng. A variety of Christian Sānzǐjīngs were produced between 1823 and 1913, a number of which have been analyzed in recent studies.

his reclusive translation practice was that he could produce a good translation in much less time than a committee. Although this proved to be true, his translation failed to garner broad support among missionaries, perhaps in large part because it was not collaborative.

A list of these works by John has been provided in Appendix A. Six works are listed as being written in both wénlǐ 文理 and guānhuà 官話 but were counted only once. An additional ten works not mentioned in Appendix A can be found on the online catalogue of the Bodleian Library, bringing the total number of works to 43:

serica.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/home, accessed December 22, 2016. A few full texts are available for viewing there. Another six works not listed in Appendix A are also available from the National Library of Australia, bringing the total to 49:

It should be remembered that John, like other leading missionary-scholars producing Christian literature in Chinese, relied on the editorial ability of Chinese co-laborers. John’s co-laborer for many years was Shěn Zǐxīng 沈子星. As is often the case with 19th century missionaries’ co-laborers, not much is known about Shěn. It appears that the only primary source on Shěn is located in the SOAS archives, not available to me at this time. He is referred to in the several biographies that have been written on John. Perhaps the best researched biography with approximately one page devoted to Shěn is Gibbard 1998, 71-72.

A Chinese historian from Fudan University in Shànghǎi, Sī Jiā 司佳, attributes to Griffith John an early Sānzǐjīng entitled “Truth that Enlightens Trimetrical Classic” Zhēnlǐ qǐméng sānzǐjīng 真理启蒙三字經, published in Wǔchāng 武昌 in 1865. 司佳 2015, 29. Sī does not indicate specifically where this particular version can be found today.

Further evidence from the Annual Report of the Society shows that a late version was titled “Truth Easy Reader Trimetrical Classic” Zhēnlǐ biàndú sānzǐjīng 真理便讀三字經. The earliest record of publication with this title shows that it was available in 1885. The Ninth Annual Report of the Central China Religious Tract Society 1885, 7.

This text is publicly available through the National Library of Australia’s online collection, standing as a part of the London Missionary Society Collection.

Based on comparisons with other versions available online through other libraries, such as the Bodleian collection, it seems that John’s Sānzǐjīng was renamed several times, but the content remained unchanged.

in addition to Rawski’s essay. Griffith John’s versions of a Christian Sānzijīng under various titles has not yet been closely examined in any secondary literature that I am aware of. John’s reputation for being linguistically and rhetorically gifted in Welsh, English and Chinese languages warrants a close analysis of this previously unexplored text.

IV. An Analysis of Relevant Aspects of Griffith John’s Christian Trimetrical Classic

1. Structural Features

The entire published text of the “Holy Teaching of Jesus Trimetrical Classic” is printed on 21 folio pages. In marked contrast with the traditional Sānzijīng, as well as with Medhurst’s versions, John’s text is broken down into sections or chapters with a numbered and titled sub-heading, indicating the general content of that chapter. It should be noted that John’s division of the text into chapters is not unique to his sānzijīng. It is possible that he was aware of a broader pattern in Chinese literature to adapt the form of the traditional Sānzijīng to various worldview perspectives. The first 18 pages are written consistently in three-character lines. The last two columns of text on folio page 18 start a new chapter written in four-character lines, and all subsequent chapters until the end of the text (19-23) are not consistent with the earlier three-character pattern. For this reason, in my analysis of the text I will only discuss the chapters that contain three-character lines (chapters 1-18). Each column of text contains two pairs (four sets) of three-character lines. This is a marked distinction from the traditional Sānzijīng and other Christian sānzijīngs, often published in columns of one pair of three-character lines.

28-29.

41 By Charles Hartwell 夏察理 (1825-1905).
45 For a list of the headings, see Appendix B.
46 See note 16 in this essay for examples of other worldviews being presented in the Sānzijīng form.
47 Why John included these five chapters that are not in three-character lines in a text entitled Sānzijīng is an interesting and somewhat perplexing line of inquiry that we will not explore here. See Appendix B for the sub-titles of these
2. Overview of Content and Concepts

a. Quality

Quality can be an ambiguous criterion for evaluating a text. It depends on who is asking the questions, and what values are at play. To keep the evaluation of John’s *sānzījīng* focused, we can take several points mentioned by Rawski as guideposts. First, does John use a “higher” or “lower” register in writing? In other words, does he employ a scholarly style in writing (*wénlǐ* 文理), or a common (*báihuà* 白話) style? And what about his general use of language? Does it demonstrate skill, or ineptitude?

Griffith John was well aware of the importance of creating literature that appealed to Chinese tastes. Of the 33 works by John mentioned in Appendix A, 16 of them explicitly mention being written in the higher style of *wénlǐ*. The *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzījīng* was likewise written in *wénlǐ*. This should not be surprising, because the condensed nature of the *sānzījīng* form would be particularly difficult to achieve without resorting to the linguistic functions available in classical Chinese. A couple of points of departure from the traditional *Sānzījīng* are worth noting. First, John employs a much more personal style and tone in the writing of his *sānzījīng*. The opening line of the text is sufficient to illustrate this:

造我者 即上帝 帝是誰 聽仔細
*Zàowǒzhě, jíshàngdì, dìshìshéi, tīngzǐxì*
My maker is the Most High God. Who is God? Listen carefully.

The audience is directly addressed, calling for personal engagement with the “narrator,” and is a regular feature throughout the text. This differs significantly from the opening line of Walter Medhurst’s (麥都思 1796-1857) *sānzījīng*, the first line of which takes an impersonal, third-person descriptive position:

自太初 有上帝 造民物 創天地
*Zìtàichū, yǒushàngdì, zàomínwù, chuàngtiāndì*
From the great beginning there has always been God Most High, maker of people anomalous sections.
and things, creator of heaven and earth.

The traditional Sānzījīng has an even more impersonal tone, presenting the ling-time imperially-endorsed perspective on human origins from the Rú tradition:

人之初 性本善 性相近 習相遠
Rénzhīchū, xìngběnshàn, xìnxīāngjìn, xìxiāngyuǎn
Human nature, at its origin, is innately good; by nature two people are near to one another, it is by practice that they become distant.

Setting aside content for the moment, while John’s language throughout the text is clearly in the “higher” literary style, he employs it in a way that is personal and even interactive between reader or reciter and audience. This certainly might have shocked his readers, unaccustomed to personal address from the sānzījīng form.

What about the use of language? John was known for his eloquent preaching in all three spoken languages he was competent in: Welsh (native), English (learned), and Chinese (learned; several dialects). In writing, he was no less skilled. It is notable to point out that the final character of the second and fourth line of each column rhyme throughout the vast majority of John’s text, with only a few exceptions. Achieving such consistency in rhyming would have been an incredible task. We can assume John received support from Shěn Zǐ xīng, his long-time co-laborer, in accomplishing such a feat. Nevertheless, it is still a remarkable feature of the structure of the text, and an indication as to how far John went to seek to truly master the Chinese language. It should also be noted that this form of rhyme conforms to a standard vernacular pronunciation of the late Qīng empire that can be read with recognition and memorized by common people with less education, in contrast to the rhyme scheme of the traditional Sānzījīng which rhymes according to a more classical scheme known at that time primarily to elite scholars and which is not always apparent in Mandarin. This reveals John’s greater concern for the conversion

48 I counted 16 instances of non-rhyming columns, out of a total 306 lines (5% non-rhyming columns), using categories I created for this study. I counted a column as rhyming if it was a “near rhyme” (i.e. zhèng 正 and shén 神, zhī 知 and sī 私), “initial rhyme” (i.e. xíng 行 and xùn 训), “vowel rhyme” (i.e. rén 人 and shèng 聖—although auditorily they do not match, the vowel is the same), or “end rhyme” (i.e. rén 人 and hún 魂). I did not count non-rhyming but visually related characters (i.e. jūn 君 and míng 名). Examples of non-rhyme include è 恶 and guò 過, xīn 心 and zēng 增, and bài 拜 and xiè 懈.

of non-Christians and the teaching of Christians at all levels of society, rather than a pursuit of personal distinction through refined literary creation for an elite readership.50

b. Content

As noted earlier, John’s *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzījīng* spans 18 chapters. Conceptually, however, the text could be broken down into fewer, larger groups:

- Chapters 1-4 fit well into a group called “theology proper” or the study of who and what God is and is not.
- Chapters 5-6 cover rational, created beings, beginning with human beings and closing with angels and demons.
- Chapters 7-13 could be generally called “Christian Living,” explaining proper responses to God, including praise and repentance, and various forms of prayer, and other specifically Christian rituals of worship such as the Lord’s Supper and baptism.
- Chapters 14-15 cover Bible basics, including information about the uniqueness of the Bible as a religious book, a very brief account of the major forms of literature in the Bible (“‘holy poetry’ *shèngshī* 聖詩, prophetic literature *yùyán* 預言, and so on), and key stories of the Old and New Testaments, with a heavy emphasis on Jesus Christ).
- Chapters 15-18, the final three chapters, address children specifically, including two songs for children and a chapter for admonishment.51

To gain perspective on how this differs from other Christian *sānzījīngs* we can compare it with Rawski’s description of the five Christian *sānzījīngs* she examines:

[These texts] all tell the Gospel story. They begin with a description of God, the Creator of the world, who is omnipotent and omniscient. Adam and Eve and the story of man’s fall introduces the notion of original sin, which taints all men. Men differ from the animals in having an eternal soul and, without Christ’s intervention, are condemned to eternal suffering. Jesus, the Son of God, came to earth to die for mankind’s sins. Those who sincerely repent and believe in Him will be saved. Salvation is open to all, and is aided by the Holy Ghost. A Christian’s duties are threefold: to read the Bible, undergo baptism, and take communion. The tracts end with a description of the millennium, when the graves will open and all will be judged at God’s tribunal. It thus behooves the reader to repent and pray.52

John’s version contains much of the same “Gospel story” content as the five versions discussed by Rawski, though not in such a concise form. At first glance it could be seen to follow the categories

51 One song in particular is worth mentioning. Chapter 18 is titled simply “Children’s Song 2,” but it is a song of much deeper influence than the simple title indicates. The original song is titled “Jesus Loves Me,” and particularly in the 19th century was something of an international sensation. It was translated into numerous languages, and became so popular in China that in some hymnals today, the tune is referred to simply as “China.” John has reproduced the song here in trimetrical verse. For one example of its presence in recent hymnody, see Brink 1998, 746-747.
52 Rawski 1985, 146-147.
of a contemporary systematic theology course: God, Human Beings and Angels, Christ and the Holy Spirit, Salvation, Church, and Future Judgment. John also includes what could be considered a typical cast of characters.\textsuperscript{53} None of the personal biblical names and names of places John mentions in the \textit{Yēsū shèngjiào sānzìjīng} would have been familiar to the vast majority of Chinese readers. In fact, it would be quite remarkable if Chinese readers found every element of John’s \textit{sānzìjīng} familiar. That would indicate that Chinese readers would already be familiar with all the significant Christian ideas he wanted to communicate, and that he had nothing new to say to his Chinese readership other than what had been transmitted through the Rú tradition.

Nevertheless, despite obvious unfamiliar elements in the text, that does not mean Chinese readers would find nothing familiar at all. John refers to 21 historical, semi-historical, literary and mythical Chinese persons, the majority of these appearing in chapters 2-4.\textsuperscript{54} After describing Jesus’ “coming to earth” as the Incarnate Savior in chapter 15, John dates his arrival first according to the Chinese imperial reckoning of time (starting from the first year of the reign of the Guāng Xù 光緒 emperor) and then according to the Gregorian calendar used by Europeans.\textsuperscript{55}

### 3. Redefining Cultural Boundaries

Having looked at these general conceptual issues, it is appropriate to now ask, how did John interact with and make use of existing Chinese cultural material to communicate his Christian message to his late Qing Chinese audience? Closely connected to this is another issue: are multiple expressions of Chinese culture even possible? The prevailing answer to the latter question in both academic and popular settings in mainland China and elsewhere even today is that there is “one Chinese culture” that does not include Christian, Muslim, and other religious views, precisely because they were not “born” in China. In other words, because these views did not originate in the geographical area today known as China, it is not possible to conceive of a form of “Chinese

\textsuperscript{53} See Appendix F for a list of names.

\textsuperscript{54} See Appendix F for a list of names.

\textsuperscript{55} 到光緒 六年間 千八百 八十年. Dàoguāngxù, liúniánjiān, qiānbābāi, bāshínián. Folio page 15.
culture” that would include them.\(^{56}\) It is helpful to remember that the “Chinese culture” John encountered in the mid- to late-19th century had not yet moved into the more pluralized, post-traditional stage we see today.\(^{57}\) So, in order for Christian ideas to be expressed in any particular Chinese cultural and linguistic context, new modes of discourse needed to be created. Chinese culture and language would need to adapt to new forms of thought, and new ways of expressing Christian doctrines would have to be developed in order to express those doctrines appropriately in a new linguistic and cultural setting. Transformation had yet to take place. This dual- (or even multi-) directional transformation (of both receptor culture and transmitted message) is a significant element in the “serial expansion” of Christianity throughout its history.\(^{58}\)

In the late Qing dynasty many traditional views still prevailed that John directly and forcefully challenged, because he saw in them a direct conflict with the particular Protestant Christian worldview he was presenting. Some traditional Chinese viewpoints John found to be compatible with his preferred Christian worldview and could support them. So, in order to successfully communicate with his audience he chose to use language and terms that favored Ruist traditions.\(^{59}\) This section will demonstrate how John approached these challenges through investigating three categories of metaphysics, history, and culture found within his Protestant

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\(^{56}\) Chinese expressions of Buddhism are often considered an exception by pointing out that Buddhism underwent a radical transformation in order to accommodate to a Chinese context, so that it is now unrecognizable as having Indian roots. In a sense, we could say that Buddhism was “reborn” or perhaps “reincarnated” in China.

\(^{57}\) John returned to London not long after the revolution of 1911 that marked off the official end of traditional Chinese culture, though much more work in dismantling the living features of those traditions was yet to be accomplished through the leadership of Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893-1976). It is interesting to note that Christian missionaries considered Mao’s home province of Hunan 湖南 to be one of the most difficult provinces to establish a foothold for Christianity. Notably, John’s life and evangelistic itineration in Hunan would have overlapped with the early years of Mao’s life. Did they ever meet? Did Mao hear John preach? I know of no sources that indicate this possibility. Mao would have been 17 years old when John returned to London.


\(^{59}\) Arthur Wright discusses the difficulty experienced by various people, both Chinese and foreign, in presenting ideas in Chinese language that did not conform to the prevailing cultural norms. These problems covered a wide variety of topics, including initial Buddhist encounters, issues in science in the Ming and Qing dynasties, where a Ru cosmology mixed with Daoist elements differed greatly from an Anglo-European empirical cosmology, and Christian religious expressions, both Protestant and Catholic, that did not have direct association with the “three teachings” of Ruist, Daoist or Buddhist traditions of the Ming and Qing dynasties. While most of the general worldviews discussed by Wright are now considered standard “Chinese” views (such as Buddhism and Communism), Christianity continues to be stigmatized as a foreign worldview, by both Chinese and foreign writers, though some advancements have been made. What I think this signifies is not so much a language and culture that is resistant to transformations (as Wright describes it), as it is certain people with particular cultural ideologies unwilling to admit the possibility of a plurality of cultural expressions and the possibility of cultural transformation. See Wright 1953. Regarding cultural transformation, see Pfister 2008.
version of the sānzījīng.

**a. Metaphysics**

True to his Protestant Christian vision of reality, John begins the Yēsū shèngjiào sānzījīng with the fundamental metaphysical category of who and what God is and what God has done. This would immediately challenge the metaphysical and cosmological views in China that tended to see the world in terms of non-spiritual material and force in perpetual transformation, such as the yīn-yáng 陰陽 and five phases wǔxíng 五行 theories introduced into Rú cosmology by Dōng Zhòngshū (董仲舒 179-104 BC), or Chinese Buddhist views of the illusory quality of the world as found in the Heart Sutra xīnjīng 心經. John begins the first chapter by inviting the audience to discover who God is, and goes on to list a number of key attributes of God: personal creator, without form, the only true god (zhēnshén 真神), all-powerful and all-knowing (quánzhīnéng 全能), entirely holy (quánshèngyì 全聖義), unchanging, without beginning or end, full of loving-kindness (quánrénshàn 全仁善), and the great and ultimate source and root that precedes all things (dàběnyuán, wéitiāndì, wànwùxiān 大本源 為天地 萬物先).

It is also worth noting that throughout the entire text John most often uses the term Shàngdì 上帝 to refer to “God,” but does not hesitate to use a number of other creative titles to refer to the Trinitarian deity. John’s openness to multiple references to the Christian deity adds complexity to the discussion of the historic, though now relatively obsolete, debate usually referred to as the “Term Controversy” that John weighed in on. John was willing to creatively appropriate old terms.

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60 I am reading this as a two-character compound, possibly revealing John’s creative adaptation in Chinese for the key Christian ethical and spiritual concept of God’s love, agapē αγάπη in Greek and hesed חסד in Hebrew.

61 For a full list, see Appendix F. It was pointed out to me in a conference in Guangzhou in December 2016 that it would be interesting to see which of these titles and names are original to John’s work(s), and which have more common purchase among the writings of other missionaries. That would involve a much longer research effort that I have not yet undertaken.

62 “Every term has to be emptied of its heathen content and replenished with new ideas. Take the term for God. It matters not on what side of the controversy, which has been carried on in China for many years, you stand, the difficulty is one and the same; the idea associated with it is a purely heathen one.” He goes on to say that neither Shàngdì 上帝 nor shén 神 is fully adequate for representing the Christian deity, and does not mention tiān 天 at all. Quoted in Lai 2012, 49, from the Annual Report of the Religious Tract Society, 1881, 143 (not available to me at the
and to develop new terms for God that were either more familiar to a Chinese audience, such as The Most High God *Shàngdì* 上帝, or would challenge the worldview of the same audience with titles such as The Most High God and Father *Fū Shàngdì* 父上帝, Savior-Lord *Jiùzhǔ* 救主, True Savior-Lord *Zhēnjùzhǔ* 真救主, and Savior of the World *jiùshìzhě* 救世者. It seems that one of the ways John overcame the difficulty of finding a single term of reference for God in his *sānzījīng* was to multiply the terms, so that all the necessary conceptual territory would be covered.

The two fundamental activities of God presented in the *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzījīng* are creation and redemption. Creation features in seven chapters, and is used as a central argument for why other beings are not God—they are mere mortals and cannot create. He identifies God as the source of all that exists in the universe, intimately involved in making humans and all things. This then provides a context in which John can “rewrite” the origin of the universe narrative with popular late Qing Chinese literary culture, taking an entire chapter (3) to refute the mythical story of Pán Gǔ 盤古 creating the world by separating Heaven and Earth, or *yīn* and *yáng*.

Redemption features in nine chapters. Compared with the concept of Creation, redemption would have been a more difficult concept to communicate because it requires an explanation of other concepts such as sin and certain views of the afterlife, all of which offered points where confusion could occur, especially with Chinese Buddhist notions. John plays back and forth
between very personal statements regarding redemption and universal aspects of Christian doctrine rooted in biblical terms. Throughout all of these passages John makes it clear that it is the Lord who saves, and saves only those who trust in him. The use of the word “trust” or “believe” would have been a new innovation in Chinese language that missionaries adapted from classical Chinese literature, and which would later have a much greater influence on modern Chinese language. It is interesting to note that is a shared character between the traditional Sānzījīng and John’s version, though its use in the former text carries a more classical meaning, appearing in the list of the five key ethical principles (or constant virtues wǔcháng) as stated by Dǒng Zhòngshū (rén, yi, lǐ, zhì, xìn), usually taking the meaning “reliable” or “trustworthy.” In John’s Protestant version of the sānzījīng the term carries a more novel meaning, repeatedly being used in the sense of believing or “having faith” in an object.

b. History

John demonstrates a good awareness of traditional Chinese history and seeks to introduce a more or less literate Chinese audience to a Judeo-Christian view of history by presenting key alternative historical persons and events from the Bible to the readers without excluding key Chinese figures. Significantly, apart from Pán Gǔ, as I mentioned earlier, John does not dispute the historicity of any Chinese historical figures he mentions. And even when challenging the story of Pán Gǔ, John challenges the historicity of the myth not through a Christian alternative text or

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68 我救主 and 信主者，必得救.
69 主耶稣，来救世 and 救世者，即耶稣.
70 There is currently a project underway at the Freie Universität Berlin led by Professor Christian Meyer looking at the evolution of the use of the word, xìn, in Chinese language. An international workshop and conference was held from June 9-11, 2017 on the topic, entitled “From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs — Changing Concepts of xìn from Traditional to Modern Chinese.”
71 See Appendix E, #403.
72 However, having given this definition, there is at least one clear use of it to mean “trust” or “believe” the words of someone in the Lunyu 14.14 (論語: 憲問): 子曰: 「臧武仲以防求為後於魯，雖曰不要君，吾不信也。」
73 See Appendix F.
historical narrative, but through authoritative Chinese texts. In chapter 4 John links a number of key Chinese historical figures with the Christian ethical duty to worship God, beginning with the statement that many well-known Chinese ancients knew and worshiped the Most High God. Throughout most of his presentation of the Christian history of redemption, John does not attempt to draw many parallels between Chinese and Christian histories. The clearest connection he makes with Chinese traditional history is, as mentioned earlier, when discussing the birth of Jesus he dates it in relation to the reign of the Guāng Xù emperor. Otherwise, his Christian version of history is presented as a wholly new set of events and people in a new chronology as recounted in the “Holy Classic” Shèngjīng 聖經 written by God’s inspiration.

The introduction of a new historical narrative makes possible an alternative history for late Qīng Chinese people. Historians and politicians then and now are aware that history is not a neutral, empirical science. What is selected for praise, censure, and collective memory shapes the values of societies and individuals; the past is also often understood as a gateway or guide to the future, allowing people in a society to shape and reshape their future based on shared knowledge, experiences, and understandings of various dimensions of the past. Although Christianity had been

74 Gùsìshū, jíwǔjīng, jiēbúzài, pánggǔmíng, yīnsānhuáng, mǎngwújī, sīmǎqiān, gài bù tí. [According to the Four Books and the Five Classics, in none of them is recorded the name Pan Gu, because (knowledge of even) the Three Emperors is obscure and absurd, Sima Qian hardly mentions them.] This is in marked contrast to a claim by Noel Gibbard, that “Griffith John’s approach was not confrontational.” Gibbard 2015, 96. Another significant point of disagreement I have with Gibbard’s presentation of John and his theology is the claim that “he did not present the concept of the Kingdom in terms of Christ’s second coming, judgment, and salvation” (97). Chapter 13 in John’s sānzìjīng (folio pages 12-13) covers precisely the Christian eschatological vision of judgment, including heaven and hell, a moment when all people will stand before a judge who is the Lord, identified directly as Jesus in resurrected bodies. He further claims that this public day of judgment (gōngshěnrì 公審日) occurs at the end of heaven and earth (tiāndìmò 天地末), and that after judgment the good (shàn 善, or blessed) spend eternity serving the Most High God, and the bad (è 惡, or cursed) suffer eternal bitterness.

75 Cǐshàngdì, gǔrénzhī, chángjìngbài, luèyánzhī. 此上帝, 古人知, 常敬拜, 略言之. Folio page 3. The next eight lines give specific instances of which persons acknowledges certain aspects of the Most High God (with the exception of Xià Jíè 夏桀, known for his evil deeds), ending with the statement that such examples could be repeated endlessly, but without enlightening a person’s heart: LèiShàngdì, YùShùnxíng, zhāoshòudì, XiàYǔxún, huángShàngdì, wéijiāngzhòng, chēngTāngyán, lǐzuìtōng, yǒuShàngdì, TāngWángwèi, gǎnbùzhèng, XiàJiézuì, ZhōuWénWáng, huòzhìjiàng, zàiShàngdì, zúyǒupáng, yòuxiāmín, zuóyǎnsì, xiǎngShàngdì, WǔWángcí, jiàoshèlǐ, shìShàngdì, Kǒngshèyán, fēi wú yì, Mèngzǐyán, rénshùì, nèngzhái, sīDíkè, cǐlì, shuōbùjìn, xīnhùn. 順上帝、虞舜行、昭受帝、夏禹訓、在上帝、或陟降、在上帝、左右旁、佑下民、郊社禮、事上帝、孔聖言、非無意、孟子言、人緇緋、龍雀浴、祀帝可。此類語說不盡, 惜世人之心不明. Folio pages 3-4, proper names are underlined in John’s text.

76 Folio page 13.

77 Already in the 19th century multiple histories were available through multiple worldviews, including therefore Buddhist, Daoist and Muslim perspectives, though the “orthodox” Rú historical view promoted by the imperial throne
present in several forms starting in the 7th century with the arrival of representatives of the “luminous religion” (jingjiao 景教), in the 19th century it had yet to establish a compelling history that would have a transformative influence in contemporary Chinese society. John clearly had intentions to change that. What is interesting to see is that John does not change or challenge much of traditional Rú history. He clearly does not find a necessary contradiction between significant portions of the Rú view of history and his Christian view. In fact, he implicitly endorses it by using it, rather than Christian history, to battle what he sees as inadequate historical views in Chinese traditional society, such as the creation story of Pán Gǔ.

c. Culture

John endorses and at the same time challenges practices and values current in China in the late 19th century. Although it is not stated directly, John clearly accepts as historical the major figures of the Rú tradition, including Kōngzǐ 孔子 and Mèngzǐ 孟子 and even earlier figures such as the sage-king Shùn 尧 and Yǔ 禹. He also gives explicit support to several key social values that stem from the Rú tradition. In chapter ten he writes, “What kind of people are the disciples of Jesus? Every day they observe the ‘five relations.’”

In chapter 11 the five relations appear again, along with the five constant virtues. In a sequence of three lines he raises the question of how all people, not just Christians, ought to live in the knowledge that they are made by God. The first principle is to reverence the Most High God, followed by loving all people as one loves oneself. The last two moral injunctions are to observe the five constant virtues and to strive with all one’s might to realize the “five relations.” This, he concludes, is the great duty of all humankind. We might think John was not well informed if he omitted from this list of virtues what is often considered the most significant moral duty, that of reverencing one’s parents xiào 孝. But this was certainly the most dominant.

78 Yēsūtú, zěnyàngrén, měirìlǐ, shǒuwǔlún. 耶穌徒 怎樣人 每日裏 守五倫,
79 Dìzàorén, yìdāngzhī, yàoshìrén, xíngshíshì, shíshíshí, jǐngshǎngdì, àizhòngrén, rúàijǐ, shǒuwūchāng, jīnwǔlún, tiānxiàrén, dàběnfēn. 帝造人 意當知 要世人 行實事 實事何 敬上帝 愛眾人 如愛己 守五常 盡五倫 天下人 大本分.
virtue appears in four places, twice in chapter three, and once each in chapters 11 and 16. In chapter three, xiào is described as the proper fulfillment of the duty reflecting one’s deepest inner feeling. One line earlier John gives parents the highest honor, from a Christian perspective, when he says that Heaven and Earth can be compared to a house and the Most High God can be compared to one’s parents. This is a clever and very meaningful move too, implying a strong connection between how one treats one’s parents with how one treat’s the Most High God. In chapter 16, entitled “Admonishing Children,” John describes the “bad child” and the “good child.” The bad child has a disrespectful heart, considers the Most High God to be of little importance, and rebels against his or her parents. The good child is quite the opposite; he or she trusts in the Savior-Lord, reverences the Most High God, and is filial to father and mother. It is no accident that John places a person’s relationship with his or her parents as a close second place to a person’s relationship with God in these two instances. The fifth of the Ten Commandments is to respect and reverence one’s father and mother, and is the first relationship mentioned among the Ten Commandments after a person’s relationship with God.

Finally, and as a segue to cultural features that John challenges in a discourse that spans eight lines in chapter 11, John discusses the proper way a person ought to relate to deceased ancestors. In a somewhat playful way, John points out that sacrifices offered once or twice a year are not sufficient for a living person to be well-fed, and likewise would leave an ancestor’s soul cold and hungry. If you offer food to a person after they are dead, he says, you are too late. A better way is to care (xiào) for your kin while they are alive. Furthermore, according to John,

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80 Jingfumù, fènnèiqíng 敬父母 分內情. Folio page 2.
81 Pìtiāndì, xiàngfángwū, pìshàngdì, xiàngfùmù 譬天地 像房屋 譬上帝 像父母. Folio page 2.
82 Èxiǎozǐ, wújìng xīn, qīngshàngdì, nìshuāngqīn……hǎoxiǎozǐ, xìnjiùzhǔ, jìngshàngdì, xiàofùmù 恶小子 無敬心 轻上帝 逆双親……好小子 信救主 敬上帝 孝父母. Folio page 2.
83 I have rendered this according to a fairly direct translation of the Chinese Union Version of the Bible: dàng ěr fùmù 当尔父母. Interestingly, the final chapter of John’s Sanzijing that is not included in this analysis is a rendition of the Ten Commandments, and he renders the fifth command as: jìng ěr fùmù 敬尔父母.
84 Chūnqiūsì, zhǐqiánshāo, fēizuòhuī, jìntúláo, húnruòchī, yīniánnèi, jìbùduō, jiēdòngněi 春秋祀 纸钱烧 飞作灰 尽徒劳 一年内 祭不多 皆凍餒. Folio page 10.
85 Dàozhǐnǐ, jìyǐchí, jìnxiàoqi, zàishēngshí 到親死 到己週 孝在生時. Folio page 10.
one’s kin ought to be buried with full honors that they deserve. So we can see that John does not seem to have a problem with the specifically Rú social practices that are advocated in classical texts such as the Lúnyǔ, but he challenges other widespread cultural practices that do not necessarily originate from a Rú philosophical perspective and are not conformable to a Christian worldview, such as offering sacrifices to ancestors. Other “empty” cultural practices that John says his “holy teaching” forbids in chapter ten include prostitution, gambling, the rampant use of opium, sacrificing to ancestors, worshipping the dead and other spirits, burning paper money, selecting auspicious days, drawing spells or incantations, sciomancy (consulting spirits of the dead), planchette writing, and fortune telling through divining the yīn and yáng and special use of Chinese characters. Many of these are associated with either Daoist or Chinese Buddhist religious traditions.

Here I have explored three aspects in which John sought to transform contemporary aspects of traditional Chinese culture by means of a Protestant Christian vision of reality. We began by asking how John interacted with existing cultural material to communicate his Christian message to a Chinese audience. He begins by laying out a traditional Protestant vision of reality that grounds all of his criticisms, but likewise offers points of contact with the culturally dominant Rú perspective, offering no criticism of any social practices or historical claims that are well grounded in the Rú tradition. However, he has decisive criticisms of Buddhist, Daoist and folk religious metaphysical beliefs and rituals. John employs a Rú historical perspective where it is useful, showing parallels or support for his Christian message, but discrediting mythical stories that lack historical credibility even from a standard Rú Chinese perspective.

V. Evaluating Rawski’s Claims

66 Qìnrúósǐ, lìyàojìn, ànběnfēn, hòuzàngyíng 若死 力要盡 按本分 厚葬塋. Folio page 10.
67 John was one of the founding members of the Permanent Committee for the Promotion of Anti-Opium Societies that developed out of the 1890 Shanghai missionary conference. See Lodwick 1996, 36.
88 Piáoyǔdǔ, yāpiànyān, bìyuǎnkāi, gèyībiān, xìnzhúxí, yóusuōjīn, jízhǐxiān, bàisǐshī, bàilíngwèi, shāoqiánzhǐ, zéjírì, huàfúzhāng, bìngqǐkè, bìngmíngxué, cǐyīlèi, jìngkōngxū, wǒshèngjiào, bìyánjù 娼與賭 鴉片煙 必遠開 各一邊 信主者 有所禁 凡虛事 切莫行 祭祖先 拜死屍 拜靈位 燒錢紙 祇吉日 畫符張 並扶乩 請陰陽 並測字 並起課 並相面 並命學 此一類 盡空虛 我聖教 必嚴拒. Folio pages 9-10.
The purpose of Rawski’s essay is to demonstrate that “mission elementary schools in the nineteenth century accommodated Chinese values and that missionaries bowed to Chinese demands on the form and content of the primary school curriculum.” She demonstrates this through two primary means, the use of teachers and the use of texts. She spends less time on the use of “native teachers,” and focuses most of her analysis on elementary level Chinese language primers. The traditional Sānzījīng was thought by many missionaries to be inadequate as a language primer, as well as in the worldview that it presents. As a result, some Christian missionary-scholars sought to replace the traditional Sānzījīng with Christian adaptations. Rawski concludes that in both cases, teachers and texts, Christian missionary-scholars were unable to “by-pass [the] demands for the traditional Chinese curriculum and traditional teaching methods.” Her ultimate aim is to demonstrate that “Chinese perspectives and values shaped the form and content of the mission primary-school curriculum.”

From a twenty-first century perspective, looking back at 19th century missionary activity, Rawski’s conclusions are not novel. It is widely accepted today that transmission of a religious or cultural view to a new context requires some kind of transformation in form and content. What is more important to consider here is Rawski’s criticisms of missionary-scholar writings. As stated earlier, Rawski wants to examine the early education literature created by missionaries, to see if it met the needs of students wishing to take the civil service examination.

Rawski examines five Christian sānzījīngs to see how well they would prepare a young Chinese person for a future civil service career, and how well they met Chinese expectations for early literacy material. She presents two tables to demonstrate that these five Christian alternatives did not meet the needs of students, and as a result, she claims, they were unpopular among Chinese people. A primary reason for this is that, in most cases, they did not reproduce even one-third of the

89 Rawski 1985, 135.
90 Rawski 1985, 151.
91 Rawski 1985, 151.
92 Rawski 1985, 137.
original characters found in the traditional Sānzijīng. Rawski concludes that “the Christian tracts were, therefore, unsatisfactory substitutes for the [traditional] San-tzu ching.” While the tracts may ultimately not make good replacements for the traditional Sānzijīng, this only tells part of the story, and from a distorted perspective that deserves reconsideration.

In order to reach a more precise and balanced perspective regarding these works by missionary-scholars, we should examine this situation from at least two angles. First, we can look from the simple perspective of the number of unique characters that a student would learn through these texts. Rawski’s claim is that the Christian Sānzijīngs did not reproduce the number of characters that would have satisfied Chinese readers preparing for civil service examinations. A young man beginning his scholarly career was required to master 9,000 characters. Viewed from this angle, even the traditional primers were clearly just that, primers. They initiated a student into the written world of Chinese literati, but were clearly insufficient by themselves to reach the ultimate goal.

Before we look at the contribution of John’s Yēsū shèngjiào sānzijīng to this high goal of 9,000 characters, it is helpful to first look at the contribution of the traditional set of three primer texts to this goal. The traditional Sānzijīng has approximately 533 unique characters. The Thousand-Character Text reduplicates 308 characters from the traditional Sānzijīng, or more than half of the latter text’s unique characters. The Hundred Family Surnames reduplicates 134 characters in the traditional Sānzijīng. Together the three texts represent 1,483 unique characters, with 358 repeated characters in two texts, and 95 characters repeated in all three texts, for a total of 453 reduplicated characters. The number of unique characters represented in the three traditional primer texts amounts to 16.5% of the 9,000 character goal.

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93 These tables are reproduced in Appendix C, with the addition of figures I compiled from John’s Yēsū shèngjiào sānzijīng 耶稣聖教三字經 (1880).
94 Rawski 1985, 150.
95 See Hsiung 1998, 32.
96 In what follows, the calculations are my own.
97 Because the numerous published versions of the traditional Sānzijīng are not entirely consistent and have some variation in the number of characters, throughout this paper I am using as a “standard” text a recently published version in 饒宗頤 2016.
What happens when we replace the traditional Sānzǐjīng with John’s sānzìjīng? The Thousand Character Text reduplicates 454 characters from John’s sānzìjīng, and the Hundred Family Surnames reduplicates 157 characters. The total number of unique characters between these three texts comes to 1,622 characters, with a combined shared or reduplicated character count of 570 characters. Replacing the traditional Sānzǐjīng with John’s Christian sānzìjīng in this collection of three texts results in a net gain of 139 unique characters, raising the total contribution to the 9,000 character goal to 18%.98

Table 1: Comparison of Unique and Shared Characters Between the Traditional Sānzǐjīng and the Version Prepared by Griffith John

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>Total Number of Characters</th>
<th>Number of Unique Characters</th>
<th>Number of Characters Shared with Three-Character Classic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three-Character Classic (三字經)</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>533</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thousand-Character Text (千字文)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundred Family Surnames (百家姓)</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of unique characters between the three texts: 1,483 (16.5% of 9,000 characters)
Combined unique shared characters: 453

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>Total Number of Characters</th>
<th>Number of Unique Characters</th>
<th>Number of Characters Shared with John’s Sānzǐjīng</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John’s sānzìjīng (耶穌聖教三字經)</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thousand-Character Text (千字文)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundred Family Surnames (百家姓)</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of unique characters between the three texts: 1,622 (18% of 9,000 characters)
Combined unique characters shared: 570

The traditional Sānzǐjīng, along with the Hundred Family Surnames and the Thousand-Character Text, were part of a long pedigree of texts designed with pedagogical intent

98 See Table 1 and Appendix C.
known as “Character Books” 字書. Hsiung Ping-chen points out that “Bibliographic information suggests...that many more in their rank were produced and circulated for one period of time or another,” and that “the standard primers [were] a late-imperial recognition of a long-standing tradition.”

Hsiung also mentions that many of these primers were not “of a high literary quality themselves,” but that “as time passed the character books paid increasing attention to content and style.” Taking these claims at face-value offers an alternative explanation to Rawski’s view as to why the missionary sānzijīngs were not widely appreciated. Of higher value to Chinese students were texts with a direct pedagogic function that would contribute to moving a person into lucrative and powerful positions of society, even if it did not prepare students to do their jobs well.

It is certainly possible that had the collapse of the traditional form of education in imperial China—the sole goal of which was passing the civil service examination—not occurred so closely to the entrance of Christianity into China, the Christian sānzijīngs would have eventually received better circulation and popularity, and been granted a minority status similar to Daoist, Buddhist and Muslim sānzijīngs. In addition, while Rawski criticizes the Christian sānzijīngs for not conforming to Chinese expectations, hypothetically speaking, it could have been possible that the more personal style of John’s sānzijīng, despite being considerably longer, might have been much easier to memorize than the traditional Sānzijīng, and ultimately more appealing and helpful as an early education literacy primer.

Now, it is not merely the number of unique characters that matters, but which characters were present or not present that adds value to this comparison. What Rawski’s statistical comparison does not reveal are the kinds of characters that do not overlap between the Christian sānzijīngs and the traditional Sānzijīng, and whether or not key philosophical and worldview concepts are represented by these characters. She covers this question with a single comment on the two tables: “Among the characters omitted were the names of major grains, major historical

99 Several of these texts are mentioned in Hsiung 1998, 32.
100 Hsiung 1998, 32.
101 Lee notes that during the Song dynasty, “Increasingly people used the schools not for serious educational purposes, but only for preparing to take the examinations,” a problem which continued until the end of the examination system in
dynasties, some of the seasons, and, of course, the [personal] names of Confucius [Zhòng Ní 仲尼] and Mencius [Mèng Kē 孟軻].”

How does John’s sānzìjīng compare with this more significant analysis? We see that John’s sānzìjīng likewise does not include many of the names of grains and animals that appear in the traditional Sānzìjīng. In addition (as seen in Appendix E), there are other characters not present in John’s sānzìjīng:

- one season and two cardinal directions (冬、南、北)
- some names of dynasties (尚、秦、魏、元、宋)
- and the personal name of Master Kong (仲尼) and other philosophically significant figures (莊、荀).

Nevertheless, he does include the formal titles for both Kǒngzǐ and Mèngzǐ (孔子、孟子), three seasons (夏、春、秋), other dynasty names (周、漢、唐、明、清), the terms for key virtues (仁、義、禮、智、信), the names of historical and mythical figures, some of whom were named in the traditional Sānzìjīng and others who were not named (虞、舜、禹、湯、周、武、佛、盤古), and a number of significant philosophical concepts that are surprisingly absent from the traditional Sānzìjīng (合、修、氣、陰、理、乾、陽、極、誠、輪、變). What this shows is that, although Rawski is correct to point out that these Christian sānzìjīngs may not include all the same characters as their traditional counterpart, this does not necessarily indicate the significance of the presence or absence of these kinds of characters. Based on the above analysis, we might equally and justifiably conclude that the traditional Sānzìjīng is an insufficient preparation for the civil service examination because students would not be familiar with characters central to the Rú worldview advocated by the text.

One point that softens this critique of Rawski’s criticism is that John’s sānzìjīng was considerably longer than the traditional Sānzìjīng (3,726 characters compared to 1,068, respectively), and so perhaps not as appealing as a character primer because of its length. However, as mentioned earlier, the style of John’s sānzìjīng may eventually have become more appealing precisely because of its

1905. See Lee 2003, 84.
102 Rawski 1985, 150. Without a list of the characters shared and not shared between the various Christian sānzìjīngs that she compares, we cannot assess the accuracy of her claims. I have supplied the information in brackets for clarification.
103 See Appendix E for an extract of a list of shared and not shared characters between John’s sānzìjīng and the traditional Sānzìjīng.
style, had the education system remained as it was.

1. Quality of Writing

Rawski further critiques these Christian versions by implying that, with few exceptions, they were all of low scholarly quality. She notes that missionaries tended to write tracts and other materials in wénlǐ 文理 because it was viewed more favorably by Chinese, hoping to appeal to a more educated readership, and also because the common people could recognize a good text, even if they could not fully appreciate it. She says, “Even in wen-li, missionary books generally suffered from poor writing,” because many missionaries did not have sufficient funds to pay for the work of a well-trained scholar with a jinshi 进士 or jürén 举人 degree. She then quotes John Darroch, an influential Scottish missionary heavily involved in Chinese Christian literary creation and distribution, as saying, “When the book is published, the best thought is found clothed in poor language.” The context of this quotation in Rawski’s essay is intended to indicate that missionary writing in Chinese was generally of poor quality, and was written with no input from well-trained Chinese scholars (because they could not afford them). What Rawski does not indicate is that this sentence from Darroch comes from a passage discussing the poor quality of some textbooks written without scholarly input early in Protestant missionary endeavors in China, not all literature created by missionaries that her claim (“missionary books generally suffered from poor writing”) seems to indicate. Just one page earlier, Darroch writes this:

It is interesting to note, as the answers to the circular above quoted prove, that the most popular and useful books [written and published by missionaries and Chinese Christians] are precisely those the style of which is most nearly irreproachable.

There is a Publishing House in Shanghai which has prepared a series of text-books for primary schools…written in lucid Wenli and though designed for the use of children, the preparation has been the work of a scholar holding the Hanlin degree…. It is a matter of common knowledge that the result has been as gratifying commercially as it has been

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104 Rawski 1985, 143, 147.
105 Darroch served on the executive committee of the China Centenary Missionary Conference held in Shanghai between April and May of 1907. In that conference he also served as chair of the committee on Chinese Literature. Rawski’s quotation come from his comments in the article for this segment of the conference proceedings.
106 Darroch 1907, 206; quoted in Rawski 1985, 147.
107 This list is provided in Lai 2012, Appendix D, 289. The original list can be found in: Darroch 1907, 197.
satisfactory from an educational standpoint.\textsuperscript{108}

He goes on to say that “There was a time, not so very long ago,” when missionaries nearly had a corner on the market of textbooks. Chinese publishing houses, however, quickly caught up, and began to outsell the Christian publishing houses. One significant reason Darroch mentions is that the Chinese textbooks were of higher quality, and the reason was that missionaries could not afford to hire a well-trained scholar, and so the textbooks they published contained “the best thought,” but “clothed in poor language.”

As Darroch indicates in the passage above, at the time of his writing in 1907 missionaries were publishing literature of such high quality that he could call the best of it “nearly irreproachable,” and that a set of textbooks were even written by a high-level Chinese scholar. So, while Rawski paints a dramatically bleak picture of the quality and effectiveness of missionary publications generally and educational materials in particular, and uses Darroch to support this point, a more complete account of the situation wholly turns her conclusion around. Darroch’s point was to admonish those few missionaries who continued to produce literature “clothed in poor language,” when they ought to know and do better. But the general tenor of his comments is on the positive side.

To read Griffith John’s writings more generally (not limited to the \textit{sānzījīng}) in the light of Darroch’s more complete statements omitted by Rawski, a further point needs to be made. As I mentioned earlier, John’s tracts were well-received by Chinese persons,\textsuperscript{109} many of them published in both \textit{wénlǐ} (literary Chinese) and \textit{guānhuà 官話} (official (Chinese) language). Notably, he always worked with a Chinese co-laborer,\textsuperscript{110} Shĕn Zǐxīng, also mentioned earlier. John describes Shĕn as “a scholar universally respected for his learning, ability, and character.”\textsuperscript{111} Darroch undoubtedly included John’s writings in the list of other original books in Chinese written by Martin, Milne, and Faber, when he said they were “nearly irreproachable” in their style. So, while

\textsuperscript{108} Darroch 1907, 205.
\textsuperscript{109} See note 106.
\textsuperscript{110} John advocated this kind of cooperative labor, indicating that he was well-aware of the limitations of most foreigners at learning erudite written Chinese. See Thomson, \textit{Griffith John}, 330.
the Christian sanzijing that Rawski examined in her essay are not now available to me for comparison, we can certainly say that John’s sanzijing does not fit Rawski’s description. In at least this one case, then, Rawski’s criticisms are inappropriate and unfounded, and prompts a need to return to the other Christian sānzi jīngs for a more fair evaluation.

**Conclusion**

Rawski’s essay makes a strong point that missionaries were insensitive to the cultural situation in which they brought their new message, and sought to impose their cultural and religious views on a resistant Chinese people. In the end, the missionaries were not strong enough and had to submit to Chinese demands. She does this primarily through an examination of five Christian sānzi jīngs.

Through an examination of Griffith John’s Yēsū shèngjiào sānzi jīng I have sought to demonstrate that Rawski’s claims are not founded. So, while we have to wait until a more complete comparison could be made between the other Christian sānzi jīngs and John’s sanzijing, in order to fully weigh Rawski’s claims, what seems clear is that John was well aware and sensitive of to his audience and their worldviews, and wrote in a way that would attract readers from a wide spectrum of backgrounds while also challenging them with something new.

Although it is not argued directly in John’s sānzi jīng or in this paper, there is evidence to demonstrate that John believed that multiple expressions of Chinese culture is possible, and this text is one example that provides an affirmative answer. While imperial practices throughout the centuries enforced cultural conformity to an “orthodox” system of beliefs, and even generated a largely self-referential language and culture, John’s sānzi jīng demonstrates that alternative visions of reality and modes of life that express these visions are possible. It certainly requires a significant measure of chutzpah, and it may remain a minority view, but it could be done, and it could be “genuinely Chinese” in its expression even as it was authentically Protestant in its content.

111 Thompson 1906, 214.
Appendix A


1. Commentary on Matthew’s Gospel
2. Exhortations to Abandon Opium
3. Leading the Family (in the Right Way)\(^{112}\)
4. Guide to Heaven
5. Trimetrical Classic
6. Eight Chapters of Truth
7. Catechism of Christian Doctrine
8. The Red Dwarf
9. Right Guidance
10. Truth Concerning Astronomy
11. The Sermon on Mount
12. Great Themes of the Gospel
13. Selection of Important Truths
15. Introduction to the Bible
16. True Savior of the World
17. Salient Doctrines of Christianity
18. Rejecting the False
19. On Regeneration
20. Superstitious Customs Exposed
21. True Way of Seeking Happiness
22. Origin of all Things
23. Doctrine of the Resurrection
24. Exhortation to Repentance
25. On the Atonement
26. Truth Concerning God
27. Plan of the Universe
28. An Outline of Chemistry
29. Leading the Parent (in the Right Way)
30. Leading the Prince (in the Right Way)
31. Leading the People (in the Right Way)
32. Doctrinal Teaching of Christianity
33. Moral Teaching of Christianity

One popular title that John was particularly proud of, but which was not listed in the 1898 catalogue is: Gate of Wisdom and Virtue 德慧入門.

\(^{112}\) The English translations were provided in the Catalogue itself; I added parentheses to indicate that some editions of the Catalogue included this phrase and others offered a shortened form without the text in parentheses.
### Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title in Chinese</th>
<th>Title in English</th>
<th>Number of Columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>一</td>
<td>獨一上帝</td>
<td>The One and Only God</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二</td>
<td>封神之謬</td>
<td>The Error of Deifying (Mere Mortals)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>三</td>
<td>萬有真原</td>
<td>The True Origin of All Things</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四</td>
<td>聖賢敬帝</td>
<td>Sages and Worthies Reverenced God</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>五</td>
<td>人之本原</td>
<td>The Origin of Humanity</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>六</td>
<td>神鬼之別</td>
<td>The Distinction Between Spirits and Demons</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>七</td>
<td>歌頌上主</td>
<td>Praising the High Lord</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>八</td>
<td>救世真主</td>
<td>The True Lord is the Savior of the World</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>九</td>
<td>聖神感化</td>
<td>Transformation&lt;sup&gt;113&lt;/sup&gt; by the Holy Spirit</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十</td>
<td>福音聖教</td>
<td>The Holy Teachings of the Gospel</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十一</td>
<td>去假歸真</td>
<td>Do Away with the False, Return to the True</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十二</td>
<td>詳論禱告</td>
<td>A Detailed Discourse on Prayer</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十三</td>
<td>審判善惡</td>
<td>Judging Good and Evil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十四</td>
<td>聖教經典</td>
<td>Classic Texts of the Holy Teaching</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十五</td>
<td>嘗引聖經</td>
<td>An Introduction to the Holy Classic</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十六</td>
<td>警醒幼童</td>
<td>Arousing the Consciousness of Children</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十七</td>
<td>孩兒唱歌其一</td>
<td>Children’s Song 1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十八</td>
<td>孩兒唱歌其二</td>
<td>Children’s Song 2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapters not in Three-Character Verse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title in Chinese</th>
<th>Title in English</th>
<th>Number of Columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>十九</td>
<td>主禱告文</td>
<td>The Text of the Lord’s Prayer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二十</td>
<td>孩兒早禱</td>
<td>Children’s Morning Prayer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二十一</td>
<td>孩兒晚禱</td>
<td>Children’s Evening Prayer</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二十二</td>
<td>食時禱告</td>
<td>Mealtime Prayer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二十三</td>
<td>上帝十誡</td>
<td>The Ten Commandments of God</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>113</sup> The term gǎnhuà 感化 in contemporary Chinese refers generally to penal contexts where a criminal is reformed or transformed through educative means. In contemporary Chinese Christian contexts zhuanhua 轉化 may be preferred. This may reflect a lack of a suitable term at this time in the translation of the Christian message into Chinese. An alternative rendering could be “conversion,” following a suggested meaning in Mathews’ Chinese-English Dictionary, revised American edition of 1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931): 感化 (3232.12) to move; to influence; to convert.” However, the content of the chapter seems to indicate more of a focus on the transformation of the person by an act of the Holy Spirit shèngshén 聖神 (qígōngyòng, huàrēnshàn 其功用，化人善, folio page 8; here the qi 其 refers to the Holy Spirit, mentioned in the two preceding columns), rather than describing the phenomenon from a sociological perspective of a change of allegiance to a particular religious tradition that would warrant rendering it as “conversion.”
Appendix C

This is a modified reproduction and of the two tables with footnotes included in Rawski’s essay discussed in this paper, with the addition of John’s sānzìjīng and the names of the authors of the Christian versions of the sānzìjīng instead of numbers versions (i.e. version 1).

Table 1: Comparison of San-tzu ching Texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>Total Number of Characters</th>
<th>Number of Unique Characters</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original San-tzu ching</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>512 (60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian versions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Henry Medhurst</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>1823-1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophia Martin Little</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>ca. 1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauncey Goodrich</td>
<td>1,008 (4,379)</td>
<td>473 (399)</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Hartwell</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>ca. 1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Blodget</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John’s sānzìjīng</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>(1865-1885; 1880)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Note a Figure in parentheses is the number of unique characters in variant editions. |
| Note b Figure in parentheses is for the commentary. |
| Note c This is the date of the text described in this essay, though other versions were published between the former dates. |

Table 2: Coverage of Characters in Christian Versions Compared with Original San-tzu ching

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>Number of Characters</th>
<th>As Percentage of Total Number of Unique Characters in Original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medhurst</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>35.5 (31.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>31.6 (28.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodrich</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>57.8 (51.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartwell</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>38.5 (34.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blodget</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>36.7 (32.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John’s sānzìjīng</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>58.1 (60.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Note a The figures in parentheses in this column are calculated on the basis of including all variant characters introduced in all variant editions of the original San-tzu ching. |
| Note b Calculated from 533 unique characters. The number in parentheses is an estimated calculation based on the figures found in Table 1. Because the editions of both the traditional and Christian sānzìjīng Rawski worked with are not available to me I am not able to precisely calculate which characters are shared, so I worked with the character list and count (533) from a standard edition published in 2016. |
Appendix D

Extracts from Griffith John’s *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzījīng* 耶穌聖教三字經.
Extracts from the first page of Walter Henry Medhurst’s *sānzijīng* and the first page of a traditional *Sānzījīng*. See Bibliography for more information.
Appendix E
This list is an extract of a comparison of characters between Griffith John’s *Yēsū shèngjiào sānzìjīng* 耶穌聖教三字經 and the traditional *Sānzìjīng*. Characters were selected for inclusion in this abbreviated list based primarily on historical, social, religious and philosophical concerns relating to the worldview presented by each text, so this list does not include such characters as names of grains mentioned by Rawski. The characters are ordered by stroke, and the adjacent numbers indicate the character’s location relative to the full list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>John’s Only</th>
<th>Shared Characters</th>
<th>Trad. Only</th>
<th>John’s Only</th>
<th>Shared Characters</th>
<th>Trad. Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>士</td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>妻</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>王</td>
<td></td>
<td>291</td>
<td>尚</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>天</td>
<td></td>
<td>298</td>
<td>明</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>元</td>
<td></td>
<td>299</td>
<td>易</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>友</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>典</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>仁</td>
<td></td>
<td>301</td>
<td>忠</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>孔</td>
<td></td>
<td>308</td>
<td>和</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>平</td>
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<td>合</td>
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<td>兄</td>
<td></td>
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<td>朋</td>
<td></td>
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Appendix F

Personal and Place Names in John’s sānzijing That Would Be Unfamiliar to 19th Century Chinese Readers.

Adam 亞當 and Eve 夏娃
Satan 鬼首 (Chief Demon)
Cain 該隱
Abel 亞伯
Noah 挪亞
Shem 閃
Ham 含
Japheth 雅弗
Abram 亞伯蘭
Isaac 以撒
Jacob or Israel 雅格、以色列
Moses 摩西
King Solomon 所羅門
Mary, the mother of Jesus 瑪利亞
John 約翰
Peter 彼得
Egypt 埃及
Judah 猶太
Bethlehem 伯利恆
Golgotha 格挖利
Jewish ancestors, nation 猶太祖、猶太國

* In context it reads: 稱邪魔，聖書云，即鬼首，爾當明。

Personal Names in John’s Sanzijing That Would Be Familiar to 19th Century Chinese Readers.

Kongzi 孔子
King Tang 湯、湯王
(King) Yu Shun 虞、虞舜
Pan Gu 盤古
Sima Qian 司馬遷
(King) Tang (Yao) 唐(堯王)
King Yu of Xia 夏禹
Xia Jie 夏桀
King Wen (the Duke) of Zhou 周文王
King Wu 武王
Mengzi 孟子
(Emperor) Guang Xu 光緒
Bodhisattvas 菩薩們
The Jade Emperor 玉皇、張玉帝
Siddhartha Gautama 釋迦
Liu Zhangsheng 劉張生 (張生大帝?)
Hui Zong 徽宗 (a Song dynasty emperor with Daoist leanings)
Wen Taishi 開太師 (“聞仲”, a character in the 16th century novel Feng Shen Bang 封神榜)
Huang Feihu 黃飛虎 (another character in Feng Shen Bang)
Zhao Xuantan 趙玄壇 (a deified Han dynasty Daoist master)
Dong Yue Di 朞微帝 (Daoist mountain spirit of Mt. Tai 泰山; also Chinese Buddhist protector of the 法)
Names and Titles of the Trinitarian God in John’s *sānzijing* and their number of occurrences:

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<th>Character</th>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>皇上帝</td>
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<td>August and Most High God</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>The Most High Spirit</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>子</td>
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<td>Son of the Most High God</td>
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<tr>
<td>道</td>
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<td>The Way, the “Word” (Logos)</td>
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</table>

I have grouped the names and titles according to similarity for convenience. The number of occurrences are listed between the Chinese characters and English translation. Only uses that refer to the Christian Trinitarian God were counted; occasional uses of the same character(s) used to refer to other persons or things were not counted (i.e. in reference to a person deified, called 神, or references to Heaven and Earth, 天地).

I have chosen “Spirit” instead of “God” so that it would not appear in English the same as 上帝.

Conspicuously absent from this list are three names or titles often present in Christian writings:

- 天主: Heavenly Lord, the Catholic neologism for God’s name
- 耶和華: The Chinese transliteration of the Hebrew Tetragrammaton יְהֹוָה, the LORD
- 天: Heaven, a traditional Chinese reference to deity, such as in the Mèngzǐ 孟子
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Together in Dao and Empowered through Virtue:
A Ritschlian Appraisal of Morality and Community in Daesoon Jinrihoe

Jason Paul Greenberger (MDiv)
Daejin University (Department of Daesoon Theology), ROK

Abstract

As East Asia enters into an unprecedented era of global influence, many East Asian new religions such as the Korean new religion, Daesoon Jinrihoe, conceive of themselves as realizing a utopia in a manner quite similar to that of earlier European theologians and philosophers who held convictions that the Kingdom of God was being actualized in their own time period. One such thinker, German Protestant theologian Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), uniquely envisaged the coming of the kingdom in terms of morality and community. Herein lies an intriguing comparative exploration wherein Ritschl’s Kantian take on Protestantism can serve as a hermeneutical lens for appraising morality and community in Daesoon Jinrihoe. Specifically, Albrecht Ritschl’s soteriological notions of Justification and Reconciliation have close proxies in Daesoon Theology wherein the former is rather similar to Era-opening (開闢 gaebyeok) and the latter can be examined as Resolution of Grievances through Mutual Beneficence (解冤相生 haewon sangsaeng). Often highlighted for its magic and mysticism, what can be learned about Daesoon Jinrihoe’s system of morality and community when both are completely eschewed in favor of a Ritschlian appraisal focused on morality, community, and the resulting lebensführung (conduct of life)?

Keywords: Daesoon Jinrihoe, Ritschl, Morality, Community, Lebensführung, Haewon Sangsaeng, Gaebyeok, Justification, Reconciliation
Together in Dao and Empowered through Virtue:
A Ritschlian Appraisal of Morality and Community in Daesoon Jinrihoe

Jason Paul Greenberger (MDiv)
Daejin University, ROK

East Asia is blossoming into an age of global influence the likes of which the region has never previously known. Perhaps it is no surprise that many East Asian new religions see themselves as gradually realizing a utopia within the world in much the same manner that German Protestant theologian Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889) and many of his predecessors such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) thought that the Kingdom of God was being actualized in the Europe of their times. In the case of Ritschl, he believed this would be largely achieved through religious community and the impetus behind this community was spiritually free actors who grounded their lives in moral reasoning and transcended the desires of natural necessity, to instead fully embrace their ethical calling within the context of community.¹

Roughly a century and quarter later, this emerges as a rather apt description of community within East Asian new religions, and these characteristics are especially exemplified in the Korean new religion, Daesoon Jinrihoe.

A thought-provoking appraisal of morality and community in Daesoon Jinrihoe can be made through the lens of Ritschlian theology. In particular, Albrecht Ritschl’s rendering of salvation as Justification and Reconciliation, also discussed through the related terms ‘gift’ and ‘task,’ can be easily applied to Daesoon Theology. Justification can be seen through the Era-opening (開闢 gaebyeok).² Reconciliation pairs naturally with the Resolution of Grievances through Mutual Beneficence (解冤相生 haewon sangsaeng). Although the application of Ritschlian theology to Daesoon Jinrihoe would prove unwieldy for many other theological explorations, for examination into morality and community, Ritschl provides a profoundly valuable hermeneutical lens. This

² And also more broadly through the other and the other Reordering Works of Heaven and Earth (天地公事 cheonji gongsa).
Ritschlian appraisal of morality and community in Daesoon Jinrihoe will include the following sections:

I. Background on Albrecht Ritschl and the Essay “Instruction in the Christian Religion”

II. An introduction to Daesoon Jinrihoe, Era-opening and the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence

III. A Comparison between Original Sin and the Root Grievance

IV. Gift: Era-opening as Ritschlian Justification

V. Task: The Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence as Ritschlian Reconciliation

VI. The Ideal Lebensführung of Daesoon Jinrihoe Devotees

VII. Conclusion

I. Background on Albrecht Ritschl and the Essay “Instruction in the Christian Religion”

Born into a Lutheran family in Bonn, religion was emphasized in Ritschl’s early upbringing as both his father and grandfather were clergymen. As a student, Ritschl studied philosophy and theology at the Universities of Bonn and Halle. Ritschl was also notably devoted to his lifelong study of biblical criticism and the history of Christianity. He eventually gained the distinction of being widely acknowledged as being one of the most learned Protestant thinkers of his time. Ritschl was a modern thinker influenced by both Kant and Schleiermacher, but he emphasized the Kantian project of grounding religious life in moral reasoning over the romanticism of Schleiermacher; especially with regards to Schleiermacher’s mystical tendencies (the cessation of the antithesis of subject and object).\(^3\) Ritschl rather infamously rejected doctrines such as original sin (Philip Melanchthon’s metaphysical interpretation),\(^4\) the miraculous birth of Jesus, and the formula of the Trinity.\(^5\) Despite these views, Ritschl deeply emphasized salvation and the kingdom of God; though he understood both in a remarkably unique way which stressed morality and community.

In his theology, Ritschl famously formulated that the “...Kingdom of God is an ellipse with two foci.” By this, he meant that the kingdom consisted of 1.) the gift: nearness to God and the kingdom which he detailed in his writings on ‘justification,’ and

\(^3\) Ibid.


2.) the task: expressing one’s relationship with God through an ethical way of living; an idea thoroughly explored by Ritschl as ‘reconciliation.’ Many of Ritschl’s most direct and accessible writings on these and other related themes appear in his essay “Instruction in the Christian Religion.” The first edition of this essay was published in 1875, and Ritschl had written it for use in teaching the upper grades of German secondary schools. Despite this intended usage, Ritschl humorously quipped, “It is not food for babies, but on the contrary very strongly concentrated nourishment. . . . I hope that it will be worthy of the attention of theologians also.” The title of his essay was intentionally written as an allusion to John Calvin’s enormously influential work on Protestantism titled “Institutes of the Christian Religion.” Regarding his gutsy allusion, Ritschl explained, “...I choose the title, so as to indicate that I wish to pick up from Calvin and (implicitly, of course) also from Melanchthon’s Loci and Lombard’s Sentences. Don’t I have high-flying aspirations?” Ritschl held the belief that the future of his essay would lie with the theology students themselves, and thereby, when improving the text in its two latter editions, he rewrote sections to be more student-friendly and also incorporated the suggestions of distinguished theologians who had used his text in their classrooms such as Wilhelm Herrmann, Adolf von Harnack, and Theodore Link.

II: An Introduction to Daesoon Jinrihoe, Era-opening, and the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence:

Although Daesoon Jinrihoe was founded in 1969, devotees trace their order’s lineage back much earlier; beginning with Gang Jeungsan (姜甑山 secular name: 姜一淳 Gang Ilsun 1871—1909), the human avatar of the Supreme God in Daesoon Jinrihoe whose full title is ‘The Celestial Worthy God Gang of the Ninth Heaven, Responder, Thunderbolt-bearer, and Transformer of the Universe (九天應元雷聲普化天尊姜上帝 gucheon eungwon noeseong bohwa cheonjon sangje). Aside from Gang Jeungsan, the transmission of the orthodox religious authority also included the following two figures: the Doju (道主 Master of Dao), J o Jeongsan (趙鼎山

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
secular name: 趙哲濟 Jo Cheolje 1895—1958) who was defied as Okhwang Sangje (玉皇上帝 the Jade Thearch), and the Dojeon (都典 Leader of Principle), Bak Udang (朴牛堂 secular name: 朴漢慶 Bak Hangyeong 1917—1996) who, unlike Gang Jeungsan and Jo Jeongsan, was neither deified as a Sangje nor enshrined in Yeongdae.  

With regards to Daesoon Jinrihoe’s account of the lineage of their order, this rather complicated concept and series of historical events is presented concisely and eloquently in the following passage from the section titled “Orthodox Religious Authority” from the 2017 booklet “Daesoon Jinrihoe: The Fellowship of Daesoon Truth”:

Doju Jo Jeongsan received the 'Orthodox Religious Authority' from Gucheon Sangje through a revelation. In his last words before passing away into heaven, Doju transmitted the lineage to Dojeon Park Wudang. The religious orthodoxy of our order is not a mere thing which is given and taken in the conventional sense, but rather it is a profound source of holiness which has been bestowed directly by Heaven.  

Daesoon J inrihoe derives the name of their order from their belief that the God of the Ninth Heaven assumed human form as Gang Jeungsan and performed an itineration of the three realms (三界大巡 samgye daesun): Heaven, Earth, and Humanity (天 · 地 · 人 cheon · ji · in). Hence, Daesoon J inrihoe literally means “The Fellowship of the Truth of the Great Itinieration (大巡真理會 daesun jinrihoe).” Like a king surveying his kingdom, this itineration allowed Gang Jeungsan to gauge public sentiment and the situation of commoners (人心 & 俗情 inshim & sokjeong). Gang Jeungsan was thereby moved to carry out reordering works (公事 gongsa) wherein he readjusted degree numbers (度數 dosu) in sacred numerology to transform the world from a state of mutual antagonism (相克 sanggeuk) into one of mutual beneficence (相生

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9 An Introduction to Daesoonjinrihoe (Yeoju: Daesoon Institute of Religion & Culture, 2014), 1-7.
sangsaeng). This act of Era-opening (開闢 gaebyeok) was performed to bring the Former World (先天 seoncheon) of disorder into the Later World (後天 hucheon) of harmony which ultimately culminates in the establishment of an earthly paradise (地上天國建設 jisang cheorngeuk geonseol) and the realization of earthly immortality (地上神仙實現 jisang sinseon silhyeon).

Daesoon Jinrihoe is by no means the only religion to apotheosize Gang Jeungsan, and in an effort to trace back ideas such as Era-opening and the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence, it may be useful to examine early religious movements and their doctrines. Much of the hagiography of Gang Jeungsan and the record of his Reordering Works are contained in two early scriptures utilized by various Jeungsanist religions: the Record of Celestial Master Jeungsan’s Reordering Works (甑山天師公事記 jeungsan cheonsa gongsa gi) published in 1925 and the Scripture of the Great Itineration (大巡典經 daesoon jeongyeong) published in 1929. Both of these scriptures were compiled in large part by a disciple of Gang Jeungsan, Lee Sangho (李祥昊 I Sangho). Daesoon Jinrihoe’s own scripture, the Jeongyeong, takes much of the contents from these scriptures and bolsters it with other texts, independent research, and revelations, as well as expanding the contents to include Jo Jeongsan and Bak Udang.

Era-opening is one of the key concepts in Daesoon Thought, and is so paramount that there is even an epithet for Sangje wherein he is called the “Era-

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11 Here “mutual antagonism” and “mutual beneficence” are technical terms from the Chinese elemental system of the Five Processes (五行 ohaeng). Mutual antagonism is a movement of the cycle of wherein elements are turned against each other destructively: for example, wood (such as roots) drive through earth, earth re-routes/dams water, water extinguishes fire, fire melts metal, and metal chops apart wood. Mutual beneficence is a harmonious movement through the cycle wherein elements are arranged to support one another: for example, wood preserves fire, fire produces earth (ash), earth develops metal, metal enriches water (mineral content), and water sustains wood (living trees).

opening Leader (開闢長 gaebyeokjang),” a term defined in the Dictionary of Terminology from the J eongyeong as “The Leader who exercises great authority over the three realms and was beseeched by a great gathering of divine beings to save humanity by performing the Reordering Works of Heaven and Earth in order to open up the creation of a new heaven and earth." Era-opening was used by Gang Jeungsan himself and also by his apostles during the earliest strata of Jeungsanist religious history. Naturally, the Record of Celestial Master J eungsan’s Reordering Works details these works extensively since Era-opening is one variety of Reordering Work wherein it is known as the Reordering Work of Era-opening (開闢公事 gaebyeok gongsa).

Some selections from the Jeongyeong which especially emphasize the nature of the fruits of Era-opening through description of the Later World via comparisons between the Former World and the Later World are as follows:

The J eongyeong, Teaching the Dharma (教法 gyobeop), Chapter 2 Verse 55

The Former World was an era of heroes wherein individuals partook of transgressions in their pursuit of life. However, the Later World is an era of sages wherein individuals partake in goodness in their pursuit of life. Does one become long-lasting by means of pursuing life through transgressions or by means of pursuing life through goodness? Now in the Later World, sentient beings establish themselves according to the standard of living through partaking in goodness.

The J eongyeong, Skillful Wisdom (權智 gweonji), Chapter 1 Verse 21

Every time Sangje had an opportunity, he would tell his assembly of disciples, “In governing over the three realms as the Supreme Sovereign, I have rectified all the degree numbers from the Former World, and soon I will open a new destiny for the Later World by building a realm for immortals in this world.” Whenever He said this, the slower among his assembly of disciples would bemoan (what they perceived to be) Sangje’s lack of urgency. They resigned themselves to just hope that Sangje would establish the great opening to the new era as soon as possible.

The J eongyeong, Prophetic Divination (預示 yeshi) Verse 6

I have rectified the degree numbers of the Former World and in the Later World, the path to the boundless and eternal realm of immortals will be opened. The grudges born from mutual antagonism in the Former World will be resolved, and through the Dao of mutual beneficence, it will become widely known that Sangje has redeemed His subjects.

In these selections, the relationship among grievances, mutual antagonism, the Former World, Sangje, the Reordering Works of Heaven and Earth, Era-opening, mutual beneficence, and the Later World is observable but perhaps still somewhat opaque for first-time readers lacking context. To briefly summarize, grievances piled up to a point that threatened humanity’s continued existence, buddhas, bodhisattvas, and divine beings called upon Sangje to intervene, Sangje diagnosed that the Former World was ordered according to the cycle of mutual antagonism, and Sangje performed Reordering Works that changed the direction of the cycle to that of mutual beneficence which is the order of the Later World.

Dating the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence, however, involves tracking the development of doctrine across several early Jeungsanist religions. The Resolution of Grievances and Mutual Beneficence first appears in the Jeungsanist religion Bocheongyo (普天敎) when they fixed their main doctrines in 1923 some fourteen years after the death of Gang Jeungsan. At that time, their doctrines appeared as: A Singly-focused Mind (一心 ilsim), Mutual Beneficence (相生 sangsaeng), the Elimination of Disease (去病 geobyeong), and the Resolution of Grievances (解冤 haewon). Curiously enough, by 1934, they reformulated these doctrines and the Resolution of Grievances was no longer included, however, Mutual Beneficence remained and was listed as the “main doctrine (主義 ju-eui).”14 In the time in between Bocheongyo’s change in doctrine, Jo Jeongsan led his own Jeungsanist religion, Mugeukdo (无極道), to enshrine Gang Jeungsan under his aforementioned full apotheosized title, “The Celestial Worthy God Gang of the Ninth Heaven, Responder, Thunderbolt-bearer, and Transformer of the Universe” and fix their own set of doctrines which combined the Resolution of Grievances and Mutual Beneficence into “The

Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence” for the first time in 1925.\textsuperscript{15} Mugeukdo would later change names to Taegeukdo (太極道), and later still, Bak Udang would split from this group and form Daesoon Jinrihoe in 1969.\textsuperscript{16} Especially in Daesoon Jinrihoe, the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence would arguably go on to become the most representative doctrine of the order and the spirit of their religious community.

III: A Comparison between Original Sin and the Root Grievance

The Garden of Eden narrative might be quite familiar to readers, however, for the sake of comparison, it will be briefly recalled here with a small selection of quotes from Genesis to aid this summary. Directly following creation, God creates Adam, the first man, and then plants a garden in the east, Eden.

Genesis 2:15-17

The Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it. And the Lord God commanded the man, “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die.”

The narrative progresses as God creates Eve to be Adam’s helper. Sometime later, conflict enters into the story as Eve is confronted by a serpent.

Genesis 3:1-4

Now the serpent was more crafty than any of the wild animals the Lord God had made. He said to the woman, “Did God really say, ‘You must not eat from any tree in the garden’?” The woman said to the serpent, “We may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, 3 but God did say, ‘You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die.’” “You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the woman. “For God knows that when you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”

\textsuperscript{15} “Gyo-un 2:32” in Jeongyeong
\textsuperscript{16} An Introduction to Daesoon Jinrihoe (Yeoju-si: Division of Cultural Affairs, 2017), 7.
Eve is eventually convinced and also leads Adam to eat the fruit as well. The couple gain new forms of knowledge included knowledge of their nudity to which they feel shame. God discovers what occurred and punishes all three varieties of beings who were involved. Namely, serpentkind is punished by a future of pain wherein humankind will detest and kill serpents. Womankind is punished with painful childbirthing, and mankind is punished with painful field laboring. The episode concludes with Adam and Eve being banished from the Garden of Eden.

Genesis 3:22-23
And the Lord God said, “The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever.” So the Lord God banished him from the Garden of Eden to work the ground from which he had been taken.

The famous rendering of this episode as “original sin” actually comes from the Apostle Paul who writes the following of banishment from Eden and Jesus dying for the sins of humankind:

Romans 18-19
“Consequently, just as one trespass resulted in condemnation for all people, so also one righteous act resulted in justification and life for all people. For just as through the disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of the one man the many will be made righteous.”

Recalling Abraham’s remarkable faith in God throughout the various trials of his life, Paul writes the following of the credit received by Abraham:

Romans 4:23-25 - Romans 5:1-2
The words “it was credited to him” were written not for him alone, but also for us, to whom God will credit righteousness—for us who believe in him who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead. He was delivered over to death for our sins and was raised to life for our justification. Therefore, since we have been justified through faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have gained access by faith into this grace in which we now stand. And we boast in the hope of the glory of God.
As mentioned earlier, Ritschl rejected the doctrine of original sin, but this was largely a rejection of metaphysical speculations regarding original sin; specifically, different formulations posited by Philip Melanchthon, Franz Hermann Reinhold Frank of Erlangen, and Matthias Flacius. Countering their views, Ritschl wrote, “This all came forth because someone undertook to define this point of Christian teaching with metaphysical concepts, but its application had already made a correct formulation of the question impossible since such an application could not possibly correspond to the religious and ethical appraisal of sin.”

Here is where sin meets ethics and Ritschl makes his case. Ever the critic of Aristotelian metaphysical intrusions into Christianity and ever the fan of borrowing Kantian arguments to promote revelation over speculation, when it came to Paul’s concepts of “justification” and “reconciliation,” Ritschl found the perfect vehicle for describing his own unique ideas regarding Christian morality and community.

Rather than sin, Daesoon Jinrihoe is far more concerned with grievances, and the episode known as the “root grievance” lends itself quite well as a proxy which can be compared to “original sin.” Here is the canonical context of the root grievance as it appears in the Jeongyeong:

The Jeongyeong: Reordering Works (公事 Gongsa) 3-4

One day in July, Sangje remarked, ‘Through this Reordering Work I will resolve the grievances which have accumulated since time immemorial. I will remove all inauspiciousness resulting from grievances and thereby enable the realization of eternal peace. This is like leading the head to make the body follow. There is a record wherein humankind’s amassing of grievances first began and the first chapter of that record began with the grievance between (Emperor) Yao and his son Danzhu. If that grievance is resolved and eliminated, then all subsequent grievances throughout history gain eligibility for resolution. Yao deemed Danzhu unworthy and gave his two daughters to (Minister) Shun and abdicated the throne to him. This caused Danzhu to form a grievance which in turn caused Shun to die at a river near Cangwu county and this further resulted in Yao’s two daughters (wives of Shun) drowning themselves in Xiaoxiang River. This was the root grievance which entangled the world continually generation after generation and caused Heaven and Earth to overflow with grievances and reach the very brink of near disaster. Consequently, as I endeavor to rescue humanity from this state of destruction, I must undergo this Reordering Work of Resolving Grievances.’

In this passage, a small sense of the metaphysics of the Daesoonist concept of grievances can be gleaned. Grievances (冤 won), and the closely related concept “cheok (㥻 grudge),” 18 are not just feelings or ill-will harbored by one party (not only humans) against another. Instead grievances and cheok are metaphysical entities which are consciously or unconsciously weaponized to physically harm their targets or prevent their targets from being able to enact their will. Although this is a fascinating area of research, just as Ritschl eschewed original sin but interpreted justification and reconciliation for use in morality and community, so too will this Ritschlian appraisal of Daesoon Jinrihoe forgo the root grievance and related metaphysics and instead limit the application of Era-opening (sometimes as Reordering Works) and the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence for their value in morality and community.

IV: Gift: Era-opening as Ritschlian Justification

In the book “Three Essays,” Philip Hefner, professor emeritus of systematic theology at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, gives the following definition of Ritschlian justification in his introduction titled “Albrecht Ritschl: An Introduction”:

Justification is a judgment by God that the sinner's transgressions no longer stand as a barrier to the nearness of God and the intimacy of man’s relationships to God. Justification provides the answer to the sinner’s question, “How can I stand before God in my imperfections?” The answer comes back, “Your sins are deprived of their alienating consequences by the God who has drawn near to you in Christ's sacrifice.” 19

If a similar formulation was written for the Daesoonist concept of Era-opening, perhaps it might read as follows: Era-opening is the Reordering Work by which Sangje diagnosed the mutual antagonism of the Former World, and thereby opened up the eventuality of the Later World wherein mutual beneficence will culminate in the establishment of an earthly paradise and the realization of earthly immortality. Era-opening provides the answer to grievance-sufferer’s question of “How can I hope for

18 In the Jeongyeong Yongeo Sajeon (Dictionary of Terminology from the Jeongyeong) Cheok is described as a type of “wonhan (怨恨)” which means “grudge” or “resentment.” Won, on the other hand, is more like an unfulfilled desire which turns into resentment and thereby, is often translated as “grievance.”

earthly immortality in the Later World when momentum from the Former World of mutual antagonism has led me to form so many grievances against others while they have likewise formed grievances against me?” The answer comes back, “All grievances affecting you and others are now eligible for resolution due to Sangje’s divine act of Era-opening which he performed for the salvation of humankind.”

Ritschl’s own wording regarding justification appears in the essay “Instruction in the Christian Religion” as follows:

The forgiveness of sins or justification [Gerechtsprechung (Rechtfertigung)], which guarantees the existence of the Christian community, is, as a divine purpose of grace, part of a free judgment. That is to say”... “sinners are given by God the right to enter into communion with him and into cooperation with his own final purpose, viz., the kingdom of God, without their guilt and their feeling of guilt acting as a barrier thereto.”

In Daesoon Jinrihoe, the community of devotees play a somewhat different role, but a role which is most certainly in cooperation with Sangje and, for that matter, all great divine beings as Daesoon Jinrihoe is not monotheistic. Where the issue of “cooperation with the final purpose” is concerned, perhaps Daesoon Jinrihoe devotees might feel that they are even more involved in this than their Christian counterparts. In Daesoon Jinrihoe, the ritual training known as gongbu (工夫) is practiced at Yeoju Central Headquarters Temple Complex (驪州 本部道場 yeoju bonbu dojang) is believed to hasten the fulfillment of the Later World. Participation in this gongbu is expected of all members whether they be ordinary dao cohorts (平道人 pyeong doin) or high-ranking executive members (任員 imwon). More to point though, applying the Ritschlian model directly to Daesoon Jinrihoe works here too to at least a reasonable extent. Devotees need not worry that grievances could interfere with the Later World because the Reordering Work of Resolving Grievances has already been carried out by Sangje.

V: Task: The Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence as Ritschlian Reconciliation

20 Ibid, 236.
Ritschl made this fascinating observation about Christians, church, community, and reconciliation in his essay, “Instruction in the Christian Religion”:

Since Christians call themselves ekkleria, church, their uniform and common prayer is considered the essential mark of their unity. For even though this community is at the same time called to the ethical task of carrying out the kingdom of God, yet this activity does not assume a direct, empirically measurable manifestation (par. 9, n. 18). But common prayer, as the manifestation of the religious worship of God, is not only in itself the church’s purpose, but serves also to mediate the believers’ sense of solidarity in the task of God’s kingdom. Apart from this, therefore, the confession of God’s name (as our Father) in common prayer is the mark which corresponds to the church’s nature as the religious community of Christ.\(^1\)

In Latin, “church” is known as “ecclesia” and this can also refer to individual church members; collectively they are “ecclesiae.” Though not identical, the word for devotee, Dao Cohort (道人 doin), is closely related to the word for the most sacred religious sites in Daesoon Jinrihoe, temple complexes (道場 dojang). “Do” in these compound words is the Sino-Korean pronunciation of Dao, and thereby, “doin” is literally “Dao person” whereas as “dojang” literally means “Dao site.”

As for the expected conduct at a temple complex, it is summarized well in this description:

Temple complexes are pristine and sacred locations. They are holy grounds wherein the two hypostases of Sangje are enshrined, and these grounds are likewise replete with the divine beings of heaven and earth. In these locations, we devote ourselves to the practice spiritual cultivation which we take as more important than our own lives. Naturally, all areas within the temple complexes are kept deep in our hearts. Therefore, we are prudent in our every behavior and action, and we carry out all practices in the orthodox manner. We maintain and care for our temple complexes for the sake of cultivating the quieting of mind and the quieting of body. The aim of this maintenance and care is to enable Dao cohorts to devote themselves completely to spiritual cultivation and Gongbu. Those Dao cohorts who partake in spiritual cultivation put sincerity, respectfulness, and faithfulness into practice and push themselves to a higher level as spiritual cultivators. Propriety with regard to desires, speaking, and dealings might be easily forgotten by humans, but the divine beings of heaven and earth are endowed with perfect awareness. Therefore, Dao cohorts should be be aware of the need to continuously maintain an illuminated mind and avoid self-deception. Temple complexes are locations which are

\(^{21}\) Ibid, 256.
perpetually kept sacred and pristine. Therefore, Dao cohorts keep their minds and bodies pristine and observe great caution so as to avoid committing even small transgressions.\textsuperscript{22}

Ritschl continues later in a related passage also from “Instruction in the Christian Religion”:

In reconciliation, for example, the forgiveness of sins appears no longer merely as the purpose of God but also as the result of that purpose. According to the conception of reconciliation with God, the individual has in faith and trust appropriated to himself the final purpose of God and given up his opposition (enmity) to God. In adoption (acceptance as children of God) the gracious purpose of the judgment of forgiveness or justification is put into effect, so that God confronts the believer as a father and gives him the right to the full confidence of a child. But these effects of divine redemption find practical application only on the condition that the believer at the same time takes an active part in the recognized purpose of God’s kingdom and has given up the pursuit of selfish ends and inclinations, whether intentional or habitual.\textsuperscript{23}

This passage provides an ample opportunity to highlight a key difference between the Christian idea of sin, forgiveness, and justification with the Daesoonist idea of grievances and resolution. Namely, in Christianity all sin can be forgiven by God and justification thereby only requires God’s forgiveness. Hence, even if it would be bad form, technically it would be the case that one could sin against another person and be forgiven by God and this would be an effective form of resolution. Although in fairness, Ritschl clarifies here that selfishness must be abandoned whether it is conscious or unconscious. Anyhow, this is all the more apparent in Daesoon thought as grievances occur dynamically between multiple parties who all act both as grievance-perpetrators and grievance-victims. The Reordering Work of Resolving Grievances performed by Sangje made all grievances eligible for resolution, but the actual task of resolution needs to be carried out by humanity. That is why Mutual Beneficence for Resolving Grievances is such a necessary moral practice in Daesoon Jinrihoe. With specific regards to Ritschl’s condition that practitioners give up “...the pursuit of selfish ends and


\textsuperscript{23} Ritschl. \textit{Three Essays: Theology and Metaphysics, Prolegomena to The History of Pietism, Instruction in the Christian Religion}, 237.
inclinations, whether intentional or habitual,” Daesoon Jinrihoe especially emphasizes the need to be aware of self-deception. The avoidance of self-deception is in fact so crucial that it appears in two sections of doctrine; first, as an item under the category of aims (目的 mokjeok): “Guarding against Self-deception - Transformation of Human Spirit” and secondly, as an item under the category of ethical rules (守則 suchik): “Do not deceive yourself’ is the golden rule for disciples. Therefore, do not deceive your conscience, mislead the public with inappropriate words and actions, or engage in any unethical actions.”

VI: The Ideal Lebensführung of Daesoon Jinrihoe Devotees

Philip Hefner offers the following direct and succinct description of Ritschl’s suggested lebensführung (system of conduct for life):

Ritschl spelled out in detail the characteristics of this style of living. They consist of confidence in God’s providence (this confidence is the expression of one’s justification), which liberates man to enter into relationships of love, primarily through the faithful exercise of his vocation. Freedom to live in the world under God’s providence is the hallmark of Ritschl’s conception of Christianity. Humility and patience go along with this liberated life, as well as prayer and participation in corporate worship. Prayer and worship remind the Christian of Christ’s revelation and example, and thus they are to consist chiefly of praise and thanksgiving for the gifts of forgiveness and freedom which God has given.

For the sake of further organizational clarity, these can be rearranged in a numbered list: 1.) Maintain confidence in God’s providence (this confidence is the expression of one’s justification), 2.) Enter into relationships of love, 3.) Practice humility and patience, 4.) Participate in prayer and corporate worship, and 5.) Offer praise and practice thanksgiving.

25 Ibid, 23.
In Daesoon Jinrihoe, doctrine codified in the “Essential Examination of Daesoon Jinrihoe (大巡真理會要覽 daesun jinrihhoe yoram) consists of twenty-eight items separated into six different categories as follows: four tenets (宗旨 jongji), seven creeds (信條 sinjo) subdivided into four cardinal mottos (四綱領 sa gangryeong) and three essential attitudes (三要諦 sam yoche), three aims (目的 mokjeok), four cultivations (修道 sudo), five precepts (訓誨 hunhoe), and five ethical codes (守則 suchik). Many of these twenty-eight items fall outside of the Ritschlian project of morality and community, and with that in mind, this attempt at a Ritschlian appraisal of Daesoon Jinrihoe offers the following concise Daesoonist lebensführung:

1.) Recognize the Era-opening of Sangje and be willingness to propagate (布德 podeok) the message that this Reordering Work has made all grievances eligible for resolutions and the old order of mutual antagonism has been rectified to allow for a new order of mutual beneficence in the world.

2.) Enter into relationships characterized by the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence by working towards the avoidance of self-deception, the practice of virtuous speech, the non-provocation of grievances from others, the recollection of benefits bestowed upon oneself by others, the promotion of the betterment of others, and the maintenance of harmony in relationships and order in society.

3.) Practice the three essential attitudes of sincerity (誠 seong), respectfulness (敬 gyeong), and faithfulness (信 sin).

4.) Participate in private daily prayer (平日祈禱 pyeongil gido) and the corporate cultivation of gongbu (公夫 gongbu), spiritual training (修鍊 suryeon), and weekly prayer (主日祈禱 juil gido).

5.) Improve yourself through continual reflection upon potential excesses or insufficiencies in either words or actions.

Line one is a rephrasing of the original premise connecting the divine act of Era-opening to the human ethical vocation of resolving grievances and living in accordance with mutual beneficence. The next line begins with the doctrine regarding self-deception which appears as an item in ‘aims’ and also in ‘precepts.’ Line two continues with the
other four items from ‘precepts’ and then alludes to the Confucian values contained in item two of ‘ethical rules’ which calls upon devotees to the Three Bonds and Five Relationships (三綱五倫 samgang oryun); namely the bonds between rulers and subjects, parents (originally “fathers”) and children, and husbands and wives as well as the exemplary qualities characterizing relationships: oughtness between rulers and ministers, intimacy between parents and children (originally “fathers and sons”), differentiation between husband and wife, precedence among siblings, and trust between friends. Line three lists the three essential attitudes from creeds, and line four summarizes the forms of cultivation. Lastly, line five concludes with the final item from ‘ethical rules.’

VII: Conclusion

Certain scholars such as anthropologist Gernot Prunner and East Asian studies specialist John Jorgensen have posited that part of Daesoon Jinrihoe appeal and increasing membership can be attributed to its emphasis on magic.26 While this is certainly a key feature of Daesoon Jinrihoe, a strictly Ritschlian appraisal of Daesoon Jinrihoe which ignores magic and mysticism entirely, goes quite a distance in revealing a side of Daesoon Jinrihoe that is regretfully rarely examined. Namely, a Ritschlian appraisal of Daesoon Jinrihoe provides profound insights into the extent to which Daesoon Jinrihoe concerns itself with morality and community. Daesoon Jinrihoe calls upon devotees to be rigorously moral and concerned with community. Albrecht Ritschl’s key themes of Justification and Reconciliation are, perhaps surprisingly, a highly natural fit for Daesoon Jinrihoe when the divine act of Era-opening is compared with Justification and the Resolution of Grievances through Mutual Beneficence is compared with Reconciliation. Another equally exciting avenue for comparison lies in devising a Ritschlian lebensführung through the doctrines of Daesoon Jinrihoe. This comparative venture enables the emergence of an ethical vocation that is simultaneously traditional yet modern as well as innovative yet inventive.

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Entrepreneurial Religion: Changing Epistemology of Religiosity and the Re-Invention of a Buddhist Monastery in Hong Kong

Lily KONG
Singapore Management University

In this presentation, I seek to re-theorise the relationships between secularity and religiosity in modernity. While geographers have recognised that the secular and the religious are mutually constituted, I seek to push this theorisation further, arguing that the religious and the secular are in fact hybrid constructs that embrace simultaneously the sacred and profane, the transcendent and the immanent. However, despite the significant advancement in disrupting enclosed epistemologies of secular modernity, which recognises that secularity is always-already enchanted by religious impulses, relatively less work has sought to theorise the possibility of religion as a hybrid operating at the secular-religious interface. In this presentation, I argue that, in modernity, religious organisations and actors may refashion and re-invent themselves by actively appropriating rationalities, values and logics normatively defined as “secular”. A study of Po-Lin Monastery, a Buddhist monastery in Hong Kong that has adopted highly entrepreneurial, growth-oriented approaches in organisational culture and production of space, provides the case for working through these arguments and retheorisations.
ENTREPRENEURIAL RELIGION:
CHANGING EPISODEOMOLOGY OF RELIGIOSITY
AND THE RE-INVENTION OF A
BUDDHIST MONASTERY IN HONG KONG

QIAN JUNXI (HKU) AND LILY KONG (SMU)

CONFERENCE ON CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPES IN CONTEMPORARY EAST ASIA
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OBJECTIVES

• What transformations occur to religion, in institutional and spatial terms, in the context of secular modernity?
• How might we re-theorise the relationships between secularity and religiosity in modernity?

MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS

• The secular and the religious are mutually constituted; binary epistemologies underpinning the separation of religious and secular artificial
• Geographical scholarship on religion demonstrates how the boundaries between sacred and profane, religious and secular are fluid, transgressed and problematised
• Existing work recognises that secularity is always-already enchanted by religious impulses
  • Postsecularity: evidence of the revival, or indeed persistence, of religion in the public sphere
  • Faith actors bring religiously motivated ethics and values to bear on engagements in social welfare, care and activism
  • Occulture, alternative spiritualities, everyday spiritualities and house churches reveal the “excess” of religion into the “routine”, secular spaces and times

• Less work has theorised the possibility of religion as a hybrid operating at the secular-religious interface
  • Much more effort has been dedicated to problematising and criticising secularity than rethinking and theorising what religion and religiosity actually mean in modernity
  • Argue that, in modernity, religious organisations and actors may refashion and re-invent themselves by appropriating rationalities, values and logics normatively defined as “secular”
MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS

- How might we re-theorise the relationships between secularity and religiosity in modernity?
- Demonstrate the disruption of the religious-secular binary, but in a reverse direction, that is,
  - while disrupting secular modernity, religiosity itself is re-constituted.
- At work in the intersections of the secular and religious is “the reconstruction of orientations, behaviours and the universe of knowledge of faith actors, leading to “a more reflexive form of religious consciousness” (Habermas, 2008: 28)
- The central problematique concerning religion in modernity is not so much the extent to which religion has declined or persisted, but “how religious thought and practice changed in relation to modernization” (Wilford, 2010: 333), manifested by myriad innovation, adaptation, and reinterpretation in religious organisation and expression (Lambert, 1999)

HOW RELIGION CHANGES IN RELATION TO MODERNITY

- Draw inspiration from French religious theorist Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1986; 2002)
  - Studied the “ongoing reorganization of the nature and forms of religion into configurations which are compatible with modern living” (Davie, 2007: 61)
- Suggests a need to delve into “the kinds of religiosity that are nurtured by and flourish in modern societies” (Davie, 1996: 101), shaped by intertwined processes of secularisation and sacralisation
- New forms of religious organisation and expression are more productively analysed as products of, rather than backlash against, modernity.
- Eventually, a religious institution that “thinks and speaks from the inside of modernity” is more likely to negotiate effectively upheavals of modernity and meet the changing demands of its constituency (Davie, 1996: 106).

MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF RELIGION AND MODERN MARKET CULTURE

- Speaking from “inside modernity” renders it necessary to understand mutual constitution of religion and modern market culture
- Understandable to believe that religiosity will be rendered inauthentic in market culture due to colonisation by instrumental logics and rational calculation
- But the mutual constitution is more complicated: religion is not subservient or submerged.
- Three examples:
  - Re-enlivened engagements of FBOs and the neoliberal overhauling of social welfare regimes => faith-by-dogma to faith-by-praxis
  - Religion providing theological justifications for economic rationalities and behaviours
  - Religion itself adopts modalities of operation informed by proactive, entrepreneurial and market-oriented outlooks, giving rise to “entrepreneurial religion”

“ENTREPRENEURIAL RELIGION”

- One body of literature that narrates comparable storylines is that on the Christian megachurches
  - compatible with ethos of market and consumerism
  - adept in reconciling the dissonances between secular and religious logics
  - theological orientations usually described as prosperity gospel
  - mobilise multiple techniques of branding and marketing
  - adopt a reformed, modernised and growth-oriented organisation of operation, management and finance, led by charismatic personalities with strategic visions
  - theologies largely devoid of concerns with social injustice and humanitarian purposes, but focus predominantly on personal experiences, spirituality, and inner self
ENTERPRISING BUDDHISM

- Po-Lin Monastery and the cross-over between religious and secular
  - History of monastery: history of Buddhism in HK
  - Consciousness of religious competition under conditions of Christian dominance among educated and elite in HK
  - Wider movement of Buddhist modernisation in Republican China
  - Beginnings of enterprising Buddhism

PO-LIN MONASTERY: BREACHING TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE

- Four strategic and tactical manoeuvres demonstrating cross-over between religious and secular:
  - Careful management of state-religion relations
  - Reform in order to act like a business
  - Instrumental rationality in the management of finance
  - Privileging continual expansion and development of monastery: production of spectacular building structures

UNFOLDING OF THE 2002 CONTROVERSY

- Tourism development on Lantau Island, post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis, with NP360 and tourism complex
- Capitalise on Buddhist heritage, natural landscapes and authentic rurality of Lantau
- Buddhism as an exploitable economic base, a backdrop to a wide array of tourist and leisure experiences
- Completed tourism complex: home to a gamut of food and beverage outlets, tourist-related product shops, and folk cultural displays, the vast majority of which do not have a discernible religious underpinning

PO-LIN MONASTERY’S RESISTANCES

- Criticised NP360 as a disruptive, even blasphemous project that Buddhists should respond to with an “uprising”
- Adept in mobilising the public sphere, especially media
- Framed the conflict as one between the religious and the secular
- Three reasons for opposing NP360
PO-LIN MONASTERY’S DISCURSIVE RESISTANCES

• Religious character compromised:
  • While the cable car is acceptable to improve accessibility, hotels and eateries would disrupt the tranquillity and sacredness in the environs of the monastery;
  • Western tourists insensitive to Eastern religions might be indiscreet in behaviours and attires;
  • Eateries might ignore religious taboos and sell meat dishes;
  • Tourists bringing meals with meat into temple grounds etc.

PO-LIN MONASTERY’S DISCURSIVE RESISTANCES

• Top-down developmentalism:
  • disempowering and potentially displacing vernacular economic practices of the native villagers catering to tourists
  • Symbolic role of land in front of temple:
    • Ritualistic and symbolic function should not be ignored

PO-LIN MONASTERY’S PRACTICAL RESISTANCES

• Closure of monastery and Tian Tan Buddha for a week in protest
• Official response:
  • Hong Kong Planning Department revised the development plan in June 2002 to remove the hotel
  • modify the spatial layout of the tourism complex so that the monastery would continue to control the land before the Skanda Hall
• Support from the monastery followed

ALTERNATIVE READINGS OF PO-LIN MONASTERY’S POSITION

• More to the monastery’s agenda than resisting secularism
• A more complex, entangled picture of interactions between faith actors and the state
  • the ritualistic meanings of land were actually secondary to its exchange value
  • worry that NP360 would channel away visitors’ spending, attenuate the monastery’s revenue, and jeopardise financial viability of projects such as the grand hall
  • socio-cultural ties between the monastery and the village have never been as strong as the monastery claimed
  • In reality, NP360 brought in visitors to the monastery and spending at the monastery, to its benefit
TEN THOUSAND BUDDHA HALL: VORTEX OF RELIGIOUS ENTREPRENEURIALISM

• NP360: Po-Lin Monastery used this to position itself as
  • sacrificial victim to developmental plans
  • committed and dependable non-governmental sector ally of the state
• Means of gaining support in subsequent monastery expansion plans, Ten Thousand Buddha Hall
  • Maximal land discount
• Completed Buddha Hall:
  • example of spirituality mediated by spectacles, iconographies, and materialities
  • grandiose architectural form
  • Lavishly furnished interior
  • Wide array of Buddhist relics and art pieces, with premium collectibles
  • Upper levels only accessible by most generous donors

PO-LIN MONASTERY: RELIGION AND RE-INVENTION OF THE SECULAR

• Our study makes the argument that religion is by no means “sequestrated” by the secular, it has been re-invented by the latter
  • the monastery has selectively imbibed the entrepreneurial and market culture of modernity, emphasising the perpetual creation of new religious experiences as extravaganzas and marketable goods
  • Role of religious leaders has morphed: religious leaders in Po-Lin monastery do not have to be role models in a moral and ethical sense; instead they emphasise their role as diligent agents whose work is to “manage” and promote religiosity
  • Religion actively adopting the methods of secular politics: the “art” and rules of dealing/negotiating with the state

CONCLUSIONS

• Contest the notion of modernity as an epoch in which the secular-religious differentiation is entrenched
• Push theorisation about the dialectic of religious and secular further
• Both the religious and the secular are hybrid constructs that are simultaneously sacred and profane, transcendent and immanent
• Much progress in the geographies of religion to demonstrate that the secular realm is not so much purely secularised as an ideal type would suggest
• Relatively less work dedicated to problematise and re-conceptualise religiosity

CONCLUSIONS

• Extend extant theorisations about the relationship between secularity and religiosity in modernity
• Not dismantling the categories of “religious” and “secular”
• Accept the categories as ideal types, from which adaptations, modifications, and hybridisations emerge
• In as much as secularism is said to be a form of (grounded) theology, those who call themselves religious also employ secular ways
• The religious and secular best conceived as mutually constituted, and ‘religious’ and ‘religiosity’ best understood as strengthened in some cases through taking on board secular traits